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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Contemporary ecological issues compound environmental communications’ primary 
challenge of raising public consciousness and effectively mobilizing agency to mount robust 
systemic and practical actions. This fundamental challenge persists amidst capitalist enclosure 
that exacerbates anthropogenic climate change in a manner that indicts current models of 
macrosocietal planning (Steffen, 2011; Garnaut, 2008). Yet, “we know little about our capacity 
to raise public consciousness and therefore incite reparatory actions” in the environmental 
domain (Foxwell-Norton & Lester, 2017). This is most consequential in resource-dependent 
communities, the frontiers of climate impact. Critical aspects of life, including subsistence on 
rainfed agriculture, are manifestly undermined by current and projected climate change related 
impacts. Given the urgent existential implications of inaction or even inadequate action, this 
study seeks to optimize climate change communication in accordance with transformative and 
reparatory consciousness. It links the field of climate change communications with critical 
perspectives in Communication for Social Change and integrates the reparatory notion of climate 
justice to explicitly highlight the ethico-political terrain on which communicative actions must be 
directed to be commensurate with the distinct variability, high degree of permanence and 
multidimensionality of anthropogenic challenges.  
The comparative and cross-cultural study is based on a representative purposive sample 
of 300 drawn from across 17 indigenous and traditional villages in Fiji, India and Belize that 
typifies heightened and disproportionate levels of vulnerability. It employs a socio-cultural 
elicitation and analytical framework to delineate and probe climate change perception, 
disposition and actions across 14 dimensions with keen attention to contextually variable group 
membership, alongside standard demographic variables. Probing these interpretive communities 
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uniquely illuminates how discrete group membership structures climate disposition. It also 
highlights contextual intervention levels for knowledge improvement and mobilization generally 
and across specific dimensions, including religious and nature-oriented fatalism, discrete motives 
and potential sources of leadership. 
Definitively, it offers globally relevant recommendations for optimizing communication 
processes in resource-dependent communities across three pathways: coping, resilience and 
transformation. This is premised on comparative analysis of the findings of the socio-cultural 
elicitation process against climate change communication’s general acceptance of core 
communication principles regarding risk perception, message construction, resonance, motive, 
intervention levels and engagement frames. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Contemporary ecological issues compound environmental communications’ primary 
challenge of raising public consciousness and effectively mobilizing agency to mount robust 
systemic and practical actions. This fundamental challenge persists amidst capitalist enclosure 
that exacerbates anthropogenic climate change in a manner that indicts current models of 
macrosocietal planning (Steffen, 2011; Garnaut, 2008). Yet, “we know little about our capacity 
to raise public consciousness and therefore incite reparatory actions” in the environmental 
domain (Foxwell-Norton & Lester, 2017). This communicative conundrum is rooted in the 
atomistic approach to climate change at both policy and programmatic levels (Adger, Paavola, & 
Huq, 2006; Agyeman, Doppelt, Lyn, & Hatic, 2007; Cohen et al., 1998). Particularly, the global 
response to climate change over the last 30 years has been overwhelmingly defined by technical 
considerations—an array of climate modelling and adaptation initiatives. Conversely, little 
progress has been made in critically assessing communication processes despite the primacy 
communication is given in Article 6a of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change for building support and promoting action. 
 In the absence of a consistent research agenda until 2010 (Moser, 2017), climate change 
communication efforts have been dominated by information and education campaigns that seek 
to influence the public’s behaviour. Chief among the persuasive behavourist turn in climate 
change communications is the deployment of social marketing. The technique involves “the 
application of marketing technologies developed in the commercial sector to solve social 
problems” (Andreasen, 1995, p3), to enable pro-environmental social changes. Some scholars 
contend that the transtheoretical nature of this approach renders it suitable for a range of social 
domains other than health, with which it is more widely associated (Darnton, 2008). While the 
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technical and persuasive orientation of this approach is pronounced in the literature on 
information campaigns, the evidence suggests that convincing people of possible negative 
consequences associated with their actions is insufficient to motivate action (Caribbean 
Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC), 2012). These campaigns have therefore had 
mixed results, and a plurality of people still do not understand how climate change affects them, 
and how their way of life is connected to it as both causational and consequential factors.  
 The consensus in the emergent field of climate change communications, a corollary 
laggard to the science and policy debates since emerging in the mid-1990s, is that the 
communicative challenges are caused by the phenomenon’s fundamental distinctions. The 
differentiating factors believed to produce unique challenges for the communicability of climate 
change include the scale of current and projected impacts, differentiating vulnerability to impacts 
both geographically and temporally, rate of onset, perceptibility, multidimensionality and a 
degree of permanence (Diamond, 2005, cited in Pelling, 2011; Galloway McLean, 2010; Steffen, 
2011). Accordingly, a discrete field has evolved to mount a concerted response to these 
fundamentally distinct challenges. However, this emergent field is largely driven by urgent needs 
noted through praxis, and contributions from a range of disciplinary interests that accounts for its 
theoretical and empirical support. Its primary observations and rationale emanate from widely 
different contexts, which undermines confidence about their applicability, especially because 
they have not been widely tested (Moser & Dilling, 2007).  
Additionally, the pursuit of a discrete practice imbues the fledgling field with an 
instrumental orientation, primarily concerned with optimizing communicative modalities. 
Specifically, the field’s primary focus on facets of engagement, values, culture, cross and sub-
cultural perceptions, accessibility, among other aspects, for the crafting of effective frames. 
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While of high import, the privileging of resonance and communicability without explicitly 
seeking to tap communication’s broader transformative affordances is indicative of the field’s 
corollary genesis and association with a resilient techno-scientific paradigm. The narrow 
conceptualization of communication’s role in addressing anthropogenic climate change results in 
the negation of the core problem: the capitalist logic underpinning society’s construction and 
dependence on fossil fuel, the primary cause of anthropogenic climate change. Both the lack of 
an explicit ethico-political consciousness and the paucity of testing of insights in the primarily 
western and cosmopolitan literature on climate change communication are consequential. This is 
heightened by the fact that it is replete with discrete consumption-oriented cases, particularly 
energy conservation and recycling initiatives (Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz, 2008). 
These cases offer insufficient guidance on how to boost the adaptive capacity of the most 
vulnerable because climate change induced challenges have differentiated impacts, are 
permanent, multidimensional and consequently require long-term and deeper engagement than 
time-bound communication campaigns and media-enabled entertainment-education approaches.  
This gap is most far-reaching for resource-dependent indigenous and traditional 
communities, which typifies the frontiers of climate impact and vulnerability. Critical aspects of 
life, including subsistence on rainfed agriculture and existence due to proximity to domains of 
heightened vulnerability (coasts, riversides, forests and hillsides), are manifestly undermined by 
current and projected climate change related impacts. Disproportionate impacts compound a 
litany of historical and contemporary exploitation and disadvantages in these contexts, including 
slavery, colonialism, unjust wars, trade and immigration regimes (Figuerora, 2011; Gardiner, 
2011). These compounded disadvantages and their rootedness in systems of exploitation 
interpolates issues of justice and ethics beyond a techno-scientifically articulated crisis that is 
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likely to structure climate change perception and disposition distinctly.      
 Given the urgent existential implications of inaction or even inadequate action, I offer a 
comparative and cross-cultural study explicitly focused on the global margins. My study seeks to 
optimize climate change communication in accordance with transformative and reparatory 
consciousness. The study links the discrete field with critical perspectives in Communication for 
Development and Social Change and integrates the reparatory notion of climate justice to 
explicitly highlight the ethico-political terrain on which communicative actions must be directed 
to be commensurate with the distinct variability, high degree of permanence and 
multidimensionality of challenges. As detailed in the theoretical outline, this frame enables 
critical examination of the nature of climate change response mechanisms, particularly 
adaptation, which underscores that there are impacts that fundamentally and differentially affects 
human development. Managing these impacts, and the communication processes they 
necessitate, unfold at differential levels ranging from coping, to adapting, and ideally, pursuing 
transformations. 
While climate impact in indigenous contexts is of primary concern, the study is chiefly 
motivated by the heightened vulnerability and risk of populations with ‘worlds’ and histories 
marked by deep connectedness and dependence upon the natural environment. This non-
essentialist motive accounts for the focus on both indigenous and traditional contexts. 
Vulnerability is conceptually important as it foregrounds “characteristics of a person or group 
and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from 
the impact of a hazard” (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon & Davis, 2004p. 11). Low or no adaptive 
capacity and exposure to hazards mean factors such as geography, identity and development 
markers aid in demarcating vulnerable groups and populations of heightened risk. 
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 In a bid to articulate more robust and efficacious climate change communication 
mechanisms, this qualitative study probes climate change perception, disposition and actions 
across 17 indigenous and traditional villages that typifies heightened and disproportionate levels 
of vulnerability. The villages are drawn from across three Fijian Islands, Andhra Pradesh in 
Southern India, and the Central American country of Belize. The study employs a distinctly 
socio-cultural elicitation and analytical framework to delineate and probe climate change 
perception, disposition and actions that span 14 dimensions (see Table 1 – Integrated Thematic 
Logic Order, Case Structure). This includes keen attention to contextually variable group 
membership, alongside standard demographic variables such as gender, age and ethnicity, where 
applicable. Probing these interpretive communities uniquely illuminates how discrete group 
membership structures climate disposition. It also highlights contextual intervention levels for 
knowledge improvement and mobilization generally and across specific dimensions, such as 
religious and nature-oriented fatalism, discrete motives and potential sources of leadership. Thus, 
my socio-cultural approach to assessing climate change perceptions and dispositions is primed 
for attenuating critical gaps in climate risk communication about the needs of marginalized 
communities not afforded by highly discursive and conceptual psychometric approaches, 
namely, Kempton (1991) and Lofstedt (1991), commonly used to examine dimensions of climate 
change and individual perceptions. 
My qualitative multi-country study is predicated on seven months of field work under 
primarily immersive conditions, and an overall sample population of 300 (Belize 74, India 121, 
and Fiji 105). The sample is drawn from 19 percent of the adult population, and 47 percent of 
households in the combined field sites. The study is also enriched by textual analysis of project 
documents associated with seven climate change adaptation initiatives (Belize (two), India (two), 
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and Fiji (three)) underway in my study sites, extensive participant observation, and several site 
visits to project installations. The sample composition, which is marked by high macro-group 
variation and representativeness in terms of gender (47 percent women) and age (40 percent 
youth – between 18 and 30 years old), was derived via non-random purposive selection and 
assemblage in 55 semi-structured focus groups, and 22 semi-structured individual interviews. 
Mindful of the paucity of cross-cultural testing of widely accepted notions in the extant 
literature, my case selections were systematically identified to reflect the economic, social, 
cultural, climatic and geographic diversity of climate vulnerability and risk affecting resource-
dependent communities globally. This collective case approach, which includes coastal, farming 
and forest communities, enables me to interrogate how dominant and external climate change 
communication modalities interact with traditional retentions in key livelihoods sectors that are 
directly impacted by both traditional practices and climate change. Crucially, the collective case 
approach facilitates triangulation, which enables me to outline a set of globally relevant 
recommendations about how best to optimize communication processes in resource-dependent 
communities in the Global South across economic, geographic and climatic realities. 
Accordingly, the study considers the findings of the socio-cultural elicitation process against 
climate change communication’s general acceptance of core communication principles regarding 
risk perception, message construction, resonance, motive, intervention levels and engagement 
frames. This process reinforces the shift from atomistic techno-scientific and instrumentalist 
approaches to climate change communication and clarifies the utility of the socio-cultural in 
boosting capabilities amidst unprecedented geological change. 
 This contextual and culture-centric critical examination enables the optimization of 
global climate change communication across varied pathways: coping, adapting, and pursuing 
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transformations. My interest in augmenting communicative approaches to climate change, which 
has social, economic, natural and political implications, is fueled by my observations as a climate 
change communications and policy actor in Latin American and the Caribbean. For nearly a 
decade, I have observed the profound, highly perceptible differentiating impacts, and the 
limitation of interventions in highly vulnerable coastal, agricultural and fishing communities due 
to a paucity of research on communication modes, messages and tools consonant with the 
situational and holistic purviews in these contexts. This is also a profoundly personal pursuit 
rooted in my maternal family’s intimate connection and dependence on the natural environment. 
Consistent with this study, our connectedness manifests in terms of subsistence agriculture, at 
least three generations of jippi-jappa weaving—a resource-based cottage craft primarily 
involving hat making—and proximity to domains of risk, including a backyard spring and a 
substantial contiguous river that regularly maroons us with moderate rainfall. For nearly three 
decades, we have agonized over crop failure, basic accessibility, property erosion and other 
impacts. 
My study is outlined in nine chapters, including this introduction, literature review, 
theoretical perspective, methodology, four complementary case studies and a conclusion. The 
four case studies constitute the study’s core. They include a two-tier critical comparative analysis 
of global climate change communication processes. The first is a macro-level comparative 
analysis of the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign in relation to the landmark Paris Agreement (2015) 
on Climate Change. The campaign is significant for potently articulating urgent existential and 
climate justice needs of the global margins. Accordingly, the chapter examines the basis on 
which the campaign is deemed a success and distills strategic communicative and engagement 
lessons for future global campaign’s focused on discrete aspects of climate action, including 
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compensation for past and ongoing impacts (loss and damage).The three complementary micro-
cases systematically examine country level data in subsets of villages derived from their 
relationship with the seven distinct climate change interventions varyingly identified in each 
country (three in Fiji, two each in India, and Belize). These country cases are commonly 
formatted in accordance with an integrated typology that combines the two elements (transcript 
and project codes) of the thematic logic order (see Table 1), a non-random procedure devised to 
analyze project and interview data and identify the decision-making processes that underpin 
climate action and inaction at the village level. However, the analytical units’ gender and 
traditional practices, alongside other macro-group dynamics such as youth and age, are 
progressively integrated because of their high and comparatively more significant resonance in 
the dataset for this country case. As outlined under paradigmatic considerations in the 
methodology chapter, this typology is consistent with Gladwin’s (1980) study of non-adoption of 
agronomic recommendations. 
Table 1: The integration of the thematic logic order to inform case structure 
 Thematic Logic Order for 
Non-Random Data Analysis 
Integrated Thematic 
Logic Order  
 Transcripts Case Structure 
 
Climate Action 
Project (Type and) 
Framework 
 Knowledge Project Activities 
 
Climate Knowledge Acquisition 
Project Action and Causes 
Profiled 
1.  Signs/Indicators Belief Progression 
 Cause and Proximity Project Outcomes 
2.  Climate Risk Project Perception 
3.  
Climate Agency 
Personal Inclusion and 
Influence 
4.  Motive for Action Knowledge 
5.  
Climate Leadership 
Climate Knowledge 
Acquisition 
6.  Project Perception Signs/Indicators 
7.  Personal Inclusion/Influence Climate Action 
8.  Belief Progression Cause and Proximity 
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9.  Angst Climate Risk 
10   Traditional Practices Climate Agency 
11   Gender Motive for Action 
12   Schooling Climate Leadership 
13   Project Documents Angst 
 Project Framework  
 Project Activities Cross-Cutting 
 Project Action and Causes 
Profiled Gender 
 Project Outcomes Traditional Practices 
 
This study is of significant theoretical and practical value as it directly tackles a dearth of 
knowledge on how to communicate amidst multifaceted sustainability challenges induced by 
climate change and variability. My cross-country, cross-cultural, multi-case research endeavour 
yields insights into audience-specific messaging and framing; the impact of framing for active 
engagement, the importance of different messengers for different audiences; appropriateness of 
adaptation plans; efficacy of communication strategies based on traditional and endogenously 
crafted systems designed to accelerate learning and knowledge exchange; contextual influences 
on communication; effectiveness of different communication efforts; motives; levels of agency, 
risk disposition and sources of leadership. These insights will improve collective understanding 
of key elements of the communication process relevant for communicating and systemically 
enhancing adaptive capacity, a challenge marked by features that pose profound new challenges 
for thinkers in environmental communication and communication for social change. 
Emblematically, how to communicate problems and enable change around intractable issues 
marked by a degree of permanence and multidimensionality. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Climate Change Communication has been a challenge since anthropogenic climate 
change first emerged on the public agenda in the mid-to-late 1980s (Flotum & Gjerstad, 2017; 
Moser, 2010). The nature of the First Assessment Report (AR1) of the United Nations (UN) 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 1990, is emblematic of this 
challenge and why it persists amidst recent concerted effort to tackle the challenge of how to 
communicate a largely human induced challenge of geologic proportions (Budescu, Bromwell, 
& Por, 2009; Cohen, Demeritt, Robinson, & Rothman, 1998; Swart, Robinson, & Cohen, 2003). 
As with the dominant discourses around global environmental change, this authoritative report 
—now in its sixth iteration— is noted for its reductionism, instrumental rationality and alliance 
to both moral-liberal and rational technocratic politics (Adger, Paavola, & Huq, 2006; Agyeman, 
Doppelt, Lyn, & Hatic, 2007; Cohen et al., 1998). As Cohen et al. (1998), Swart et al. (2003) and 
Pelling (2011) observe, the reductionism is a legacy of the phenomenon being primarily 
considered a scientific domain and then catapulted into the public consciousness. This holds true 
whether one harkens back to the 19th century efforts of Aarhenius or more recent concerted 
scientific expositions about the greenhouse gas effect in the mid-to-late nineteenth century as a 
way of periodizing this development (Cohen et al., 1998).  
 In establishing both the climate change discourse and actions upon a techno-scientific 
rationality, it “bypass[es] the complex, locally specific problems of sustainable development, 
reducing them to the single imperative of controlling global greenhouse gas emissions [GhG]” 
(Cohen et al., 1998, p. 348). This reductionism and instrumentality are in part responsible for the 
limited way the adaptation response frame has been belatedly incorporated within the discourse 
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alongside mitigation (Agyeman et al., 2007; Figueroa, 2011; Gardiner, 2011; Moser, 2017; 
Pelling, 2011).  
The literature suggests the twin elements of instrumentality and reductionism that imbue 
mainstream climate change science and policy discourses enable a moral-liberal formulation of 
the response mechanisms. These mechanisms seek to muster public resolve and sway those with 
knowledge deficits by communicating ostensibly objective climate risks and impacts, “while the 
rational-technocratic relies on science to identify optimal policy to which individuals must then 
submit” (Cohen et al., 1998, p. 349). This privileging of science in structuring policy responses 
and public understanding of global environmental change accords a limited transmission 
function to communication in which “the scientific facts are assumed to speak for themselves 
with their relevance and policy significance interpreted by all audiences in similar ways” (Nisbet, 
2009, p. 14). More broadly, according science the role of providing “certain knowledge” for the 
formulation of political decisions undermines democratic consensus in accordance with 
conventional liberal political theory and policy optimization (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2015; 
Cohen et al., 1998; Dutta, 2011; Moser, 2010; Papa, Singhal, & Papa, 2006; Pelling, 2011).  
So, there is broad consensus that the critical role accorded to a rationality that is imbued 
with imprecision and uncertainty is at once a distinguishing factor for this global challenge and a 
central reason for the persistent challenges in crafting effective climate change communication 
mechanisms (Flotum & Gjerstad, 2017; Kiwanuka-Tondo & Pettiway, 2016; Maibach, Roser-
Renouf & Leiserowitz, 2008; Moser, 2010; Nisbet, 2009; Pelling, 2011; Spence & Pidegon, 
2010). While humans have coevolved with a variable and changing climate since the onset of 
time, the sheer complexity and pace of the threat of human-induced climate change, as well as 
the need for and scale of adaptation that its adverse impacts warrants, is unprecedented 
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(Diamond, 2005, Cited in Pelling, 2011; Galloway McLean, 2010; Leichenko & O’Brien, 2002; 
Paavola, 2006; Steffen, 2011). It amounts to a “fundamental change in the life support system for 
humans… and cuts to the core of contemporary society—energy systems, lifestyles, institutions 
and governance, forms of economic organization and basic values” (Steffen, 2011, p. 23). 
Accordingly, Garnaut (2008), who terms it a ‘truly diabolical policy’ challenge, observes that 
“no other problem—environmental or otherwise—facing society requires such a strong 
interdisciplinary knowledge base to tackle” (p. xviii). 
The social sciences, specifically communication studies and related fields, have much to 
contribute to this interdisciplinary project, especially given contemporary environmental 
change’s intimate formation within and influence upon the sociological milieu and 
communication’s co-constitutive function in society (Bailey, Cammaerts, & Carpentier, 2008; 
Couldry, 2003). However, climate change communication scholarship has evolved as a discrete 
enterprise removed from the established body of work constituting communication studies and as 
a corollary laggard to the public policy debate on climate change, largely due to the enduring 
elements underpinning the framing of the issue. While its inclusion in Article 6a of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1994) suggests early recognition 
of its importance, it was leveraged in a manner consonant with the instrumentality and 
rationalism embedded in prevailing understanding of the challenge and therefore served to 
advance moral-rationalism by building support for and promoting action on climate as defined 
by specified scientific conclusions around lowering GhG emissions. As Moser (2010) observes, 
early efforts were “relatively narrowly focused on scientific findings and [IPCC] synthesis 
reports, sometimes occasioned by particularly severe extreme events, sometimes by high level 
conferences or policy meetings” (p. 32). This is consistent with a historical tendency among 
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experts in the natural sciences, particularly health and environmental sciences, to assume that 
when behaviour diverts from what they deem to be in society’s best interest, it is due to “either a 
lack of relevant knowledge on [the public’s] part (an information deficit) and/or misguided 
attitudes” (Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2008, p. 489). Invariably, the prescription 
tends to be to change people’s behaviour by making the knowledge they lack available to them 
and/or persuade them to change their attitudes. While these responses have been variably 
employed since the issue entered the public policy realm in the late 1980s, climate change 
communication research only emerged in the mid-1990s, largely with an emphasis on mitigation 
because of its congruence with techno-scientific imperatives (Cohen et al., 1998; Swart et al., 
2003; Pelling, 2011). Adaptation, which is more closely tied to the quotidian or complex lived 
domains, became an object of study for climate change communication scholars about a decade 
later and achieved a measure of vibrancy around 2010 (Moser, 2017). 
Despite being a corollary laggard to the science and policy debates, climate change 
communication research now seeks to open the nature of the public discourse through a myriad 
of discrete analytical pathways: framing, targeting, audience, messaging and channel analysis 
and employing a wider range of messengers. This is consonant with changes in the science and 
policy discourses since the IPCC’s AR3, which recognized the linkage between climate change 
and broader socio-cultural issues (Figueroa, 2011; Pelling, 2011; Steffen, 2011; Swart et al., 
2003).  
Despite this improvement, empirical evidence suggests an urgent need for reflexive 
praxis, particularly as practice outpaces theory and the scope of theoretical focus is deemed 
narrow given the multidimensionality and scale of the challenge. So critical is this that Moser 
(2010) charges the field with being a practice “without a solid foundation of research” (p. 43), 
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the expansion of which is now widely deemed necessary for increasing public engagement. 
Moser (2010) and Corner, Markowitz and Pidgeon (2014) note that much of what is known 
about climate change communication is inferred from other fields. This is inevitable, given the 
development of a large body of literature over the last generation spanning economics, 
anthropology, sociology, philosophy and psychology that “has sought to understand and explain 
the relationship between people’s values and how they engage with the natural environment” 
(Corner et al., 2014, p. 412) and invariably, orienting communication efforts to restructure or 
attenuate those values.  
It is no surprise then that the key categories of climate change communication research 
all seek to optimize messaging by varyingly focusing on more textured appreciation of some 
combination of the facets of engagement (cognitive, psychological and social barriers or factors) 
noted by Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007). This is evident in both the Yale 
Program on Climate Change Communication (YPCCC) and Moser’s categorization of the field. 
The YPCCC (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/topic/) outlines six research categories 
(audience, behaviours and actions, beliefs and attitudes, climate impacts, messaging and policy 
and politics), whereas Moser (2010) offers a more succinct tripartite description of the studies in 
the emerging field that appropriately combines inextricably linked works: those concerned with 
boosting the effectiveness of an instrumental conception, those concerned with communicating 
the impacts and adaptation in particular and those engaged in tactical projects. With Moser’s 
(2010) more resonant and compact typology in view, those frontally concerned with the 
instrumental objective often invoke an information deficit rationale for their project. She also 
points to key exponents such as Blennow, Persson, Tome and Hanewinkel (2012), Houston, 
Spialek, Cox, Greenwood and First (2015), Raymond and Robinson (2013), Reser and Swim 
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(2011) and Tamoczi (2011). As noted at the outset, this approach, although articulated in 
relatively more sophisticated terms to date, is the traditional response and conforms with the core 
elements of the dominant techno-scientific and policy discourses on climate change: 
reductionism, instrumental rationality and an alliance to both moral-liberal and rational 
technocratic politics. Accordingly, they deem improved communication as a means of 
attenuating barriers to participation in adaptive actions for various populations. Consistent with 
its status as a corollary laggard, others are increasingly concerned with communicating “win-
win” scenarios that link both mitigation and adaptation communication, long after both response 
approaches achieved a more balanced standing in the dominant discourses since AR3 (Cohen, et 
al., 1998; Swart et al., 2003). Yan and Ho (2017) typify these strands of the instrumentalist 
approach. In their investigation of public knowledge acquisition of climate change, they revisit 
and call into question the long-established knowledge gap hypothesis and posit that a profusion 
of more mass mediated information is needed to address what they deem to be the key barrier 
toward mitigation and adaptation to climate change: the knowledge gap among different socio-
economic population segments in Singapore.  
More sophisticated approaches that largely supplant the information deficit view of 
population behaviour in favour of the ecologic view or “people and places” framework (the 
socio-ecological Obregon, 2014), which is widely used to describe population behaviour 
(determined by factors linked to both people and place) as determinants of population outcomes, 
still conceives of communication in an instrumentalist frame. Maibach et. al. (2008), for 
instance, explicitly interpolate communication and social marketing as policy instruments 
through which to alter behaviour that may have a significant impact on the environment with the 
singular objective of limiting the threat posed by climate change to human health. So, the more 
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nuanced ecological view invoked is directed toward optimizing an instrumental function, as the 
objective is to identify the people and place-based drivers of population behaviour that can be 
influenced through communication modalities or trans-theoretical social marketing techniques 
that are widely associated with piecemeal change in the health and lifestyle domains (Corner & 
Randall, 2011; Peattie & Peattie, 2009). This is enabled by the framework’s emphasis on and 
ability to make legible the intricate relationship between “human agency in causing or preventing 
[…] environmental problems” (Maibach et al., 2008, p. 490) and how environmental problems in 
turn directly influence populations and environmental outcomes. The extant literature suggests 
that even within this narrow focus there is still need for further examination of the potential of 
this instrumentalist approach: influencing drivers of climate change-related behaviour using 
communication and social marketing. Studies of this nature have largely focused on individual 
level drivers of population behaviour, particularly around mitigation—namely reducing 
household energy consumption, managing transportation choices and green commercial practices 
(Maibach et al., 20081; Moser 2017; Pelling, 2011). Individual level adaptation tends to revolve 
around “increasing household preparedness against natural disasters” (Maibach et al., 2008 p. 
490). As the ecological model of behaviour implies, population behaviour is determined 
multifactorially and so much of the literature suggests multi-level interventions hold greater 
promise for the ends to which the instrumentalists seek to prime communication modalities to 
achieve in the climate change realm (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; McKenzie-Mohr, Lee, Schultz, & 
Kotler, 2012; Obregon, 2014).  
However, perspectives within this body of work are multilayered. Stern (2002, cited in 
Maibach et al., 2008) contends that communication as a policy instrument is limited. He notes its 
                                                          
1 Majority of 38 studies examined.  
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importance for influencing some important drivers of behaviour, namely “personal capabilities, 
habits and routines, values, attitudes, beliefs and personal norms and the social context in which 
behaviours are or are not performed” (p. 493) but questions its capacity to influence more 
important drivers of behaviours, including laws and resource deficits (money, access to 
technology etc). Maibach et al. (2008), McKenzie-Mohr (2000) and McKenzie-Mohr et al. 
(2012) counter that optimizing instrumentalism through well-honed and directed communication 
and marketing techniques can effect consequential change(s) across all drivers of behaviours.  
While not decidedly instrumentalist in orientation, the other categories of research in 
climate change communication are not entirely divorced from the objectives of their colleagues 
who maintain a commitment to the traditional or outmoded conception of a fundamentally co-
constitutive modality. Those concerned with communicating impacts and adaptation in 
particular, seek to address cognitive, psychological and social barriers to public understanding 
and action on climate change that persists amidst widespread public recognition of the issue. 
Overall, they are centrally concerned with what various audiences know about climate change 
impacts and adaptation options: identifying resonant language, capturing impact perceptions, and 
cognitive and affective responses. In practice, they argue for more effective climate change 
communication approaches “that allow individuals to engage meaningfully with climate change 
and opening new prospects for lifestyle decarbonisation” (O’Neil & Hulme, 2008, p. 1). In other 
words, cultural usability is of central interest and as will be explored in subsequent sections, 
understanding the “series of complex and constantly evolving cultural discourses” has been 
acknowledged as most critical for climate change communication (Hulme, 2007, para. 7). 
The privileging of affective and contextually resonant interpretive frames alongside 
cognition has led to innovative projects geared toward understanding and harnessing human 
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values and cultural worldviews to shape public engagement with climate change. The contention 
is that effectiveness of climate change communication is predicated upon the extent to which it is 
made congruent with the values of a target audience (Corner et al., 2014; Dessai, Adger, Hulme, 
Turnpenny, Kohler, & Warren, 2004; Flotum & Gjerstad, 2017; Miller, 2000; O’Neil & Hulme, 
2009; Pelling, 2011; Priest, 2016). This includes work on “the ideological determinants of 
climate change risk perceptions, the social factors affecting the performance of low-carbon 
behaviours and the many situational influences on beliefs about climate change and how to 
mitigate it” (Corner et al., 2014, p. 411). Others concerned with this question focus on enabling 
greater deliberation by combining natural and social science knowledges in conjunction with an 
appreciation for non-expert values and experiences to promote engagement with climate change 
(O’Neil & Hulme, 2009).  
While there is “no systematic review of how human values structure public engagement 
with climate change” (Corner et al., 2014, p. 411), there is a body of work that offers strong 
evidence in favour of the “interpretative effects of values on climate engagement” (Corner et al., 
2014, p. 415), which adds credibility and importance to this category of climate change 
communication research. Both Dietz, Dan and Schwom (2007) and Nilsson, von Borgstede and 
Biel (2004)—who first explicitly examined the relationship between values and beliefs about 
climate change—found a positive relationship between transcendent values and the acceptance 
of policy measures. Subsequent studies have confirmed this, noting that people with self-
transcendent values show lower levels of climate skepticism and are more likely to be concerned 
about the consequences (Corner et al., 2014; Kearns, 2011). Corner et al. (2004) point to more 
textured and small-scale qualitative studies that found “individuals who made notable 
behavioural adjustments to their lifestyles in response to climate change” (p. 414) were more 
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motivated by altruism rather than biospheric or transcendental values. In other words, the 
environment per quo (perceived social injustice accompanying climate change) was dominant 
over concern for the environment per se. Even Dietz et al. (2007), who found a weaker link 
between the endorsement of certain traditional values and willingness to support climate change 
policies, notes its significance. While the link is still ambiguous, because other studies connect 
traditional values with climate skepticism (including varied forms of religious conservativism, 
per Jamieson (2011)), more careful examination of climate change engagement across societal 
groups defined by political ideology or cultural worldviews indicate differences that reinforce the 
resonance of values (Kearns, 2011). Therefore, there is consensus that individuals with stronger 
egalitarian and communitarian worldviews perceive climate change as riskier than those with 
individualistic and hierarchical values. 
This trend is reflected in Bellamy and Hulme’s (2011) multimodal methodological study 
that sought to understand perspectives of abrupt climate change and their implications in order to 
yield findings that are crucial for message formulation. This multimodal study’s sophistication 
differentiates it and merits a closer review to illustrate the methodological operationalization of 
the cultural and values prioritization approach. It includes a three-part internet-based quantitative 
questionnaire and two focus group sessions with a systematically self-selected sample of 
respondents to the questionnaire. The questionnaire had three sections: a psychometric 
instrument tailored to elicit “ways of life” within a cultural theory grid-group typology adapted 
by the scholars, questions designed to elicit perceptions of “abrupt climate change”—another 
term for tipping points—and demographic profiling questions. The carefully adapted cultural 
theory grid-group typology used by the scholars is indicative of the cultural theory interpretive 
framework used in this study, which is consonant with the prioritisation of values and cultural 
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worldviews. The scholars reach the peak of their reflexivity with the keen attention paid to 
ensuring congruence between their methodological decisions and their theoretical frame. They 
conscientiously bridged the empirical testing championed by the two interpretive schools within 
cultural theory (stability and mobility) to ascertain the degree to which values and judgment 
affect the utility of tipping points in climate change communication. This is demonstrated by the 
use of the quantitative psychometric questionnaires for eliciting “people’s ways of life in 
organizing their social experiences” (Bellamy & Hulme, 2011, p. 5), which is favoured by 
cultural theorists who champion stability and qualitative focus groups. Mobility theorists would 
welcome this decision as it functions as a bulwark against self-reporting and captures relevant 
dimensions of varied social relations. The employment of both in linked fashion—focus group 
participants were systematically drawn from respondents to the questionnaire and the questions 
were similarly structured—allows for the testing of the stability of values and enrich our ability 
to glean actionable findings from the study.   
Though the interpretive framework is a reflexive articulation of cultural theory and the 
methodology is both dialogic and dialectical, ontologically, the scholars approached this study as 
post-positivists. The laws governing behaviour with respect to concepts such as tipping points in 
climate change communication have been primarily subjected to quantitative discovery and 
highly statistical articulations. I, however, demur the urge to label Bellamy and Hulme (2011) 
positivists because of their interpretive framework and probabilistic presentation of findings. 
Their near complete avoidance of prescriptive statements and call for further investigation of 
fatalism in discourses surrounding abrupt climate change is indicative of their credentials as 
critical realists rather than naive realists. It is a significant shift toward orienting adaptation and 
associated communication toward situated worldviews. 
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Linguistic Approaches 
The findings from those studies interested in the role of human values and cultural 
worldviews in public engagement on climate change are compatible with contributions from a 
linguistic perspective, which invariably guides the outcomes (more granular or nuances 
understandings of public perceptions and engagement with climate change) sought within this 
category of climate change research. This intricate connection between the linguistic 
contributions, specifically narrative analysis and framing, underscores the important role of 
language use in climate change communications of varied genres. As both a concept and area of 
research, language use and the broader notion of framing in the context of climate change 
communication has been an object of study in the social sciences since the issue emerged, but 
more linguistically oriented approaches only emerged in the 1990s (Flotum & Gjerstad, 2017). It 
is widely accepted as an unavoidable feature of the communication process. Exemplifying this 
view, Nisbet (2009) contends ‘there is no such thing as unframed information.’ He notes “the 
stories used to communicate climate change knowledge shape opinions and preferences and 
analyzing such narratives can help explain how they are constructed and how they influence us 
on personal and societal scales” (p. 15). Also, given the dynamic nature of the sociological 
milieu, the role of how values restructure framed information and recirculate them makes 
examining how communities/societies arrive at and respond to stable frames an especially 
difficult exercise. 
Miller (2000) presents four models for understanding the effects of conflicting frames or 
narratives on public opinion and attitudes toward climate change (framing as storytelling, 
modeling, canonization and normalization) that also reflects the heuristic device’s wide-ranging 
utility for a constellation of actors: audiences for making sense of and discussing issues, 
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journalists in crafting resonant reports, policymakers in decision-making and experts to simplify 
technical details and make them persuasive (Nisbet, 2009). Citing the distinct cognitive 
challenges associated with global environmental change, the multiplicity of associated frames 
and the importance of opinion intensity as a central driver of participation on policy issues, 
Nisbet (2009) argues framing is even more important for climate change communication. The 
latter is reinforced by Pelling’s (2011) comprehensive analysis of the social dimensions to 
climate change adaptation that makes manifestly clear an array of complex policy options. It is 
also a prescient observation given the fact that “prioritization and opinion intensity on other 
issues eclipse general concern about climate change” across publics (Nisbet, 2009, p. 14). 
Framing is therefore resonant with an emerging body of work in the field focused on adapting 
information for end-users in specific cultural contexts, including the use of core concepts such as 
metaphors, iconography and exemplary figures for tapping/building trust in localizing 
information (de Castro Salgado, de Souza, & Leitao, 2011; Getto & St. Amant, 2014). Hulme 
(2015) makes profoundly clear the importance of tailoring frames across a multiplicity of 
contexts to ensure the resonance of linguistic representation and interpretive acts. He invokes 
Shanahan’s (2007) itemization of a multiplicity of frames, none of which emerge from the global 
margins, that illustrates this well: national security, polar bear frame, money frame, catastrophe 
frame and the justice and equity frame. This reveals that the utility of the narrative perspective is 
in helping to “identify actors, realized as narrative characters (hero, victim, villain) and explain 
the presence or absence of typical components in a story” (Flotum & Gjerstad, 2017, p. 2), which 
can then improve the crafting of communication efforts, which means they can be used for 
various ends. But, framing as a communication necessity is primarily used to “pare down 
information, giving greater weight to certain considerations” (Nisbet, 2009, p. 16). This is 
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evidenced by Moser’s (2010) description of frames as “triggered by words, imagery, symbols” 
(p. 39) and as detailed earlier, O’Neil and Hulme’s (2009) exploration of iconographic framing 
embedded in non-expert conceptualizations and values to boost engagement. 
However, the field is also driven by more exculpatory and transdisciplinary analysis that 
started to emerge around the mid-2000s, focused on the lack of fixity in scientific articulations 
and the uncertain nature of the findings outlined in the IPCC Reports (Budescu et al., 2009). This 
growing activity in linguistically influenced approaches to climate change communication in 
recent time is largely in response to the dominance of tipping points in the climate change 
discourse (Russill & Nyssa, 2009), as evidenced by news reports (Boykoff, 2007), science and 
policy articulations around key international climate change fora (Oreskes, 2004) and global 
campaigns such as 1.5°C To Stay Alive (CCCCC, 2012). However, the value of tipping points in 
communication is highly contested as it confounds common-sense notions of change as linear 
and largely predictable. It is believed that this fundamental divergence between epidemiological 
change and common-sense notions of social, ecological, political and economic change is both 
conceptually and procedurally problematic for the promotion of self-efficacy because it stymies 
problem formulations. The literature suggests there are considerable limitations of crafting 
messaging around a concept of change that challenges common-sense understanding, which 
negates the utility of tipping point as a useful heuristic device for understanding and enabling 
self-efficacy. However, problem formulation is a prescient challenge irrespective of the 
conception of change or theoretical frame used to guide climate change communication efforts, 
particularly in empowering and emancipatory notions of communication for social change. 
Budescu et al. (2009) examines the utility of tipping points from a post-positivist 
ontological perspective. They elementally and directly address the core concern that the veracity 
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of problem formulation is the primary challenge to the utility of tipping points in the promotion 
of self-efficacy in the climate change sphere. The scholars sought to ascertain how uncertainty is 
communicated in the most important scientific and policy dossier, the UN IPCC Annual ARs. 
They posit that the clarity with which uncertainty is communicated determines the potency of 
tipping points in climate change communication. The scholars used a randomized self-selection 
procedure to derive a sample of volunteers from their university community, 60 percent of which 
were students. The scholars’ preference for ease in their sample selection rather than a systematic 
selection, limits its representative nature in terms of education level which significantly impact 
perceptions of climate science.  
Nonetheless, they crafted a credible quantitative methodology that included an 
individually administered computerized experiment. The questionnaire was designed to capture 
“beliefs about and attitudes toward the environment and climate change” (Budescu et al., 2009, 
p. 2) using two established rubrics in the field: New Ecological Paradigm (revised) and Heath 
and Gifford’s perception scales. In the experiment, subjects were assigned to one of four 
conditions (1) control group - no instructions, 2) a translation group - received the IPCC’s 
guidelines, 3) two verbal-numerical groups - shown numerical ranges and their verbal 
expressions of certainty (likely, very likely, etc.): a) wide group with the IPCC range and b) a 
narrow group with more precise percentages.     
As critical realists, Budescu et al. (2009) set out to demonstrate the efficacy of an 
alternative reporting format that would augment the potency of the tipping point metaphor rather 
than perfect or solve the crisis.  Their explanatory frame emphasizes prediction and control over 
factors such as common-sense reception of verbal terms (likely, very likely, unlikely) in relation 
to or independent of precise numerical ranges that expressed degrees of (un)certainty about 
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tipping points. This explanatory and predictive interpretive frame also underscores their 
postpositivist orientation.  
However, they also leverage constructivist elements to articulate their position. Though 
they believe the nature of knowledge can be apprehended by testing a hypothesis, they also 
leverage constructivist practices by producing reconstructions to reach a consensus. In fact, their 
knowledge accumulation process is more nuanced (informed) and the set of recommendations 
more sophisticated than what obtains in the UN-IPCC reports. This is also evident from the 
utility of the findings and methodology to catalyze action by improving trust and perceptibility, 
which are key for enabling self-efficacy. The study’s revelatory ethical orientation is a 
consequence of its enhancement of certainty, which improves problem formulation and makes 
climate change tipping points more potent. In fact, it seems to embody the articulations of 
Nerlich, Koteyko and Brown (2010), among the early thinkers to consider linguistic approaches 
to climate change communications. They charged that “investigations of climate change 
communications cannot avoid attending to the role of language” (p. 8) by focusing squarely on 
the linguistic deficits at the core of the dominant discourse. 
Budescu et al.’s (2009) study also has resonance with the third category of climate 
change communication research: studies concerned with tactical questions around improving 
strategies for producing and disseminating effective materials for communicating climate 
predictions and related risks in different contexts. This category of research can be described as 
communication design, varyingly described by scholars (Frascara, 2006; Spinuzzi, 2012; Swart, 
2012), including Kiwanuka-Tondo and Pettiway (2016), as “a transactional and constructive 
practice of communication focused on developing communication artifacts, examining holistic 
systems and ecologies and creating novel approaches for resolving problems” (p. 82). 
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While all categories of climate change communication research ostensibly contribute to 
this endeavour, this category of work is more frontally concerned with communication design 
and representing scientific information using a myriad of established and emerging tools, such as 
graphics, visualizations, interactive games or tools, scenarios, etc. While related research seeks 
to reveal strategies for producing and disseminating effective materials for communicating 
climate science (predictions and related risks) to various audiences, Cagle and Tillery (2015) 
suggest this can also pave the way for an ostensibly technical communicative focus to be 
advocated. This view is indicative of a shift in the conceptualization of communication design 
from being singularly focused on translating and transmitting information (Kiwanuka-Tondo & 
Pettiway, 2016; Moser, 2010), as was the case when climate change entered the public policy 
agenda, to “strengthening the communicational power of the messages” (Frascara, 2006, p. xii—
xiv).   
Consistent with the interest in visual representation of scientific information in the 
literature on science communication, most scholars focused on communicating climate change 
per se, have investigated and supported the view that “visual aspects of scientific communication 
are central to understanding how climate change information might be framed, mediated, 
perceived and designed” (Kiwanuka-Tondo & Pettiway, 2016, p. 74).The literature suggests a 
need to develop climate communication tools that focus on local or perceptible impacts of 
climate change to increase proximity (spatially and temporally), which is deemed a cognitive 
limitation and communicate risks and projected impacts in more resonant ways. Consequently, 
this category of research is replete with experimentations predicated on the skills of technical 
communicators to depict information on climate projections, risks and impacts rather than 
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advocate in the socio-political and structural sense (Dobrin & Morey, 2009; Kain & Covi, 2013; 
Cagle & Tillery 2015). 
 Kiwanuka-Tondo and Pettiway’s (2016) bid to offer a conceptual framework for localizing 
climate prediction and risk management information to guide strategic communication planning 
fits this mould at a practical or strategic level. The authors call upon well-established 
communication design mechanisms such as SWOT analysis, a framework that isolates strengths 
weaknesses, opportunities and strengths and a multi-sectoral purview that specifies multiple 
audiences to critically examine the communication efforts of two international entities engaged 
in monitoring climate extremes and disaster risk management in the Greater Horn of Africa: the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGARD) and the Climate Predictions and 
Applications Centre (ICPAC). In a bid to enhance what recent scholarship in communication 
design offers, they note, in accordance with Hayhoe (2012), a need for “strategic approaches 
suited for complex, organizational settings” (Kiwanuka-Tondo & Pettiway, 2016, p. 74) and 
cross-cultural audiences. This challenge, they argue, is primarily due to the complexity and 
detachment of the environment within which climate change artifacts are produced and 
distributed, which renders strategic climate planning, prediction and risk management more than 
a matter of a cognition (issue of framing). 
They delve into the complex, socio-technical process by which both international 
organizations produce climate change information and highlight the difficulty in localizing it for 
a myriad of audiences spanning sectors, decision-making levels and user spheres: agriculture, 
water resources, disaster management, energy, forestry, urban development, health and fisheries; 
the media; politicians and policy-makers at the sub-regional level and end-users–farmers, 
women, youths, traders, fishermen, etc. Eschewing the debate about the need to (Spence & 
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Pidegon, 2010) or unfeasibility of (Birkman & von Teichman, 2010) localizing climate 
information at critical levels such as the community, they call for greater interaction across 
discrete technical groups working in both entities and the broad audiences they serve. In doing 
so, they privilege the dialogic models advocated by Adger et al., (2006), Carvall, (2008), Dutta 
(2011), Moser (2010) and Reagan (2007), which further underscores the complementarity of the 
three streams of work in the field noted, particularly with the tailoring of messages that explicitly 
concentrates minds in the second category of scholarship reviewed. 
While Kiwanuka-Tondo and Pettiway (2016) tackled the tactical representation of 
climate science in a traditional conceptual and strategic sense, others have examined the issue by 
testing a myriad of tools to hone and merge their capabilities for representing climate science. 
Data visualization is a hallmark of this approach. It is considered one of the best ways to 
understand data, according to the YPCCC (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/topic/), an 
interdisciplinary research actor that has amassed a range of new media tools to map climate 
opinion across the United States. It is considered essential for capturing and depicting the rate of 
changes and impacts associated with climate change, cogently distilling copious data and 
achieving resonance with a myriad of audiences (Harvey, 2017). This is typified by the widely 
tracked blog The Climate Lab Book by climate scientist Dr. Ed Hawkins. The blog employs a 
myriad of Graphical Interface Formats (GIFs) and other data visualization tools to distil research 
on climate variability and change, including a simple animated visualization that progressively 
shows global temperature increase over one and a half centuries (http://www.climate-lab-
book.ac.uk/). 
A range of studies have emerged in this area as the affordances of the new media 
communication context makes interactivity and creativity more compelling and accessible 
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(Herring, VanDyke, Cummins, & Melton, 2016; Zhao, 2017; Bishop, Pettit, Sheth, & Sharma, 
2013). Consistent with the interest in attenuating the cognitive challenge, specifically the 
proximal challenge, these thinkers note the opportunity to use technological tools to make 
inaccessible raw climate data legible for lay audiences, especially when localized. Herring et al. 
(2016), who offer a reflexive take on this category of research has evaluated the ability of 
localized data visualization tools, specifically the interactive climatedata.us tool, in influencing 
climate change attitudes and the degree to which geographic proximity matters. While the 
findings of their study contradict the widely held assumption in climate change communication 
research that proximity (temporal or geographic) is a central limiting and differentiating factor in 
climate change risk perception (Moser, 2010; O’Neil & Hulme, 2009; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; 
Weber, 2006), it reinforces the view that data visualization of climate science improves its 
communicability. They note that the interactivity of the data representation modality resulted in 
“strong changes in beliefs and attitudes” (Herring et al., 2016, p. 103) among participants 
directly attributed to their use of the site.  
Their nuanced contradiction of the consensus in the extant literature is also instructive of 
the wider contributions of this technique- and technology-focused body of work that further 
illustrates a remarkable shift from the earlier translation enterprise. Specifically, they note that 
the interactive data visualization tool reduced “temporal proximity, which led to stronger 
attitudes toward and beliefs in climate change” (Herring et al., 2016, p. 102), but not 
significantly more so for proximal groups compared to distal ones. Rather than discounting the 
proximity thesis altogether, they posit that data visualization of climate science points to a 
greater degree of salience of temporal rather than spatial proximity. This is a key contribution to 
collective understanding of how to communicate climate change as the emerging scholarship has 
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accepted the proximity thesis as a fundamentally distinguishing challenge that justifies the 
ongoing pursuit of climate change communication research as a discrete enterprise, divorced 
from the more established fields of communication studies, communication for development and 
social change, among others. 
This ostensibly tactical and experimental body of work unearths further evidence along 
these lines. Pursuing the question of climate change uncertainty and the degree to which it 
further complicates decision-making, Bosetti, Webster, Berger, Budescu, Liu and Tavoni (2017) 
leverage data visualization as a means to address the largely underexplored area of how to 
effectively communicate climate science to policymakers, critical players in the global 
negotiations and policy development agenda. Their study of 217 policymakers who attended the 
landmark 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21) concludes that graphical 
presentation of “individual model estimates in addition to the statistical range was more 
effective” (Bosetti et al., 2017, p. 185) way to influence the views of climate change 
policymakers on projections of global temperature increases, a critical focal point around which 
all climate decisions are made and their robustness assessed. Based on the degree of belief 
updating observed after exposure to the strategically visualized data, this can be taken as 
indicative of a data visualization principle that can improve climate change communication for 
this crucial demographic. But even more central to the broader enterprise it contributes to 
(climate change communication research), it effectively tackles at a core-level scientific 
uncertainty, another monumental challenge associated with global environmental change that 
climate change communication research also notes as distinguishing and justification for a 
discrete practice (Cooke, 2015; Fischhoff & Davis, 2014; Moser, 2010; O’Neil & Hulme, 2009; 
Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Weber, 2006). 
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Bishop et al. (2013), who also seek to address policy-makers’ information deficits to 
effectively address climate change, supports the data visualization principle in a manner relevant 
to decision-makers and general audiences with less technical experience than policy-makers who 
are engaged in the negotiation process. Their study examines the effectiveness of a range of 
‘abstract and realistic’ visualization practices and representations of “facets of climate change 
(downscaled climate-change projections of localised temperature and rainfall and the likely 
effects of these on land suitability, pasture growth, the visual landscape and sea-level changes)” 
through an experiment intended to yield findings that will improve land-use policy-making in 
response to climate change. Methodologically, these decisions allow for probity of (and 
confirms) the findings of studies that have found that audiences treat uncertainty from distinct 
sources differently (Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido & Wakker, 2011) and communication format is 
a consequential factor in information use (Budescu et al., 2014; Dieckmann, Peters, & Gregory, 
2016; O’Neil & Hulme, 2009). The study, which was concerned with both the visualisation 
options and the process of evaluation, a practice that is seldom done or superficially practiced in 
climate change communications (O’Neil & Hulme, 2009; Moser & Dilling, 2007), found that 
visualization tools enabled an “increase in knowledge of the local climate-change situation and 
also an equalisation of self-assessed knowledge” (Bishop et al., 2013, p. 230-231) and increased 
concern even from a ‘high base’. It underscores the utility of data visualization for improving 
climate change cognition and perception for all categories of people. They conclude that 
“multiple interactive tools and the ability to see scenarios side-by-side within a deeper 
informational context” (Bishop et al., 2013, p. 213) are most effective. This underscores the 
utility of this approach and experimental category of climate change communications research 
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overall in demystifying the case for complexity and uncertainty as challenges distinguishing 
enough to merit a distinct field of study to improve how climate change is communicated. 
Paradigmatic Resilience 
The literature shows that after nearly two decades on the public agenda, climate change 
communications research has moved along with and significantly beyond the science and policy 
issues (Moser, 2010).  This is consistent with the fact that in the post-COP 21 (Paris) era, public 
awareness is near saturation levels and the issue is more about concerted action and less about 
the facticity of the problem or phenomena on the policy agenda. However, the evolution of the 
field has been largely driven by urgent needs noted through praxis and contributions from a 
range of disciplinary interests that accounts for its theoretical and empirical support. This 
discrete practice is deemed a field by Moser (2010) and functions as such because it is 
considered as a concerted response to a fundamentally different challenge in terms of the scale of 
its current and projected impacts, differentiating levels of vulnerability to such impacts 
geographically and temporally, rate of onset and perceptibility (Diamond, 2005, Cited in Pelling, 
2011; Galloway McLean, 2010; Steffen, 2011). These differentiating factors are believed to 
produce challenges for the communicability of climate change that are distinct. Though these 
challenges have commanded much critical attention, it imbues the fledgling field with an 
instrumental orientation decidedly committed to optimizing a modality per quo even as many 
note the intimate link between the phenomenon and societal practices.  
Overall, there are noteworthy continuities within the extant literature that indicate the 
persistence of the techno-scientific paradigm that has existential implications, particularly for the 
most vulnerable. This paradigmatic persistence is most evident in the narrow role envisioned for 
communication and the ostensibly instrumental ends to which the current focus on textured 
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approaches (facets of engagement, values, culture, cross and sub-cultural perceptions, 
accessibility, among others) lend themselves. Specifically, embodying a diffusionist logic, 
elements of technological determinism and the neoliberal or economistic imperatives that 
structures many campaigns. This is unsurprising as “the deepest disputes in Western social 
science about macro-level sociological pursuits that are defined in techno-scientific terms (e.g. 
developmentalism) tend to be between strands (liberal and radical varieties) of the dominant 
rather than alternatives (Pieterse, 2001, p. 23). The adaptive capacity of paradigms is a 
fundamental explanatory factor for the smooth transitions that often blurs the persistence of the 
dominant as Khun observes (cited in Rogers & Hart, 2003, p. 268). 
Ethico-Political Perspective 
Twin consequences of this are insufficient explicit recognition of the politics of climate 
change and climate change communications research’s marginalization of communication’s 
expansive and maximal role in holistically tackling a complex phenomenon. This is observed 
even as Moser (2010) makes overtures to “the common-but-differentiated fate that the 
interconnected inhabitants of this planet now face” (p.37), while calling on scholars to consider 
the purpose of communication along the typical horizons articulated in communication studies: 
‘to inform and educate;’ ‘achieve some level of engagement and action’ and ‘bring about 
changes in social norms and cultural values.’ However, these narrow roles envisioned for 
communication fall far short of positioning it as a constitutive tool suitable for enabling 
commensurate systemic changes at micro-, meso- and macro-political levels. The invocation of 
conventional risk communication research as a key disciplinary influence partially accounts for 
the narrow roles envisaged for communication in the realms of climate change research, policy 
and action. It is primarily concerned with analyzing factors, “often technical, that influence the 
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form and effectiveness of communications without including the social contexts within which 
individuals adapt to risk and information exchanges occur” (Agyeman et al., 2007, p. 130). 
However, the ‘complex and diabolical’ phenomenon “cuts to the core of contemporary society-
energy systems, lifestyles, institutions and governance, forms of economic organization and 
basic values” (Garnaut (2008) cited in Steffen, 2011, p. 23). This necessitates complex action 
aimed at fundamentally reimagining society (social change), an inevitably political matter that 
requires communication differently oriented and varyingly situated to be commensurate with the 
challenge(s). 
This is a view supported by the climate adaptation and just sustainability development 
literature concerned with rights and outcomes. The former, which is related to the second 
category of climate change communication research reviewed, points to the need for an ethico-
political awareness because of the lack of uniformity in the distribution of risks across and within 
societies (Cole & Foster, 2001; Dow, Kasperson, Bohn, 2006; Leichenko & O’Brien, 2006; 
Pelling, 2011; Rees & Westra, 2003; Steffen, 2011). While adaptation is one of two climate 
change response mechanisms (the other being mitigation) and is more likely to result in gains 
(Adger et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 1998; Pelling, 2011), it only gained traction in climate change 
communication research in the second-half of the 21st century (Adger, Dessai, Goulden, Hulme, 
Lorenzoni, Nelson, Naess, Wolf, Wreford, 2008; Moser, 2017). Its belated policy and research 
traction are a result of its costly, complex, and contextually influenced nuture, which warrants 
the significant degrees of situated engagement noted above. Thus, it has been considered a 
hindrance to achieving political consensus in global negotiating processes from the onset of the 
discourse (Glantz, 1990).  
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Emblematically, adaptation did not gain centrestage in the scientific and policy discourse, 
the premise for the communicative corollary, until the working conferences leading up to IPCC 
AR3 (2001). This shift was at the urging of thinkers and negotiators from the global margins, 
where climate change-induced impacts are or will likely have the greatest impact and compound 
existing challenges. However, the dominant natural science literature on climate adaptation pays 
scant attention to the social justice aspects of adaptation. It varyingly explores adaptation options 
(CCCC, 2010; Smit, Burton, Klein, & Wandel, 2000; Splash, 2007; Stern, 2006) and prudential 
considerations (Gardiner, 2011) that are mirrored in the related communications research. The 
absence of the ethico-political consciousness from the embryonic climate change 
communications research field noted, even within the adaptation stream of scholarship, is 
unsurprising considering its status as a corollary laggard. It is strikingly replete with wide 
employment of economic frames to address the reductive mitigative discourse: reducing GhG 
emissions. Maibach’s et al. (2008) review of 38 studies concerning communicating climate 
change shows that a majority focused on household energy conservation used communication to 
influence individual level drivers of population behaviour and all relate to reducing GhG 
emissions.  
However, these reductive frames, which are consistent with the “formulation of the 
relation between science and politics, is a weak foundation for responding effectively to climate 
change” (Cohen et al., 1998, p. 349). Alongside widely mooted apprehensions and credibility 
concerns caused by the imprecision of the science, itself a social construction, the nature and 
quality of public engagement have also been questioned. In other words, employing “the moral-
liberal politics of global citizenship and public education to convince individuals to change their 
lifestyles to avert global climate change has run afoul of public apathy and mistrust,” per 
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Hinchliffe (cited in Cohen et al., 1998, p. 349), as its delayed onset and the top-
down/instrumentalist means of engagement “divorces them from their social context” (p. 349). In 
fact, this may account for the general failure of the persuasion approaches and point to the need 
for more granular examination to structure climate change communication to optimize action, 
especially across cultural contexts as much of what is known about communicating climate 
change is based on western observations. 
The fact that adaptation itself poses justice implications on multiple measures (timing, 
appropriateness, scale and ripple effects) warrants a more textured reading as a socially 
embedded process. While a great deal is known about communicating climate change mitigation 
and general lessons may undoubtedly hold across adaptation and mitigation even in varied 
contexts, communicating adaptation is distinguished by its multiple forms. Specifically, climate 
adaptation ranges from resilience or coping, to transition and transformation (CCCCC, 2010; 
Gardiner, 2011; Pelling, 2011). This means that across adaptation forms, there are likely 
different roles for communication and a need for situated understandings of the likely outcomes 
across contexts for each form.  
Distiling and Tackling Gaps 
Accordingly, this dissertation tackles critical gaps surrounding the communicability of 
climate change adaptation, the second category of climate change communication research 
reviewed and noted for being the most expansive, socially implicated and promising response 
mechanism. It decisively explores how to effectively communicate climate change in a manner 
that enables the individual, socio-political and economic changes commensurate with the nature 
of the challenge by contemplating efficacious communicative approaches and actions that are 
dialogically determined in accordance with the multiplicity of adaption pathways, as well as 
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adaptation’s dynamic and differential political and existential implications at various scales. This 
is distinct from the extant literature’s politically agnostic focus on the role of values and insights 
about risk perception (Corner et al., 2014) that seeks to determine and structure the acceptability 
of largely pre-determined adaptation options. 
This approach is premised on an expansive conception of communication that goes well 
beyond the starting point Moser (2014) highlights: 
Basic tenets of effective practice, such as knowing one's audience, relating to people in 
ways that resonate with pre-existing values and beliefs, engaging respectfully and 
addressing the whole human being, not just assuming that there is an information deficit, 
but also tapping into deep motivations and understanding resistances and barriers to 
action—all of these hold as firmly as ever in communicating adaptation. (pp. 49)  
As outlined in the subsequent chapter, the study connects the discrete climate change 
communications research enterprise with the established fields of communication for 
development and social change with attentiveness to the participatory and empowering frame 
and modalities that have emerged as corrolaries consanant with the just sustinabilities 
development discourse. The study mobilizes the environmental justice frame, including notions 
of climate justice, to explicitly demarcate and critically illustrate the ethico-political terrain(s) on 
which communicative actions and efforts must be directed to be commensurate with the nature of 
the challenge in a holistic sense. The study uniqely leverages this critical culture-centric 
disposition to address three core gaps in the current discrete climate change communication 
literature that my experience as a climate change communications practitioner and the extant 
literature suggest are central for robust action. These three challenges are: a paucity of research 
on communicating climate change adaptation (Maibach et al., 2008; Moser, 2017; Pelling, 2011), 
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scant attention to non-western and cross-national studies (Boykoff, 2007; Miller, 2000; Moser, 
2010; O’Neil & Hulme, 2008) in contexts (much of the Global South) where some of the central 
issues highlighted as fundamentally distinguishing challenges (scientific uncertainty, proximity 
to impacts (spatially and temporally) and low opinion intensity and problem prioritization) do 
not apply and a need for greater integration of theory and praxis.  
The study addresses these three gaps by attenuating collective understanding of 
communicating climate change adaptation at various levels (coping, resilience and transition) in 
multiple distinct contexts, where the high and immediate perceptibility of climate impacts 
confounds the factors asserted as distinguishing and foundational for a discrete field. This is 
achieved by examining data gathered from 17 villages across Belize, India and Fiji where 
various sorts of adaptation initiatives were and/or are being pursued with varying scope and 
levels of engagement. This rendering of multiple non-western, case-specific, cross national 
research projects decidedly focused on ongoing climate adaptation processes, which examines 
climate change communication in relation to social change, therefore clarifies the foundations for 
the communication and engagememt efforts commensurate with the challenge described across 
levels of ambition or degrees of empowerment.  These communicative and engagement efforts 
are distilled in the adaptive pathways highlighted in the conclusion chapter. 
The study thus contributes and illustrates that the communicative triggers for adaptation 
are decisively different from those of mitigation. Its multifactorial embeddedness in lived 
experiences means the social and cultural worldviews—namely religion and nature, knowledge 
systems, social structures and order—require greater focus on situated and collectively 
determined action to awareness models than pre-determined awareness to action.  
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Next is a description of the critical framework employed to probe and detail 
communication’s affordances and the associated tools that can enable the individual, socio-
political and economic changes commensurate with the fundamental destabilization of life 
underway amidst unprecedented global environmental change.  
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Perspective 
As a discrete enterprise, climate change communications research does not contemplate 
the role of communication in enabling the scale of changes (individual, socio-political and 
economic) commensurate with unprecedented anthropogenic climate change. This limitation is 
chiefly due to the absence of a holistic view of climate change and the ethico-political lens the 
challenge necessitates. The ethico-political gap, which is a product of the reductive and 
instrumentalist formulation of climate change science, policy and communication discourse, 
imposes functional limitations on the scope and efficacy of climate change action. The 
imposition of functional limitations on climate change communications is highly consequential 
given the urgent nature of the challenge and the narrow(ing) window of opportunity for effective 
action.  
Therefore, this chapter outlines a multiperspectival reading of the phenomenon and its 
implications. It formulates the issue more expansively as a complex development challenge that 
is primed for probity within the just sustainable development paradigm, particularly the 
participatory communication for development framework because it is crafted for tackling 
development issues deeply embedded in lived contexts. This critical perspective foregrounds the 
multidimentionality and variability of climate change impacts and optimal adaptive response 
mechanisms, alongside the phenomenon’s differentiated socio-cultural embeddedness. Such an 
expansive problem formulation paves the way for the examination of a more comprehensive and 
multifactorial role for communicative actions in climate change responses and their efficacy for 
realizing different outcomes. To highlight the varying roles for which efficacious and ethico-
politically conscious communicative actions can play in climate change response mechanisms, 
Mark Pelling’s (2011) tripartite adaptation framework, which is within the Just Sustainability 
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paradigm, is employed to foreground actionable and participatory development approaches. 
Specifically, it clarifies the need for communicative actions that can enable coping or resilience 
(stability), transition (incremental social change and the exercising of existing rights) and 
transformation (new rights claims and changes in political regimes). 
A Holistic View: Climate Change and Sustainable Development 
 It is imperative to situate climate change within the context of development, specifically 
the Just Sustainability paradigm. This is accentuated by the scale, multidimentionality and 
peculiarity of the material and immaterial impacts of climate change. Poignantly, climate change 
has differentiating impacts that are and will continue to compound pre-existing development 
challenges, namely poverty, vector borne diseases, economic malaise and cultural erasure (Adger 
et al., 2006; Agyeman et al., 2007; Cole & Foster, 2001; Dow et al., 2006; Leichenko & O’Brien, 
2002; Paavola, 2006; Pelling, 2011; Rees & Westra, 2003; Routledge, 2011; Steffen, 2011). 
Therefore, this study is concerned with achieving an actionable participatory approach towards 
Just Sustainable development. Just Sustainable development seeks “to ensure a better quality of 
life for all, now and into the future, in a just and equitable manner, while living within the limits 
of supporting ecosystems” (Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2003, p. 2). This conception is 
consistent with critical perspectives attuned to disproportional negative impacts or outcomes 
(Capehart & Milovanovic, 2007), including related notions of environmental racism or “eco-
apartheid” (Rees & Westra, 2003, p.100). 
This conceptualization of sustainable development makes manifestly clear that climate 
change poses questions of fairness, particularly justice, which Rawls (1999) deems ‘the first 
virtue of social institutions.’ As Gardiner (2011) observes, even those who question the pre-
eminence of what is among many facets of ethics deem it a central concern. Given the extant 
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literature’s robust reading of justice, it is this ethical aspect that commands primary attention. 
The justice implications of climate change made clear by a holistic sustainable development 
frame is most apparent when considering climate adaptation in particular, which can also have 
justice implications “because benefits and costs are frequently distributed in ways that 
consolidate or exacerbate current vulnerabilities rather than reduce them” (Adger et al., 2006, p. 
4).  In other words, the fairness of even participatory adaptation strategies (scale: individual or 
collective; timing: proactive, reactive or inaction; and resources dedicated) is central in 
considering the effectiveness and legitimacy of climate actions and the possibilities they generate 
(Adger et al., 2006; Pelling, 2011).  
Climate change communication as a discrete practice seeking to tackle a reductive 
techno-scientific formulation is a central challenge. As established in the literature review, this is 
chiefly due to the field’s emergence as a corollary laggard to the instrumentalist global science 
and policy debates on climate change.   Newby (cited in Cohen et al., 1998) notes the tendency 
within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) first and second assessment 
reports “to deal with human or social dimensions of global change by attaching some social 
science analysis, virtually as an appendage, to a body of work that defines the problem in terms 
of natural science approaches” (p. 341). So, despite the multidimensional and cross-sectoral 
impact of climate change, the communicative corollary also leverages social science approaches, 
rarely the humanities, to analyze “the driving forces, impacts and adaptive capabilities relative to 
the biophysical phenomenon of global change, largely divorced from their social context” 
(Newby, cited in Cohen et al., 1998, p. 341). This is particularly evident as it relates to the link 
between climate change and the political economy of development, which the climate justice 
 43 
 
narrative emanating from the Just Sustainability paradigm explicitly implicates (Routledge, 
2011).  
Climate justice is rooted in the Global South, particularly Small Island and low-lying 
developing states, where climate change impacts and risks are most profound. Climate justice 
foregrounds capitalism as the root cause of the phenomenon. It implicates the rapacious and 
rationalist pursuit of extractive activities without regard for social and environmental 
externalities, chiefly fossil fuel extraction and broader energy intensive economic and social 
processes. This is of consequence because fossil fuel use is the foremost source of greenshouse 
gases (such as Carbon Dioxide), and the increasing emission of which is the main cause of 
anthropogenic climate change. Broad acceptance of the unequally distributed and experienced 
social and environmental externalities produced by fossil fuel dependent economic “processes 
and the values of the political economy that increasingly [and historically] concentrate[s] wealth 
in the hands of a few [people and nations]” stymies political action (Pelling, 2011, p. 11). By 
implicating the logic of the prevailing economic dominant, the climate justice narrative positions 
North Atlantic states (North America and Western Europe), who first industrialized with few 
constraints, as the key beneficiaries. By implicating capitalism “as a social and ecological 
relation” in human-induced climate change (Routledge, 2011, p. 385), climate justice seeks 
redress or “corrective justice” (Gardiner, 2011, p. 310) for the divergence in benefits and risks 
associated with what David Harvey (cited in Routledge, 2011, p. 385) calls “accumulation by 
dispossession.” Climate Justice is enshrined in the Bali Principles of Climate Justice (2002) 
outlined by the International Climate Justice Network ahead of the Earth Summit and sought to 
“shift the climate change discourse from a scientific-technical issue to one of human rights and 
environmental justice” (Agyeman, 2007, p.119). Very much in concert with the charges outlined 
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against the dominant discourse, climate justice advocates contend that “the scientific debate has 
stymied productive global warming discussions and hindered more equitable policy solutions” 
(Agyeman, 2007, p. 121). So, unlike ecological justice that is concerned with justice in relation 
to nature or injustice between species, climate justice poses a more multiperspectival reading of 
the impacted and the layers of impacts (Agyeman, 2007, Capeheart & Milovanovic, 2007; 
Gardiner, 2011; Routledge, 2011). The preamble of the Anchorage Declaration (2009) issued at 
the Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change illustrates this by calling attention to 
a litany of historically situated vulnerabilities exacerbated and/or induced by climate change that 
are “at their core, articulations of struggles to sustain environmental identity and heritage in the 
face of threats to the physical resources that shape their living ecology and the threats to values, 
beliefs, behaviours, histories, and languages” (Figuerora, 2011, p. 232). The declaration states: 
 
We are experiencing profound and disproportionate adverse impacts on our cultures, 
human and environmental health, human rights, well-being, traditional livelihoods, food 
systems and food sovereignty, local infrastructure, economic viability and our very 
survival as Indigenous Peoples. (Anchorage Declaration, 2009, cited in Figuerora, 2011, 
p. 232). 
 
Climate justice is “wedded to environmental justice in accounts of intergenerational 
justice, distributive inequities and active contribution to the causes of climate impacts” 
(Figuerora, 2011, p. 235). Consistent with the bivalent logic of environmental justice that 
requires both distributive and recognition justice to be bridged by participatory forms of 
procedural justice, climate justice goes further by placing both environmental identity and 
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heritage issues at the core of the discourse to offset the inability of distributive frames to account 
for the intangible and paves the way for the articulations of the impacted or vulnerable to be 
heard. So, climate justice is distinct in that it makes clear considerations for the full range of 
losses induced and exacerbated by climate change (tangible and intangible) that cosmopolitan 
conceptions of justice do not (Attfield 1999; Cole & Foster, 2001, Figuerora, 2011, 2006; 
Paavola, 2006) and goes beyond environmental and ecological justice by linking to a broader 
array of socio-political and historical injustices that undermine adaptive capacity by implicating 
the dominant logic around which life now functions. In particular, climate justice raises 
questions about “corrective justice” (Gardiner, 2011, p. 310) premised on the articulations of the 
impacted/vulnerable. This reparatory orientation considers “how to treat past emissions, and 
some actors making restitution because of their roles in past failures,” including failure to meet 
past goals and propagation of misinformation (Gardiner, 2011, p. 310). This means the intricate 
link between the social and the environmental and the power dynamics involved in climate 
change problem formulation, its interpretation and consequent actions/responses across contexts, 
levels and time periods has fundamental implications for vulnerability (adaptive capacity) and 
achieving ethical outcomes (justice).  
Therefore, the concept of climate justice is critical to my analytical frame. It is especially 
useful in considering the nature of adaptation decision-making because of the co-causal nature of 
the social and the environmental and pursuing an ethico-political study with a comprehensive 
view of the issue. This is underscored by the concept’s regard for the interrelatedness of social 
conditions with the environment and power dynamics with historical (past) sensitivity to the 
extent that it intersects with universal justice and ethics concerns beyond the looming ecological 
crises that compound vulnerability and undermine adaptive capacity, namely slavery, 
 46 
 
colonialism, unjust wars, trade and immigration regimes, poverty and human rights (Figuerora, 
2011; Gardiner, 2011).  
The multiperspectival and critical notion of climate justice also makes clear the 
complexity of acting on climate change, as consensus around it by developing countries does not 
negate contestations around allocation and impacts and its differential implications at various 
levels, including within their own borders (Gardiner, 2011; Pelling, 2011; Routledge, 2011). The 
multiple scales of impact and connections with varied scales of responsibility interpellated by 
climate justice in the context of the Anthropocene also casts doubt on conventional liberal 
political theory’s “constructing basic justice on the model of a single self-sufficient nation-state” 
(Gardiner, 2011, p. 319), which harkens back to the failures of the moral liberal politics and 
credibility challenges underpinning climate change’s rational technocratic frame (Cohen et al., 
1998). Gardiner (2011) posits that this “mismatch of vulnerability and responsibility,” which is 
exacerbated by power inequalities, questionable regard for intergenerational dependence and 
insufficient theoretical attention to the ethical considerations, in addition to global political 
inertia, constitutes “a perfect moral storm” (p. 313). This view brings into question the 
possibility of avenues for meaningful action.  
By shifting from the “isolation model” that conceives climate change as a techno-
scientific issue, there remains space to act moderately and/or decisively: the moderate options 
from a climate justice perspective includes those that result in “mild rectification” (including 
modest improvements in some areas intersecting with climate change) and the “neutrality 
model,” which concentrates on preventing the expansion of wider injustices (Gardiner, 2011, p. 
319; Pelling, 2011). However, this study’s commitment to a politics of hope and change 
grounded in addressing fundamental social injustices disposes it towards the vanguard model or 
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pathway (Leary, 2006; McIntosh, 2008; Orr, 2011; Stoknes, 2015).  Climate change in this 
mould, particularly the radical and action-oriented readings of hope offered by Lear (2006), 
McIntosh (2008) and Orr (2011), is an opportunity to fundamentally rethink how we live and in 
so doing, come to terms with compounded vulnerabilities and injustices both materially and 
ideationally. This politics of hope with a profound interest in enactment at the lived level such 
that it is materially resonant runs counter to the prevailing political climate at this juncture. 
However, history suggests these are not immutable limits. Distilling and enacting participatory 
processes is central for enabling the radical and action-oriented responses to the material and 
immaterial impacts of climate change. It is against this backdrop that this study adopts 
participatory communication theories, alongside Pelling’s (2011) tripartite climate adaptation 
framework that foregrounds actionable response pathways for incremental and/or radically 
transformation, as its theoretical and conceptual frameworks for the analysis of various scales of 
adaptative actions across three countries. 
Participatory Communication Approaches and Communication for Development and 
Social Change 
Given the primary concern of Just Sustainability discourse’s (particularly climate justice) 
with the lives of people and climate change’s explicit interpellation of existentiality and quality 
of life concerns, this study is guided by George Herbert Mead’s comprehensive view of 
communication. George Herbert Mead views communication as “the basic social interactive flux 
of human activities in a manner akin to the way money is to economics” (cited in Roy, 1987, p. 
109). This conceptualization foregrounds the centrality of communicative processes in probing 
and tackling modernity’s most pressing and multidimensional development challenge. 
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From this expansive communicative vantage point, the interdisciplinary nature of 
communication for development and social change uniquely positions it to offer actionable tools 
to address the multidimensionality of the reformulated challenge, which is deeply connected with 
lived experiences and existentiality, and realize degrees of climate justice. Specifically, 
communication for development “tackle[s] critical questions about the way people communicate, 
express demands and act upon critical social problems. It is usually positioned to understand the 
increased centrality of voice and rights as guiding principles of social change” (Waisbord, 2014, 
p. 147). Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada’s (1998) description of development communication further 
underscores the field’s natural suitability for probing and acting upon a phenomenon that 
profoundly implicates livelihoods: 
 
the use of communication processes, techniques and media to help people towards a full 
awareness of their situation and their options for change, to resolve conflicts, to work 
towards consensus, to help people plan actions for change and sustainable development, 
to help people acquire the knowledge and skills they need to improve their conditions and 
that of society and to improve the effective-ness of institutions (cited in Ramirez, 2005, p. 
425). 
 
The shift from a narrow techno-scientific problem formulation is consistent with the 
emergence of more nuanced critical or communitarian perspectives in the development 
discourse’s communicative corollary since the 1970s. The evolution of thought and practice 
sought to overcome the failures and pre-eminence of an economistic and prescriptive meta-
narrative (modernization paradigm). Amidst conceptual challenges and changes associated with 
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the normative and historical contexts of communication and development, a broad spectrum of 
‘alternative” strategies emerged (Pieterse, 2001). These ‘alternative’ reflections, which include 
the Just Sustainabilities paradigm, are at the foundation of “post-structuralist, post-modernist, 
postcolonial and communitarian theories, [which] together provide an assumptive basis for 
participatory strategies” (Melkote and Steeves, 2015, p. 372). As articulated by Inayatullah 
(1967), they emerged amidst a growing understanding of development “as a process through 
which a society gains increased control over its environment, political identity and individuals 
gain increased control over themselves” (cited in Sparks, 2007, p. 44). 
Although communication occupied a central role in the foundational discourse on 
development and emerged as its corollary, communication and development are not congruent 
conceptually (Hemer and Tufte, 2005; Pieterse, 2001; Quebral, 1987). However, both 
communication and development have an explanatory effect on each other and may each be part 
of the other (Roy, 1987). This study is guided by the participatory communication paradigm, 
which eschews the primarily economic and political orientation of the modernization paradigm 
and dependency theories, noting that there is no universal path to development. Thus, 
development is conceived of as “an integral, multidimensional and dialectic process that differs 
from one country to another” and operating at fundamentally different scales (Servaes, 1999b, p. 
6).  
The participatory communication paradigm is noteworthy for its contestation of the 
special epistemological privileges that modernization theorists accord to positivism and other 
western ways of knowing and interpreting the world (Jacobson (1996), cited in Sparks, 2007, p. 
61). However, participation is open to a multitude of interpretations and is, as Servaes (1999b) 
observes, further evidence of the pluri-paradigmatic nature of development communication. 
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Rather than a grand narrative or single paradigm, this participation approach ranges from 
“attempts to mobilize the populace to cooperate in development activities to participation-as-an 
end in itself that aims to empower people so that they may articulate and manage their own 
development” (Melkote and Steeves, 2015, p. 373). However, the dialogical pedagogy of Paulo 
Freire (2000) and the ideas of participation and self-management articulated in the New World 
Information and Communication Order (NWICO)/UNESCO debates and captured by the 
McBride Commission of the 1970s, embody the principles widely accepted as common sense 
(Servaes and Malikhao, 2005). Common approaches such as community organizing, action 
research, participatory action research and social mobilization are conceptually grounded in 
Freirean philosophy (Cadiz, 2005), which seems prescient given the nature of the contestations 
that mark the field and the emergence of a consensus around the core issues they tackle: “the 
centrality of power, the integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches, the need for a 
communication ‘tool-kit’ approach, the articulation of interpersonal and mass communication 
and contextual factors to realize the goals of the field” (Waisbord, 2005, p. 78). 
However, the operationalization of the principles espoused by the participation paradigm 
varies across projects. The operationalization varies in that the negotiated variant in development 
communication tend to proffer very modest goals and, in some formulations, is consistent with 
neo-modernist/continuity variant’s appreciation for piecemeal changes, but at its most 
sophisticated, it is distinguished by its focus on traditional settings, structures and 
communication channels (Servaes and Malikhao, 2005; Sparks, 2007). Conversely, the radical 
variant (namely, multiplicity and concretization), which motivates this study, begins with a view 
of reality rather than one of modernity. The latter guides this study because it is much closer to 
explicit theories of social change in the normative democratic traditions, and conceives of or 
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accommodates communication systems in the cultural and functional terms, even in cases where 
media are not explicitly noted (i.e. conscientization). This is most palpable in the dissonance 
between the UNESCO discourse’s neutral conception of the public and institutions, and Freire’s 
explicit focus on the oppressed, individually and collectively. However, a heightened degree of 
reflexivity precludes adherence to a binary approach that negates leveraging the strategic value 
of the negotiated variant. 
It is therefore possible to identify the continued salience or dominance of modernist 
principles based on how they are deployed. Whereas the diffusion or modernist model conceives 
development communication as a mere vertical transfer of mass mediated information to 
attenuate a lack of knowledge and enable behaviour change through social marketing and 
edutainment activities, the participatory model seeks to address structural inequities, (re)claim 
rights, empowerment and equity. As a more process-oriented and community-focused model, 
participatory approaches ascribe solutionist potential to ongoing interactive knowledge exchange 
at local levels using interventions consistent with the common approaches noted above (Morris, 
2005). However, Morris (2005), who offers a comparative analysis of both the diffusion and 
participatory models, which have dominated the “strategic application of communication 
technologies and processes to promote social change” (p. 123), contends that a variety of 
development efforts employ a combination of strategies that vary according to local needs, 
resources and politics, which fits the mode of the multiplicity paradigm that takes a lack of 
replicability to be a virtue. So, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of how the multiplicity 
approaches lend themselves to congruence with notions central to the old paradigm. Cornwall’s 
(1998) contention that both Gender and Development and participatory development are 
compatible with neoliberalism reinforces this observation. 
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For instance, human development seeks to maximize society’s economic potential, albeit 
from the perspective of the individual. As a case in point, Sen (1999) informs us that improving 
women’s agency is an ideal way to empower them and meet national development objectives. He 
cites education/literacy, employment outside of the home and property rights as means of 
empowerment for women (p. 191). His emphasis on the individual, initiative, rationality and 
capital are undeniably neoliberal and modernist. To illustrate the importance of empowering 
women, he emphasizes the wide-ranging benefits for society as a whole: lower mortality rates 
and economic benefits for the elderly and children. This represents a micro version of the 
dominant ‘economistic’ development approach. However, this does not negate the fact that Sen’s 
(1999) characterization of Development as Freedom aptly captures the mutually reinforcing 
relationship between rights and development, but the fundamentally instrumental and economic 
basis of the argument is consistent with modernist conceptions. It embodies what Cornwall 
(1998) terms the strategic use of essentialism, which does not fit neatly with complex realities. 
The instrumentalist economic frame is also evident in the limited conception of the social 
contract/citizenship (formal democracy), which he takes to account for the absence of famine, an 
observation de Waal (cited in Vincent, 2004, p.120) has critiqued. 
Likewise, microcredit, which a strong contingent of practitioners has championed as a 
means of empowering women primarily, can be deemed a form of objectification or strategic 
essentialism to advance capitalist intents. Briggs (2001) asserts that micro-credit should not be 
interpreted as a radical means of emancipation and empowerment because it works within the 
existing societal structures (male dominance and female subservience plus ‘capitalocentrism’). It 
represents a move to peddle capitalism to women on the margins of society and yet nullifies key 
issues of power and voicelessness. Rankin (2001) extended the discussion by positing that micro-
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credit as a development strategy fails to circumvent the global economy and as such, falls within 
the global capitalist structure. However, consistent with the primarily mitigative frame that 
guides the reductive and instrumentalist formulation of the climate change challenge, micro-
credit is increasingly seen as a means of delivering low-cost renewable energy resources, 
including smokeless stoves and lanterns, in climate interventions. People who would otherwise 
be outside of the market due to a lack of capital and other resources are brought into its fold, 
thereby contributing to the ultimate objective of expanding the capitalist system to new frontiers.  
These observations are consistent with a broader trend where the pursuit of the key 
principles (self-reliance and cultural identity, access and participation) which were at the core of 
the UNESCO discourse that found resonance with adherents of “another development” who 
championed the importance of traditional values and also championed democratic process and 
human rights (variants) (Carlsson, 2005), also seem to have embraced a degree of technological 
determinism and the diffusionist logic in their pursuit of empowerment at the margins and 
cultural preservation. The preponderance of new visual, web and audio technology, as well as 
their synchronization in the new information context means connectivity to key platforms is now 
deemed central for empowerment objectives, for instance, “the rediscovery of indigenous 
frameworks that have enabled Australian aboriginals to survive into the new millennium rather 
than learn new skills” (Morris and Meadows, 2003, p. 71) and varyingly articulating land rights, 
meta emancipation and preserving identity (Rodriques, 2001).   
So, while mindful of the continuities observed, the fact that the convergence and 
dialectics observed have been the product of pragmatics rather than critical reflection imbues this 
research with a motive to bridge the gap between theory and practice.  Short of bridging this gap, 
it is premature to reject the validity of development and climate action projects by multilateral 
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agencies, the state and large, primarily international, non-governmental organizations because 
they embrace resilient and possibly contextually adapted tenets of the founding paradigms (and 
its problematic heritage). The fact that paradigms are essentially post-hoc constructions intended 
to order reality (Halloran, 1987) makes this especially prescient. Thus, philosophically, this study 
eschews binary thinking that pits diffusion of innovations against participatory strategies.  
Given the various planes on which development unfolds and the consequential material 
impacts (current and projected) in the Anthropocene, this study is primarily concerned with 
distilling the empowering and participatory potential of the two dominant variants of 
development communication (participatory development communication and development 
support communication), which are associated with multiple scales (local, regional, national and 
international). Traditionally, of the two major approaches, participatory development 
communication is most applicable to a whole society and is often a feature of a national 
development plan, whereas development support communication is typically project oriented, 
strategic and diffusionist (Jayaweera, 1987). However, as observed above, operating in a 
normative and objective field means many of the arguments levelled at the latter are applicable 
to the former and this is evident throughout the evolution of the field. This view is underscored 
by contemporary reassessments of strategic diffusionist actions that place communication and 
collective action at the centre of social change. Such reassessments underscore the heightened 
import of embedding strategic issues and actions, participation and co-equal communicative 
actions to achieve social change and empowerment. Waisbord (2014), for instance, contends that 
the normative desirability and pragmatic imperative of broad-based active engagement in social 
change to ensure durable changes necessitates deeper understanding of participatory strategic 
communication because contrary to the view that social change is unpredictable and random, it is 
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planned with turns and twists. In other words, while this study privileges broad-based, 
contextually determined participatory processes as a basic human right, it deems the pursuit of 
such to be insufficient as an end within itself in enabling the level and nature of changes 
necessitated by the material and immaterial impacts of climate change.  
Participatory Processes and the Culture-centric Purview 
Consistent with Waisbord’s (2014) privileging of concerted action based on insights 
yielded through strategic participatory communication approaches, this study builds upon 
Dutta’s culture-centred communicative approach to participation, empowerment and social 
change. Dutta’s culture-centric perspective “fundamentally notes the capacity of marginalized 
communities to consciously and strategically participate in processes of change that are 
meaningful to them (Dutta, 2011, p. 3).” While the perspectives within subaltern studies 
primarily problematize and discursively challenge prevailing conditions and externally driven 
development interventions, Dutta’s perspective enables the fashioning of a pragmatic yet critical 
set of actions. The eschewing of cultural essentialism and a solutionist view of participatory 
processes enable this shift towards action by highlighting the negotiated status and impact of 
structures, culture and agency across the subaltern. The critical culture-centric perspective 
highlights that even where there is broad population-level engagement (participation) in 
development activities, the outcomes are mediated by socio-cultural and political realities and 
degrees of agency, which can be constraining and/or enabling. Thus, in addition to illuminating 
the variability of likely outcomes and impacts from participatory development processes, the 
critical culture-centric approach to participatory development communication also clarifies 
specific points of entry necessary for corrective and/or additional intervention. 
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Therefore, by delving into what McClure (1992) calls the “politics of the quotidian” 
(cited in Rodriquez, 2001, p. 156) with a critical gaze, this study avoids the pitfalls of the four 
dominant schools of thought in the western social view: namely, atheistic evolution, egocentric 
competition, relativism and positivism. To be wedded to either school precludes “genuine 
development and social change” (Obomsawin, 1993, p. 5) or the efficacy of such in Waisbord’s 
(2014) formulation of the problem. The implication is that efficacious development and social 
change processes necessitate reposing power and responsibility in people’s hands, so they govern 
their own lives at the level of self, family and community. However, as established in the 
adaptation framework above, delving into the quotidian to optimize climate change 
communication oriented towards social change (transformation) is highly political, chiefly 
because it implicates the dominant logic that underpins societal construction and distinctly 
connects a multiplicity of prevailing and projected challenges. In fact, it raises fundamental 
concerns that have been at the core of indigenous and traditional knowledge debates, including 
the inaugural Indigenous Knowledge Monitor Symposium in the Phillipines (1993), chiefly, the 
value of and access to Indigenous Knowledge and intellectual property rights.  
So, ethically, this study is committed to moving beyond instrumentalizing indigenous and 
traditional communities as indicators of a tipping point to empowering them to act to adapt to the 
changing climate more efficiently and progressively to the extent that their full range of 
vulnerabilities are considered. Consistent with eschewing essentialism and the pursuit of 
participation as an end, the study is geared at offering a basis for more efficient discovery of self-
sufficiency and self-determination through the collective implementation of appropriate 
programmes in relation with exogenous actors, dissimilar worldviews and capacities. This 
relationist disposition, when enacted with the critical culture-centric gaze, is likely to yield 
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gradual rather than dramatic changes in cultural formations, which renders it compatible with the 
valuing of incremental victories across pathways towards transformation within the adaptive 
framework outlined below. As such, consistent with the eschewing of binaries in participatory 
approaches, the study adheres to a non-essentialist reading of culture. The conceptually nebulous 
notion of culture is defined by Shadid (2007, cited in van den Pol, 2010) as “a total of meanings 
or knowledge that human beings need to function in a certain situation: knowledge of language, 
habits, rituals, opinions, values and norms” (p. 1). Mobilizing such a broad tapestry of elements 
that underpins existence differentially in a non-essentialist fashion is important because climate 
change poses an existential threat to cultural retention and diversity so significant that Lampert 
(2010) calls for a cultural ‘Red Book,’ akin to the Red Book for Endangered Species. Culture 
also plays a consequential role both in the fashioning of climate change content and the way it is 
expressed (Shadid, 2007, cited in van den Pol (2010)). This is in accordance with a broader trend 
in comparative environmental policy that regularly foregrounds the disparity between the 
reactions of different population groups to ecological threats (Cohen, 2000).  
Accordingly, this study conceives culture as a fluid social phenomenon to be considered 
as a dynamic, lived experience that “incorporates both lived practices and practical ideologies” 
(Couldry, 2003, p. 77). This is a key step towards moving beyond the limitations of pre-
established cultural codes, including cultural identity and citizenship. The radical democracy 
thesis offered by feminists such as Mouffe and McClure (cited in Rodriquez, 2001 and Couldry 
and Curran, 2003) contests the essentialism invoked by pre-established cultural codes and recasts 
the political subject as fluid and emergent. Specifically, they do not deem social subjects as 
being constituted by essence associated with historical location. In other words, membership 
within a historically marginalized group should not be conflated with membership of a specified 
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interest group with specified demands (Rodriquez, 2001, p. 18). This view provides a more 
nuanced relationist perspective that incorporates notions of fluidity and contingency to describe 
culture and by extension identity as mutually dependent and eschew the existence of true 
essences and related staid conceptions. This shift in our understanding of pre-established 
existential givens—political, sociological and psychological—brings into question the 
communication studies perspectives from which cross-cultural communication and participatory 
development efforts are often interpreted in oppositional terms. This reductive view traps 
traditional cultures in an exclusive subversive mode, precluding the identification of broader 
dialectical trends in cultural formation and social change processes this study aims to examine 
and use to map a critical yet pragmatic course of action.  
Specifically, this relationist conception of culture and the political subject in traditional 
and indigenous communities on the frontiers of climate change will aid me in unearthing the 
adaptive capacity of these cultures. Rather than being a mere fixed or calcified and fragile victim 
of climate change (Downey, 2013), this relationist reading of culture opens up avenues for 
contemplating endogenous communicative frameworks and optimized actions for adapting to 
climate change in much the same way traditional and indigenous communities have adapted to 
ecological change for millennia. Most importantly, it informs what content and framing is likely 
to be most resonant and yield the greatest range of positive social change in the medium term. 
This is a most consequential disposition as endogenous communications, particularly indigenous 
forms, which contrasts significantly with exogenous communication systems, bureaucracies and 
other formal systems, is often neglected (Mundy and Compton, 1993). This is untenable given 
the historical centrality of media in social change and the salience of culturally appropriate 
modes of communication. It is also consequential in that it opens opportunities to detail how 
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frames emerge, become stabilized and enable varieties of change across adaptation pathways in 
contexts where spatial and temporary factors, uncertainty and other widely accepted challenges 
deemed distinguishing factors do not complicate perception and frames resonance in the manner 
they are said to in the mostly generalized, Western and cosmopolitan oriented literature on 
climate change communications. 
Finally, this relationist conception of culture and the broader culture-centric purview of 
communication for social change outlined means that when one delves within the quotidian and 
observes the decision-making processes, their enactment and the criteria that drive both in 
context, one shifts from merely uncovering psychological processes—which are useful to a 
diffusionist agenda (resilience/coping, and perhaps transition) but wholly insufficient to enable 
social change—towards marshalling communicative and policy understandings more useful for 
supporting the realization of transformation amidst climate change  primarily on the terms of 
communities. This critical disposition is used [to map how] communication processes, strategies 
and tactics [that can be] mobilized to deal with … challenges” (p. ix) and realize change based 
on the nature of the adaptation process or pathway communities pursue.  
Adaptation Pathways 
Philosophically and practically, this study accords greater attention to the social justice 
aspects of adaptation. Adaptation is the response mechanism through which “win-win” outcomes 
are most likely and the modality through which the most vulnerable must act and frame their 
responses (Adger et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 1998; Galloway McLean, 2010; Howell, Capstick & 
Whitmarsh, 2016; Moser, 2017; Pelling, 2011; Swart et al., 2003). Further, there is substantial 
attention to equity issues in mitigation of climate change. Mitigation “is a core principle of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” (Adger et al., 2006, p. 2), although 
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limited to narrow concerns about citizenship and, political actions around emissions rather than 
“multiscale and multifaceted” conceptions warranted by climate change (Adger et al., 2006, p. 
1). The lack of ethico-political attention to what is emerging as the most impactful and holistic 
locus of action, adaptation, therefore underscores why a reflexively participatory disposition 
underpins this dissertation.  
The study examines a range of adaptation initiatives on the margins to see how they 
communicate the impacts and adaptation to ascertain the core elements. My hypothesis is that the 
communicative triggers for adaptation, which are fundamentally embedded across spheres of life 
with high perceptibility, are decisively different from those of mitigation and require greater 
focus on action to awareness than awareness to action. This endeavour may reveal the degree to 
which decision-making and institutional functioning impact the nature of effective adaptation 
action and the attendant communication process(es) required. This is a key step because at 
various scales in climate change: global (Backstrand, 2011; Biermann, 2011), regional 
(Kiwanuka-Tondo & Pettiway, 2016), national (Paavola, 2006) and all scales, including 
community (multiple (Pelling, 2011)), involves procedural and distributive justice (Adger et al., 
2006; Figuerora, 2011; Routledge, 2011; Capeheart& Milovanovic, 2017; Gardiner, 2011), 
which are intertwined with multilevel institutions and procedures of collective action, primarily 
dialogic (Adger et al., 2006; Carvallo, 2008; Dutta, 2011; Moser, 2010; Regan, 2007).  
While the culture-centric participatory framework outlined paves the way to pursue 
empowerment and articulate rights strategically, it is not explicitly primed for articulating and 
realizing justice as it manifests in the environmental domain. Although philosophically 
congruent with my disposition, the nuanced perspectives in the literature on the politics of hope 
(Bennett, 2011; Lear, 2006; McIntosh, 2008; Orr, 2011; Stoknes, 2015), much like critical 
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perspectives on participation and articulations of empowerment as ends within themselves, lack 
tools for action that can address the materiality of climate impacts with due attention to the 
multiple planes of action and likely outcomes. To attenuate this, Pelling’s (2011) 
conceptualization of adaptation is integrated. Pelling’s adaptation framework goes beyond the 
transitionality that characterizes Gardiner’s (2011) view of the future amidst the Anthropocene 
and offers a structure for making sense of the pathways available to humanity that is useful for 
outlining the terrain of action and the material outcomes associated with the pathways pursued.  
Pelling (2011), the first to offer a comprehensive analysis of the social dimensions to climate 
change adaptation, conceives of adaptation as a dynamic process that presents an “opportunity 
for social reform, for the questioning of values that drive inequalities in development and our 
unsustainable relationship with the environment” (p. 9). This reading foregrounds power 
asymmetricities as consequential for climate change impacts and responses and is guided by 
Rawl’s (year) normative framework (cited in Pelling, 2011) for the realization of justice that 
“prioritizes human rights over public good, holds the social contract between citizens and the 
state in dynamic tension” (p. 12) and calls for governance “principles that ensure inclusive 
governance and seek to enhance the quality of life of the poorest” (p.12). This normative frame is 
compatible with Gardiner’s (2011) call for an “ethics of transition” (p. 319). 
 In concert with this view, Pelling (2011) offers a tripartite “resilience—transition—
transformation” framework (p. 81) for delineating and probing the full range of adaptive choices 
that must be made at various levels across societies. These three layers are pathways or terrains 
of actions that clarify how varieties of the politics of hope can be enacted in a participatory 
fashion. The first, resilience, is consistent with the isolation and mild-rectification frame 
highlighted by Gardiner (2011). It “refers to refinement of actions to improve performance 
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without changing guiding assumptions or the questioning of established routines” (Pelling, 2011, 
p. 37), but compounded actions could result in tipping-points that lead to transition.  
The second and third elements, transition and transformation, are significantly different 
(though not unrelated) as they allow for varying engagement with the socio-political elements 
embedded in this complex reality that one seeks to address. Transition, according to Pelling 
(2011), is tantamount to incremental social change; modest modifications are made and existing 
rights are exercised, which positions it within the mild-rectification and neutrality frames noted 
by Gardiner (2011). However, compounded incremental actions can lead to a tipping point 
towards more radical outcomes and it is these tipping points that are of primary interest. On the 
other hand, transformation includes the explicit assertion of/demand for “new rights and changes 
in political regimes” (Pelling, 2011, p. 3), particularly the enactment of bivalent justice 
mechanisms. Transformation therefore points towards “radical change” (Pelling, 2011, p. 10) 
and is the pathway of most theoretical and practical interest to me given my profound interest in 
responses commensurate with the challenge in the context of compounded vulnerabilities 
(historical and current). The power dynamics and inevitable contestations of this 
conceptualization of adaptation lay bare means, pathways or terrains of action that are not 
necessarily inequitable or equitable and context (physical and cultural) will be determinative.  
The connections between all three levels or pathways for action, to the extent that 
incremental action at one end can result in action oriented towards other elements, even in a 
countervailing manner, warrant an understanding of climate change communication’s role 
commensurate with an interest in the politics of hope in both the material and philosophical 
sense outlined. This is important because communication is essential for changing social systems 
(Gumucio-Dagron & Tufte, 2006; Rogers, 1962, 1973; Schramm, 1964). Further, the theoretical 
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frame presented makes clear that the future and invariably the climate change communication 
needed, is multiple. One can speak of communication for climate resilience, transition and 
transformation, which are unrecognized in contemporary climate change communications 
research. The contention is that optimizing climate change communication requires 
understanding the modalities commensurate with the differential challenges associated with 
each, delineating how reflexive and action-oriented communication can enable progressive and 
ethical tipping points towards the vanguard model (Gardiner, 2011), transformation (Pelling, 
2011) or radical material realization of the politics of hope (Lear, 2006; McIntosh, 2008; Orr, 
2011) and how communities and other adaptation actors enact these communicative acts. The 
multiple ways in which adaptation occurs—autonomous, spontaneous or passive and planned, 
per Carter (cited in Pelling, 2011); reactive, concurrent and anticipatory (Burton, Kates, & 
White, 1993), maladaptation (Moser & Dilling, 2007), their scale (Smit et al., 2000; Splash, 
2007; Stern (2006) and time-horizon (Pelling, 2011) will also certainly impact the nature of the 
communication. It is for this reason that my theoretical frame is consistent with my decision to 
address this fundamental communication challenge that affects the pursuit of sustainable 
development within the field of communication for development and social change. Distilling 
the modalities commensurate with the differential challenges associated with each pathway and 
delineating the ways how communication can enable progressive tipping points towards 
transformation is premised on this study’s privileging of Waisbord’s (2014) reassessments of 
strategic diffusionist actions that eschew participatory binaries in favour of embedding strategic 
issues and actions, participation and co-equal communicative actions to achieve social change 
and empowerment. Guided by the non-essentialist view of culture adopted and Dutta’s (2011) 
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culture-centric purview, this theoretical disposition is consistent with the communitarian 
perspective. 
Conceptually, social change for empowerment and climate justice is congruent with the 
transformation pathway (vanguard model) and progressive tipping points leading towards such 
radical change that Pelling’s (2011) framework highlights. Consistent with the culture-centric 
participatory purview this study privileges, the process is “directed at changing marginalizing 
social structures,” which is distinct from efforts within the mainstream framework that seem to 
alter individual behaviour change (Dutta, 2011, p. 26). This ontological opening means how we 
conceptualize social change impacts the associated strategies developed and how they are 
implemented (Dutta, 2011; Gumucio-Dagron & Tufte, 2006; Melkote & Steeves, 2015) across 
adaptation pathways. The tipping points across adaptation pathways, for instance, typify the 
pursuit of strategic social change that foregrounds the role of communication solutions in 
addressing challenges associated with climate change. Specifically, “social change issues are 
framed within a broader communicative lens within which solutions are proposed and acted upon 
to bring about change in the social systems” (Dutta, 2011, p. 29).  
So, quite consistent with my contextualization of the rationalization for this study, my 
theoretical disposition, which is underscored by conceptual and practical commitment to the 
critical assessment and improvement of development agendas, accords a functional role to 
communication as envisioned with the communitarian paradigm—notably, the examination of 
the role of “information, communication and the media in directed and non-directed social 
change, including a variety of practical applications based on the mainstreaming of 
communication as a “process” and the leveraging of media technologies in social change” 
(Thomas, 2014, p. 7). The privileging of change realized through “ongoing, culturally and 
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socially relevant communication, including dialogue among providers and clientele and within 
the recipient group itself” (Servaes, 2008, p. 15.) is indicative of the consensus in the literature 
that a dialogical social process is essential for enabling social change. 
Conclusion 
The chapter outlines a reflexive, holistic and critical culture-centric theoretical 
framework that enables the delineation of the varying roles and modes of activation for 
communication to aid the realization of three different levels of climate change adaptation 
actions. The theoretical framework outlined connects the discrete enterprise of climate change 
communications research with the established field of communication for development and 
social change, particularly participatory development communication and associated 
empowerment modalities associated with the Just Sustainabilities paradigm. In addition to 
clarifying insights on how communication ought to be employed amidst complex 
macrosociological change with geologic interconnections, this theoretical perspective shifts from 
a reductive and instrumentalist problem formulation that isolates a complex phenomenon. 
Instead, the reflexive and relationist disposition adopted lays bare the differentiating existential 
implications (human, non-human) and the fundamental societal reformatting and dissolutions at 
the level of the quotidian, multilevel systems and governance. This nuanced approach positions 
climate change as an urgent global challenge with long-term implications forsustainable 
development, questions of justice and equity. The next chapter offers a detailed presentation of 
the methodological procedure employed to pursue this critical agenda and make clear how the 
holistic and critical participatory culture-centric theoretical framework outlined guided those 
methodological decisions. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
Both the extant literature and the critical-culture centric theoretical frame I have outlined 
indicate a fundamental ethico-political gap in climate change communication research that, at 
minimum, warrants special attention to be accorded to those disproportionately impacted by 
anthropogenic climate change. Traditional and indigenous communities that are sustained by 
their relationship with the natural environment are widely accepted to be among those 
disproportionately affected because of their low adaptive capacity, which is a product of a 
multiplicity of vulnerabilities that are variably connected or unconnected to, but exacerbated by, 
climate change. These vulnerabilities include historical atrocities such as genocide, slavery and 
colonialism; systemic injustices such as capitalist enclosure, infringement of rights (human, 
property and cultural); and a myriad of related low development indicators. This compounded 
existential threat that disproportionately affects the margins, the persistent challenges in crafting 
effective engagement modalities overall and those specific to their distinct cultural dynamics, as 
well as their current and anticipated exposure to unparalleled climate change warrants critical 
assessment at both the global and local levels for two fundamental reasons: first, the narrow and 
narrowing window of opportunity for effective action (urgency or existentialism); second and 
relatedly, a paucity of policy and programmatic interventions based on “the self-determination 
ethos, cultural values, human capabilities and dignity rather than the catch-up thesis (Ojo, p. 95, 
2013),” which now underpins contemporary climate change action, including communication 
modalities and techniques, because of the existential impetus.  Consistent with Graham (2001), 
who speaks to the socio-cultural and political nature of development, Ojo (2013) deems the latter 
to be consequential for sustainable development and social change.  
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To tackle this consequential gap in accordance with my ethico-political disposition, I 
have undertaken a critical assessment of global climate change communication processes (macro 
case/analysis) and the implications for social change in a cross-section of vulnerable traditional 
and indigenous communities where adaptation initiatives are underway (micro cases/analysis), 
and will articulate the foundations of a more robust global climate change communication 
agenda based on the various adaptation pathways they pursue.  
My objects of study in this two-tier critical comparative analysis are a) the 1.5˚C to Stay 
Alive campaign in relation to the Paris Agreement (2015) on Climate Change and b) three 
original multilayered case studies in relation to global climate change communication processes, 
including the COP agreement and the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign. The first (macro-level) 
critical case has been selected because it uniquely permits analytic generalization about the 
potential of climate change communications to shape outcomes in domains of power (global 
policy-making). It is important to probe this global campaign alongside the discrete country 
cases because it articulates the needs of the most vulnerable nation-states and people to climate 
change at a landmark juncture. Particularly, the campaign held the scientific and moral high 
ground in articulating an existential concern, functioned amid unprecedented global public 
support, consensus in climate science, and with the clout of the improbably named “high 
ambition coalition.” The landmark nature of the Paris Agreement, a culmination of more than 30 
years of antagonisms that involved more than 195 countries committing nationally determined 
action plans, also underscores the distinct opportunities my case selection presents for 
understanding if and how attendant contentious climate (and environmental) justice ambitions 
can be advanced successfully using cogent multilevel campaigns.  
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The macro-level analysis outlined is complemented by an examination of the efficacy of 
theories and modes of communication used in climate change communication and strategy in 
both conceptual and practical terms when leveraged to enable social change in diverse micro-
contexts (economically, socially, culturally, ethnically and climatically). The study includes three 
original qualitative case studies focused on indigenous and traditional communities spanning 17 
villages across Belize (four), India (seven), and Fiji (six) where climate adaptation initiatives are 
underway (see Appendix D). My country cases were systematically selected to reflect the 
economic, social, cultural, climatic and geographic diversity of climate vulnerability and risk 
affecting indigenous and traditional communities globally. This collective case approach, which 
includes both coastal and farming communities, enabled me to interrogate how dominant and 
external climate change communication modalities interact with traditional (indigenous) 
retentions in key livelihoods sectors that are directly impacted by both traditional practices and 
climate change. Crucially, the collective case approach facilitates triangulation, which will 
enable me to outline a set of globally relevant recommendations about how best to optimize 
communication processes in indigenous and traditional communities in accordance with their 
adaptation pathways that go beyond the narrow focus on the Global South that only accounts for 
a specific economic, geographic and climatic reality.  
Paradigmatic Considerations 
To empirically study people’s adaptation actions/community adaptation pathways and 
delineate how they arrive at and pursue these decisions necessitates both a theory and 
methodology for studying their decision-making processes. Consistent with Gladwin’s (1980) 
study of non-adoption of agronomic recommendations, I employ a theory of choice whereby 
“people, in choosing between two alternatives, do not make complex calculations of the overall 
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worth or utility of each alternative” (p. 10). As such, people use procedures to simplify their 
decision-making processes. Gladwin (1980) states: 
 Hierarchical models or trees, with decision criteria at the nodes or branching points of 
the tree, can represent such procedures.  […] A decision tree is thus a sequence or series 
of discrete decisions criteria, all of which have to be passed along a path to a particular 
outcome or choice. (pp. 11). 
Analytical units are individually (codes) and collectively (thematic groups/code groups) 
employed in this study to map these decision-making processes. Given the complex nature of the 
problem under investigation, the centrality of context and culture in structuring vulnerability, 
adaptive capacity, perception and action, as well as their interrelatedness, I delved into the 
quotidian to discover the particular criteria decision makers use in specific contexts to move 
beyond unconverging the mere psychological processes involved (as Gladwin (1980) did and 
many of his contemporaries do), which, though useful to a (neo)diffusionist or instrumentalist, is 
insufficient to enable the transformational social change this project privileges. Indeed, delving 
into the quotidian is resource intensive as (Atton (2014), Gladwin (1980), Moser (2010) and 
Rodriquez (2001) note, but it offers a unique opportunity to contribute critical baseline 
information necessary to enrich macro level pronouncements, guide action at multiple levels and 
is of evaluative significance from a project perspective. In concert with my theoretical frame, I 
primarily used focus groups and interviews to unearth people’s reasoning rather than positivist 
instruments that yield facts and data as they would be inconclusive when patterns of action, core 
decisions/indecisions, degree of adaptive capacity and vulnerability are observed.  
These elicitation techniques reflect a conscious effort to use appropriate methodologies culturally 
(highly oral contexts) and ethically (balances literacy variance where they exist). The extensive 
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participant observation the researcher invested in this project includes living among and working 
with most of the study populations during the seven-month data collection process, as well as the 
settings in which interviews and focus groups were conducted (e.g. around ritualistic “grog 
sessions” and honorific events in Fiji). This reflects both the researcher’s commitment to the 
ethico-political and culture-centric purview that underlies the project and an overall commitment 
to Barker’s (1980) contractual view of the data collection process. Barker (1980) notes: 
 
The data collection process is part of a social contract between a researcher and local 
people, and cultural context in which they are to be used, and are tailored to the abilities 
and requirements of the community in which he works (p. 301).  
 
So, consistent with Barker (1980), I have found a compromise between the field 
techniques of anthropology and those of mainstream western social science, but while I 
eschewed the centrality of questionnaires, I do not entirely subscribe to Warwick’s (1973, cited 
in Barker, 1980) contention that participant observation and survey research are two extremes of 
a continuum of techniques (p. 305). In fact, I fully recognize that there are more useful 
frameworks than this survey-participant observation continuum, but their full exploration would 
warrant prohibitive resources. 
Research Questions  
My complementary macro and micro level cases are motivated by two sets of questions. 
The first, the macro-level case, includes five questions. In exploring these questions, I will 
undertake a comprehensive critical case analysis that contextualizes the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive 
campaign’s success in shaping the Paris Agreement with due consideration to scientific 
consensus, global policy structures, policy, ideology and economics, as evidenced by the critical 
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ontological disposition outlined in my theoretical chapter. A similar outlook will characterize my 
interpretive framework, particularly my determination of success and broader methodology.  The 
first set of questions is as follows: 
1 On what basis are proponents of 1.5˚C to Stay Alive proclaiming success?  
2 How does the manner in which the campaign demands are included in the Paris Agreement (2015) 
advance and/or undermine its emancipatory potential?  
3 What factors contributed to the success and/or failure of the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign?  
4 What lessons do the 2015 iteration of the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign present for future climate 
change campaigns from the Global South?  
5 How do global and national climate change communication processes reflect the voices, needs and 
traditions of indigenous communities?  
The second set of questions concern the interface between global or macro level climate 
change communication efforts and traditional and/or indigenous retentions. These questions are: 
1 What principles, communication modalities, messages and channels drive or are used in climate change 
communication aimed at indigenous and traditional communities?  
2 What retentions exist in indigenous and traditional settings that are or can be used to adapt to a changing 
climate?  
3 Are traditional and indigenous practices included in official climate change communication planning and 
action? a.) If yes, how? b.) If no, why not?  
4 How are climate change communication campaigns and programmes accounting for indigenous culture 
(food sources, farming and building practices, health, employment options), climate perceptions, 
attribution of cause, knowledge levels, climate risk and aspirations (food sources, farming and building 
practices, health, employment options)?  
5 How do various indigenous and traditional demographics (clans, tribes, gender, employment and status, 
various group/activity membership, education and age) view and respond to climate change? 
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6 How do indigenous and traditional communities conceive of climate justice?  
7 What similarities and differences are there in indigenous and traditional conceptions of climate justice 
versus global narratives, namely the 1.5 to the South-South led Stay Alive Campaign? 
8 How can climate change communication aimed at indigenous communities be used to improve 
livelihoods?  
9 What can global climate justice efforts learn from indigenous and traditional communities? 
10 How should global climate justice movements incorporate indigenous and traditional notions of climate 
justice? 
11 How can global climate change responses better reflect indigenous and traditional experiences and 
aspirations? 
The Macro-Cases 
My analysis of the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign includes a close reading of the campaign 
platform in relation to the Paris Agreement (2015) and semi-structured qualitative interviews. 
The campaign operated on two levels: a) the general audience pop-culture thrust, including 
videos, social media postings and a website; b) the negotiating platform that clearly articulated 
an 11-point demand anchored by the title of the general audience campaign. I examined the 
campaign’s success using a coding procedure in two stages—coding the campaign documents 
and focusing on the Paris Agreement. Both stages of coding were conducted line by line using 
the qualitative analysis software, ATLAS.ti. I used this software because it produces various 
automatic outputs suitable for multilevel analysis of complex coding of policy documents. Using 
this tool, I reviewed the demands articulated at both levels of the campaign and critically 
assessed if and how they are captured in the Paris Agreement. To achieve this, I used a case 
specified discursive rubric (coding), outlined in Table 2 (below), to examine how many of the 
campaign demands are captured in the Paris Agreement and how they are taken into account. In 
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enacting this discursive process to determine the campaign’s success, a critical interpretive frame 
that is consistent with my ontological and broader methodological approach, especially keen 
attention was paid to the campaign’s core demands: one, four, eight and 11 (see Figure 1). My 
discursive rubric for representation of campaign demands includes probity for unqualified 
inclusion (as intended), modified inclusion with precision (such as differing financing 
commitments and differing temperature rise limits), qualified inclusion (if, when, upon 
investigation) or included but made optional, as detailed below.  
Upon completion of my close reading of the 11-point campaign platform, I reviewed 
rolling updates published by the campaign on its official website in the 30 days preceding and 
following the Paris Conference (a six-week period), including issue highlights/briefs, news 
summaries and the campaign’s official song, to identify how accurately they reflected the official 
11-point demand and what points were emphasized (frequency).  I coded the material using an 
eleven-point numbering system to identify demands that are reflected in the general audience 
campaign and the frequency with which they are championed. The numbering or coding of 
campaign demands in the Paris Agreement (2015) corresponds to the numerical listing of each 
campaign demand as represented in the campaign’s official publication, “How important is COP 
21?” (CCCCC, 2015). Simultaneously, I coded for twelve categories of information to ascertain 
a more granular and substantive understanding of the official 11-point campaign demand that 
featured in the general audience material. The categories were designed to reflect the emphasis 
of each of the eleven campaign demands. 
Table 2: Discursive rubric employed for the macro-case. 
Category Demand Description 
Protocol 1, 11 Statutory nature of the agreement and applicability 
Adaptation 
 
 
2 
Proposals/activities that will improve/transform systems to withstand climate change-
induced impacts (except compensation for past damage and general financial 
mechanisms) 
Loss and 
Damage 
3 Assessment and redress for past damage, including financial compensation for damage 
already done. Excludingcapacity building activities, adaptation or coping measures 
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 that aren’t expressly compensatory 
Mitigation 4 Activities aimed at limiting/curbing climate change, include temperature targets, 
exclude technological transfer and monitoring of mitigation commitments 
Technology 2,9 Transfer of machinery/equipment and software. Exclude transfer of technical training 
on processes (capacity building) and funding for technology (finance) 
Capacity 
Building  
2 Skills building and exchange activities, excluding the transfer of technology, 
adaptation proposals and compensation frameworks 
Monitoring  5, 10 Review cycles for mitigation activities and implementation of adaptation mechanisms, 
exclude specific activities/actions 
Verification 5, 10 Provisions for measuring reporting and authenticating commitments 
 SIDS 6, 9 Provisions focused on the special circumstances of Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) 
Frontiers 7 Provisions for supporting the needs of vulnerable developing countries (exclude SIDS) 
Finance 8 New/expanded climate financing mechanism, exclude SIDS specific and frontier 
specific provisions 
Compliance 11 Mechanism to ensure enforcement/adherence 
I established frequency using ATLAS.ti’s query tool that produced a formatted Excel 
output with an overview of code frequencies by documents that was further filtered to facilitate 
varied comparisons. This procedure enabled me to determine the degree to which the core of the 
platform was advanced. Points of emphasis (tallies of frequency) are assigned chronological 
alphabetic ranking from A (strongest) to L (weakest).  
Similarly, I conducted a rudimentary content analysis (underpinned by the alpha-
numerical and categorical systems articulated) to identify if, how and the frequency with which 
the campaign demands are captured in the Paris Agreement (2015). Upon completion of my first 
engagement with the Paris Agreement, another reading was undertaken using ATLAS.ti to note 
how the campaign demands are captured. A symbolic system was employed to demarcate 
campaign demands that are captured in the same terms (unqualified), modified (included with 
precision, such as a specific financing commitment that differs and specific temperature rise 
target that differs) and those advanced with caveats (if, when, upon investigation). Campaign 
demands that are rendered optional and those that are explicitly rejected are independently 
coded. Upon completion, the software was used to produce a series of reports to facilitate a 
comprehensive review of the findings of my content analysis. This comprehensive review was 
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undertaken in conjunction with another review of the campaign’s 11-point platform to establish 
which campaign demands are excluded. Campaign demands that are unaccounted for are 
interpreted as an implicit rejection or an ad hoc measure that can still be realized bilaterally. 
Interviews and Sample Selection (Macro-Case) 
To bolster the legitimacy of my critical case analysis, I probed my findings by conducting 
semi-structured interviews with two randomly selected representatives from the Caribbean’s 
climate change negotiating team. The two interviews were semi-structured because this approach 
best facilitates probity and contextualization of the findings realized from my extensive coding. 
This exercise was conducted after my content analysis and critical comparative reading of the 
campaign platform in relation to the Paris Agreement (2015). The interviews were intended to 
test and probe my findings, specifically why the core of the campaign fared as I have determined 
(partially successful) with respect to the Paris Agreement and the framing of the broader set of 
demands. This exercise in probity strengthens my critical case analysis by enabling me to 
accurately contextualize my findings, specifically around areas I have identified as successes and 
failures.  
The probing procedure outlined is of high importance as it will buttress the potential of 
my study to inform future climate action by ensuring key challenges, networks and/or 
relationships, procedures, among other things, are noted. So, contextualization is central to my 
analysis and inclination toward praxis. I sought this through interviews as it is not sufficiently 
discoverable through the coding of my object of study—nor is it actionable and meaningful 
enough when contemplated solely within the conceptual framework I have constructed. Through 
semi-structured interviews, I tapped into the subjects’ unique insights from their involvement in 
the crafting of the specific campaign demands and key role in negotiating for them during COP 
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21 in Paris. This process yielded nuances about why some demands were achieved, while others 
are parsed, rejected or are unaccounted for that enriched my analysis beyond the purely 
conceptual reading of global environmental politics that motivated this study. 
My interview sample has been limited to two representatives from the Caribbean region 
for convenience as negotiators change frequently and require onerous clearance procedures to 
speak given their sensitive roles. However, the sample is representative because of broad 
uniformity in policy articulation and proclamation of success in identical terms across the island 
blocs. Crucially, too, my sample of two independently conducted interviews facilitated 
triangulation, which enabled me to capture nuances and posit highly contextualized findings 
about the reasons for the nature of the campaign demands’ inclusion and exclusion from the 
Paris Agreement.  
 As anticipated, the critical analysis of the campaign within the context I have posited 
revealed that the intractable nature of global climate change politics undermined its 
emancipatory potential and lacks nuanced contemplation of cultural idiosyncrasies, including 
traditional retentions and practices that can be leveraged for effective action in vulnerable 
contexts.  
An Overview of the Micro-Cases 
The macro-level analysis outlined is complemented by an examination of the efficacy of 
theories and modes of communication used in climate change communication and strategy in 
both conceptual and practical terms when leveraged to enable social change in diverse micro-
contexts (economically, socially, culturally, ethnically and climatically). The study includes three 
original qualitative case studies focused on indigenous and traditional communities spanning 17 
villages across Belize (four), India (seven), and Fiji (six) where climate adaptation initiatives are 
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underway (see Appendix D). My country cases were systematically selected based on established 
institutional connections (non-governmental organizations, regional institutions and university 
research departments) across borders that could reflect the economic, social, cultural, climatic 
and geographic diversity of climate vulnerability and risk affecting indigenous and traditional 
communities globally. This collective case approach, which includes coastal, farming and 
hinterland communities in conservation zones, enabled me to interrogate how dominant and 
external climate change communication modalities interact with traditional (indigenous) 
retentions in key livelihoods sectors that are directly impacted by both traditional practices and 
climate change. Crucially, the collective case approach facilitates triangulation, which will 
enable me to outline a set of globally relevant recommendations about how best to optimize 
communication processes in indigenous and traditional communities in accordance with their 
adaptation pathways that go beyond the narrow focus on the Global South that only accounts for 
a specific economic, geographic and climatic reality.  
The 17 field sites or villages were selected systematically from field lists (documents 
with project descriptions and the names of villages and hamlets where they were implemented) 
provided by five organizations and one independent community animator or ICA (the Pacific 
Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development (PaCE-SD) and Professor Joeli Veitayaki 
(an ICA) in Fiji; Protection of Remote Agency and Guaranteed Action for Tribal Improvement  
(PRAGATI) Foundation and Laya Foundation in India; and Ya'axche Conservation Trust and the 
Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) in Belize). The 17 villages are 
associated with seven distinct climate adaptation projects (two each in Belize and India, three in 
Fiji) and were implemented by the five organizations and an ICA that provided the master lists 
from which the systematic site sampling was enacted. As outlined in Appendix: Countries-
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Projects-Villages, two projects were implemented by PaCE-SD under different mechanisms at 
different times in Fiji.  
The organizations and ICA were identified based on a mixture of publicly available 
databases about climate change adaptation projects implemented no longer than five years prior 
to the Paris Agreement i.e. 2010 to the present (PaCE-SD in Fiji); the researcher’s environmental 
network (the ICA in Fiji; PRAGATI Foundation and Laya Foundation in India; and Ya'axche 
Conservation Trust in Belize), and pre-existing relationships (CCCCC in Belize). They were 
engaged based on availability and willingness to disclose project details, be interviewed and 
connect the researcher with the communities in which they worked. In exchange, the researcher 
provided cost-neutral consulting support on a range of non-related institutional priorities. 
After establishing these institutional relationships, the researcher systematically selected a 
representative sample of villages from the field lists provided by each entity using all the 
applicable criteria outlined below, in addition to some subset (village/project site clusters) 
peculiarities non-randomly established around the axis of the first macro-level criterion. These 
contextual determinations are detailed in the more granular description of the sampling 
procedure for each subset in the subsequent section. However, the four operative criteria 
employed are: 
1. Exposure to at least one climate change and/or environment-oriented project up to five 
years prior to the Paris Agreement (COP 21) 
2. Communities are marked by farming and/or coastal activities  
3. Resident populations are primarily officially classified as indigenous/traditional 
4. Communities are homogeneous in terms of caste 
Consistent with the highly contextualized culture-centric purview that guides this project, 
 79 
 
the fourth macro-level criterion only applies to the Indian case for complementary ethical and 
scientific reasons. In other words, the application of the fourth criterion allowed the researcher to 
simultaneously respect the yeoman endogenous strides made in limiting the destructive impulses 
of casteism (ethics) without compromising to account for a key cross-social group dynamic 
(caste identity) where it is present and actively structures the sociological order, including 
undermining adaptive capacity (scientific).  
The third criterion is especially important as any discussion of indigenous peoples begins 
with controversy (Fleras, 1999). As such, I have employed the practical definition of indigenous 
people set forth in my introduction (one of three outlined by Niezen (2003) that is consistent with 
my theoretical framework’s non-essentialist and nuanced relationist reading of culture in 
accordance with Couldry and Curran (2003) and Mouffe and McClure (cited in Rodriquez, 
2001). However, all my indigenous villages fit the three definitions (legal or analytical, practical 
and collective) outlined by Niezen (2003). 
 The second criterion ensures the case is consonant with the impetus of the overall study, 
which is to accord special attention to the experiences and prospects of those most vulnerable to 
climate change impacts due to the centrality of their connectedness/existential relations with the 
environment. It is therefore intended to enable me to interrogate how dominant and external 
climate change communication modalities interact with traditional retentions in key livelihoods 
sectors that are directly impacted by both traditional practices and climate change. The first 
criterion uniquely allows me to link the micro-level cases with the macro-level case and the 
broader intention to optimize climate change communication at multiple levels. 
My field engagement spanned seven months – two months in Belize and India and three 
months in Fiji. However, both the Indian and Belizean cases followed prior engagements. 
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Previously, I conducted 24 semi-structured interviews and five site visits in India with the 
requisite university level ethics approval for a related climate justice project. I also returned to 
Belize having worked there extensively, with established regional, national and community level 
relationships and institutional support that were readily activated to pursue the case, which 
uniquely combines opportunities to study climate change in an indigenous community context on 
both the mainland and tropical island spaces. 
This seven-month qualitative study includes textual analysis of project documents 
associated with the seven climate change adaptation initiatives (Belize – two, India – two and 
Fiji – three) underway in my study sites, including communication aimed at my units of analysis 
during the project, extensive participant observation, several site visits to project installations, 55 
semi-structured focus groups and 22 semi-structured individual interviews. Both focus groups 
and individual interviews were conducted using a common set of guiding questions (See 
Appendix O). 
 
Per Table 3, the study has an overall sample population of 300 (Belize 74, India 121, and 
Fiji 105) drawn from 19 percent of the adult population and 47 percent of households in the 
combined field sites. The sample composition is also marked by high macro-group variation and 
representativeness in terms of gender (47 percent women) and age (40 percent youth – between 
18 and 30 years old) (see Appendices: Sample Profile Fiji, India and/or Belize). While the 
Table 3:  Overall Sample Profile 
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sample size is moderate at only a fifth of the total adult population in the combined field sites, it 
is consistent with and accompanied by methodologies commonly used to draw inferences for 
developing broad theoretical conclusions and recommendations.  
Overall, participants were recruited using a relatively fluid non-random quota procedure 
that accounts for a combination of factors: engagement with the climate change activity 
underway in their community (direct or indirectly), the nature of their engagement with the 
project (collective or individual), gender, age and ethnic identity. The researcher eliminated 
education and livelihood roles as factors because of uniformity in educational levels and the 
conformity between gender, age and livelihood roles, which is captured by the age and gender-
oriented focus group format outlined below. A cross-section of the factors were outlined and 
socio-cultural dynamics were used to determine when, how many and who were invited for 
semi-structured individual interviews and whether a subsequent focus group was needed for 
triangulation and probity of particularistic factors.  
Consistent with the culture-centric theoretical frame outlined and the contextual nature of 
the sampling procedure, in particular, the sampling technique varied to some extent (e.g. the 
ethnic factor was only relevant in the EU-GCCA-Seaqaqa Subset in the Fijian case), but 
logically across villages and will be detailed for each village subset in the subsequent section. 
However, focus groups were generally conducted with four cohorts defined by gender (two male 
and two female cohorts) and age (two older (over 30 years old) and two younger (between 18 
and 30 years old)) and included four to six persons drawn from different households (non-
random quota procedure). There are three notable exceptions. First, the Gau island villages in 
Fiji, where gender was a differentiating factor in terms of direct engagement and socio-cultural 
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imperatives (status, rootedness and gender) dominated such that it merited individual interviews 
with a specific subset of older men (16 across three villages) rather than focus groups.  
Second, the Trio Village from the Ya'axché Conservation Trust subset of villages in 
Belize, where an additional focus group was held with members of the Trio Cocoa group, a 
distinct group of cocoa farmers who are managing a landmark agroforestry concession area in 
which climate-smart agriculture is being pursued. This group merited special attention as it 
transcends standard demographic variables and may reveal distinct interpretations, knowledge 
levels and perceptual valence relevant for boosting engagement and adaptive capacity in an 
integrated manner (climate change and livelihoods). It also uniquely allowed the researcher to 
tap into what Moser (2010) sees as a paucity of cross-social group comparisons in climate 
change communication research to see how group identity other than the standard macro markers 
impact climate perceptions.  
Third, instances where socio-cultural, inter-ethnic and economic dynamics altered the 
demographics of the villages such that some cohorts were absent (young people in general (San 
Miguel Village in the Ya’axché Subset in Belize, or young women in particular (Nellikota  
Village in the Laya Subset in India)), opportunity sampling was warranted to account for gender 
and ethnic representativeness (EU-GCCA-Seaqaqa Subset in the Fijian case), and a mixture of 
individual interviews and focus groups were used for directly engaged project beneficiaries to 
probe clusters of knowledge (Gau Island Subset in Fiji), as well as to account for climate change 
impacts on inter-ethnic relations (EU-GCCA-Seaqaqa Subset in the Fijian case). 
The consonance between age, gender and sectoral or livelihood roles in each context (e.g. 
women go fishing or source household protein in Fiji or tend household gardens in India and 
Belize, while men source staples for household consumption and some commercial prospects, 
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build homes and tend to animals) means the sampling approach yielded focus groups that were 
prime for probity well above the researcher’s anticipation. It afforded probity for clusters of 
knowledge, awareness, practices, aspirations, agency, perception of risk, cause, responsibility, 
action and inaction about key areas of climate vulnerability across critical macro group nodes. 
Fiji Sample Profile 
 
Table 4: Fiji Sample Profile 
 
 
The Fijian case includes a sample population of 105—56 men and 49 women. The 
sample was drawn from six field sites (villages and settlements) on three different islands. The 
selected sites include Malawai Village and Lamiti Village on Gau Island; Seaqaqa, an atypical 
multi-ethnic, tripartite settlement (Rokosalase, Navudi, and Navai) on Vanua Levu; and Yaqaqa 
Village, the sole community on Yaqaqa Island. 
The six field sites were selected using three macro-level factors: 
1. Exposure to at least one climate change and/or environment-oriented project prior to the 
Paris Agreement (COP 21) 
2. Resident populations are primarily and officially classified as indigenous or traditional  
3. Communities are marked by farming and/or coastal activities 
Initially, in all instances, the sites or village subsets selected using the criteria above were 
among a range of other villages that have benefited from the same intervention (the first 
selection criterion). So, consistent with the critical culture and contextual ethos of the project, the 
first criterion was used as an entry point and formed an axis around which key project level 
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sampling refinement decisions were made.  This contextual determination is consistent with the 
non-random selection procedures employed at the macro level.  
Seaqaqa 
The tripartite multi-ethnic settlement of Seaqaqa was identified as the sole project 
beneficiary of an European Union – Global Climate Change Alliance (EU-GCCA) adaptation 
initiative implemented by PaCE-SD. Navai, the most engaged of the three settlements was 
initially identified as a field site, but the researcher determined that studying all three sections of 
the settlement was feasible, consonant with the cross-group and culture-centric purview and met 
the selection criteria. This is primarily because of the distinct ethnic configuration in the 
settlement, which offered a unique opportunity to see how a rare inter-ethnic composition 
(iTaukeis and Indo-Fijians living in proximity) in the Fijian context is or could be affected 
amidst climate change impacts, action and observable differences in adaptive capacity. Crucially, 
the atypical inter-ethnic composition conforms with selection criterion two. 
Yaqaga Village 
Yaqaga Village, the only population on the island of Yaqaga Island, benefited from a 
climate change adaptation initiative supported by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) that was implemented by PaCE-SD in three villages across two of the 
three provinces in Vanua Levu (Yaqaga village in Bua Province and the villages of Korotasere 
and Vusasivo in Cakaudrove Province). Yaqaga Village was selected because of two factors that 
manifestly exacerbate its vulnerability: a) it is the most isolated (only island of the three and with 
no road network, etc.); and b) is the only village of the three without a creek and/or river.  
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Gau Island  
 The Vanouso Tikina Project was implemented across villages on Gau Island at various 
periods by Professor Joeli Veitayaki, an ICA who is from the island (Kai Gau), specifically 
Malawai Village (Kai Malawai). It was determined that focusing on a sample of the six villages 
(now five free-standing entities) that have been engaged the longest (from the pilot phase) would 
be most useful. Malawai Village was selected because it is one of only two villages that 
demonstrated a lack of preparedness to commence the project but is the only one that was still a 
free-standing village/settlement. Lamiti was selected because it was among the three free-
standing villages with the most challenges (Vanuas and Nacavanadi), all of which overlapped, so 
proximity (or convenience) to Malawai (the first site), as well as the fact that it now hosts the 
residents of Naovuka (the remaining pilot), which had the most reported challenges during the 
pilot. This resulted in three of the six pilot villages being sampled on Gau (or two of the five 
currently free-standing villages), which provided a representative look at the intervention. 
These three sites are distinct in terms of composition and the nature of the climate change 
intervention to which they were exposed. Therefore, a non-random context/culture-centric 
procedure that accounts for gender, age, livelihoods practices and engagement with the climate 
change action/interventions in the community was used to identify a representative sample for 
both semi-structured interviews and focus groups. See Appendix E for village-level sample 
profile and data. 
Sampling in Fiji 
Seaqaqa  
The sample includes 30 people (34 percent of the adult population). It includes 13 women 
and 17 men. Three specialist interviews were conducted with individuals who held singular 
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roles associated with the settlement (selected based on their role rather than gender). These three 
individuals do not reside in the village and as such are not included in the sample totals. The 
significant divergence in the gender composition of the sample for the Seaqaqa village subset is a 
consequence of contextual factors, namely the absence of young women due to marriage, the 
pursuit of education in urban centres and general depopulation induced by limited opportunities 
and a downturn in the viability of the sugar industry, the main economic activity in the area. (See 
Appendix E for village-level sample profile and data.) 
No official gender disaggregated data exists for each section of the cane-farming belt as 
they do not form independent political entities. However, women represent 43.33 percent of the 
interviewed participants, which is indicative of a representative sample on two counts: first, high 
overall representativeness in terms of households reached as the sample included at least one 
person from 92.06 percent (58 of 63) of households; second, the comparable gendered 
representation, despite the general absence of young women from the village, which suggests 
men outnumber women substantially. Household representation was determined through both 
recruitment and pre-interview (individual or focus group) vetting by strategically engaging 
people from different households and asking new recruits about the households they belong to, 
respectively. Only five couples were interviewed.  
A mixture of focus groups, individual interviews, participant observation while living in 
the settlement for two weeks and site visits to project installations were employed in Seaqaqa. I 
conducted six focus groups (four with men and two with women), seven individual interviews 
(six with men and one with a woman), as well as three specialist interviews that were warranted 
by contextual imperatives (general communal leadership structure with direct responsibility for 
the project, among other things (an Advisory Counsellor); an institutional beneficiary of the 
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project (Headmaster of the local school); and relevant opportunity sampling (the presence of a 
corporate sugar representative). 
Sampling Procedure 
Interviewees were selected using culture and context-centric non-random selection 
criteria that account for gender, age, livelihoods practices, engagement with the climate change 
action/intervention associated with their village and the atypical ethnic diversity in the three 
sections of the settlement. Opportunity sampling for individual interviews was utilized twice in 
accordance with these criteria in instances where ethnic and age distribution were in flux.  
The Seaqaqa sample included six individual interviews with primary project 
beneficiaries, two from each of the three sections of the settlement that were engaged by the EU-
GCCA project. The near homogenous ethnic make-up of each section ensured a representative 
distribution of both Indo-Fijians (traditional population) and iTaukeis (indigenous population). 
These primary project beneficiaries were all middle-aged men by virtue of the gendered nature of 
work and land ownership patterns (men farm and generally own/manage the land as women tend 
to move for marriage etc.). 
Six semi-structured focus groups were also conducted using the criteria outlined. The 
first of these focus groups functioned as a testing group to probe the views of the individually 
interviewed primary project beneficiaries that also afforded the researcher an opportunity to 
observe the inter-ethnic and cross-locality interactions in this atypical multi-ethnic, tripartite 
Fijian settlement. To facilitate the testing procedure, the individually interviewed men were all 
invited to participate in a focus group. Four of the six participated. The other four focus groups 
included two with older men, one with younger men, two with older women. There was no focus 
group for younger women because of their absence from the settlement due to customary 
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migration for marriage, pursuit of education in proximal or distal conurbations and general 
depopulation induced by limited opportunities and a downturn in the viability of the sugar 
industry, the main economic activity in the area. Young men, too, are largely absent due to the 
same factors (except marriage) and opportunity sampling was used to interview, one young man 
who met the selection criteria, in order to broaden the subset as only three participated in the 
focus group, and my non-random procedure requires a minimum of four for each cohort. Two 
focus groups with older men (other than the testing group) and women were conducted to ensure 
representativeness across the three sections of the settlement being studied. For men, one of the 
focus groups included four men (three from Navundi and one from Navai, both sections are 
occupied by Indo-Fijians), so a third was conducted with three men from Rokosalase (occupied 
by iTaukeis) to ensure consistent and representative sampling across various areas of the 
settlement that invariable captures the ethnic composition. 
Of the two focus groups with women, the first included seven participants, the majority 
(five) of which were from Navai (one each from Rokosalase and Navundi). So, a second was 
held, which was attended by five women, four of whom are from Navundi. As such, the 
researcher used opportunity sampling based on the criteria to interview one woman from 
Rokosalase to achieve a more representative distribution of women across the three sections of 
the settlement: Navai – five, Navundi – five and Rokosalase – three. 
Young men (18 to 30), also largely absent from the village due to the factors outlined 
above, were only found in the Rokosalase settlement. A focus group was held with the three men 
who met the criteria, including residency—which was imperative as transient workers were in 
the area—and an individual interview with a fourth (opportunity sampling, as described above). 
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These interviewees were selected based on customary associative patterns, specifically their 
membership in a cane-farming gang and belongingness to the settlement. 
With respect to older men, I conducted six individual interviews with primary project 
beneficiaries (men over 30) and three focus groups. As outlined above, the first of these focus 
groups functioned as a testing group to probe the views of the individually interviewed primary 
project beneficiaries, which also afforded the researcher an opportunity to observe the inter-
ethnic and cross-locality interactions in this atypical multi-ethnic, tripartite Fijian settlement. To 
facilitate the testing procedure, the individually interviewed men were all invited to participate in 
a focus group. Four of the six participated. The second focus group included four men (three 
from Navundi and one from Navai), so a third was conducted with three men from Rokosalase to 
ensure consistent sampling across various areas of the settlement that invariably captures the 
ethnic composition.   
Yaqaga Island: Yaqaga Village  
This sample includes 21 persons, which is more than a quarter of the adult population on 
the island. It includes eight women and 13 men. As with Seaqaqa, young women are largely 
absent from Yaqaga Village, the only population centre on the entire island, due to the pursuit of 
education in proximal and distal conurbations, customary practices that cause women to move 
for marriage, as well as transient seasonal work opportunities on neighbouring islands with more 
infrastructure and opportunities. (See Appendix E for village-level sample profile and data.) 
Sampling Procedure 
Interviewees were selected using a culture and context-centric non-random selection 
criteria that accounts for gender, age, livelihoods practices, engagement with the climate change 
action/intervention associated with their village and the traditional structure of the village 
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(matanqalis – clans comprising relatives, which includes toka tokas – discrete or individual 
family units). Owing to the village's small size, dense web of familial ties and the communal 
rather than targeted nature of the disaster risk reduction (climate change) intervention associated 
with the community, as well as the culture-context selection framework employed, semi-
structured focus groups and participant observation were the primary methods employed at this 
field site over a two-week period living among the population. Four focus groups and two 
individual interviews were conducted. However, the two semi-structured individual interviews 
were conducted based on opportunity sampling. The first was done to achieve representativeness 
for the younger women category and was done in accordance with the criteria. The second was 
used to probe insights from an older male about his inventiveness that emerged across focus 
groups.   
Consistent with the approach at other field sites, the focus groups were conducted with 
age-based gendered categories to ensure the sample captures the most salient macro-group or 
demographic categories in the village: women over 30 (five), men over 30 (eight), young men 
i.e. 18-30 (five), and young women i.e. 18 - 30 (two). In addition, the researcher ensured each 
focus group included at least one representative of each toka toka (family) from each matanqali 
(clan) that had a full-time presence in the village (three of four). The focus group with older men 
included both the head of each matanqali (traditionally all men, except in one instance where a 
woman chief deffered leadership to her eldest brother) and the head of a toka toka (one in each, 
in this village) and/or his matavanua (spokesman, also from the same family or clan). 
Gau Island: Malawai and Lamiti Villages  
The sample includes 54 interviewees (26 men and 28 women) drawn from across two 
neighbouring villages (Lamiti and Malawai), which represents 27 percent of the adult population 
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in both villages (54 of 203); and 52 percent of all households (49 of 95) of the combined village 
populations. (See Appendix E for village-level sample profile and data.) 
The sample included 16 individual interviews (nine in Lamiti and seven in Malawai), six 
focus groups (three in each village) and participant observation over a three-week period. 
Interviewees were selected using a culture and context-centric non-random selection criteria that 
accounts for gender, age, livelihoods practices, engagement with the climate change 
action/intervention associated with their village and the traditional structure of the village 
(matanqalis/clans, which includes toka tokas/families). The 16 individual interviews include one 
with a religious figure from Malawai that was conducted to further probe a religious current that 
emerged during the focus groups, a methodological decision that is consistent with the contextual 
reflexivity that underpins my research agenda. The other 15 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with directly engaged participants from each household in each village. Given the 
culture/context-centric methodology, they were selected using the traditional structure that maps 
proportionally with households in the village.  
Specifically, the head of each toka toka (family) in each of the seven matanqalis or clans 
(four in Lamiti and three in Malawai) that had full-time presence in the each of the two villages. 
Of the four matanqalis or clans with their 11 corresponding toka tokas (families) in Lamiti (four 
in Tacilevu; three in Burelevu and Naocoqolo each; and one in Salavova), 10 met the criteria but 
an eleventh interview is also included in the sample (opportunity sampling) as one of the first 
order interviewee’s health necessitated aid from his son, whose insights significantly 
influenced the primary interviewee and on many counts emerged independently and was 
captured accordingly. In Malawai, of the three matanqualis or clans with their seven 
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corresponding toka tokas (three in Nauluvatu and Kasavu each; and one in Namuani), six met the 
criteria. All these individual interviewees were men.  
However, sampling them individually was necessitated by an even broader range 
of distinguishing factors. Cultural and contextual realities such as belongingness/rootedness, 
which is expressed as Kai Malawai or Kai Lamiti (born and raised in the village), is almost 
exclusively held by men as women move elsewhere for marriage. These rooted interviewees, 
who reflect a representative sample of the households and all matanqalis (clans) and toka 
tokas (families), were also most likely to be directly engaged in the project and could draw upon 
a longer range of observational knowledge about the context and the specific climate adaptation 
initiative underway in their locality. This approach, therefore, allowed the researcher to access 
historical insights about climate change induced-impact in the study site that is unique to 
these men who are the most rooted segment of the village population.  
 Consistent with the approach at other field sites, the six focus groups were conducted 
with age-based gendered categories to ensure the sample captures the most salient macro-group 
demographic categories in the village: two with women over 30 (15 participants: seven in Lamiti 
and eight in Malawai), and two with women below 30 (13 participants: seven in Lamiti and six 
in Malawai), and two focus groups with men below 30 (eight participants: four in each 
village). Consistent with the selection criteria outlined, the researcher ensured each focus group 
included at least one representative of each toka toka (family) from each matanqali (clan) that 
had a full-time presence in the village (three of four). No focus group was held with older men in 
this village because saturation of views was quickly observed, which suggests their views were 
sufficiently captured in the semi-structured individual interviews. The absence of social fault-
lines (such as ethnicity in Seaqaqa) in this communal context did not necessitate a focus group. 
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Unlike Yaqaga Island, which has a similar communal and traditional structure, the Gau Villages 
were large enough and engaged in a more comprehensive set of climate change activities to 
necessitate individual interviews. 
The India Sample 
 
Table 5: India Sample Profile 
In
di
a 
Adult Pop. In 
Field Sites Sample 
Households 
in Field Sites 
Households 
Sampled Men Women 
Focus 
Groups Youth  
Total 645 121 133 62 66 55 8 53 Rate 19% 47% 55% 45% 44% 
The sample for the Indian case is 121 (66 men and 55 women). The sample (see Table 5) 
was drawn from Adivasi hamlets or indigenous tribal villages that are associated with two 
distinct climate adaptation initiatives. 
The seven field sites were selected using four macro-level factors: 
1. Exposure to at least one climate change and/or environment-oriented project up to five 
years prior to the Paris Agreement (COP 21) 
2. The communities are marked by farming and/or coastal activities  
3. The resident populations were primarily officially classified as indigenous/traditional 
4. The communities are homogeneous in terms of caste 
Consistent with the critical culture-context purview that guides this project, a fourth macro 
factor was needed to identify the field sites in India (factor four). As described in the 
methodological overview, it was employed for complementary ethical and scientific reasons. 
Ethically, it allowed the researcher to honour the yeoman endogenous strides made in limiting 
the destructive impulses of casteism (ethics); and scientifically, the researcher could honour his 
ethico-political consciousness without compromising on accounting for a key cross-social group 
dynamic (caste identity) where it is present and actively structures the sociological order, 
including undermining adaptive capacity. 
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Using this rubric, seven Adivasi hamlets or indigenous tribal villages were selected from 
across East and West Godavari in Andhra Pradesh, South India. Consistent with the critical 
culture and contextual ethos of the project, the first criterion was used as an entry point and 
formed an axis around which key project level sampling refinement decisions were made. The 
climate change activities used as my entry way were led by two entities: PRAGATI and Laya 
Foundations. Both social service organizations coordinate a myriad of activities variably 
associated with climate adaptation across hundreds of indigenous tribal hamlets, so 
project/organization-specific criteria were crafted to complement the four macro-factors and 
identify a representative subset of villages from the larger set that met the macro-criteria. 
Representativeness was established by prioritizing those exposed to core rather than tangential 
climate change and environmental activities.   
Accordingly, the four hamlets associated with the PRAGATI project were determined 
using the following criteria: two to four villages that have benefited from at least two of the 
following adaptation project activities: 1) community forest management; 2) nursery and plant 
distribution for ecosystem strengthening; 3) land and water development. Similarly, villages 
associated with the Laya project were determined in accordance with the following criteria: two 
to four villages that have benefited from at least two of the following three project activities: 1) 
community forest management (especially the System of Rice (and Ragi) Intensification (SRI) 
and agroforestry); 2) Low carbon farming; 3) women who participated in the learning and 
education programmes and project leadership activities. Where multiple villages met the criteria 
outlined, geographical spread, community reception to outsiders and convenience were used to 
select sites. See Appendix F for village -level sample profile and data. 
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The Belize Sample 
 
Table 6: Belize Sample Profile 
B
el
iz
e Adult 
Pop. 
in 
Field 
Sites 
Sample Households in Sites 
Households 
Sampled Men Women 
Focus 
Groups Youth 
Total 438 74 449 70 37 37 15 35 Rates 17% 16% 50% 50% 47% 
 
 
Per Table 6, the sample for the Belizean case is 74 (37 women and 37 men). The sample 
was drawn from four villages and is associated with two distinct climate adaptation initiatives 
that were implemented in dissimilar and discretely settled ethnic communities (Quiché Mayans, 
an indigenous population and Creoles, a traditional community).  
The four field sites were selected using three macro-level factors: 
1. Exposure to at least one climate change and/or environment-oriented project prior to the 
Paris Agreement (COP 21) 
2. Resident populations are primarily, and officially classified as indigenous or traditional  
3. Communities are marked by farming and/or coastal activities 
Using this approach, four villages were selected – three Quiché Mayans in southern Belize, 
and one Creole village in western Belize. Consistent with the culture and context ethos of the 
project, the first criterion was used as an entry point and formed an axis around which key 
project level sampling refinement decisions were made. The climate change activities used as my 
entry way were led by two entities: Ya’axché Conservation Trust, ostensibly an NGO, and the 
Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC), a regional organization. Both entities 
coordinate a myriad of activities across communities, so project/organization specific criteria 
were crafted to identify villages exposed to their core rather than tangential climate change and 
environmental activities. Accordingly, only one village, Flowers’ Bank Village, was studied for 
the Caribbean Climate Community Project as it was the only village engaged under the selected 
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project: The Cohune Palm Nut Renewable Energy Project (henceforth, the Cohune Palm Nut 
Project). The communities that benefited from the project implemented by Ya’axché 
Conservation Trust were Trio, Medina Bank, Indian Creek, Golden Stream, San Miguel and 
Silver Creek, of which three (Trio, Indian Creek and San Miguel) were selected based on the 
following criteria: engagement: Trio has had the most sustained engagement under the project 
and is the biggest beneficiary with the agroforestry concession in Maya Mountain North Forest 
Reserve; all other villages had comparable levels of engagement and outcomes and Indian Creek 
was selected because it is the most recent village in the subset to be engaged by Ya’axché. Given 
the comparability in engagement levels across the remaining villages, San Miguel was selected 
to account for geographical distribution across the MGL reserve area (variation in inter-village 
location and dispersal across the reserve).  
No individual interviews were conducted because project beneficiaries were engaged 
collectively at demonstration sites, workshops and groups meetings. Therefore, focus groups 
were conducted in all villages in four cohorts defined by gender (two male and two female 
cohorts) and age (two older and two younger), including four to six individuals drawn from 
different households. Consistent with the contextual nature of the sampling procedure, an 
additional focus group was held in Trio with members of the Trio Cocoa group, a uniquely 
organized group of cocoa farmers in the MGL region who are managing a landmark agroforestry 
concession area in which climate-smart agriculture is being pursued with support from Ya’axché. 
Cocoa farmers in the village who are not members of the group were excluded. As detailed in the 
methodological overview, this group merited special attention as it transcends standard 
demographic variables and may reveal distinct interpretations, knowledge levels and perceptual 
valence relevant for boosting engagement and adaptive capacity in an integrated manner (climate 
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change and livelihoods). It also conforms with my critical contextual and culture-centric purview 
that uniquely allows me to address what Moser (2010) sees as a paucity of cross-social group 
comparisons in climate change communication research and contribute to collective 
understanding of how group identity other than the standard macro markers impacts climate 
perceptions. See Appendix G for village-level sample profile and data. 
Method of Analysis for the Micro Cases  
The study is fundamentally committed to privileging the views of the study population. 
This endogenous culture centric philosophical commitment is evident in the researcher’s use of 
grounded theory. Codes and themes were all developed progressively based on close reading of 
the transcripts from each study population in each country and then systematically collating 
similar representations to form fluid code groups (See Appendix A). The analytical units evolved 
progressively with each additional country case (See Appendix B and C, respectively).    
 An array of data sources was used in this multi-staged second phase of the study, 
including the review of project documents and reports for seven projects, 28 interview 
transcripts, 60 focus groups transcripts and copious field notes progressively compiled during 
participant observation and site visits. The multi-staged analysis yielded a progressively 
developed codebook or rubric with 173 defined codes and 20 meta analytical units called code 
groups or themes (see Appendix A). However, as detailed in Appendix A, only 15 of the code 
groups or themes are relevant for the study overall. Five are solely for the demarcation of 
contextual information relevant for understanding projects conceptually and operationally (four 
specific to the project documents: Project Framework, Project Action and Causes Profiled, 
Project Outcomes, Project Activities; and one associated with the transcripts: traditional 
practices. Further, the code group schooling is non-functional due to the near uniform nature of 
 98 
 
educational levels across all study populations. The remaining 14 thematic units constitute the 
core analytical framework employed by this study for each country case. The progressive 
development of this framework, which is premised on the coding procedure detailed below for 
each country in consequential order, makes clear the remarkable resilience of the interpretative 
framework, particularly the meta analytical units (code groups). Data analysis for each country 
case was conducted in each field country during the research period indicated below. The 
analysis was done in accordance with a common three-tiered, progressively granular analytical 
framework that is detailed in the section following the progressive, country-level description of 
the coding process that gave rise to the analytical rubric presented in Apprendix A. 
Fiji (August 1 to October 30, 2017) 
On completion of data collection in the first field country (Fiji), the researcher enlisted 
the services of two transcribers from the field contexts with the requisite bilingual linguistic 
competence warranted by the socio-linguistic environment to generate detailed transcripts in soft 
copy format. Hardcopies of the transcripts were reviewed, followed by first cycle-coding free-
coding (manually). This process entailed demarcating meaningful segments within the transcripts 
that are resonant with the core research questions or informed the researcher of contextual 
realities. A mixture of discrete codes, a word or short phrase that succinctly captures the 
demarcated utterances and “in-vivo” coding (verbatim utterances of high significance that could 
not be immediately linked, condensed or defined) were employed. On completion, the data was 
reviewed and all “in-vivo” codes were assigned discrete codes. A total of 133 codes were 
identified, collated and defined to establish a referential rubric or codebook. The data was then 
imported into the qualitative analysis software, ATLAS.ti, and a second-cycle coding exercise 
was enacted to identify the ideas embedded in the data set using the rubric established. 
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To minimize the occurrence of errors during the coding process and improve the internal 
reliability of the data set, two interviews were coded separately by two coders prior to 
performing the second-cycle of coding. Each coder was given a copy of the ‘codebook’ which 
explains and illustrates what each code signifies (see Appendix A for the final codebook, and 
Appendix B for the first or Fijian iteration). The inter-coder reliability rate was found to be 84 
percent. The high inter-coder consistency is largely due to two factors: a) the use of a linguistic 
taxonomy (codes) derived from rather than projected onto the transcripts; b) relatedly, the codes 
emerged from a stable experiential and interpretive range (similar contexts and culture) about 
discrete actions, customs, perceptions, angsts, natural events and shared livelihoods. The 
marginal inter-coder inconsistency is in part due to the coder’s perception of overlaps between 
some codes. This was confirmed upon completion of the second-cycle coding process and the 
production of reports showing the prevalence of codes that allowed similarities and relationships 
between and among codes to be more readily noted. 
India (November 2 to December 30, 2017) 
On completion of data collection in India, the researcher enlisted the services of two 
transcribers with the requisite bilingual linguistic competence warranted by the socio-linguistic 
environment in the field contexts to transcribe the focus groups and generate electronic 
transcripts that were manually reviewed using the rubric established in Fiji, while adding new, 
discrete and “in-vivo” codes to label data fragments that were definitionally non-associative with 
the rubric. On completion of this manual, first-cycle coding, the researcher reviewed and refined 
the list of codes by varyingly combining linked references that inferred similar sentiments but 
were differentiated by a) socio-linguistics (teri-tree planting, mangrove, among other tree 
planting references associated with preventing erosion became “tree planting/aforestation” while 
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tamboo, no catch, no take became tamboo/no take); geologic/environmental features (mountain, 
hill, beach and river erosion became soil erosion, while concerns interpolating proximity to 
waterways, e.g. coastal dwellers and river dwellers became “Coastal/Riverside Dwellers”). In 
addition to linking commonalities, the researcher noted the new codes that emerged due to 
context (primarily due to the physical location – forest reserve versus coast, culture, nature of the 
project intervention – integrated or targeted domains) and transformed the “in vivo” codes into 
discrete codes. A total of 23 new codes were identified, defined and incorporated into the 
referential rubric or codebook and one code was modified to make it more encompassing (see 
Appendix C). The data was then imported into the qualitative analysis software, ATLAS.ti, and a 
second-cycle coding exercise was enacted to identify the ideas embedded in the data set using 
the rubric established. 
Consistent with my approach in Fiji, I assessed the reliability of the rubric prior to 
conducting the second-cycle of coding. This was done to minimize the occurrence of errors 
during this crucial second-cycle coding process, gauge the internal reliability of the data set and 
sustain the integrity of the study. Two interviews were coded separately by two coders prior to 
performing the second-cycle of coding. Each coder was given a copy of the expanded 
‘codebook’ which explains and illustrates what each code signifies (see Appendix A for the final 
codebook, and Appendix C for the subsequent Indian and Belizean iterations). The inter-coder 
reliability rate was found to be 78 percent. Despite a marginal fall in the inter-coder reliability 
rate, the researcher proceeded with high confidence as the rubric showed remarkable resilience 
across vastly distinct experiential, environmental, linguistic, cultural, climate adaptivity and 
country contexts.  
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Belize (January 5 to March 15, 2018) 
Similarly, on completion of data collection in Belize, the researcher enlisted the services 
of three transcribers with the requisite trilingual competence warranted by the socio-linguistic 
environment in field contexts to transcribe the focus groups and generate electronic transcripts 
that were manually reviewed using the evolving rubric. As with India, new, discrete and “in-
vivo” codes were added to code data fragments that were non-associative with those already 
established. On completion of this manual, first-cycle coding, the researcher reviewed and 
expanded the rubric. A total of 11 new codes were identified, defined and incorporated into the 
referential rubric or codebook (see Appendix A for the final codebook, and Appendix C for the 
subsequent Indian and Belizean iterations). The data was then imported into the qualitative 
analysis software, ATLAS.ti, and a second-cycle coding exercise was enacted to identify the 
ideas embedded in the data set using the rubric established.  
Consistent with my approach in both Fiji and India, I assessed the reliability of the rubric 
prior to conducting the second-cycle of coding. This was done to minimize the occurrence of 
errors during this crucial second-cycle coding process, gauge the internal reliability of the data 
set and sustain the integrity of the study. Two interviews were coded separately by two coders 
prior to performing the second-cycle of coding. Each coder was given a copy of the expanded 
‘codebook’ which explains and illustrates what each code signifies (see Appendix A). The inter-
coder reliability rate was found to be 81 percent. This high inter-coder reliability, in addition to 
two other critical factors, motivated the researcher to proceed with high confidence. First, there 
was varying consonance with both Fiji and India in terms of climate adaptivity, experiential and 
environmental factors. Specifically, the nature of the two climate change projects underway in 
Belize were varyingly similar to the those in India (agroforestry oriented); both were enacted in 
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interior or hinterland contexts similar to all the Indian sites, and the tripartite settlement of 
Seaqaqa in Fiji (3 of 7 sites in that case).  
Experientially and environmentally, the field sites in Belize also had significant 
geological formations (rivers and hillsides) that are also present in the Indian case that directly 
impacts climate change and livelihood experiences and responses (e.g. Flowers Bank Village is 
on the banks of the Belize River and the Indian Hamlet of Agraharam is on the banks of the 
River Krishna; homes are perched on unstable hillsides in Belize (Flowers Bank), India 
(Polusumamidi and Agraharam) and Fiji (Gau Island)). This high level of consonance on the 
counts detailed contributed to a second factor that sustains confidence in the rubric: the rubric 
showed remarkable resilience. The rubric’s resilience is evidenced by the absence of the need for 
further refinement of the improved units of analysis (namely the merging and multi-
focal/referential expansions enacted in India). This is a consequence of the levels of consonance 
noted, the researcher’s growing confidence and deep cultural and relevant professional ties to 
Belize. At a macro level, these observations are reinforced by the nature of the new codes added 
to the rubric. The majority (eight of 11) is associated with contextual imperatives: i.e. related to 
the peculiarities of the project (three project actions) or locality specific challenges (five angsts, 
which are functions of context and culture).  
Data Analysis: A Three-tiered Procedure 
Upon completion of the coding exercise in each field country, ATLAS.ti was used to 
produce a series of reports that were exported in Microsoft Excel format to facilitate varied 
assortative adjustments and comprehensive review of the data. This report production and 
comprehensive review was undertaken systematically in each field country at three levels: 
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 1) Macro-level: An overall thematic and code review to ascertain a top-level country and 
project view. This involved generating two sets of tables for each cluster of villages (village 
subsets) associated with each project: three in Fiji and two each in India and Belize. The first 
showed thematic prevalence and the second showed code prevalence for each village subset.  
This provided an overall picture of the code and thematic prevalence for each country case and 
enabled the researcher to make a range of top-level comparisons across project interventions.  
Tables showing thematic prevalence are presented throughout each case. However, macro-level 
group data are presented in the appendix. See Appendix H.1 to H.12, I.1 to I.12 and J.1 to J.12 
for Fijian projects on Gau Island, Yaqaga Island and Seaqaqa, respectively; K.1 to K.12 and L.1 
to L.12 for Indian projects associated with PRAGATI and Laya, respectively; and M.1 to M.11 
for Belizean projects). 
2) Meso-level: A comprehensive thematic analysis of village or project subsets to 
examine how various populations process climate change experiences, including the enactment 
of climate adaptation efforts associated with the identified project. This thematic analysis was 
enacted non-randomly. Each project or village subset was analyzed comprehensively in a logical 
thematic order that ensured the researcher could gauge thought development based on manifest 
thematic relationships, make associations and connect insights that progressively revealed or 
suggested decision-making patterns about climatic and project experiences, perceptions and 
responses (See Table 1). This is a methodological decision that is consistent with the theory and 
model of decision-making that guides my study. To undertake the thematic analysis of each 
village or project subset in the logical order established, a table was generated for subsets 
showing the prevalence of each code in the relevant theme or code group for each transcript 
(labelled using the age-gender, or other macro-group e.g. Cocoa Farmer’s Group in Trio Village, 
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Ya’axché subset, Belize). Each thematic analysis at the meso level was done gradually in relation 
to code prevalence (highest to lowest). At this stage, thematic and code comparisons across 
villages was conducted, observations established, expressed quantitatively (totals, ratios, 
percentages), while simultaneously re-examining the transcripts, my field notes and recollection 
to capture illustrative quotations, probe and contextualize the quantitatively suggested or 
emerging patterns. All cross-group (gendered, aged, specialized) comparisons at both the inter- 
and intra-village level (age, gender and engagement level analysis) remained uncontemplated 
until the third level of analysis;  
3) Micro-level: An analysis of the resonance of codes (prevalence) across villages, the 
age-gender axis (young men, young women, older men, older women) and engagement level 
(e.g. Trio Cocoa Farmer’s Group). During this granular analytical exercise, holistic thematic and 
code comparisons were made at the macro-group level both inter and intra village(s), 
respectively. Observations were established and expressed quantitatively (totals, ratios, 
percentages), while simultaneously re-examining the transcripts, my field notes and recollection 
to capture illustrative quotations, probe and contextualize the quantitively suggested or emerging 
patterns. Drawing on the rich tapestry of data and experiential knowledge uniquely allowed the 
researcher to contextualize gendered variances by interpolating socio-cultural and engagement 
factors. The detailed examination of macro-group variances within and across villages also 
allowed the researcher to identify outliers (a product of various factors) that further contextualize 
quantitatively suggested trends with varying valences along the gender-age and experiential axes. 
On completion of the thematic analysis for the villages associated with a project, the researcher 
proceeded with analyzing the data for other discrete projects in the same logic fashion. On 
completion, the analysis of the village subsets associated with each project is collectively 
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reviewed to further enrich the marco-level observations drawn and more revise the progressive 
linkages drawn between and/or across themes due to manifest cause/effect and correlative 
relations made clear by the logical order of the thematic review. 
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Chapter Five: Global Power & Politics: 1.5˚C to Stay Alive vs The Paris Agreement 
The quest to reconcile social justice with environmental protection has been central to 
negotiations and discussions at every major international meeting on sustainable development 
since the 1972 environment and development conference in Stockholm (Roberts and Parks, 
2007, p. 2). The tension between these two constructs, which manifest materially in terms of 
social, livelihood, economic and ecological costs, is pronounced in international climate change 
negotiation processes. This is especially so where the interests of the Global South—large 
emerging market economies such as India, Brazil and China—and the Global North collide. So 
central has this source of contention been that ahead of the 15th session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP 15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
in December 2009, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) which includes the highly 
vulnerable nations of the Caribbean and Pacific regions, framed their negotiating stance as 
“1.5˚C to Stay Alive”. The reprise of the existential “1.5˚C to Stay Alive” frame as a public 
campaign, alongside formal negotiations, ahead of the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, 
therefore, offers a near optimal point (and objects) of inquiry into the tensions between social 
justice and environmental protection. This chapter offers a critical assessment of concerted 
efforts by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to articulate, navigate and realize the inclusion 
of climate action priorities in the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015. This probing of efforts by 
the most vulnerable but least powerful states to articulate climate action priorities within the 
most consequential global climate change negotiation process, pays keen attention to issues of 
power and their myriad manifestations locally, namely through transnational policy articulation 
and the nature and scope of action.  
 
 107 
 
Core Questions and Roadmap 
Accordingly, this chapter probes four issues: 1) How do the power differentials structure 
climate change policy formulation? 2) Do the way the campaign demands are included in the 
COP 21 agreement undermine its emancipatory potential? 3) What factors contributed to the 
success of the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign? 4) What lessons do the 2015 1.5˚C to Stay Alive 
campaign present for future campaigns from the Global South? In a quest to answer these 
questions, this chapter first contextualizes the environment in which international climate change 
politics, policies and action is unfolding. As highlighted in the theoretical chapter, 
contextualizing the policy environment is imperative because global climate change policy 
formulation structures the nature and scope for climate change action across geo-political levels. 
The analysis pays keen attention to the deployment of influence through varyingly linked 
institutional mechanisms at the international, regional, national and sub-national levels using 
Stone’s networked reading of policy formulation, transfer and translation. Subsequently, the 
chapter reflects upon the campaign demands and consider how each demand is reflected in the 
Paris Agreement to establish the degree of success attained by the campaign in more precise 
terms than the generalized proclamations of success by campaign proponents. This critical 
comparative analysis will be leveraged to contextualize how and why each campaign demand is 
accounted for in the Paris Agreement using insights made amenable by the networked policy 
diffusion and translation (for action) conceptual frame. 
As indicated in the methodology chapter, this analysis is intended to yield findings that 
will form the foundation for future efforts to map a course of action for other South-South efforts 
such as the call for loss and damage, more ambitious climate financing and broader actions that 
advance the climate justice narrative in tangible ways. So, in pursuit of this improvement in 
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praxis, the chapter concludes by highlighting significant strategies that enabled and constrained 
success based on the examination of the object of study: the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign 
demands in relation to the Paris Agreement. 
Networked Policy Diffusion, Reformulation and Enactment 
 
Stone’s networked reading of policy formulation, transfer and translation is especially 
congruent with my theoretical articulation of the consequential nature of climate change impact 
and actions manifesting differentially across micro, meso and macro levels, while the scope of 
action necessitated by the Just Sustainability paradigm—climate justice in particular, is multi-
scaled and global. Stone’s networked framework uniquely enables the contextualization of the 
multidimentional reformulation of the phenomenon, differential emphasis on mitigation and 
adaptation from stakeholders across the globe and the levels of support accorded to varied 
thematic emphases that underpin robust climate change action. These thematic emphases include 
technology transfer, climate finance, loss and damage and adaptation in Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) and low-laying developing states. Very much in accordance with this study’s focus 
on multi-scaled integrated climate change actions, Stone’s networked reading of global policy 
formulation foregrounds the role of a tapestry of actors unconfined to the state. Leveraging this 
multi-organizational perspective, which the extant policy diffusion and translation literature 
construes in a primarily statist and intergovernmental manner, enables this study to probe the 
important role played by international organizations, private interests, the third sector and 
knowledge-based actors in structuring the range and nature of local adaptive efforts studied, 
cross-national experiences and the global climate policy agenda. This is especially important 
given that PANOS Caribbean and other regional NGOs, rather than individual states or 
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intergovernmental entities, such as AOSIS, led the iteration of the campaign under scrutiny 
(2015).  
Furthermore, PANOS’s informal and ad hoc connection with the official Caribbean and 
AOSIS negotiating machinery and embeddedness in international structures through a range of 
funding relationships and collaborations reinforce the need for a critical networked reading. 
Emblematically, the lead entity, PANOS Caribbean, is a regional non-for-profit organization that 
aims “to amplify the voices of the poor and the marginalized through the media and ensure their 
inclusion in public and policy debate, in order to enable Caribbean communities and countries to 
articulate and communicate their own development agenda[s]” (PANOS, 2019, para 2). 
However, this manifestly politically conscious Caribbean entity that, among other things, tackles 
environmental issues in accordance with this study’s participatory communication for 
development perspective, is chiefly funded by extra-regional entities. PANOS’s wide-range of 
primarily non-Caribbean funders include large NGOs and foundations, such as Catholic Relief 
Services and the Open Society Institute, respectively. Other funders are as varied as the official 
British, American and Nordic bilateral development agencies, national bodies such as the 
National Institutes of Health (USA) and supranational entities such as the European Union (EU) 
and several UN agencies. The structuring effect of funding in development activities through the 
prioritization of programmic activities means PANOS’ actions and leadership of the campaign is 
likely influenced by a multiplicity of factors in a myriad of non-linear ways. 
The networked perspective is also distinctly primed for probing the structuring impact of 
these multidimentional relationships and their associated goals. Consistent with the eschewing of 
binary dispositions and essentialism detailed in the theoretical chapter, the networked reading of 
the formulation, diffusion and enactment of policy ideas “stresses the role of agency, […] the 
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logic of choice, cognition and interpretation of circumstances or environment and (bounded) 
rationality in imitation, copying and modification by decision-makers” (Stone, 2001, p. 1). This 
liminal disposition underscores the differing political modalities of policy transfer (emulation, 
harmonization, elite networking and policy communities and penetration) and variability with 
which climate change policy diffusion functions even where direct support underpins 
organizational relationships. This nuanced perspective of policy diffusion and reformulation also 
includes divergence where negative or partial lessons are drawn (Ladi, 2000) and structures 
action at various levels. So, the policy network literature also “offers a method for understanding 
the politics of inter-organizational [or multi-actor] policy transfer [and outcomes]” across geo-
political levels (Stone, 2001, p. 14).  In particular, it lays bare the manner in which networks are 
increasingly cultivated and managed by states and international organizations both coercively 
through conditional reform and aid mechanisms (penetration) and less explicitly coercive 
mechanisms such as convergence. Convergence is fostered by interdependence and the high cost 
of divergence, which means international regimes establish norms that structure or harmonize the 
expectations of actors. Emblematically, convergence within supranational bodies such as the EU, 
which takes a unified view on climate change action and global commitments, means PANOS 
Caribbean’s direct and indirect dependence on the supranational entity through the official 
development agencies of Britain and the Nordic member states heightens the extent to which 
European climate policy priorities is likely to structure its programming. 
So, the networked perspective of climate change policy formulation, diffusion, 
reformulation and enactment aligns with the constructivist culture-centric disposition outlined as 
a foundational element of this study. Its emphasis on sociality and the emergence of inter-
subjective understandings transcends what the neo-Gramscian perspective is likely to deem as a 
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“process bounded by power [and] symptomatic of the spread of neoliberal hegemonic practices 
via knowledge networks” (Stone, 2012, 490). In fact, it foregrounds the salience of transfer, 
influence and motive patterns more akin to a pastiche. Emblematically, there is heightened 
import of knowledge in the international political economy, the emergence of inter-governmental 
and inter-sphere forms (state, private and third sector formations) of governance, including 
increasingly interdisciplinary evidentiary bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) and ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Kingdon, 1984) who promote policy ideas. More 
fundamentally, Stone’s conceptual tools clarify critical actors, namely the third sector and 
funding agencies, who are deeply engaged in the transfer of ways of knowing and seeing the 
world across geo-political levels, which has implications for the nature of climate actions 
privileged even on the margins of society because adaptive actions, particular the most 
consequential ones, are costly, often technically advanced and necessitates external support to 
establish and/or boost low capacity. The consequential nature of networked diffusion of climate 
change policies and actions and penetration of geo-political spaces, therefore, underscores the 
importance of this study’s employment of a critical participatory communication theoretical 
perspective that is both culture-centric and action-oriented. Specifically, the penetrative salience 
and consequences of networked diffusion show that the nature of the communicative processes 
adopted is central for mediating the interface between prevailing knowledge systems or 
worldviews and those transferred or diffused. In fact, it is likely determinative of the ethico-
political significance of climate change actions. 
Contextualizing International Climate Change Politics 
The emergence of the global climate change public policy network and the context in 
which the campaign under scrutiny emerged typifies why governments and international 
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organizations increasingly cultivate and manage frameworks for policy learning and action.  
Confounded by the geologic scale, likely permanence and initial uncertainty about its cause, 
several interdependent actors composing of NGOs, government and international organizations 
sought to tackle the shared geologic challenge through “information exchange, collaborative 
independent research, debate, a search for solutions and appropriate policy responses” (Stone, 
2001, p.14). This gave primacy to knowledge generation, information and analytic resource 
sharing necessary for policy formulation within and beyond the network. The emergence of a 
global climate change policy network gave rise to a range of “complex interrelationships 
between stakeholders and societal coordination” (Frohlich and Knieling, 2013, p. 9) at the global 
level, which inform action at the local level through policy articulation and crucial resources. 
This constitutes a governance structure with vast influence and is of great consequence for the 
realization of climate justice. Specifically, global structures such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Nobel prize winning United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UN-IPCC), functions as the chief policy 
and research orbits, whereas findings are readily diffused because of the wide adoption of the 
discourse and practice of knowledge and learning within international organizations. These 
organizations include the Global Environmental Facility, which facilitates a range of innovative 
and experiential initiatives, the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund), regional and national development banks and western development agencies.  
Furthermore, these institutional mechanisms, alongside the Green Climate Fund and the 
Global Adaptation Fund, form the core of climate finance funding, which reinforce the power of 
the global climate policy network that structures the orientation of global action on climate 
change. Akin to the GEF, the World Bank effectively leverages its knowledge base to diffuse 
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policy and programmatic approaches through initiatives such as the Global Development 
Network and the World Bank Institute (WBI). The WBI has a dedicated Environmental and 
Natural Resources Group for the cross-sectoral inclusion and promotion of sustainable 
development through programmes such as the Environmental Economics and Policy Network 
(Stone, 2004). This culture of knowledge exchange through cultivated networks results in the 
development of norms that foster both voluntary and involuntary policy adoption. Voluntary 
adoption is most common where the risks are greatest and internal capacity is most constrained 
(the Global South). As outlined earlier, it is fostered through both emulation and elite 
networking. However, involuntary diffusion is enabled by norm adoption through climate policy 
harmonization processes, such as climate risk and vulnerability assessments for development 
interventions. The Caribbean, which boasts an advanced intergovernmental climate change 
research and programmatic mechanism, including a United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research (UNITAR) ranked centre of excellence, is emblematic of these voluntary and 
involuntary mechanisms. The Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC), which 
leads policy and programmatic formulation based on extensive sector-specific climate modelling 
for the region, which offers precision absent from global modelling, is primarily presented in 
economistic and cost frames, as observed in the Belize Chapter with the adaptation project it 
managed in Flowers Bank Village and the risk management tool described below. This is likely a 
result of voluntary adoption of norms through elite networking processes and emulation brought 
forth by the embeddedness of Caribbean scientists in transnational scientific networks, including 
collaborative modelling efforts with European research centres and universities, namely 
Newcastle University and University of East Anglia. 
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Akin to harmonization within supranational bodies such as the EU, diffusive lesson and 
knowledge sharing means of enabling climate policy convergence such as elite networking and 
emulation are not manifestly coercive. However, they function alongside coercive or penetrative 
forms of policy diffusion. In the Caribbean scenario outlined, the totality of the over US$50 
million in climate adaptation activities undertaken by CCCCC (2004 to 2014), which crafts the 
basis for Caribbean specific policy responses such as those articulated in the campaign under 
scrutiny, was sourced from external bilateral partners, primarily the EU and member states 
(CCCCC, 2015). In fact, the CCCCC’s operating budget, much like that of PANOS Caribbean, is 
chiefly determined by project fees earned from their primarily externally funded programmes. 
So, policy diffusion and formulation are also likely structured by the longstanding practice of 
conditional programmatic inclusion, sectoral prioritization and other facets. In fact, the 
embeddedness of sustainable development, including contemporary practices of variable 
attentiveness to climate change, within the modernist development programming of both 
international and bilateral development agencies has been the primary means of global policy 
diffusion to the Global South over the last 70 years (Peters, 1997; Stone, 2001). While not as 
frontally coercive (penetrative in Stone’s formulation) as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund’s explicit demand for reform in exchange for development financing during 
various iterations of structural adjustment programmes, climate change-influenced objectives are 
both conditionalities for funding and measures of success in development programming across 
levels (international, regional, bilateral, third sector and increasingly the private sector). The 
Caribbean Development Bank, for instance, a regional variant of the Bretton Woods financial 
architecture, requires the use of the Caribbean Climate Online Risk Assessment Tool (CCORAL) 
to determine the climate sensitivity and risk management needs of the projects it funds. 
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Poignantly, CCORAL was developed by the CCCCC with financial support from the British 
state funded Climate and Development Knowledge Network and technical support from 
Acclimatise, a London-based climate consultancy indicative of the knowledge 
entrepreneurialism the networked perspective foregrounds as critical actors. 
However, voluntary and involuntary diffusion of climate change policy ideas and 
scientific facts among international organization, states, the third sector and other actors based on 
the findings generated by the global policy and scientific orbit materializes differentially. In 
some instances, translation and institutional limits undermine the efficacy of policy adoption and 
results in maladaptations at the level of policy and outcomes, as illustrated within Pelling’s 
(2011) politically inclined climate adaptation framework. However, a more decisive mitigating 
factor in the global climate change discourse has been the variable ways in which the diffusion of 
climate change policy ideas and knowledge has been adopted. The transnational policy literature 
from which Stone draws inspiration points to the situated nature of policy learning, which 
challenges the assumption that the diffusion of policy concepts is direct and singular. The notion 
of “learning” expressed as policy is contingent upon “cognition and the redefinition of interests 
on the basis of new knowledge which affects the fundamental beliefs and ideas behind policy 
approaches” (Hall, 1993, cited in Stone, 2001, p. 9). This suggests that policy transfer is a social 
and collective process founded on exchange between groups, which necessarily bring to the fore 
their own pre-existing dispositions. As outlined by Goldstein and Keohane (cited in Levy and 
Kolk, 2002), beliefs or ideology are central to the formulation of policy positions and outcomes, 
namely worldviews, principled beliefs and causal beliefs, even where they are drawn from a 
shared knowledge base such as the IPCC. Ideas, they contend, ‘‘define the universe of 
possibilities for action.’’ This brings to the fore issues of culture, religion, rationality, emotion, 
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ethnicity, race, class, gender, identity and historical experiences as pivotal factors in structuring 
how we perceive the world in which we operate. Indicatively, historical experiences, identity, 
culture and spatially informed rationality manifestly account for the Caribbean and AOSIS’s 
consistent policy support for contentious ideas such as the reparatory demands embedded in ‘loss 
and damage’ (see campaign platform) inspite of their dependence on primarily European states 
for climate financing and technical support. 
The centrality of a wide-range of socio-cultural subjectivities and their varied national 
and regional import in structuring and articulating national interpretive frames further 
underscores the generative value of the networked perspective for critically examining the 
efficacy of a campaign for collective and ambitious global action emanating from the global 
margins. It clarifies how this South-South effort successfully advanced a primarily existential 
message built around notions of climate justice. Embedding the notion of “climate justice” at the 
core of policy, media coverage and public opinion results in a “political frame around [Global 
South] risk and [Global North’s] responsibility” (Boykoff, 2010). Such a narrative is 
diametrically opposed to the Global North’s conceptions about economic growth, their viability 
as nation states and the cost of action they are largely expected to underwrite. These contrasting 
narratives are indicative of what Stone terms third order change, where policy diffusion results in 
divergence because contextual factors and wider societal forces also structures policy decisions. 
These factors include private interests, culture, and historical experiences.  
Consistent with the nature of policy divergence, in key sections of the Global North, 
global climate “policy outcomes are the result of material self-interest, bargaining power, and the 
ability to strong-arm weaker states through more coercive forms of power” (Roberts and Parks, 
2007, p. 5). As DeSombre (2000) contends, few nations can credibly threaten to not participate 
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or defect (bargaining power), particularly on an issue of existential import where risks are 
greatest in localities where capacity constraints (technological, monetary and technical) are often 
higher. Both Gruber (2000) and Martin (cited in Roberts and Parks, 2007) posit that the ability to 
change the status quo unilaterally and gainfully is limited to a select group of nations (wealthy, 
and in the Global North), that also has the ability to directly and indirectly (via networks) 
institute sanctions of various sort to influence the actions of other nations (coercive and non-
coercive power).  
In other words, the nature of the global climate change policy network constrains 
ambitious climate action by reinforcing power differentials and associated worldviews, beliefs 
and interests. The UN IPCC, for instance, by virtue of its dependence on agreement among states 
has had to balance politics with scientific consensus and has been heavily criticized for delaying 
its expression of certainty about the primary cause of climate change—anthropogenic activities. 
In balancing politics and scientific consensus, the intergovernmental entity is compelled to 
qualify its assertions of certainty through negotiation with states that give primacy to their 
economic self-interest and ideological dispositions in order to earn their approval for timely 
publications. The result is a degree of obfuscation that rids potentially powerful generative 
concepts such as “tipping points” of their potency for promoting self-efficacy (Russil and Nyssa, 
2009). So, while the UN IPCC does not have the same obviously skewed dispensation of power 
as evident in the UN Security Council where five nations hold a veto on global matters, it is still 
subject to the broader challenges that undermine policy outcomes in seemingly egalitarian 
intergovernmental entities such as the UN General Assembly and the exercise of the Global 
North’s soft power in diplomatic parlance or Ideological State Apparatuses, in Althussian terms. 
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The UNFCCC, which is a comprehensive articulation of the climate change challenge, 
what ought to be done and the global engagement process, constitutes the core of the global 
governance and policy framework. The Framework is widely regarded as strong for its focus on 
both adaptation and mitigation—the two ways in which climate change must be tackled—and 
notes the importance of effective communication, among other measures necessary for a 
comprehensive global response. However, the points of action noted by the UNFCCC require 
major investments and are necessitated to varying degrees by geography. In the latter case, much 
of the Global South advocates for adaptation measures to ensure that livelihoods are preserved 
amidst immediate and projected climate-induced changes that have both economic, social and 
environmental costs which they are unable to even remotely offset alone. Conversely, the Global 
North, by virtue of physical and psychological distance to immediate and projected impacts and 
the consequential (causative and preventative) role of their historical and contemporary 
economic model, often emphasizes mitigation.  
Both approaches are critical as the UNFCCC contends, however, the limited influence of 
the Global South has meant that the mitigation discourse dominated the conversation and flow of 
resources. Internationally, the core of global development financing flows from entities such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are chiefly guided by the 
motives of their dominant western shareholders and voting blocs. At a bilateral and third sector 
level, the flow of development resources is also structured by North-South flows.  In some 
instances, countries, namely the United States, Canada and Australia prohibited funding 
development projects with an explicit climate change focus for ideological reasons (climate 
denialism) and economic self-interest (protection of oil and coal sectors). The substantial 
requirement for monetary resources to address climate change is therefore a dominant 
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determinant of power in the allocation of climate resources globally and consequently, the ability 
of countries to act effectively and timely. That this form of power is largely held and dispensed 
by the Global North means its bargaining power diminishes that of the states most directly 
affected by climate change. As noted earlier, some countries in the Global North have exercised 
coercive or repressive forms of power directly in the allocation of their development resources 
and indirectly through disproportionate influence over critical segments of the global climate 
change knowledge, policy and resource network. So, the differential materialization of policy 
diffusion and action in response to a challenge framed in existential terms and a clear delineation 
of risk and responsibility within a geo-political context marked by national wealth and power 
differentials has material consequences in the Global South. 
However, the exercise of power and influence based on beliefs and worldviews has a 
degree of mobility, as multimodal cultural theory interpretive frameworks often demonstrate 
(Bellamy and Hulme, 2011). With respect to my object of study, this mobility is due to a range 
of factors, including strategic advocacy by varied interest groups and events that constitutes a 
tipping point that forces policymakers and influencers to rethink their course of action. In recent 
years, the Global South has advanced both a rational and moral position often framed as “climate 
justice,” which is also reflected in the multilevel negotiation processes in positivist and 
livelihoods terms. This scientific and existential framing around risk and responsibility privileges 
robust climate financing, compensation for “loss and damage” and keen focus on adaptation 
efforts. Such advocacy, combined with major events (tipping points) such as Hurricane Sandy 
that devastated New York and New Jersey (major centres of power and influence in the Global 
North), has likely contributed to a shift in the Global North’s disposition towards climate change.  
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Since COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico, the Global North agreed to fully equip the Green 
Climate Fund to the tune of US$100 Billion (Leslie, 2013). While a significant elevation of 
adaptation measures at the global level, the rules governing the fund still reflect the worldview 
and priorities of the Global North. This is most palpable in terms of the nature of the entities that 
have been certified to tap and utilize these resources: eight of the last 13 institutions to be 
accredited are development banks (national and intergovernmental actors) or investment funds 
(private actors) that operate in accordance with the priorities and Bretton Woods entities, that 
enforce neoliberal orthodoxy (Caribbean Climate, 2015). Consistent with the privileging of 
economistic frames at the expense of adaptation’s justice implications noted in the theoretical 
outline, these institutions do not prioritize intangibles, including alternative livelihoods projects 
that are difficult to quantify and often take years to result in manifest changes along the narrow 
time horizons of development projects. The onerous conditionalities associated with these 
resources, including reporting procedures, also render them unattractive and may compel states 
to opt for commercial loans to install gray infrastructure such as sea walls, breakwaters, and 
other urgent mitigation projects (Negotiator A, personal communication, February 15, 2018). 
 So, while there has been a significant degree of mobility in the Global North’s 
worldview with respect to broad climate change approaches, the ideological impetus that governs 
action remains relatively fixed and are varying fostering policy and action convergence through 
an established network (assemblage of apparatuses in Foucauldian terms) that have been 
naturalized as local or regional. The indigeneity invoked in the names of some apparatuses (often 
national and regional) powerfully reinforces this: African Development Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, Caribbean Development Bank, Development Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, 
Kenyan Development Bank, among others). Importantly, too, is the degree of commitment to 
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adaptation as the non-binding commitments to fully resource the global adaptation facilities have 
not materialized and the Global North often recycle broader development commitments to meet 
targets or strategically use climate financing to secure support from vulnerable states for other 
causes, which can fragment the frail South-South alliance on climate change (Negotiator A, 
personal communication, February 15, 2018). 
Forging Community 
It is within this context that the most vulnerable states in the Global South, the small 
island developing states of the Caribbean and the Pacific which are otherwise completely 
unlinked culturally, economically, politically or historically, first framed their negotiating thrust 
for global surface temperature rise to be limited to 1.5˚C. These regions contended that their 
future depended on “a binding and ambitious agreement” at COP 21. A bold agreement is 
understood to be one that curbs Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions to limit the global rise in 
temperature to as far below 1.5˚C as possible. This “is needed to safeguard our survival, food, 
critical industries such as tourism, infrastructure and promote renewable energy” (CCCCC, 
2015). These existential demands implicitly indict the existing global climate change governance 
framework and gave rise to a trans-regional community in activist, political and technical terms. 
 The UNFCCC, whose ultimate objective is to limit emissions of GHG came into force in 
1994 (two years after it was signed). Its Kyoto Protocol that sought to set emission reduction 
targets for developed countries only came into force in 2005 (nearly a decade after it was signed) 
and ultimately failed after Australia, the United States and Canada withdrew while much of the 
European Union missed their targets. Consequently, emissions of GHG continue to rise at great 
detriment to the world and small island and low-lying coastal states. The inaction associated with 
these early efforts continued in negotiation processes where the industrial world advocated 
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limiting global temperature rise to below 2˚C above preindustrial level, despite mounting 
evidence that if global warming is not contained to below 1.5˚C, the consequences for much of 
the developing world could be catastrophic.  
The SIDS Campaign Platform 
Recognizing the earlier limits of protocols such as Kyoto that only compelled a subset of 
nations to act, the SIDS thrust (campaign and negotiations) was conceptualized around this 
scientifically backed notion of 1.5˚C as a tipping point with existential consequences for SIDS. 
In leveraging the scientific and moral high ground, the regions demanded a new comprehensive 
agreement applicable to all, including the critical big emitting emerging economies of Brazil, 
India, China and the broader G20 group. While these demands were officially articulated through 
particularly confidential and secretive diplomatic and negotiating channels, they were mirrored 
by the PANOS Caribbean led independent campaign. “1.5˚C to Stay Alive,” which is an optimal 
and highly accessible proxy for the interests of SIDS ahead of the Paris Conference. 
The campaign included a public awareness thrust that highlighted the centrepiece of the 
region’s negotiating position: keeping warming “as far below 1.5˚C as possible” (CCCCC, 
2015). The existential “1.5˚C to Stay Alive” negotiating frame was reprised because of its high 
resonance within the policy and scientific interface since COP 15 in 2009, which spurred interest 
in launching a two-tiered campaign. At a general level, it sensitizes citizens across the respective 
regions about the existential implications of climate change, particularly its impact on 
livelihoods. At the global level, it was used to make a convincing case within the 
intergovernmental policy negotiating fora for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
as an effective means of stabilizing global warming (CARICOM Climate Change Centre, 2009). 
While a formal campaign only materialized on the cusp of the landmark COP 21 held in Paris, 
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France in 2015, ad hoc actions were previously implemented in accordance with the highly 
resonant theme and consistent use of the existential framing within the ongoing global 
negotiating processes since COP 15. It also did not result in the inclusion of the title demand to 
limit global temperature increase to 1.5˚C in the climate targets or pronouncements emerging 
from COP 15. On account of this, the ad hoc campaign’s emancipatory potential was unrealized 
and the intransigent nature of international environmental politics, primarily the vast power 
differentials between small island states on one hand and large emerging economies and 
developed countries on the other, was cited as the main cause for the campaign’s failure. 
The COP 21 iteration of the campaign, which was spearheaded by Caribbean-based non-
governmental organizations, is widely deemed to be successful and a critical tool in the SIDS’s 
articulation of its interests. The campaign’s success is routinely justified by its visibility—the 
campaign slogan became a dominant buzzword at the conference—and the policy traction it 
yielded. Its visibility is largely associated with its sprawling online platforms, including an 
informative though rudimentary website (www.1point5.info) and well-maintained social media 
pages (Facebook (1point5toStayAlive) and Twitter (@1point5OK)) that promoted negotiating 
positions and the region’s climate challenges in its three official languages (English, Spanish and 
French). These platforms were central to the intended purpose of the online campaign, namely, 
supporting: 
a large coalition of journalists, artistes, writers, civil society organizations and 
members of the negotiation teams, united in a series of events and activities raising  
awareness on the issue. Production of a music video with regional artistes and 
performers, as well as a series of one-minute clips with individual regional celebrities 
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promoting the campaign and the message. Series of events such as a Day of Action on 1 
November, 30 days to the opening of the Paris Conference (Lévesque, 2016, p. 2). 
The high visibility of these purpose-built and launched platforms, primarily the website 
and Facebook, is underscored by the realization of substantial following in the narrow period 
spanning the campaign’s launch and the end of the landmark conference. Google Analytics (see 
Table 7) shows the website attracted nearly 11,000 views between its October 23, 2015 launch 
and January 20, 2016 (Lévesque, 2016, p. 4). Similarly, Facebook’s insight tool shows (see 
Table 8) that the combination of the campaign’s varyingly launched multilingual pages (between 
October 6 and December 6) exceeded the targeted 5,000 followers in merely six weeks 
(December 6, 2015 to January 20, 2016) (Lévesque, 2016, p. 5). Twitter, which was less widely 
used, only attracted 180 followers in the same period.  
Table 7: Campaign website visits in the three months spanning launch day and the aftermath of COP 21 
 
*October 23, 2015 to January 20, 2016 
 
Table 8: Campaign followers between complete multilingual Facebook launch and conference aftermath. 
 
Alongside didactic information about climate change and its impacts on the Caribbean 
and explaining the region’s negotiating position, these platforms offered a daily round-up of 
climate change media coverage and a range of audiovisual content. Audiovisual content included 
a reggae and calypso theme song (the collaborative effort of several Caribbean acts) that 
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championed the key campaign theme. Relatedly, they featured awareness-raising activities, such 
as a Selfie Video Challenge and a flash mob. The campaign’s prominent employment of a 
mixture of contemporary science, strategic partnerships (such as the high ambition coalition), 
cultural tropes (such as music and visuals), new communication tools and nuanced advocacy 
allowed it to bridge ideological divides rhetorically, but not functionally or procedurally where it 
matters most.  
However, the efficacy of the campaign must account for the totality of the platform rather 
than solely the key demand featured in its title. The “1.5˚C to Stay Alive” campaign also 
included 10 other features that are often missing from much of the analysis about the widely 
proclaimed success of the campaign (see Figure 1). The other campaign demands articulated by 
the negotiators from the Caribbean and Pacific are that: 1) the agreement should be in the form 
of a protocol to the UNFCCC applicable to all Parties; 2) the agreement should address 
adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, finance (nominal support), technology and capacity 
building; 3) loss and damage (compensation) should be treated separate and apart from 
adaptation; 4) mitigation commitment cycles should be of five-year durations with ex-ante and 
ex-post reviews to ensure that each commitment cycle responds to the latest climate science 
rather than being locked into long cycles; 5) provisions be included to address the specific needs 
and special circumstances of SIDS; 6) enhanced provisions for supporting the adaptation needs 
of vulnerable developing countries be included; 7) developed countries provide adequate, 
predictable and new resources to boost climate finance; 8) capacity building, technology 
development and transfer in SIDS be prioritized; 9) there must be provisions for measuring, 
reporting and verifying performance on commitments; and 10) a compliance regime must be 
instituted (CCCCC, 2015).   
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Figure 1: Brochure Part A showing the Caribbean's official negotiating position for the Paris Agreement. 
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Figure 1: Brochure Part B showing the Caribbean's official negotiating position for the Paris Agreement. 
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Critical Reflection: Campaign Platform and the Paris Agreement  
Table 9: The representation and ranking of campaign goals (Section A) and thematic focus (Section B) in the Paris 
Agreement 
SECTION A 
 
SECTION B 
Code Code Total 
Goal 
Total  
Goal 
Rank Category Total Rank 
Goal One 
Verification 9 A 
Protocol  
6 Optional - 1 1 
2 
Unqualified - 1 1 
Goal Two 
Adaptation 7 B Adaptation   
Capacity Building  
2 Technology  
Compliance 6 C 
Unqualified - 2 11 11 
Goal Three 
Finance 5 D 
Loss and Damage  
6 Modified - 3 1 
2 
Optional -  3 1 
Goal Four 
Mitigation 4 E Mitigation  
10 
 Modified - 4 1 1 
Goal Five 
Monitoring 4 E 
Monitoring  
10 Verification  
Unqualified - 5 1 1 
Goal Six 
Capacity 
Building 4 E 
SIDS  
5 Modified - 6 1 
3 
 Optional -  6 2 
Goal Seven 
Technology 4 E Frontiers  
3 
Modified - 7 7 7 
Goal Eight 
Protocol 3 I 
Finance  
6 Modified - 8 1 
2 
Optional - 8 1 
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Goal Nine 
SIDS 3 I SIDS  
6 
Optional - 9 2 2 
Goal Ten 
Frontiers 2 K 
Monitoring 
 
1 
Verification 
Modified - 10 5 
12 
Unqualified - 10 7 
Goal Eleven 
Loss and 
Damage 1 L 
Compliance  
4 
Protocol  
Modified - 11 2 
6 Optional - 11 3 
Unqualified – 11 1 
 
A substantial evaluation of the pronouncements about the success of the campaign hinges 
on how these demands feature in the Paris Agreement. Close reading of the Paris Agreement, in 
conjunction with the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign (both the general audience thrust and the 
official negotiating positions), reveals that the Agreement addresses all the priorities of the SIDS 
in some form (see Table 9). Emblematically, goal two, which signals six areas of focus that 
ought to be accorded central attention by the Agreement, is the second ranked goal in terms of 
prevalence and is only marginally outpaced by goal 10 (11 and 12, respectively). Furthermore, 
each of the discrete areas highlighted by the campaign for special attention are accorded 
heightened (in terms of rank, a measure of focus) and comparable attention, except the crucial 
issue of loss and damage, which is the least grounded category in the Agreement with prevalence 
of one (see Table 9 - Section B). Specifically, Adaptation and Finance have prevalence of seven 
and five, respectively, with ranks of B and D on a scale of A to L (highest to lowest), whereas 
mitigation, monitoring, capacity building and technology are ranked next (E) with equal 
prevalence of four each. 
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Section A of Table 9 shows the numerical ranking of each of the 11 goals outlined by the 
campaign and the nature of the goal’s inclusion (unqualified, modified and/or optional), 
alongside the categories or areas of focus emphasized by each goal. Specifically, goals 10, two, 
seven and 11 are the most grounded in the Agreement. These top four ranked campaign demands 
register at least twice the next highest ranked goal (goal six with prevalence of three). Goals one, 
three, eight and nine are ranked sixth with equal prevalence of two, while goals four and five are 
ranked last (10th) with equal prevalence of one each. 
However, the nature of their inclusion varies substantially. Only goals one, two, five, 10 
and 11 have elements that are included in the Agreement. As established, earlier, goal two which 
itemizes the scope of the Agreement the campaign envisioned, is entirely accounted for. 
Alongside goal five, which covers monitoring and verification, these are the only campaign goals 
to be accorded totally unqualified inclusion. While goal 10, which also covers issues of 
monitoring and verification, is accorded highest attention by the Agreement (first ranked goal) 
and the 12 elements relevant to its inclusion are primarily unqualified (seven of 12), more than 
40 percent of it is modified and substantially subject to variable interpretation by signatories. 
Relatedly, goal 11, which covers issues of compliance, is included (unqualified), the mechanism 
is both modified (two of six) and primarily optional (three of six). This is in concert with the 
unqualified but optional inclusion of goal one, which advocates for the Agreement to be in the 
form of a binding protocol to the UNFCCC as a means of instituting an enforceable compliance 
mechanism. 
On the other hand, goals eight, six and three, which address issues pertaining to finance, 
SIDS and loss and damage, respectively, have been included as modified and optional 
components in equal measure, except goal six which is primarily optional (two of three 
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elements), whereas, goals seven and four, which address issues relevant to frontiers (developing 
countries in general) and mitigation, respectively, have been included in modified form. Goal 
nine, which addressed the special circumstances of SIDS, is entirely optional. 
Consistent with the fact that thematic or categorical focus transcends campaign goals 
because some goals reflect multiple areas of focus, Table 9 - Section B shows the descending 
alphabetical rank (A to L) of each category based on its prevalence in the Agreement. 
Verification, Adaptation, Compliance and Finance are the categories of issues accorded greatest 
attention by the Agreement with descending ranking of A to D. Considered alongside earlier 
observation of the identical and relatively high ranking (E) accorded to mitigation, monitoring, 
capacity building and technology, the data foregrounds the distinctly low level of emphasis 
accorded to issues of loss and damage and the frontiers (developing countries in general), per 
goals three and seven, respectively, which rank last (L) and penultimately (K). Issues 
emphasized by goal one (protocol), six and nine (SIDS) are also accorded relatively low priority 
with equal ranking (I). 
While the discursive rubric used to generate Table 9 attends to all campaign goals and 
categories, campaign demand numbers one, four, eight and 11 constitute the campaign’s core. 
Specifically, without elements one, eight and 11, the existential motivation for 1.5 ˚C to Stay 
Alive cannot be realized (four). Demand four, which emblematically features in the title of the 
campaign and the framing of the 11 goals (see Figure 1), constitutes a critical threshold beyond 
which climate change-induced outcomes will be catastrophic and irrevocable, whereas demand 
eight calls for a specified climate-financing regime, without which none of the commitments can 
be realized. Both demands one (call for a protocol) and eight (compliance) call for systems to 
ensure the realization of all demands, especially the two other core elements (Leslie, 2013). 
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Accordingly, it is instructive to further probe the nature of the inclusion of the campaign goals, 
with emphasis on the core. 
 With respect to the key demand on how to orient mitigation ambition (goal four), the 
Agreement opted for between 1.5˚C and 2˚C rather than the “as far below 1.5˚C as possible” 
(CCCCC, 2015) needed to preserve the existence of SIDS. Per Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, 
the decisions taken to tackle climate change, which have been deemed relatively ambitious by 
commentators, are based on voluntary national commitments known officially as Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCS). This crucial section of the Agreement notes that 
the INDCS do not even remotely meet the Global North’s preferred “least-cost scenarios” 
associated with a 2˚C increase in global average temperature.  
In practical terms, the key demand of the campaign is therefore unmatched by the 
INDCS, which comprehensive action hinges on, even as the clear majority have been submitted. 
This is a fundamental indication of how deeply the key 1.5˚C demand has been rebuffed. A 
closer look at the crafty semantics used to acknowledge this demand illuminates this assertion, 
particularly Articles 17 and 21. In Article 17, where the farfetched possibility of the least cost 
scenario associated with 2˚C is cited as a by-product of conservative voluntary national 
commitments, the Agreement calls for emissions to be reduced to 40 gigatonnes to realize the 
2˚C mark. It continues by adding 1.5˚C as a secondary option, thus creating a range and notes the 
undetermined level of emissions reductions necessary to attain 1.5˚C, the upper limit of the key 
demand by the SIDS campaign. The Paris Agreement uses Article 21 to invite the IPCC, a key 
pillar of the global climate governance architecture, to prepare a report within three years “on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5˚C above preindustrial levels and related greenhouse gas 
emission pathways” (p. 4, 2016), which can further inform adjustments to the voluntary national 
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emissions reduction targets. This is a clear effort to appease proponents of the climate justice 
narrative amidst mounting evidence that the will to realize a target below 1.5˚C is non-existent. 
Curiously, SIDS have pointed to this “special report” slated for publication in 2018 in their 
declaration of victory as an important concession.  
It is important to probe this further by looking at the framing of 1.5˚C in the Agreement. 
It is presented as desirable, but not practical and subject to further quantification as well as the 
same voluntary process. This concession is suggestive of tokenism. Specifically, the worst-case 
scenario articulated by the campaign is deemed the best-case scenario in the Agreement. I posit 
this assertion as the precise negotiating demand was for global average temperature rise to be 
held to “as far below 1.5˚C as possible.” On this basis, it is reasonable to argue that the 
campaign’s key demand gained traction, but it does not constitute a victory. In fact, it is dubious 
to claim a modicum of victory on this basis where the key demand is effectively rejected based 
on projected INDCs and broader scenarios outlined in Article 17. 
The campaign’s key demand is not the only under-realized negotiating position. SIDS 
stoutly demanded that the Agreement is crafted as a protocol, a legally binding agreement, 
associated with the UNFCCC (goal one). While the Agreement is adopted under the auspices of 
the UNFCCC, it is not legally binding and lacks enforcement mechanisms. The rejection of this 
key demand is primarily because of adamant opposition from both India and the United States 
(Negotiator A, personal communication, February 15, 2018). The basis on which both countries 
rejected the notion of a protocol is illustrative of the centrality of beliefs and worldviews to my 
reading of international climate change politics and the exercise of power. In the case of the 
United States, where the executive is headed by a President who favours bold action, a binding 
agreement would be stoutly rejected by a legislature (Congress) in which the balance of power is 
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held by Republicans who oppose this approach for a myriad of reasons. Namely, a rejection of 
mainstream climate science (ideological), the defence of sectors that bankroll their campaigns 
and provide substantial investments and employment to their constituents or country (self-
interest) and deep suspicion of multilateralism, which is believed to undermine American 
prestige and competitiveness (ideology).  
The lack of a protocol is consequential. The Paris Agreement, as I have posited, is based 
on voluntary commitments with no sanction mechanism. So, while the call from SIDS for a 
transparent reporting framework and a facilitative compliance regime are evident in the 
Agreement, the lack of enforcement mechanisms could undermine their effectiveness. These 
foundational fissures deeply undermine the potency of the Agreement from the vantage point of 
the SIDS. They also constitute a trend of both linguistic and procedural ambiguity in the 
Agreement relative to the negotiating positions held by the SIDS. In a bid to ensure INDCS are 
subject to the latest science and undermine climate denialism, SIDS called for mitigation 
commitment cycles that are in sync with IPCC reports. However, the Agreement calls upon “the 
Parties” to review their commitments in 2020 and every five years thereafter with no clear 
directive to adhere to the IPCC’s findings. This linguistic ambiguity has manifest consequences 
in procedural terms and the extent to which livelihoods can be safeguarded through effective 
global action.  
The ambiguity is also evident even in instances where the campaign more convincingly 
claims success. Though the Agreement reflects the call for support—financial, technical, 
capacity building etc., per goals two, six, seven and eight—to be made available to the most 
vulnerable, there is no clear delineation of “who” and what constitutes that category. This is an 
important consideration as the existing global rubric for vulnerability in development contexts 
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primarily uses Gross Domestic Product. This measure of progress marks most Caribbean SIDS 
as middle income, which precludes them from tapping generous debt relief and broader 
development support (Goff, 2003). Importantly, vulnerability could be established in terms that 
could include wealthy countries that are nominally part of the Global North, such as Japan, The 
Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand, who have had widely reported climate-induced losses 
(Negotiator A, personal communication, February 15, 2018). This conception could contribute to 
the unmooring of the impetus for the imagined community of SIDS that gave rise to the vigorous 
campaign under examination. 
Notwithstanding the chequered set of outcomes relative to the demands of the campaign, 
I earnestly question the veracity of the claim of success upon closer inspection of three critical 
aspects of the agreement articulated by the campaign: climate finance, loss and damage and 
technology transfer, alongside the campaign’s banner call for global temperature rise to be 
limited to a maximum 1.5˚C, the core of the 11-point position outlined by the SIDS. As I posited 
earlier, the Agreement implies that warming will be limited to between 1.5˚C and 2˚C, and not 
“as far below 1.5˚C as possible,” alongside clear evidence that even 2˚C might be unattainable 
under the current regime. Of the campaign’s core, climate finance is perhaps the most critical as 
it determines the extent to which SIDS will have access to resources to adapt to climate change. 
The Agreement acknowledges the campaign’s call for new and substantial streams of finance by 
setting the low threshold of $100 Billion per year for the world, a mere 0.13 percent of the 
nominal global economy (International Monetary Fund, 2015). However, the non-binding regime 
also means this commitment is no different from other international aid pledges that fail to 
materialize or are articulated using a myriad of accounting procedures that obfuscates actual cash 
flow for real work. This shortcoming in the Agreement is also evident in its failure to describe 
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the nature of the financing: how much of it will include concessionary loans, grants and capacity 
building? 
Notwithstanding, I note the continuation of a pattern of partial victories with the crucial 
climate finance indicator. This is in part because climate finance rhetoric fits the preferred 
ideological approach of the Global North, whereas loss and damage, the most seminal climate 
justice demand, does not (Agyeman, Doppelt, Lynn, & Hatic, 2007; Gardiner, 2011). Loss and 
damage compels the Global North to compensate countries for climate change induced damage, 
such as the disappearance of barrier reefs, islands, infrastructure and livelihoods. While this 
notion (goal two) is included in the Agreement, the nature of its inclusion is antithetical to the 
spirit of the manifestly political nature of the reparatory climate justice impetus that underpins 
the concept. Emblematically, Article 52 states, “the Agreement does not involve or provide a 
basis for any liability or compensation” (Paris Agreement, 2015, p. 8). This position is another 
manifestation of the Global North’s coercive (repressive) and ideological power in international 
climate policy. The thrust of any credible agreement rests on its support, particularly because of 
its financial clout, which is needed to fund effective action. Its ideological disposition around 
capital and finance, intellectual property rights and climate justice guides the exercise of that 
power.  
The ideological undercurrents related to capital and climate justice are most notable. 
Singling out regions of vulnerability and prioritizing their needs is inevitable from a climate 
justice perspective, but diametrically opposed to the capitalist logic that underpins engagement 
and global policy processes. In this sense, the principles of engagement enforced in global trade 
are being mapped onto the climate scene in that common rules are preferred (convergence 
through harmonization). In large part, this is because climate risks are viewed as a by-product of 
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economic activity (past and current) and an opportunity to spur a new economy that will 
revitalize growth. Preferential treatment in this context, though a product of vulnerabilities 
induced by the Global North because of its development model (Garnaut, 2008; Pelling, 2011), 
violates the economic logic that drives the Global North’s new-found urgency to act: capitalism 
in the form of the ‘green or blue economy.’ Conceived in a more historically sensitive manner, 
SIDS have not won any special treatment to address their existential climate change-induced 
challenges in much the same way they have lost preferential trade positions with the European 
Union because of prior exploitative economic and social arrangements. In the latter instance, it 
was global governing ideological apparatuses, namely the World Trade Organization, that 
thwarted that arrangement at the behest of North American corporate agricultural interests 
(Grynberg, 1998). 
The ideological undertones, particularly economic self-interest, that thwarted the core of 
the existential demands made by SIDS are deeply pronounced in the Paris Agreement. The 
modified inclusion of technology transfer (goals two and seven) as a non-binding 
recommendation is tantamount to the Global North abstaining on a critical adaptation and 
mitigation mechanism. Greater non-market technology transfer (renewable energy, climate smart 
agriculture techniques and infrastructure) would enable SIDS to adapt amidst a changing and 
variable climate by reorienting their beleaguered economies by reducing energy cost and 
boosting competitiveness. This is a fundamental point of contention as technology transfer would 
undermine the green economy thrust that Europe, North America and emerging market giants are 
actively investing in to reorient their economic futures amidst clear signs that a transition from 
fossil fuel is inevitable. Uncontrolled early-stage and non-market technology transfer would 
therefore undermine the key principle that drives action (and inaction) on climate change today: 
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deep territorial and national concerns about economic competitiveness. In tandem, it also 
undermines capitalist notions about the sanctity of intellectual property rights, which are 
intended to ensure maximum return on inventions and/or ownership of rights (Benkler, 2006).  
The centrality of ideology and beliefs in determining global climate change policy 
outcomes within the existing structures is therefore a primary reason the campaign merely 
achieved the series of partial victories I have discerned. By critically examining each of the 
campaign’s key demands as reflected in the Paris Agreement, I have detailed how the global 
climate change governance structures function as avenues for the articulation of the Global 
North’s interests. Within these structures, I have noted the dispensation of the unequal 
distribution of power between the Global North and South—specifically, how the Global North’s 
vast advantages (monetary, technological and its emission levels that renders it both the main 
cause of the problem and a prime change agent) are used to defend its economic interests and 
ideological disposition about climate science and approaches to effective action. In exercising 
these positions through the global climate change governance structures that are largely funded 
by its resources, the Global North ensured the process yielded tepid outcomes that are largely 
framed as landmarks in the press and by campaign proponents.   
The rejection or partial accommodation of the core demands of the climate justice 
movement—limiting global warming to as far below 1.5˚C as possible (goal four), a robust 
climate finance regime attuned to the needs of SIDS, LDCs and other vulnerable states (goals 
six, seven, eight and nine) and a compensation regime for loss and damage and technology 
transfer (goals goal three, seven and nine)—underscore that the dominant impetus for climate 
action is primarily conservative and economistic in orientation. This dominant impetus for action 
is counter to climate justice, the narrative championed by the campaign.  
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Given this context, the partial successes noted must be scrutinized to determine what 
factors accounted for them. My analysis of the Paris Agreement and critical reading of the 
SIDS’s campaign shows that all areas mentioned by the campaign are reflected in the final 
document. However, the nature of their inclusion renders this an insufficient basis on which to 
claim success or influence. Rather, it reflects SIDS’s expertise in climate science and policy. The 
constrained way the goals articulated by SIDSs are included speaks to the limited influence held 
by the SIDS bloc. This limited influence is even more palpable when one accounts for the 
broader environment in which it was exercised and the structure of the actions in support of the 
campaign. The campaign held the scientific and moral high ground in articulating an existential 
concern (IPCC, 2014) and sought to leverage unprecedented global public support and consensus 
in climate science, as well as the clout of the improbably named “high ambition coalition.” 
Whereas the public audience thrust led by PANOS Caribbean was launched a mere two 
months ahead of the Conference, the coalition emerged independently at the level of the political 
and diplomatic directorate. It was formed covertly by the European Union, alongside 79 
countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific blocs, six months before the Paris 
Conference to push for an “ambitious, durable and legally binding” deal with strong reviews 
every five years (Negotiator B, personal communication, February 2, 2018). The coalition, which 
was unveiled at a crucial point in the negotiation process, was later joined by Canada, the United 
States and Norway. The bloc of countries embraced the campaign call for “strong recognition of 
the below 1.5-degree temperature goal, a clear pathway for a low-carbon future, five-yearly 
updates and a strong package of support for developing countries” (McGrath, 2015, para. 8).  
However, the lack of coordination at the technical level, where the specifics of the 1.5˚C 
target is determined, indicates the hobbled nature of a coalition of disparate interests (Negotiator 
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B, personal communication, February 2, 2018). Winning the support of a wide and powerful bloc 
of countries, such as the High Ambition Coalition, is crucial for the advancement of the 
campaign’s mission considering the power deficit. It constitutes a key bridging principle 
employed by the diplomatic and political directorate across SIDS to advance their interests that 
likely contributed to the key demands being featured in the Agreement in some fashion. While it 
predates the launch of the campaign, the expansion of the coalition is also an inevitable response 
to the moral and scientific high ground occupied by the SIDS efforts aligned with the campaign 
goals and the popular public support generated and leveraged by the general audience pop-
culture thrust enacted by PANOS Caribbean. This combination of factors necessitated decisive 
public overtures by the Global North, especially as its own scientific, fairness and participatory 
developmentalist rhetoric was marshalled against it in a convincing manner that resonated with 
the global public. This complemented the SIDS’s need for alliances with powerful nations to 
boost their cause. This constitutes a significant strategic positive for the campaign. However, the 
operationalization of the coalition was invariably hobbled by similar degrees of challenges I have 
pointed to in the broader global structures. These challenges are due to unequal power, ideology, 
worldviews and beliefs. The near total political nature of the coalition’s engagement, to the 
exclusion of common technical positions and its independent functioning from the general 
audience thrust, are manifestations of these factors. The disparate nature of the countries cobbled 
together underscores these observations. 
The technical and political coordination fissures at the global level are also evident in the 
campaign’s interaction with populations most emblematic of the risks and cause that it 
championed. The belated emergence of the general audience thrust, the campaign’s overall 
technocratic general audience framing, and execution resulted in a lack of resonance among the 
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most vulnerable. Of the 300 people sampled for this project across 17 indigenous and traditional 
villages in Fiji, India and Belize, which exemplifies the campaign’s climate justice impetus, none 
were aware of the popular social media campaign and related negotiating thrust. Furthermore, 
even the name of the bi-annual confab (COP 21) for which public support was being mobilized 
by the campaign is unrecognized. Both the full name, Conference of the Parties and acronym, 
COP, were unrecognized by respondents in all contexts, except Fiji where there is maximal 
recognition. However, this is not associated with the campaign. It is entirely attributable to the 
fact that Fiji held the presidency of COP 22 at the time of the study and funded a significant 
media campaign championing the prestige the role accorded the island nation. This campaign is 
explicitly cited by most respondents. 
Lessons 
Notwithstanding the deeply qualified pattern of successes I have outlined, there are 
lessons evident from the process that are instructive for future climate justice efforts. As laid bare 
by the palpable absence of the campaign’s resonance among populations most representative of 
the cause championed, there is need for more concerted engagement beyond cosmopolitan 
spaces with substantial new media connectivity. While the global negotiating process functions 
on a different narrative terrain from lay perceptions and understanding of climate change, more 
concerted and broad-based engagement with vulnerable populations is likely to generate a 
broader base of public support for a campaign and reinforce its credibility and authenticity for 
the pursuit of political change. Additionally, campaigns with a broader base of engagement in 
contexts of relevance are likely to generate transversal pressures on, across and within a 
multiplicity of sectors and networks that can influence decision-making processes and priorities 
varyingly across geo-political localities based on responsiveness to democratic forces, capital 
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and varied interest groups. In other words, even where a campaign gives primacy to political 
change in articulating existential claims, the multidimensionality of a phenomenon such as 
climate change (socially, politically, economically and ecologically) and the linked nature of 
spheres of power (business, politics and citizenry) warrants an expansive view of communication 
and its indirect impact across spheres.  
Specifically, the partially successful advocacy of the Global South at COP 21 indicates 
that communication’s emancipatory role does not completely reach its limit in domains of power 
at the global level where negotiations often privilege economics. In fact, it plays a definitive role 
in harnessing mounting global public pressure, scientific knowledge, diplomatic processes, 
economic modelling and the moral high ground to forge new relationships such as the high 
ambition coalition. The campaign is therefore revelatory about the role of communication and its 
utility in the domain of power and that moderate degrees of successes can be realized even 
amidst intractable politics. This is an important observation as the emergent literature on climate 
change communication is primarily concerned with general audience appeals.  
However, the belated nature of the campaign and a lack of coordination between the 
supporting elements (public communication, negotiation and diplomatic) or related facets at the 
technical, political and general audience campaign level undermined the cohesiveness and 
efficacy of the overall campaign. In fact, these structural deficiencies mark the campaign as an 
exemplar of a missed opportunity to fully mobilize communication’s expansive role and power 
in enabling change in technical domains (especially the policy and political), as espoused in 
dialogical and participatory communicative paradigms. The consequential nature of the lack of 
coordination is also likely a product of the distinction in narrative terrains across technical, 
political and general audience levels. The belated launch of the campaign, a mere two months 
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prior to the conference, four months after the discrete political and diplomatic machinations and 
several years after the technical exchange machinations, also clarifies the continued primacy of 
the techno-scientific approach to climate change policy-making. It also foregrounds the add-on 
or instrumentalist ends to which communicative efforts are proscribed. As observed in this 
study’s review of the extant literature and theoretical outline, much of the valiant global response 
to global environmental change over the past quarter century has focused on the generation of 
scientific information on technical aspects of climate change and its impacts. However, the 
partial successes and resonance of the ambitious but structurally undermined campaign strongly 
indicates scope for a more expansive and central role for climate change communication 
activities. Specifically, climate change campaigns are likely to be more efficacious and robust 
when crafted alongside political and technical strategies and launched alongside or ahead of and 
in support of technical and political engagements. As the belated launch of the communicative 
thrust in support of 1.5˚C to Stay Alive strikingly shows, it was neither envisioned nor privileged 
as a strategic function with agenda setting potential at the outset. 
Conclusion 
This examination of the widely proclaimed success of the strategic 1.5˚C to Stay Alive 
campaign underscores the salience of coercive and soft power in international environmental 
discourse, policy formulation and diffusion across networks, as well as the importance of 
strategically navigating ideology in negotiations. Based on critical comparative analysis, the 
chapter contends that though the spirit of all campaign demands is reflected in the Paris 
Agreement, the manner in which they are featured considerably undermines the emancipatory 
potential of the campaign and does not portend well for the existential risks articulated. This is 
most evidenced by the non-binding nature of the agreement and the use of the upper limit of the 
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campaign’s tipping point marker (1.5˚C) as the best-case scenario. This litany of partial and 
consequential successes achieved is a product of the intractable political context within which 
they are negotiated. In this context, fundamentally powerful national blocks privilege 
economistic and conservative beliefs, worldviews and self-interest at the expense of weaker 
states’s existential needs. So potent is this environment that a highly strategic campaign that 
captures the global public mood, contemporary scientific consensus and diplomatic, technical 
and political alliances, such as the High Ambition Coalition, could only eke out moderate 
victories.  
The campaign’s success was also undermined by structural deficiencies, namely the ad 
hoc execution of various crucial supporting facets of action (political, technical and 
communicative). Strikingly, communication was conceived in such a narrow, instrumentalist and 
ad hoc fashion that the public engagement element only emerged belatedly (two months before 
the conference) and functioned as an ‘add-on’ that was tangentially managed by PANOS 
Caribbean, a third sector entity. 
However, the partial successes realized by the structurally constrained multi-level 
campaign indicate that communication’s effectiveness can transcend individual and societal 
boundaries and enable degrees of change in the political domain, which is instructive for future 
climate justice efforts. Specifically, communication should be viewed expansively, crafted at the 
outset and enacted alongside broader strategic, technical and political actions. The campaign’s 
lack of resonance among populations most emblematic of the existential cause it championed 
also clarifies a critical gap in enabling communicative power and influence in technical and 
policy spheres through transversal network mobilization. Relatedly, it raises fundamental 
questions about the disconnect between the global and the local at the core of efforts to address a 
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challenge that necessitates bold and locally situated actions that are contingent upon globally 
defining and structuring policy decisions, which governs the distribution of critical adaptation 
resources (technical, financial, technological, among others) and the scale of mitigative action. It 
also clarifies fissures in the extent to which the most vulnerable are engaged and a need to 
explore how to do so effectively in order to mobilize critical support for global actions and, most 
importantly, enable efficacious local action. Accordingly, the subsequent chapters delve into the 
quotidian of life on the frontiers of climate vulnerability and impact to identify ways of 
optimizing agency boosting communication and engagement modalities. 
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Chapter Six: Fijian Case 
The multi-island nation of Fiji is much like the world’s other 42 Small Island Developing 
and Low-lying Coastal States (SIDS) physically, geographically and socio-economically. These 
distinct features, varyingly bestowed by nature and produced by culture and history, predispose 
Fiji, a set of 300 small islands in the middle of the world’s largest ocean, the Pacific, and the 
Pacific Ring of Fire, highly vulnerable to climate change impacts. This vulnerability is 
compounded by economic constraints, the settlement of more than 90 percent of its population 
(approximately 800,000) along the coast, where the bulk of all services, infrastructure and 
commerce, including the critical tourism industry, are also situated. These frailties render Fiji 
and other SIDS unable to effectively anticipate and manage current climate impacts, even as the 
devastating effects on critical coastal sectors (natural and built) and livelihoods (tourism, 
fisheries and agriculture) manifest in a variety of ways. These include sea-level rise, which is 
associated with “coastal erosion and coastal inundation, increased exposure to wave action (as 
coral growth lags behind sea-level rise) and, in some cases, the retreat of mangroves” 
(Masilomani, 2013, p. 1). 
In the absence of effective local and global action, the direct and indirect consequences of 
projected average global temperature increase above 2°C, when Fiji’s social, environmental and 
economic systems are already stressed and struggling to meet the current impacts of climate 
variability and anthropogenic climate change, are of devastating existential proportions. 
However, at the level of the quotidian, there is much underway to tackle these existential 
challenges that engender and sustain the topic of hope, particularly the radical and action-
oriented readings of hope offered by Lear (2006), McIntosh (2008) and Orr (2011), rather than 
the seemingly immutable limits of practical political reality. This action-oriented optimism is 
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underscored by indigenous scholar-practitioner Joeli Veitayaki’s (2002) contention that Pacific 
Islanders have vast experience, “traditional knowledge and wisdom that can be the basis of 
response and adaptation policies, strategies and actions to address climate change and sea-level 
rise issues” (p. 2). So, given the complex nature of the problem under investigation, the centrality 
of context and culture in structuring vulnerability, adaptive capacity, perception and action, as 
well as their interrelatedness (Leichenko & O’Brien, 2000; Paavola, 2006; Pelling, 2011; Wisner 
et al., 2004), this case—one of three country-level analyses—examines the efficacy of three 
distinct climate change adaptation initiatives across six villages on three different Fijian islands 
(see Table F12; Appendix Countries-Projects-Villages for all projects across the three field 
countries) to ascertain how and under what conditions climate change adaptation is effectively 
communicated.  
Methodologically, the case is predicated on qualitative analysis, including textual 
examination of project documents associated with the three climate change initiatives underway 
in my study sites, including communication aimed at my units of analysis during the project, 
extensive participant observation, several site visits to project installations, as well as 13 semi-
structured focus groups and six semi-structured individual interviews that were conducted over a 
three-month period under immersive conditions. As detailed in the methodology chapter, both 
focus groups and individual interviews were conducted using a common set of guiding questions 
(See Appendix O).  These direct engagements with the study population yielded a sample 
population of 105 (see Table 10) drawn from the six field sites (see Appendix E for village-level 
sample profile and data for each subset).  
Table 10: The Fijian sample profile based on the adult population and households across field sites. 
Fiji 
Adult 
Pop.  
Sample 
of Adult 
Pop. 
Households 
in Field Sites 
Households 
Sampled Men Women 
Focus 
Groups 
Individual 
Interviews Youth 
Total 498 105 196 126 56 49 13 6 33 Rate 21% 64% 53% 47% 31% 
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While the sample size is moderate at only a fifth of the total adult population in the 
combined field sites, its representativeness is buttressed by a high degree of household 
representative (64%) and comparable levels of engagement across genders, and significant age 
youth representation. Structurally, the case is formatted in accordance with an integrated 
typology that combines the two elements (transcript and project codes) of the thematic logic 
order (see Table 11), a non-random procedure devised to analyze project and interview data and 
identify the decision-making processes that underpin climate action and inaction at the village 
level However, the analytical units gender and traditional practices function as cross-cutting and 
interpretive factors, respectively, alongside broader macro-group considerations such as age and 
ethnicity, where applicable. As outlined under paradigmatic considerations in the methodology 
chapter, this is consistent with Gladwin’s (1980) study of non-adoption of agronomic 
recommendations. All codes and themes are defined in Appendix A. 
Table 11: The integration of the thematic logic order to inform case structure 
 Thematic Logic Order for Non-Random Data 
Analysis Integrated Thematic Logic Order  
 Transcripts Case Structure 
 Climate Action Project (Type and) Framework 
 Knowledge Project Activities 
 Climate Knowledge Acquisition Project Action and Causes Profiled 
1.  Signs/Indicators Belief Progression 
 Cause and Proximity Project Outcomes 
2.  Climate Risk Project Perception 
3.  Climate Agency Personal Inclusion and Influence 
4.  Motive for Action Knowledge 
5.  Climate Leadership Climate Knowledge Acquisition 
6.  Project Perception Signs/Indicators 
7.  Personal Inclusion/Influence Climate Action 
8.  Belief Progression Cause and Proximity 
9.  Angst Climate Risk 
10.  Traditional Practices Climate Agency 
11.  Gender Motive for Action 
12.  Schooling Climate Leadership 
13.  Project Documents Angst 
 Project Framework  
 Project Activities Cross-Cutting 
 Project Action and Causes Profiled Gender 
 Project Outcomes Traditional Practices 
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Table 12: The climate interventions with their associated discrete and combined field sites, implementers and funders 
Project Name Implementer Funder Village Subset 
The Vanouso Tikina Project ICA Prof. Joeli Veitayaki Assorted & Local Malawai Gau Island 
The Vanouso Tikina Project ICA Prof. Joeli Veitayaki Assorted & Local Lamiti Gau Island 
Coastal Community Adaptation Project 
(C-CAP) PaCE-SD 
United States Agency for 
International 
Development (USAID) 
Yaqaga Yaqaga Island 
European Union Global Climate Change 
Alliance (EU-GCCA) PaCE-SD European Union Navai Seaqaqa 
European Union Global Climate Change 
Alliance (EU-GCCA) PaCE-SD European Union Navundi Seaqaqa 
European Union Global Climate Change 
Alliance (EU-GCCA) PaCE-SD European Union Rokosalase Seaqaqa 
 
Although PaCE-SD implemented two (EU-GCCA Project in Seaqaqa and the USAID C-
CAP on Yaqaga) of the three climate change initiatives (Vanuaso Tikina on Gau) associated with 
the study populations in this case, all three are distinct in scope, sectoral focus, programmatic 
design and implementation.  
The Vanuaso Tikina Project – Gau Island 
The Vanuaso Tikina Project is a comprehensive ecosystems-based climate change 
adaptation intervention underway across 16 villages on Gau Island. Conceptually, it is predicated 
on the notion that resource management is about people, a formulation that privileges the view 
that improving the health of ecosystems promotes ecosystems services and enables human well-
being.  So, rather than pursuing clearly articulated and discrete goals, this locally driven initiative 
that started as a pilot in 2001 seeks to empower local people to “preserve their relatively pristine 
environment as the basis of their development” (Veitayaki, 2007, para. 3).  The endogenous 
ethos of the project is evident from its explicit emphasis on offering ideational enhancement 
(knowledge and understanding of how to use it) and skills building to support the villages only 
after they have collectively determined their own plans that evolve across time. The soft 
guidance offered by way of regular follow-up visits to individual villages to validate their 
resource management plans and development activities, and the provision of trainings based on 
emergent community objectives are particularly emblematic of the project’s endogenous ethos.  
 150 
 
Although community objectives were determined based on “externally driven” (by the 
project) initiation of a consultation process, it privileged local dialogue and communal process 
that allowed the people to decide on undertaking resource management in an inclusive and 
consultative manner. The resource management activities determined by the villages range from 
a ban on fish poisoning and declaring prohibitions on portions of their fishing grounds, to 
targeting land-based issues (such as waste disposal) and rehabilitating natural habitats. This 
broad range of activities includes and transcends gendered division of duties along customary 
lines such that the project generates engagement across gender lines. 
Consistent with the privileging of their experiences and voices, the villagers “instituted 
resource management practices that they are convinced are appropriate for their purposes” 
(Veitayaki, 2007, para. 4).  These collectively determined local resource management plans that 
were developed in each of the six pilot villages formed the basis for the training workshops 
offered as part of the full initiative, namely: leadership, project planning and preparing project 
proposals; compost toilets; and smokeless stoves. This consultative local action has been a 
central feature of the project since the pilot phase in 2001. The soft guidance afforded through 
regular follow up visits, and substantial training based on locally determined needs, empowered 
the communities such that they “took their management plans and activities to the island and 
provincial councils, where they solicited assistance and publicize[d] their activities” (Veitayaki, 
2007, para. 3).  So, while the initiative privileges collectively determined and comprehensive 
local action and provided capacity enhancement on an evolving needs basis, it sought political 
validation of plans rather than transformation of systems. 
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EU-GCCA Project - Seaqaqa 
On the other hand, the EU-GCCA Project in Seaqaqa is a targeted adaptation intervention 
singularly aimed at alleviating a scarcity of potable water amidst a changing and variable 
climate. The circumscribed goal of the project and technical response highlights its lack of 
political consciousness. While both men and women were included in the intervention, the 
broader agricultural focus of the intervention skewed engagement and inclusion towards men 
because of the customary gendered division of labour that marks the sector as a male domain. 
The project framework for this circumscribed intervention is consistent with PaCE-SD's 
procedural framework for level one or “soft” measures and relevant management plans for 
community-based activities (see Figure 3). It is crafted to privilege participatory assessment and 
planning—which is evident from the intervention's predication on a broad-based community 
needs prioritization exercise—and local adaptive management that significantly drives 
evaluation and monitoring beyond the official project evaluation that was executed six months 
after the implementation of the intervention. The local adaptive management that drives 
evaluation and monitoring beyond the official project evaluation is evident in a myriad of 
instances, but two are noteworthy for their enabling and efficacy enhancing or efficacy-building 
potential: a) the requirement for women in Rokosalese, where the main tank is based, to act as 
custodians on behalf of the multi-enclave settlement's water supply by cleaning it to prevent 
algae and maintaining water quality; b) training of community members in plumbing and proper 
installation of water pipes, which allows community members to fix simple water plumbing 
breakages on the system and at home.  
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Figure 3: The PaCE-SD Procedural Framework (PaCE-SD, n.d.) 
 
 
 
C-CAP Project - Yaqaga 
Similarly, the C-CAP Project on Yaqaga is a highly targeted adaptation intervention, but 
it was aimed at reducing the broader issue of disaster risk and improving disaster response 
planning amidst a changing and variable climate. The USAID funded initiative was also 
implemented by PaCE-SD, but in conjunction with DAI, an American development consultancy. 
Yaqaga is one of three villages across two of the three provinces in Vanua Levu (Yaqaga village 
in Bua Province and villages of Korotasere and Vusasivo in Cakaudrove Province) to benefit 
from this project. As outlined in the methodology chapter, the researcher selected Yaqaqa 
because of two factors that manifestly exacerbates its vulnerability: first, it is the most isolated 
(only island of the three, lacks paved roads and other critical infrastructural gaps); and second, it 
is the only village of the three without a creek and/or river. The project framework for this 
circumscribed intervention that sought to educate and prepare the village to manage disaster 
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risk by creating a disaster risk preparedness plan (soft) and built a starter shelter (hard 
infrastructure) is consistent with PACE-SD's procedural framework for level 2 projects (or “soft 
and hard” measures and relevant management plans – see Figure 3). It is crafted to privilege 
participatory community-based assessment and planning and local adaptive management. This 
participatory ethos is evident from the intervention's predication on a broad-based community 
needs prioritization exercise that entails climate change risk identification and an infrastructure 
mapping exercise or participatory risk mapping. Even at a more technical level, this participatory 
community ethic was enabled by geo-referencing the village's social, economic, coastal and 
water infrastructure assets based on the collective determination of a project committee that 
constitutes a representative cross-section of the village population (36 people or 23 percent of the 
population (157) at the time (November 4, 2013), Masilomani, 2013, p. 3), including leaders 
from men’s, women’s and youth groups. In addition, the Senior Technical Adviser and the 
Country Mobilizer guided facilitator-based elements such as the operationalization of the 
knowledge derived from the community-designed Infrastructure Prioritization Index.    
While the C-CAP initiative was also a specific technical response with no manifest 
political consciousness, or even the validating engagement with the political realm observed in 
the Gau project conceptualization, it differs from the EU-GCCA intervention in Seaqaqa. Unlike 
the EU-GCCA intervention, the C-CAP project’s conceptualization and deployment of the 
locally informed Infrastructure Prioritization Index acknowledges the broader scale of the 
challenge and the piecemeal or limited sufficiency of the intervention and clarifies gaps to be 
filled in the future by potential partners. 
Although the three climate change interventions are distinct in scope, sectoral focus, 
programmatic design and implementation, they all feature varying but significant levels of 
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consultation with and active inclusion of members of the communities in which they are 
implemented. As my comparative review of the project approaches indicates, these consultative 
and inclusive efforts span conception to post-implementation monitoring. This is significant, as 
critical perspectives on development and social change identify participation of this scale, 
particularly from the point of conceptualization, as a central factor for interventions to gain local 
support and ownership, affirm beneficiaries and even pave the way for alternative imaginings to 
emerge (Inayatullah (1967) cited in Sparks, 2007, Pieterse, 2001, Melkote and Steeves, 2015). 
My thematic analytical procedure offers two measures or bases to commence gauging the 
efficacy of these inclusive and participatory features: belief progression and project 
perception/inclusion.  
 
Belief Progression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belief progression includes two analytical units (immediate and progressive) that denote 
how long it took interviewees to accept or commit to a climate change project intervention in a 
community. Immediate belief is the most significant belief pathway observed in the data with 
overall prevalence of 16 compared to 11 for progressive belief. The comparatively higher 
prevalence of immediate belief in the project interventions across the study population is 
Figure 4: Measures of belief progression upon introduction of climate change initiatives in study sites 
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strongly associated with the inclusive project framework that guides the interventions noted and 
the nature of the projects. Specifically, all three interventions were designed based on the 
outcomes from substantial community needs prioritization exercises conducted prior to 
inception, particularly in Seaqaqa and Yaqaga, which were especially targeted/circumscribed in 
terms of the nature of the interventions (water supply and disaster risk reduction, respectively).  
Conversely, the Gau population, which was exposed to a comprehensive ecosystems-
based intervention that required social change and commitment on a significant scale, in addition 
to making linkages beyond what the community initially perceived, accounts for all but one (10 
of 11) instance of progressive belief/commitment to the project. The importance and 
effectiveness of comprehensive needs prioritization, particularly for circumscribed or targeted 
interventions, is further underscored by the fact that Yaqaga, which accounts for the only other 
instance of progressive belief, represents an outlier as the one instance is explicitly attributed to 
negative perceptions associated with past unaffiliated project interventions of a general nature, as 
declared by a young woman. The respondent said, “it took me some time to think about it 
because a lot of government people came and made false promises to us.” This shows how 
project intervention history can impact future project ownership and support. Seaqaqa, as implied 
above, only recorded immediate belief. 
Table 13:  The level and nature of belief progression across study sites in Fiji 
Villages Immediate Progressive 
Prevalence Rate Prevalence Rate 
Lamiti* 12 63% 7 37% 
Malawai* 2 40% 3 60% 
Seaqaqa 1 100% 0 0% 
Yaqaga 1 50% 1 50% 
Totals 16 59% 11 41% 
* Gau village    
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In addition to inclusive needs prioritization processes and targeted interventions, the 
primacy of immediate belief observed across the study population is further buttressed by a range 
of factors, namely perception of the main project agent’s expertise, belongingness, knowledge 
initiation premium and consonance with worldview. The first two factors—perception of the 
main project agent's expertise/credentials and belongingness—are palpable on both Yaqaga and 
Gau Islands. The projects implemented on these islands, C-CAP and VTI, were led by Semi 
Masilomani and Dr. Joeli Veitayaki, who have direct and existing roots in these contexts that 
renders them the status of Kai (from or belonging to Yaqaga and (Malawai) Gau, respectively). 
These factors emerged explicitly on Gau, where the intervention was independently initiated and 
led by Dr. Veitayaki, rather than solely mobilized and technically guided for an external entity as 
Mr. Masilomani did on Yaqaga (see Excerpt 1, Dialogue A). This conforms with broad 
consensus in the extant literature about the importance of effective selection of messengers and 
champions (Moser, 2010; Agyeman et al, 2007) for successful communication. However, the 
technical level at which the messengers functioned most effectively in this context, Gau and 
Yaqaga, shows that transcending the focus on messengers as mere functionaries for the diffusion 
of messages across mediated networks can engender more trust and credibility and create a 
motive to act. The unique combination of technical capacity and belongingness is likely to 
reinforce the perception of a champion’s stake in a local activity and can thus foster the creation 
of a resonant and endogenously driven participatory space. This is consistent with progressive 
contentions proffered (Dutta, 2011; Freire, 1970, 1973; Melkote & Steeves, 2015; Servaes & 
Malikhao, 2005), as it paves the way for the articulation of change and action with a broader 
purview than circumscribed action, especially where the project champion’s technical role is 
unencumbered by external project affiliation, as is the case on Yaqaga Island. 
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Excerpt 1: Factors enabling immediate belief progression 
Dialogue A: Young Men Focus Group – Lamiti Village, Gau 
Island 
Dialogue B: Older Male Interview – Malawai Village, 
Gau Island 
Interviewer: When Joeli first came, did you believe him or it  
                     took some time to believe him? 
Respondent (All): Yes. 
Respondent 1: We believe him. 
Interviewer: Why did you believe him? 
Respondent 1: Because he is a Doctor and he is from here. 
Interviewer: Why did the community feel that what 
                      Dr. Joeli said was right? 
Respondent: We believe him because he was the                    
                     first one to come and told us about the   
                     climate change on what we are facing,   
                     and there’s one come to come and     
                      teach us about it. 
Interviewer: Did it match with some of the  
                     thing you’re seeing? 
Respondent: Yeah. 
 
The data also suggest a premium is accorded to the provision of new information. This 
knowledge initiation premium is operative where the new information is relevant for addressing 
prevailing issues (see Excerpt 1, Dialogue B). But, the extent to which the issue-problem 
proposition conforms to the engaged population's perceptual lenses and worldview seems to be 
an equally important factor. This is typified by explicit religious rationalization of project 
support on Gau, as typified by statements in Lamiti, such as: “I believe it because it says in the 
Bible that a time will come when everything will change.” This reinforces the broad consensus in 
the literature about the importance of values in structuring response to and support for pro-
environmental policies and actions, an issue probed in greater detail in the subsection exploring 
climate agency (Corner et al., 2014; Kearns, 2011; Miller, 2000; Nisbet, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 158 
 
Project Perception 
Figure 5: Markers of project perception across the study populations in Fiji 
 
 
The second measure from my thematic analytical procedure that aids in gauging the 
efficacy of the inclusive and participatory features of the project is project perception. Project 
perception captures how the study population views the projects implemented in their 
communities. Overall, positive perceptions of the diverse climate change project interventions 
associated with the study populations are the most grounded project perceptions in the data. On 
Yaqaga Island, where a disaster risk mitigation initiative was developed based on community 
prioritization and ownership, positive perceptions are the only markers of project perception that 
register. A similar though slightly more varied picture is also evident on Gau, where a decade-
long, relatively bottom-up, comprehensive ecosystems-based climate change adaptation initiative 
is underway. Overall, positive project perceptions have a 94 percent prevalence (100 percent in 
Malawai and 88 percent in Lamiti). However, Lamiti, which accounts for the only variance in the 
data for Gau, does not exhibit any negative disposition toward the project: neutrality and mixed 
views account for a tenth and two percent, respectively, of the prevalence of project perceptions 
captured in the data from the village. This is also consistent with greater knowledge gaps in 
Lamiti relative to Malawai, as well as a higher tendency in Malawai to regurgitate project 
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information than in Lamiti, where individual observation has significant resonance as a first 
source of climate change knowledge (see Table 15: The nature and relative strength of various 
forms of detectable indicators of climate knowledge in Fiji).  
Table 14: The relative nature of project perception in each study site in Fiji 
Villages Mixed Negative Neutral Positive Density Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Lamiti* 1 2% 0 0% 5 10% 42 88% 48 
Malawai* 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 33 100% 33 
Seaqaqa 1 13% 3 38% 1 13% 3 38% 8 
Yaqaga 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 3 
Totals 2 2% 3 3% 6 7% 81 88% 92 
* Gau village         
Consistent with the intractable nature of the primary climate change-induced challenge 
facing Seaqaqa, water scarcity, which the EU-GCCA project sough to tackle, Seaqaqa is the only 
study population where explicitly negative project perceptions were registered. With a 
prevalence exceeding a third (38 percent), negative project perceptions are equal to positive 
project perceptions, particularly as mixed and neutral perceptions also have equal prevalence (13 
percent each). This is consistent with the level of climate change knowledge and ideation in the 
village. As the study population with the narrowest and most recent range of initial climate 
change knowledge acquisition (only the project intervention), the study population may be 
conflating a targeted climate change adaptation measure (water scarcity), which is a coping 
strategy still subject to the vagaries of a changing and variable climate, with an overarching 
solution to the community determined priority issue that the project sought to tackle. This 
reading is informed by the nature and framing of the negative project perceptions expressed by 
the study population. An emblematic response to whether the project was good or beneficial is, 
“no, because we are having water cuts every day, even today” (Respondent 1 – Older Women’s 
Focus Group, Navai, Seaqaqa). So, more broadly, the inference is also supported by the 
significant knowledge gap evident in the study population, despite the manifest connection 
between their climate change-induced challenge and the especially limited or targeted ideation 
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afforded by the project intervention. This suggests a need for ongoing climate change edification 
in the community, which is also supported by the community's strong preference for climate 
leadership by external forces and exceptional individuals (45 percent of relative prevalence, see 
Table 24). As will be evident during the subsequent explication of the climate leadership 
theme, the absence of the self or kin nomination (family) as a preference suggests the outward 
look, which compares favourably to the confidence reposed in communal leadership, is an 
interest in tapping expertise not found within their place of abode to inform and aid them to 
tackle their acute climate change induced challenges, particularly water and crop yield. 
While significant levels of explicit negative views in Seaqaqa marked project perception, 
the contextual factors noted based on observations in the dataset and further elucidated in 
succeeding sections suggest the inclusive project framework and the nature of the project 
strongly correlates with positive perceptions. The consistency of this observation with the higher 
prevalence of immediate belief on the first measure strongly suggests a high degree of efficacy 
of the inclusive and consultative features alongside the nature of the project and contextual 
factors such as knowledge levels and sources.  
Personal Inclusion/Influence  
Figure 6: Markers of perceived personal inclusion and influence on climate adaptation interventions in Fiji 
 
 
This is further buttressed by uniformly positive expressions of personal 
inclusion/influence across all three study populations. Personal inclusion/influence captures the 
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study population's perception about the project's level of inclusion, particularly their experience 
of engagement with project leadership; as well as views on how well the project reflects 
community priorities. So, its consistency with overall project perception reinforces the 
observation that the multi-stage inclusive and consultative nature of the climate adaptation 
engagements affects project perceptions. The extent to which this impacts effectiveness with 
respect to activity recollection and linkage with climate change and project priorities is subject to 
a closer review of the climate actions highlighted by the study populations, knowledge levels and 
agency, which are explored in detail in subsequent sections. But, it is instructive to note that 
while there are absolute positive expressions of personal influence/inclusion, there is a 
noteworthy lack of youth specific consultation as in all contexts, only gendered groups 
comprised of adults are directly engaged in decision-making. While the data suggests the 
absence of youth-specific consultation is inconsequential for perception of personal inclusion 
and influence, this may mask cultural factors that influence responses. Specifically, it may be 
attributed to the duty bound or communal nature of both indigenous contexts, where traditional 
structures and authority are highly regarded and maintained. So, this may be understood as 
acceptance of one’s place or position in an unchallenged social order where age confers status 
and engagement privileges (Veitayaki, 2007).  This assertion about age-based deference and 
privileges is supported by the ready conformance expressed by young men on Gau when probed 
about their inclusion and influence over the climate change adaptation activities underway in 
their village (Excerpt 2: Dialogue A). 
Excerpt 2: Age-based deference and perceptions of influence and inclusion on Gau Island 
Dialogue A: Young Men Focus Group – Gau Island 
Interviewer: Before Dr. Joeli started the programme, did he meet with the young people to find  
                    out if there is a problem? Do you think you can be able to say or comment on  
                   things? You wanted it? 
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Respondent (ALL): No 
Interviewer: Do you think you can call Dr. Joeli and say we can do these things too? You think  
                    they will listen to you? 
Respondent 1: Explain again. 
Interviewer: If you wanted to say these things… 
Respondent 1: Joeli says the plan and we do. 
Climate Knowledge  
 
Figure 7: The core indicators of the nature of climate change knowledge in Fiji. 
 
 
Considering the central role of participation in paving the way for alternative imaginings 
(Dutta, 2011; Freire, 1970, 1973; Melkote & Steeves, 2015; Servaes & Malikhao, 2005), climate 
knowledge and the sources of such knowledge can also offer insight into the efficacy of the 
inclusive and consultative engagement features that varyingly mark the three interventions 
associated with the study populations. Climate knowledge denotes both an awareness of climate 
change, its cause, impact and the responses it warrants. As shown in figure 5, this study takes 
stock of the state of knowledge in the study population using five metrics or units of analyses 
that record statements through which the study population links climate change causes and 
effects, indicators and practices.  
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Table 15: The nature and relative strength of various forms of detectable indicators of climate knowledge in Fiji 
Villages 
A Posteriori Experiential Knowledge Gap Regurgitation 
Density 
Prevalence Rate Prevalence Rate Prevalence Rate Prevalence Rate 
Lamiti* 16 53% 6 20% 7 23% 2 7% 30 
Malawai* 21 75% 1 4% 3 11% 3 11% 28 
Seaqaqa 7 78% 0 0% 2 22% 0 0% 9 
Yaqaga 3 60% 0 0% 2 40% 0 0% 5 
Totals 47 65% 7 10% 14 19% 5 7% 72 
* Gau villages         
 A posteriori knowledge, which are statements about climate change causes and effects, 
indicators and practices based on what an individual observes and their reflections as well 
as attribution of responsibility (see Excerpt 4, Dialogue B), is the most grounded of all 
knowledge indicators in the data overall (65 percent prevalence). However, knowledge 
gaps follow with a prevalence of nearly a fifth (19 percent). Regurgitation and experiential 
knowledge also figure significantly, but only in the Gau study population, which warrants a more 
granular examination of the data across village and project subsets.  
On Gau, a posteriori knowledge figures most prominently with a prevalence averaging 64 
percent. However, the rate is significantly lower in Lamiti (53 percent) than it is in Malawai (75 
percent). Knowledge gap (17 percent or 10 of 58), experiential knowledge (10 percent or seven 
in 58) and regurgitation (nine percent or five of 58) account for the other statistically significant 
indicators of knowledge forms in the population subset. However, these three associated factors 
figure differentially in each village in a manner that explicates the divergence in a posteriori 
knowledge detected in the two neighbouring villages. The lower rate of a posteriori knowledge 
in Lamiti is consistent with a vastly higher degree of experiential knowledge in the village (20 
percent prevalence) than in Malawai (four percent), and a greater degree of knowledge gaps (23 
percent prevalence in Lamiti) compared to Malawai (11 percent). Knowledge gaps are also less 
prevalent in Malawai because respondents in this sub-set had a higher tendency to regurgitate 
(see Excerpt 6, Dialogue D) project information (11 percent prevalence versus seven percent in 
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Lamiti), which is less likely to exacerbate or create opportunities for knowledge gaps to emerge 
versus when experiential knowledge is invoked (see Excerpt 5, Dialogue C). 
Excerpt 3: The intractable nature of knowledge gaps in Seaqaqa 
Dialogue A: Knowledge Gap: Older Men Focus Group - Rokosalase, Seaqaqa 
Interviewer: When you hear climate change, what comes to your mind? 
Respondent 1: All of us are from Lau, where we experience rise in sea level, so we need assistance from  
                       bigger countries. 
Interviewer: Apart from the grant assistance, what kind of help do you need from outside? 
Respondent 1: As a farmer, we need a lot of assistance for fertilizer, etc. 
Respondent 2: We want the cost of distilleries to go down. 
Interviewer: How does climate change affect you as a farmer? 
Respondent 2: Before we used to have more rain, in nowadays we hardly receive rain, so it affects the soil. 
Respondent 2: Even the soil is very old because of too much dry weather, soil tends to become very hard.  
                        So, it is very difficult to do the planting. 
Interviewer: Can we do anything about climate change, or limit its impact inside the village? 
Respondent 1: Yes, after using the weedicide bottles, avoid burning it. We can dig the hole and bury it. 
 
Only a posteriori knowledge and knowledge gaps were observed in the Seaqaqa and 
Yaqaga study populations. Seaqaqa records the highest degree of a posteriori knowledge (78 
percent) relative to the other two island populations (64 percent on Gau and 60 percent on 
Yaqaga Island). This is consistent with the nature of the primary ways in which climate change-
induced impacts have affected the communities, particularly as expressed through 
the fundamental ways in which they express signs/indicators of climate change. Specifically, 
Seaqaqa disproportionately identifies an acute water challenge as its primary indicator of their 
climate change-induced challenges, which is both scientifically supported and especially more 
manifestly tied to their lived observations, experiences, communal discussions and the project 
interventions implemented in their community. However, the manifest connection also brings 
into focus the knowledge gap in Seaqaqa (see Excerpt 3, Dialogue A: Knowledge Gap). The 
knowledge gap, which stands at over a fifth (22 percent prevalence) despite the manifest 
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connection between their climate change-induced challenge and targeted ideation (exposure to 
climate change knowledge through the project), is particularly high. This is especially so as it is 
still higher than the knowledge gap observed on Gau (17 percent), which features a sustained and 
comprehensive climate change adaptation intervention in a context affected by climate change-
induced events in more complex ways. 
 Continuing the connection between climate change knowledge and the primary ways in 
which climate change-induced impacts affect communities (per the signs and indicators they 
note), Yaqaga—which identifies coastal erosion as its most significant indicator of climate 
change and exhibits a degree of fatalism marked by failed efforts to build a makeshift seawall for 
a generation—records the highest level of knowledge gap (40 percent). 
Excerpt 4: Multi-layered and personalized premium climate knowledge (a Posteriori) on Gau Island 
Dialogue B: A Posteriori Knowledge – Excerpt – Older Women Focus Group, Malawai Village, Gau 
Island 
Interviewer: Can you tell me the technique that you used to fish? So [Respondent 1] what do you 
                      use? 
Respondent 1 & 2: The fishing line 
Interviewer: Fishing line? Oh that is how everyone fish?  
Respondent 3: Fishing net.  
Interviewer: Sometimes you go out on the boat?  
Respondent 4: This lady here [Respondent 2] goes out on the boat but uses the fishing line.  
Respondent 1: Fishing net 
Interviewer: Do you like to get more? So that is the traditional way? Do you used to spear or things  
                     like that? 
Respondent 4: Yeah. 
Interviewer: This is what I need to know. 
Respondent 4: Sometimes we go out to the ‘qoli nunu’  
Interviewer: Tell me in detail, you use the fishing line, the spear, what else do you use?  
Respondent 4: The ‘qoli nunu’ we use the spear and what you call the goggles that’s all. 
Interviewer: How do you deal with the corals? Do you take care of them? Tell me how you interact? 
Respondent 4: Before there is lot of corals but now no more.  
Interviewer: Do you think the way you fish affects the coral?  
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Respondent 4 & 3: Yeah. 
Interviewer: Like how? 
Respondent 4: When we see an octopus, we’ll use the stone to break down the coral 
Interviewer: So, you’re learning new ways of fishing by breaking down this coral and learning how                    
                     to fish? Is that the only way? 
Respondent 4:  We can use only the spear 
Interviewer: Which one is easier- stone or the spear? 
Respondent (ALL): Spear. 
Respondent 4: If it doesn’t come out then we will use the spear.  
Interviewer: Okay so spear is alright. I get that. 
 
Excerpt 5: Correlation between higher prevalence of experiential knowledge and knowledge gaps 
Dialogue C: Experiential Knowledge & Knowledge Gap: Young Women Focus Group, Lamiti 
Village, Gau Island 
Interviewer: Is there anything happening in your village that makes you think of climate change? 
Respondent 1: In 2013, there was an earthquake here that makes us think of climate change. 
Respondent 2: Cyclone Winston. 
Respondent 3: Landslides during Cyclone Winston in 2015 make us difficult to get food. 
 
Excerpt 6: Regurgitation limits knowledge gaps in Malawai Village, Gau Island 
Dialogue D: Regurgitation Excerpt: Older Male – Malawai Village, Gau Island 
Interviewer: Is there anything you think you can do as a community or as a person to limit the damage  
                      climate change? 
Respondent: Yes, according to Dr. Joeli, he told us to plant more mangroves along the beaches, to plant  
                      more trees and to stop cutting down many trees and also not to burn our areas. 
Climate Knowledge Acquisition 
 
Figure 8: The range of initial sources of climate knowledge in Fiji 
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The varied knowledge levels across the projects support the view that the nature of the 
project interventions (duration and focus) and the problem formulation impact the efficacy of the 
comprehensive inclusion, consultative frameworks and procedures guiding the three projects. 
The data relevant to climate knowledge acquisition (when and where people learn about climate 
change) across village and project subsets suggests that the degree and depth of ideational 
exposure is also a consequential factor. Ideational exposure refers to the extent and time 
committed to discussing climate impacts, their cause and the range of responses they demand, 
which varies significantly across the projects (targeted and limited in Seaqaqa and on Yaqaga, 
but comprehensive and sustained over a decade on Gau). The prevalence ratios of the six 
analytical units used to capture climate knowledge acquisition across the study populations 
makes this manifestly clear. Overall, it is the project intervention (a formal means of 
informational transfer), with a prevalence of nearly a half (49 percent), that is the main means 
through which respondents first learn about climate change. The only other significantly 
grounded sources of initial climate knowledge in the overall study population are School (21 
percent), observation (16 percent) and knowledge acquired before the project (nine 
percent) through a multiplicity of unspecified means.  
Table 16: The relative prevalence of initial sources of climate knowledge in Fiji 
Village 
Before 
Project 
Holy Book News Observation Project 
Intervention 
School 
Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Lamiti* 3 18% 0 0% 0 0% 2 12% 9 53% 3 18% 17 
Malawai* 0 0% 1 7% 1 7% 4 27% 6 40% 3 20% 15 
Seaqaqa 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 
100
% 0 0% 4 
Yaqaga  1 14% 0 0% 0 0% 1 14% 2 29% 3 43% 7 
Totals 4 9% 1 2% 1 2% 7 16% 21 49% 9 21% 43 
*Gau village            
At a more granular level, climate knowledge acquisition is more varied and better 
illustrates the consequential nature of ideational exposure (time and scope) for knowledge levels, 
and the efficacy of climate change projects. Seaqaqa, the locale with the least degree of climate 
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change agency (detailed in a later subsection, also see Table 22) and significant knowledge gaps, 
only registers the project intervention as their first exposure to climate change knowledge. This 
first and only exposure at the time of study means the consultative and inclusive project designed 
that provided climate change information oriented specifically to the climate change-induced 
water scarcity challenge prioritized by the community is a consequential factor for knowledge 
levels. But, the data suggests this circumscribed ideational exposure may have been insufficient 
to address the prevailing knowledge deficits, which, as observed earlier, accounted for more than 
a fifth of the prevalence for knowledge on climate change in spite of the manifest connection 
between the climate change challenge they prioritized and was specifically tackled by the 
intervention. This strong correlation between a narrow climate change knowledge acquisition 
base, circumscribed ideational exposure and climate knowledge gap in Seaqaqa may also 
account for earlier observation of comparatively low project perception, despite general 
appreciation for the intervention and high perception of inclusion and influence over the project. 
The data for the other two villages and project subsets supports this claim, particularly 
concerning the range of climate change knowledge acquisition sources. 
While the project intervention also ranks foremost as the initial instance of climate 
change knowledge acquisition in both villages on Gau, it only accounts for a thematic prevalence 
of 47 percent (or 15 of 32). School and observation follow with prevalence of nearly a fifth each 
(19 percent). The near identical sources of climate change knowledge between the two village 
populations on Gau Island is consistent with their identical population composition, proximity 
(10 minutes apart via a footpath and two wooden pedestrian bridges), contextual and ideational 
exposure under the same comprehensive and sustained ecosystems-based adaptation initiative. 
This reinforces the importance of the project intervention for ideational exposure on climate 
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change and suggests the range of initial or overall climate change knowledge acquisition sources 
is another equally consequential factor. The climate knowledge acquisition patterns observed on 
Yaqaga Island strongly supports this observation. Although the project intervention also features 
as a prominent source of climate change knowledge acquisition on Yaqaga Island, the level of 
prevalence, less than a third (29 percent), detected is secondary to school (43 percent 
prevalence) as a source of initial climate change knowledge acquisition. This distinguishes 
Yaqaga from Seaqaqa (maximal) and Gau (47 percent) where project intervention is the most 
common initial source of climate change knowledge acquisition. Observation, which registers a 
prevalence of 14 percent, is the only other source of climate change knowledge acquisition on 
Yaqaga Island. 
So, the diversity of initial climate change knowledge acquisition sources on both Gau 
Island (6 overall – four in Lamiti and five in Malawai) and Yaqaga Island (four), particularly 
those that are manifestly credible (news, school and project intervention with 69 percent 
prevalence on Gau; school and project intervention at 72 percent prevalence on Yaqaga), 
strongly correlate with the higher degree of climate change agency and knowledge detected on 
these islands relative to Seaqaqa, which only shows first engagement through an issue-specific 
and time-bound project intervention. This suggests concerns about climate knowledge and 
information provision (Maibach et al., 2008; Yang & Ho, 2017) are credible but should also 
contemplate the significance of the rate of information provision, range and nature of 
information sources, to effectively attenuate the limitations of individual barriers to climate 
change communication and action. Per Lorenzoni et al. (2007), these include a lack of 
knowledge, absence of desire to seek information and limited availability of relevant or 
accessible information. Therefore, a closer look at how climate change is perceived may 
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simultaneous offer insights as to how the factors identified affect the efficacy of the interventions 
overall and shed light on what and how the study population interprets and associates events and 
changes with climate change. 
 
Signs and Indicators 
 
Figure 9: The primary signs and indicators of climate change perceived in Fiji 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: The relative prevalence of six of 13 signs in Fiji in alphabetical order. 
Village 
Climate 
 Coastal Erosion 
Coral Health Crop 
Diversification 
Crop 
Yield/Soil 
Health 
Fish Stock 
Density 
of Signs 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Lamiti* 2 3% 5 6% 2 3% 0 0% 21 26% 8 10% 80 
Malawai* 5 4% 6 5% 4 3% 2 2% 24 21% 27 23% 117 
Seaqaqa 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 18 23% 0 0% 79 
Yaqaga 0 0% 9 21% 3 7% 0 0% 4 10% 7 17% 42 
Totals 8 3% 20 6% 9 3% 3 1% 67 21% 42 13% 318 
        *Gau villages 
Table 18: The relative prevalence of seven of 13 signs in Fiji in alphabetical order 
Village 
Health Lifestyle Pollution Sea Level 
Rise 
Soil Erosion Water Weather Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Lamiti* 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 5 6% 14 18% 0 0% 21 26% 80 
Malawai
* 
2 2% 14 12% 0 0% 11 9% 10 9% 0 0% 12 10% 117 
Seaqaqa 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 1 1% 5 6% 36 46% 16 20% 79 
Yaqaga 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 10% 4 10% 0 0% 11 26% 42 
Totals 3 1% 15 5% 1 0% 21 7% 33 10% 36 11% 60 19% 318 
*Gau villages 
The data offers 13 social, environmental, philosophical and existential markers that the 
study populations deem to be signs and indicators of climate change, which are observable or 
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likely to impact their place of abode (see Figure 9). Crop yield/soil health is the most significant 
indicator of climate change with a prevalence of over a fifth (21 percent) across the study 
populations. Weather, fish stock, water and soil erosion round off the top five most prominent 
indicators of climate change among the study populations (19, 13, 11 and 10 percent, 
respectively, see Tables 8 and 9). The prominence of both crop yield and fish stock (accounting 
for more than a third of relative prevalence for the 13 indicators, see Tables 17 and 18) suggests 
these communities perceive climate change as an immediate existential issue that is directly and 
routinely experienced by way of what appears on their plates. This strong food security theme is 
underscored by concerns about water (11 percent), coral health (three percent), and crop 
diversity (one percent), which would result in a thematic prevalence of nearly a half (48 percent) 
when combined with the prevalence associated with crop yield and fish stock (see Tables 17 and 
18). Dialogues A to D in Excerpt 7 exemplify this theme across the study populations: 
Excerpt 7: Food stock and associated domains are highly resonant signs and indicators of climate change in Fiji 
Dialogue A: Older Women Focus 
Group - Yaqaga Island 
Dialogue B: Older Male - Gau 
Island 
Dialogue C: Older Women Focus 
Group – Navai, Seaqaqa 
Dialogue D: Older Men Focus 
Group - Yaqaga 
Interviewer: So, when you hear 
about climate change, what do you 
think about it? 
 
Respondent 1: It’s the weather 
changing, soil erosion. 
 
Interviewer: How does that affect 
you? 
 
Respondent 1: Before we use to 
eat big yams, nowadays just a 
small one and we [are] 
experiencing hot weather which 
maybe affects the crops. 
 
Interviewer: Does that affect how 
you build your houses, too? 
 
General Response: Yes, before we 
use to stay in Fijian house (bure) 
and we need to change it in every 
year. So, building modern houses 
is much better and is much safer 
from hurricanes, too. 
 
Interviewer: Is there, can you 
discuss some of the changes you 
see? You talked to me about the 
cutting down of trees, the soil you 
talked about the rubbish what else 
did you see? 
 
Respondent 2: Even the fish before 
our grandmas they went fishing 
they got plenty but nowadays they 
can go out in the morning they 
come back in the afternoon still 
they got nothing. 
 
Interviewer: Why is that such a big 
thing if they come back with no 
fish? What does that mean? What 
impact does that have on families? 
 
Respondent 2: It was not like that 
before as we have to look for 
something again for our dinner. 
 
Interviewer: When you hear about 
climate change, what comes to 
mind? 
 
Respondent 2: Changing of 
weather, due to this dry season… 
we are having smaller fruits and 
many of the fruits get bad. 
 
Interviewer: How about in your 
farm, do you see anyway climate 
change affecting you farm? 
 
Respondent 4: Yes, like dry 
season our crops take much time 
to mature and result in affecting 
our produce, even the cassava is 
too hard to chew and also takes 
much time to cook. 
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Interviewer: Is there any way your 
village is being affected by climate 
change? 
Respondent 2: Yeah, we go out at 
night for fishing and diving and the 
water is too cold compared to 
before and it affects our catch too. 
 
Although significantly attenuated by contextual factors, the comparable range of signs 
and indicators across the villages studied and the prevalence of this food security theme also 
underscores this observation. Of the 13 signs and indicators of climate change derived from the 
Fijian dataset, 10 are active in Lamiti versus 11 in Malawai, while Seaqaqa and Yaqaga 
Island registered eight and seven, respectively (see Tables 17 and 8). The consistency of these 
markers of climate experience and perception in indigenous and traditional communities studied 
in Fiji may also be attributable to their common intimate connection with and co-dependence on 
largely common aspects of the natural environment. Figueroa (2011) contends that the loss or 
diminishment of this “amalgamation of cultural identities, ways of life and self-perceptions that 
are connected to a given group’s physical environment” (p. 233) underscores the relevance of the 
environmental justice frame that should underpin climate adaptation action. This is even more 
critical, as even elements of differentiation in this relationship between markers of climate 
change and perception across these communities reinforce the degree to which context impacts 
the signs and indicators articulated. 
On Gau, crop yield/soil health (23 percent), fish stock (18 percent) and weather (17 
percent) account for over half (57 percent) of the prevalence of signs/indicators of climate 
change. While these three signs emerge as the primary ways through which the study population 
in both villages studied on the island perceive climate change, soil erosion and sea level rise also 
figure prominently with prevalence of 12 percent and eight percent, respectively. While crop 
yield/soil health (four), fish stock (seven) and weather (11) also account for more than half (52 
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percent) of the density of signs of climate change on Yaqaga Island, which is a similar 
geographical and environmental context as Gau, the salience or prominence of the signs and 
indicators are ranked differently (see Tables 17 and 18). Weather (26 percent), coastal erosion 
(21 percent) and fish stock (17 percent) mark the top-tier, while crop yield/soil health, sea level 
rise and soil erosion also feature prominently with a density of nearly a tenth each. The similarity 
in the signs noted in these two comparable study contexts highlights the significance of 
experiential knowledge, particularly those derived from direct climate risks and climate change-
induced angst, as well as collective reflection in defining and articulating climate change 
experiences and action. This is evident from how Yaqaga Island's more pressing and direct 
contemporary experience with coastal erosion differentiates an otherwise identical signs and 
perception framework across the two island communities (Gau and Yaqaga Islands), 
notwithstanding the significant difference in the scope and duration of the climate change 
ideational experiences the study populations have been afforded. 
The prevalence of signs and indicators observed in Seaqaqa strongly supports these 
observations about context and ideational experiences through climate change projects (see 
Tables 17 and 18). Ideationally, one observes a smaller though identical subset of codes being 
used in both Seaqaqa (eight codes) and Yaqaga Island (seven codes), relative to Gau (average of 
10). This is especially evident where codes indicative of a more complex link with climate 
change, such as health and lifestyle—which are only incorporated in specialist or comprehensive 
climate change programmes, only appears in the Gau population dataset that experienced a 
sustained decade-long climate change ecosystems-based initiative. With respect to context and 
geography, one also observes that the signs/indicators differ from both Seaqaqa and Gau in a 
manner that reflects the peculiar climate change-induced exigencies of an inland sugarcane 
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farming community. Water (46 percent), crop yield/soil health (23 percent) and weather (20 
percent) account for the majority (89 percent) of the prevalence of signs/indicators of climate 
change; with soil erosion (six percent) being the only other statistically significant marker of 
climate change in this population.  
So important is context in shaping how people perceive climate change that water, which 
does not register in the study populations on the relatively pristine islands of Yaqaga and Gau, 
dominates the frame through which the study population in Seaqaqa, an arid inland region of 
Vanua Levu, perceives climate change. Consistent with this contextual note, the Seaqaqa subset, 
from whose imaginary and daily experience the sea and elements associated with this domain are 
visually and experientially distant, did not register climate change signs/indicators associated 
with the domain of the sea (coastal erosion, coral health or fish stock), except for one instance of 
sea-level rise. This suggests contextual factors such as proximity to domains (land, sea, 
waterways, among other things) affected by climate change-induced events strongly influence 
the signs/indicators of climate change that define people’s perception of climate change. 
Climate Action 
 
Figure 10: The array of current climate actions identified by study populations in Fijian villages 
 
 
 
Table 19: The relative prevalence of climate actions identified by study populations in Fijian villages 
Village Inaction 
Planting 
Trees/Afforestatio
n Sandalwood Sea Wall Taboo/No Take 
Teri 
Planting 
Climate 
Action 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev 
Lamiti* 0 0% 8 21% 0 0% 9 24% 10 26% 17 45% 38 
Malawai* 0 0% 6 23% 1 4% 6 23% 3 12% 16 62% 26 
Seaqaqa 4 
100
% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 
Yaqaga 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 14% 7 100% 0 0% 7 
Totals 4 5% 14 19% 1 1% 16 21% 20 27% 33 44% 75 
*Gau villages 
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Activities underway across the village that the study population describe or identify as 
climate change responses, whether or not they are personally involved (climate actions), 
reinforce the connections observed between context and ideational experiences through the 
climate change projects and the efficacy of these conceptually inclusive interventions. As shown 
in Figure 10, six measures or analytical units are employed to examine the data for what is 
considered a climate action. Consistent with the comprehensive nature of their long-standing 
climate change adaptation ideation and programming, Gau records a disproportionately higher 
range of climate change activities with a higher rate of resonance across the study populations in 
both Lamiti and Malawai (see Table 19). The only difference that marks these two villages is 
that the second and third most grounded climate actions for the combined study population, 
taboo/no take activity (19 percent or 13 of 64) and the sea wall (24 percent or 15 in 64), are 
significantly more resonant in Lamiti (taboo/no take 26 percent and sea wall 24 percent) than 
Malawai (12 percent and 23 percent, respectively). This can be explained by socio-geological 
factors in Lamiti, which has more divers who trade commercially and is a larger village with 
greater coastal and river/tributary exposure.  
On the other hand, Yaqaga Island records two distinct climate change actions (taboo/no 
take and sea wall – see Table 19), both of which are not explicitly associated with the nature or 
focus of the disaster reduction-oriented climate change intervention they were exposed to. This, 
as later described, suggests the high degree of climate change agency detected in this population 
is specifically active local agency, as evident from the endogenous generation’s long effort to 
build a sea wall without external prompting. Of the seven unique instances in which climate 
change action emerge in the dataset, the taboo/no take accounts for the totality of prevalence 
among the population subset. It is the most resonant activity, which is congruent with the fact 
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that fishing is the primary income generating activity in the village and this activity both 
preserves income generation and their food stock. The sea wall, which has a relative prevalence 
of 14 percent, was mentioned in a secondary fashion alongside the dominant climate change 
activity underway in the village.  
Seaqaqa, which was exposed to a single targeted climate change adaptation intervention 
and lacks any sustained endogenous climate change ideation or action, only registers inaction 
with a total prevalence of four (see Table 19). This inability to recognize the connection between 
the manifest climate change-induced water scarcity challenge in the settlement and the broader 
phenomenon is consistent with the higher proportion of negative climate agency, negative 
project perception and knowledge gaps, as profiled in Excerpt 8 - Dialogues A and B. 
Excerpt 8: Knowledge gaps precludes the identification of climate actions in Seaqaqa, Fiji 
Dialogue A – Male – Navai, Seaqaqa Dialogue B: Older Women Focus Group – 
Navai and Navundi, Seaqaqa 
Interviewer: Is your village working on any kind 
climate change project? 
Respondent: No. 
Interviewer: Does climate change make you fearful? 
Respondent: Yes. 
Interviewer: What do you want the village to do 
about climate change? 
Respondent: Minimize the destruction of trees. 
Interviewer: Has there been any climate change 
project? 
Respondent 1, 2 &3: No, none so far. 
 
 This probing of what the study population deems climate actions suggests a significant 
link between the range of climate change actions and the ideational experiences through the 
climate change projects. This reinforces a similar link observed between the range of signs and 
indicators, although significantly influenced by context and the range of climate change 
knowledge acquisition sources, which shows the project intervention to be a significant factor 
across the board. These declarations of climate actions are even more revelatory when read 
against the activities identified by the project interventions. 
Consistent with finding that inaction accounts for the totality of prevalence for climate 
action in Seaqaqa the study population’s low project perception and significant knowledge gaps 
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associated with the circumscribed ideational exposure accorded by the project—their primary 
climate knowledge acquisition source, there is no conformance with the project’s description as a 
climate change intervention. However, all four projects identified successes that conform with 
the expressions of the study population (operational water tanks, use of plumbing skills for 
community purposes, household sanitary facilities, establishment of water committees, etc.).  
On Gau, all but three of the 11 activities identified by the project are reflected in the set 
of actions considered climate actions by the study population exposed to the project intervention. 
The activities that were not mentioned are the re-emergence of the Fiji Petrel (a bird species) off 
the coast in May 2009, submerged fish aggregation devices to boost catch and the distribution of 
renewable energy household tools, such as solar light and smokeless stoves. A similar level of 
discrepancy also appears in what the project deems a climate change success and the perceptions 
of the community. The project outlines 14 indicators of success, but only four are explicitly 
mentioned as climate change successes by the study population. Project declared markers of 
success such as sanitation—the protection of water catchment critical to the health of the 
communities, improved management of hazardous waste, planting of pandanus or voivoi to make 
mats for income generation and buildings, income generating taro gardening in Lamiti, the 
operation of a cattle farm by the youth council and multi-cropping—are not mentioned as climate 
change issues by the study population. The other two projects’ declared markers of success refer 
to the increased involvement of women and youth, which is corroborated by evidence of full 
participation in the data but is confounded by earlier observation of the absence of youth specific 
consultation and a likely unchallenged age-based deferential order that accords privileges to 
elders.  
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Conversely, there is consonance between all five actions and causes profiled by the C-
CAP Project for Yaqaga Island. This consonance is consistent with the community defined 
nature of the circumscribed interventions they were exposed to. However, the dissonance 
between project identified climate actions and successes observed in the study populations in the 
other two contexts is variably marked by a high degree of domesticity (smokeless stoves, solar 
lights on Gau) or routine existence (water tanks, tasks and skills in Seaqaqa and sanitation on 
both Gau and Seaqaqa), income generation activities (Gau) and specialist factors (re-emergence 
of species and use of fish aggregation devices). The data thus far suggests this is a function of 
knowledge, primarily in the Seaqaqa context where misconceptions or a significant knowledge 
gap attenuates both perception of the circumscribed project intervention and the limited ideation 
it afforded, alongside a narrow range of climate knowledge acquisition sources precludes the 
population from linking manifest climate actions with the climate change phenomenon. This 
suggests understanding of what causes climate change may be a factor in demarcating what the 
study populations on Gau and across the Seaqaqa settlements perceive as a climate change action 
in terms of proximity, even in contexts such as Gau where the scope, scale and duration of the 
climate change intervention is comprehensive and sustained.  
As observed in my scrutiny of population-defined climate actions relative to project-
declared actions and successes, especially proximal actions (routine, domestic and income 
generating)—while recognized as ongoing, are not identified as climate change actions in both 
sites. Similarly, distal and specialist actions (re-emergence of bird species and use of submerged 
fish aggregation devices) have no prevalence in the dataset for Gau. This is highly significant, as 
it confounds widely accepted notions in the extant literature. On one hand, it is postured that 
proximal limitations on climate perception, action, agency and knowledge are singularly 
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associated with temporally and spatially distal concerns, such as multi-generational projection of 
impacts and geographical distance from endangered islands and/or species such as polar bears 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Moser, 2010; O’Neil & Hulme, 2009; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; 
Weber, 2006). On the other hand, there is the contention that spatial proximity, particularly on 
the frontiers, accords higher levels of climate awareness and knowledge (Galloway, 2010). This 
warrants closer scrutiny, considering the paucity of probity of the proximity thesis, beyond 
discrete experimental observations, such as Herring et al.’s (2016) study of data visualization of 
climate science that indicates a greater degree of salience of temporal rather than spatial 
proximity. 
Cause and Proximity 
 
Figure 11: The perceived causes of climate change and their associations in Fijian villages 
 
 
Table 20: The relative prevalence of perceived causes of climate change across study populations in Fiji 
Village 
God/Religion Humans International Local Nature Cause 
and 
Proximity Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Lamiti* 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 
Malawai* 7 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 7 
Seaqaqa 0 0% 13 93% 1 7% 2 14% 0 0% 14 
Yaqaga 0 0% 4 80% 2 40% 2 40% 1 20% 5 
Totals 8 30% 17 63% 3 11% 4 15% 1 4% 27 
                      *Gau village 
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Scrutiny of the data pertaining to cause and to proximity further confirms the proximity 
bifurcation of perception and understanding of what constitutes a climate action. More 
importantly, it reinforces the observations about the strong correlation between the range and 
nature of climate knowledge, knowledge acquisition sources and ideational exposure offered 
through climate adaptation initiatives. These observations, particularly the importance of a wide 
range of knowledge acquisition sources and sustained ideational exposure offered by climate 
change interventions, are accessed using the analytical units associated with the theme of cause 
and proximity (see Figure 11). It captures the study population’s perceptions of what accounts 
for climate change and the type of connections they make with their actions and the actions of 
others at various scales. While humans are primarily seen as the cause of climate change activity 
overall, this attribution is only evident in Seaqaqa on Vanua Levu and Yaqaga Village on 
Yaqaga Island with a prevalence of 93 percent and 80 percent, respectively (see Table 20).  
The attribution to human activity as the primary cause of climate change though 
overwhelming expressed generally in Seaqaqa (11 of 13), except two instances where local 
human activity was explicitly cited, was equally attributed to local and international human 
activity on Yaqaga. Beyond this strong emphasis on human activity as a primary factor for 
climate change, the only other attributions recorded were distal, perceptible but out of their 
control or immutable. Specifically, one international reference to industrial activity and 
mechanization in Seaqaqa and one attribution to nature on Yaqaga Island (see Excerpt 9, 
Dialogue A – Nature - Yaqaga Island), which is consistent with related expressions of low or no 
climate change agency in both contexts, as detailed in subsequent sections. The high degree of 
human attribution in Seaqaqa appears to be inconsistent with the patently nature-oriented climate 
change impacts they highlight, but subsequent probing of low levels of agency suggests this 
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observation is consistent with the prevailing climate perception and experiences among the study 
subset. So, while the data does not conclusively indicate the extent to which proximal (local) or 
distal (international) human activities are responsible for climate change impacts, evidence of 
low agency and a preference for external support or leadership to contend with the impacts 
suggest the primacy of distal attribution of cause. This is consistent with the observations on 
Yaqaga Island, where although human causes are equally attributable to distal (international) and 
proximal (local) human cause, the remaining attribution of cause is entirely accounted for by 
nature, an immutable distal factor. 
Excerpt 9: Attribution of cause to nature on Yaqaga Island, Fiji 
Dialogue A – Nature - Yaqaga Island 
Interviewer: Do you think there’s a link between climate change and what’s happening in the sea? 
Respondent: Yeah. 
Interviewer: Tell me what you think are the main things? 
Respondent: Like weather always changing like before, the temperature of the water like before at this stage 
it’s usually warmer and now cold. 
Interviewer: Does that affect you being able to fish? 
Respondent: Yeah, we can spend only one to two hours diving because it’s too cold and the fish are moving in 
to warmer water which is too deep. 
Interviewer: Is there anything you can do about those things? 
Respondent: In Fiji, I don’t think so because it’s all nature. 
 
This tendency towards distal attribution of cause is also evident on Gau Island, where the 
population sub-set only registers God/Religion, an immutable cause (see Excerpt 10: Dialogue A 
– Religion – Malawai Village, Gau Island). The limited prevalence or the lack of multilayered 
attributions of cause and proximity among the Gau population subset is inconsistent with the 
expected affordances of sustained ideational exposure around comprehensive ecosystems or 
livelihoods-based climate change adaption initiatives. However, it appears consistent with the 
theoretical basis and activity culture they have been exposed to, which privileges the provision of 
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information on a ‘need to know basis’ and a granular problem-response model that eschews 
conventional emphasis on conservation language and principles that emphasize general 
information, cause and effect, impact and responsibility. While this approach is efficacious in 
terms of overall high knowledge levels, a high degree of consonance with actions profiled by the 
projects, causes and successes with community understandings and perceptions of what a climate 
action is, and supports my earlier observation of the significance of the rate of information 
provision to boost knowledge levels, there are clear limitations for recognition of actions that are 
highly proximal, primarily routine and domestic or distal and particularly scientific or technical. 
 This tendency towards proximity-based bifurcation of cause, particularly distal attribution 
which is evident across all three study contexts, reveals a correlation between non-identification 
of distal, technical and scientific climate change actions/responses, alongside distal causes and 
impacts on one hand, and highly proximal, particularly domestic and routine activities or actions 
(smokeless stoves, income generation, sanitation, water monitoring task groups etc.), and local 
human cause on the other hand. These dissociative bifurcations are palpable supporting evidence 
of the climate knowledge gaps observed in the data and suggests limits in the ideational 
affordances enabled by the climate change interventions associated with study populations. 
Theoretically, it underscores my earlier observation that the generally accepted notions 
underpinning the proximity thesis is in fact more complex, as it is marked by perceptual limits, 
largely associated with knowledge levels. However, culture may also be a mediating factor at the 
proximal level based on the general tendency towards perception of equal climate risk at the 
village level and expressions of optimism on climate change agency while offering non-
committal responses on direct questioning about responsibility as a cause and for leading action 
across all three contexts. The latter is evidenced by the inconclusiveness of the data on local 
 183 
 
versus human responsibility in Seaqaqa. However, this is consistent with the general communal 
disposition of traditional societies where group cohesion is privileged.  
Excerpt 10: Attribution of cause to religion on Gau Island, Fiji 
Dialogue A – Religion – Malawai Village, Gau Island 
Respondent: The changing of the world, the weather, the marriage, the way of the people and the looking of the  
                      land that is changing every year. That’s what is meant about climate change. 
Interviewer: Any of those changes in your village? 
Respondent: I see the way of the people, in the olden time some years ago see the way the people live. I also see  
                      that past years ago there’s only one religion and during this few years ago some more religion come.  
                     This religion come and separate the people this religion. Before this people like it’s one God when  
                     some religious come they can’t work together and what.  
Interviewer: So, you think that is related to climate change? 
Respondent: That is climate change from the church. Also, the way the people some years ago people like the  
                      people look at each other now the people don’t want to; they just do what they want to do. 
Interviewer: So, you’re saying that people just want to do what they want to do? 
Respondent: They don’t listen to the leaders to tell them what to do. The leaders of the church, leaders of the  
                     village, the turaga ni koro they don’t listen and what to do what they want to do.  
Interviewer: And you think that is related to climate change?  
Respondent: Yes. 
Interviewer: Is there anything in the Bible that you think to speak that out? 
Respondent: The Bible says in the last time and we are how as in Mathew 24:10, where many people will give up  
                      their faith and betray one another. People’s love will grow cold. That shows about the last time. 
Interviewer: And you think climate change is the sign of the last days? 
Respondent: Yes, climate change is the sign of the last days. 
Climate Risk 
Figure 12: Climate and vulnerability risk perception in Fijian villages 
 
The data denoting perception of vulnerability and relative vulnerabilities (self, 
community and livelihood) across the study population or climate risk offers textured supportive 
evidence for this mediating cultural factor. Climate risk is probed using six analytical units (see 
Figure 12) that were derived based on the data, including two layers of coastal dwellers, to 
differentiate between secondary identification of personal risks (Coastal Dwellers – Self, those 
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derived when probed) from primary invocation of personal risk (Coastal Dwellers). The data 
shows a dominant interpretative risk disposition, the probity of which emerging research on 
interpretive communities of risk strongly suggests can improve message and programme design 
that resonate with values and predispositions (EcoAmerica & SRI Consulting, 2006; Leiserowitz, 
2005; Moser, 2007). This is particularly important as the dominance of the communal risk 
disposition suggests limited segmentation is required to frame the stakes of inaction for various 
segments of the population. 
 Overall, Equal Risk accounts for nearly two-thirds (see Table 21) of the prevalence of 
climate risk in the data. In Yaqaga, a small coastal village with a dense web of familial ties, 
equal risk marks the totality of the study population's perception of climate risk and showed a 
degree of sturdiness when probed, as highlighted by Excerpt 11, Dialogues A and B. This is 
consistent with the disaster risk ideation and overall high climate change knowledge and agency 
in the village. 
Table 21: The relative prevalence of climate and vulnerability risk markers perceived across study populations in Fiji 
Village Children - 2 
Coastal 
Dwellers - 
Self 
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers Equal Risk Farmer - 2 Women - 2 Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Lamiti* 0 0% 0 0% 2 17% 8 67% 1 8% 1 8% 12 
Malawai* 1 8% 3 23% 1 8% 8 62% 0 0% 0 0% 13 
Seaqaqa 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 50% 4 50% 0 0% 8 
Yaqaga 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 5 100% 0 0% 0 0% 5 
Totals 1 3% 3 8% 3 8% 25 66% 5 13% 1 3% 38 
             * Gau village 
Excerpt 11: Equal Risk Perception on Yaqaga is emphasized even when probed 
Dialogue A: Yaqaga Island OM FG Dialogue B: Yaqaga Island OW FG 
Interviewer: Do you think anybody is more affected 
or all the same?  
Respondent: All the same. 
Interviewer: Everybody agree? 
Respondent: Agree. 
Interviewer: Who or does anybody feel their groups 
in the village are more affected by climate change 
than another people or is everybody affected the 
same way?  
Respondent: All the same 
Interviewer: Explain further… How are people 
affected the same way, like now some people move 
further away from the sea, some people [end up 
being] closer... Do you (sic) think about that? 
Respondent: Because of the erosion there and the 
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house is far away this time. We all have to carry our 
bag, our food, and everything far away. 
Interviewer: OK, so your house might be affected but 
it’s closer? 
Respondent: When it’s low tide over here we have to 
go another 100 meters to our homes. 
 
Even in Seaqaqa, a communally atypical Fijian village (both Indo and Indigenous or 
iTaukei Fijians) with looser traditional bonds where specified risk attribution is higher (50 
percent farmers and 50 percent equal risk), specification only emerged in individual interviews 
with farmers. The fact that Seaqaqa was designed as a farming community less than two 
generations ago and decidedly thrives as such today underscores the comparatively higher level 
of risk specification. While the difficulty to reconcile risk perception (equal versus particular 
(farming)) is indicative of the looser social bonds across the multi-enclave cane-farming 
settlement and is consistent with the overall significance of the knowledge gap in the 
community. This further underscores the importance of climate change ideation afforded by 
project interventions, which suggests highly targeted adaptation (and coping mechanisms) are 
less likely to afford. However, the significant resonance of equal risk in this context of relatively 
loose social ties because of the atypical ethnic and industrial construction of the settlement 
supports the observations drawn about the cultural and communal mediating factor.  
The data pertaining to the Gau subset offers strong support for both the ideational and 
cultural extrapolations I have drawn. On Gau, where climate change ideation is more 
comprehensive, equal risk accounts for the great prevalence associated with climate risk 
attribution (64.5 percent), and in similar proportion across both villages (Lamiti (67 percent) and 
Malawai (62 percent)). The Gau population subset also reveals a broader range of climate risk 
perception or risk attribution, which is consistent with the ideational affordances of the 
comprehensive ecosystems-based adaptation intervention on the island, the high level of climate 
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knowledge and wide range of climate knowledge acquisition sources detailed earlier. 
Specifically, where the study population departs from the tendency to note equal climate risk, 
especially in focus groups, clear links are drawn between cause and effect that has resonance 
with key indicators/signs of climate change in the study area.  
The risks faced by Coastal Dwellers (both levels) account for the second most important 
climate risk category in the study overall and in the Gau population subset (the only sub-set it 
figures in) with combined prevalence of 24 percent (six of 25) at the combined village level. 
However, respondents tend to change their answers to acknowledge their specific and 
disproportionate climate risk on probing in both. For instance, a half of the specification of risk 
faced by coastal dwellers (Climate Risk - Self) emerged in the Malawai subset after individual 
risk was invoked and explicitly probed by the researcher (see Excerpt 12 Dialogue A). The 
analytical unit, Climate Risk - Self, is therefore a secondary attribution of risk, which suggests 
overall communal climate risk perception on the island is in excess of two-thirds. It also 
underscores my observation of a tendency to focus on communal risk rather than individual risk 
as it is evident in both focus groups and individual interviews. It is consistent with the overall 
communal motive for action, a preference for communal action and the privileging of traditional 
structures as the chief means through which to lead on climate change. 
Excerpt 12: Risk specification on Gau is secondary 
Excerpt A: Malawai Older Women Focus Group Excerpt B: Lamiti Older Women Focus Group 
Interviewer: Who will you say in the village- which group is 
mostly affected by climate change? 
 
Respondent 1: This two groups? 
Interviewer: All the youths, men, women, fishes, farmers; is 
there a group that is mostly affected or is everyone equally 
affected? 
 
Respondent 2, 3, 4, 5: ALL 
Respondent 1: No, I think is everybody because the women 
goes out fishing and there is less, men cut down the trees.  
 
Interviewer: So, you think everybody is equally affected? 
 
Respondent 1: Yes 
Interviewer: So, why do you think the men are more affected, 
Interviewer: What do you think about climate change? 
Respondent 1: The change in weather now is different from the 
way our forefathers used to live in the olden days compared to 
what we are experiencing now with regards to the lifestyle and 
culture 
Respondent 2: Climate change affects us in terms of the weather 
in the olden days we look at the mountains we always see the soil 
erosion what we never experienced now is washed to the sea. The 
place where it is not swampy now it’s swampy. The sea-weed is 
not good enough too dirty and less to eat that is affected by the 
climate. When it’s a sunny day there is not much sunshine and vice 
versa. We always wait for [things] to happen like waiting for the 
sun and it never comes. 
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tell me it doesn’t have to be one this is why it is good to have 
multiple people share. Tell me why you think the ladies are 
more affected than man?  
 
Respondent 2: When we cut down the trees.  
 
Interviewer: So, you’re saying women are indirectly affected 
by… Any other comments. How about the people who live 
closer to the sea, they are more affected by those that live in 
land? I’m saying whose house is closer to the sea? Anyone 
else? 
 
Respondent 2: No, I live down here  
Interviewer: Oh, so, how many… one, two? So, you think 
climate change affects you more than the rest of the village? 
Yes? You think so? 
 
Respondent 2: Yes 
 
Interviewer: Do you think you should do more? What more 
do you think you can do?  
 
Respondent 1: Planting of mangroves beside the shore 
Respondent 3: Rain does not come regularly not like before it 
affects us mostly erosions are there in the mountains that affects 
our river, our water due to the rain and it affects the sea affecting 
the fish. Now the sea weeds we can’t get as they have been very 
dirty like what Soko said. 
Interviewer: Who in Lamiti is mostly affected by climate change? 
Is affected more or the same? 
Respondent 3: The same 
Respondent 2: Mostly to the farmers because if the soil erosion 
and move to some other places to do their farming and is not good 
to locate somewhere else 
Respondent 4: The fishes are affected the women 
 
 
Children - 2, Farmers - 2 and Women -2, also registered prevalence of four percent each 
(singular instances) in the data. The specification of both Farmers and Women emerged in the 
Lamiti (Gau Island) women's focus group (older women), where equal risk was also mentioned. 
Although these references appear gendered in a consequential manner (farming is a male job), 
both were proffered with strong food security emphasis per Excerpt 12, Dialogue B. However, 
these attributions differ from the specification of farmers in Seaqaqa as they are not 
particularities stemming from a knowledge gap or discounts the communal make-up (all families 
are dependent on farming and fishing). Instead, they reveal how climate change affects both 
genders in terms of employment/communal obligations and subsistence in resource dependent 
contexts. It is also articulated in a manner that is consistent with elements of their primary 
climate perceptions, particularly their emphasis on dwindling crop yields/soil health and fish 
stock.  
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Climate Change Agency 
Figure 13: Forms of climate change agency in Fijian Villages 
 
 
Table 22: The relative prevalence of forms of climate change agency across study populations in Fiji. 
Village 
Failed 
Actions Fatalism 
Mixed - 
Agency 
Nature 2 - 
Agency Optimism Religious Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Lamiti* 3 10% 2 6% 0 0% 0 0% 26 84% 0 0% 31 
Malawai 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 26 58% 18 40% 45 
Seaqaqa 0 0% 8 23% 1 3% 4 11% 25 71% 4 11% 35 
Yaqaga 1 6% 3 19% 0 0% 0 0% 13 81% 0 0% 16 
Totals 4 3% 14 11% 1 1% 4 3% 90 71% 22 17% 127 
             * Gau village 
The strong correlation between the range and nature of climate knowledge and 
knowledge acquisition sources, project perception and ideational exposure offered through 
climate adaptation initiatives across the study populations also correlates with agency. It also 
reinforces Lorenzoni et al.’s (2007) observation of the interrelations between individual level 
barriers to climate change communication and action, specifically a lack of knowledge, absence 
of desire to seek information and limited availability of relevant or accessible information. 
Climate agency concerns the study population's perspectives on what they or others can 
do to limit climate change-induced impacts experienced in their communities. This study 
employs eight analytical units (see Figure 13) to capture the presence of agency, mixed agency, a 
lack of agency, and various forms/causes of fatalism (nature, failed actions and religious). While 
fatalism is substantial, there is no discernible climate denialism, which is consistent with the high 
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perceptibility and primarily existential or subsistence perceptual valence. This correlation 
suggests the extant literature’s association between climate denialism and knowledge gaps is 
overdetermined in resource-dependent contexts where perceptibility and impact are substantial. 
Overall, 71 percent of all expressions related to climate agency are optimistic (see Table 22). 
This high level of optimism soars to 83 percent (90 of 108) when one accounts for an outlier in 
the Malawai sample pool, a transient resident pastor who accounts for the only instance of 
explicit fatalism and all 18 explicit references to its religious orientation. This high degree of 
optimism is evident across all the study populations with notable variations. 
Malawai Village on Gau Island records 100 percent optimism on climate action, apart 
from the outlier noted above. Lamiti Village, which is also located on Gau and was exposed to 
the same decade-long comprehensive ecosystems-based adaption initiative, is marginally less 
optimistic at 84 percent (or 26 optimistic references to climate action out of 31 instances in 
which climate agency was invoked).  The absence of agency that marks the remainder of the 
population also seems mutable as it is marked by fatalism caused by failed actions, which are not 
irreversible. With these adjustments, when combined, climate change optimism on Gau stands at 
91 percent or (52 of 57).  
In Seaqaqa, climate outlook is also largely optimistic with a prevalence of 71 percent, in 
addition to one instance of mixed agency that's attributed to nature. The population segment that 
was marked by a lack of optimism on climate action accounted for nearly a quarter of relative 
prevalence (23 percent), which is marked equally by fixed causes nature (four) and religion 
(four). This is strongly associated with the primary way through which they perceive climate 
change (water scarcity) and its direct relationship with nature (natural well), which is subject to a 
changing and variable climate. 
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Yaqaga Island also shows a high degree of optimism on climate action with an optimistic 
prevalence of 81 percent. The population marked by a lack of climate agency, specifically 
fatalism caused by failed actions, features in relative prevalence of 19 percent. This also 
correlated strongly with the signs/indicators of climate change most resonant on this island that 
distinguishes it from a near identical island geographical context in the Gau villages: coastal 
erosion and efforts over a generation to tackle it by building a makeshift seawall.  
The nature of fatalism that weakens agency across the study populations is variably 
mutable, which is consequential for how values are interpellated in climate change interventions. 
Both nature and religion are interlinked domains in Fijian traditional and indigenous societies 
that structure the values held by the populations studied. The religious-oriented fatalism 
observed in Malawai Village, for instance, is very complex (see Excerpt 13, Dialogue A). It does 
not promote inaction but demarcates a clear limit to which action is necessary, warrants support 
and can or will be viewed as efficacious. In a phenomenally logical fashion, it decisively 
separates necessary short-term actions with direct benefits (utility) from panaceas, while linking 
participation with end-time preparatory rituals or duties. So, religion is not an immutable limit in 
this context (see Excerpt 17, Dialogue A; also see motive for action on Gau). This contrasts with 
the fixity that underscores religious fatalism expressed by interviewees across faith traditions 
(Hinduism, Christianity and traditional retentions) in the multi-ethnic enclave of Seaqaqa (see 
Excerpts 14, Dialogues B and C).  This complexity that marks the connection between agency 
and religion is theoretically significant. It strongly suggests significant limits to contentions 
about the high efficacy of religious frames, even when tailored to faith traditions in the same 
religion (Kearns, 2011; Nisbet, 2009). The absence of initial and explicit immutability evident in 
Excerpts 13 and 17 shows that the openings that can be enabled by framing environmental 
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stewardship as a matter of morality and ethics, or a religious duty of care akin to Pope Francis’s 
(2015) second Laudato Si’ Encyclical “On Care for our Common Home,” are conditional. 
The contrast in how religion or religious disposition affects climate agency across Gau 
and Seaqaqa is consistent with the differences in ideational exposure, range of climate 
knowledge acquisition sources and knowledge levels in both contexts. Similarly, nature and 
nature-induced fatalism (failed actions) are variably mutable across study populations in a 
manner consistent with ideational exposure, range of climate knowledge acquisition sources and 
knowledge levels. In Seaqaqa, a context where circumscribed or limited ideation correlates with 
low levels of both measures noted, nature related fatalism is invoked with resignation when 
probed about what can be done about climate change. This retort from a participant in the Male 
Probing Group is emblematic, “[we] just go with the climate and right now we can only prepare 
the land and calmly wait for rain.” Whereas, failed actions, which figure in the data for both 
Yaqaga Island and Lamiti Village on Gau Island, contexts with relatively and variably higher 
ideational experiences and range of climate knowledge acquisition sources and knowledge, are 
manifestly mutable blocks that can be attenuated with access to resources, technical support and 
improved coordination, particularly for Yaqaga (see Excerpt 15, Dialogue D). 
Excerpt 13: The mutability and complexity of religious oriented fatalism observed in Malawai Village 
Dialogue A: Religious Fatalism – Malawai Village, Gau Island 
Interviewer: So, you say climate change is the sign of the end time? 
Respondent: Yes 
Interviewer: So, you see climate change is the sign of the end times but there is lot of work 
going on in the village. Do you think this is something we can do anything about? 
Respondent: Yes 
Interviewer: We can still do something about it even though it’s a sign of the end times? 
Respondent: Yes 
Interviewer: If climate change is a sign that [the] world is going to end, can we still do 
something about it? What can we do? 
Respondent: Do the what? 
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Interviewer: Climate change is a sign of the world’s end and Joeli has this project where you 
planting tiri, building seawalls. Does it make sense? 
Respondent: Yes 
Interviewer: Will that stop it? 
Respondent: It doesn’t 
Interviewer: It’s going to happen so you do it because some help, some benefits  
Respondent: Yes 
Interviewer: Are you involved in the building of the sea-wall? 
Respondent: I’m involved  
Interviewer: OK, and you plant tiri as well? 
Respondent: Our task is to do that but the day will come 
Interviewer: So, you do it because if something happens to the village? 
Respondent: Yes, to protect the village now and nothing in this world can stop  
Interviewer: OK that is what I was thinking of. Thank you! thank you! Do you talk to your 
congregation about this? 
Respondent: Yes 
Interviewer: What are their reaction? Like did they agree with you or…? 
Respondent: Agree. I told them what they have to do every day and most thing they have to 
is to prepare ourselves for the end. 
Interviewer: They’ll help with the things. You saying something what is it? 
Respondent: The task I told them every day to do, their spiritual growth they must prepare 
for the last days their movements. 
Interviewer: Do you think people or Joeli understands it from the view of the Church? Have 
you talked to him about this- the villagers view on climate change? 
Respondent: Yes, he also knows. 
 
 
Excerpt 14: The immutability and fixity of religious fatalism expressed in Seaqaqa across faith traditions. 
Dialogue B: Religious (Hindu) Fatalism – 
Older Male Focus Group – Navai, 
Seaqaqa 
Dialogue C: Religious (Christianity/ 
Traditional Retentions) – Male Focus 
Group – Rokosalase 
Interviewer: Do you think we can do 
anything about it? 
Respondent 2: No 
Interviewer: Why? 
Respondent 2: Because it’s in God’s hands 
and we cannot do anything about it. 
Interviewer: Do you talk about climate 
change in your various churches, temple? 
Respondent 2: Yes 
Interviewer: Why can’t you do anything  
about climate change? 
Respondent 1: Everything is up to God 
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Excerpt 15: The mutability of fatalism induced by nature and failed actions on Yaqaga Island. 
Dialogue D: Nature and Fatalism – Older Men Focus Group –  Yaqaga Island  
Interviewer: So, you guys are doing something about the sea wall that you build. When do you 
build the sea wall?  
Respondent: Back in the 1980’s  
Interviewer: Is it a community thing? 
Respondent: We’re all part of the project, we built the stone  
Interviewer: What I’m trying to find out is that the Government started the project or the village 
Respondent: The village 
Interviewer: Because of the erosion? 
Respondent: And the climate change knowledge just came in now 
Interviewer: You learn about climate a long time ago. How do you describe it at that time of the 
building of sea wall back in the 80’s? 
Respondent: Right from the shoreline to the front  
Interviewer: They say move the stones from where? 
Respondent: They move the stones back to its original place; they move it over there and they see 
it was not that effective. The shoreline now regrow back so they move it closer to the village. 
Interviewer: Oh, they are trying to get back and reclaim the land so that was working? So, it is to 
protect what you have? 
Respondent: Yes  
Interviewer: This is done ever since? 
Respondent: Yes, it is done every Monday. 
Interviewer: What is it that you do every Monday?  
Respondent: Collecting rocks  
Interviewer: Did you do it in groups? 
Respondent: Men, women, children 
Interviewer: Nice. And this was all way back in the 80’s? And what did you call when you were 
doing it then term it as building of seawall? 
Respondent: I was there when they build 
Interviewer: What did they call it then seawall? 
Respondent: We were building sea wall then; you know all those big trees on the right those are 
right on the shoreline but now they are like islands.  
Interviewer: My next question is if climate change is something you can do something about, you 
clearly think the Community has been a lot of really interesting things. Do you think climate 
change is something you can do something about? What I’m trying to find out is [if you think] 
what you’re doing will stop it, limit it or help you survive it- climate change? What do you think? 
Are you doing it to cope for now or the things you are doing will stop it? 
Respondent: To adjust to the changes we can’t do anything to the changes in climate  
Interviewer: What about fishing? Do the way you fish has anything to do with climate change? You 
said yes? Why? Why? What’s the link between you fishing and climate change? So, you fish right 
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and I’m trying to find out if there’s a connection between climate change and fishing? 
Respondent: We used to fish there but now we go far away 
Interviewer: So, you think climate change is causing that? What is it of the shores that is forcing 
you to move away? So that’s something missing from your shores that’s making you shift where 
you fish. Did you have any idea of what that is?  
Respondent: That is where the baby of the fish  
Interviewer: What is making the sardines migrate? 
Respondent: Because of the net, we overfish the sardines. 
Respondent: It also shifted to the outer islands like Yadua, it should be near here. 
 
Motive for Action 
However, considering the high level of agency across study populations (decidedly 
majoritarian to maximal), even in Seaqaqa where ideational exposure, climate knowledge levels 
and acquisition sources are relatively lower, a closer look at why people participate in or care 
about acting on climate change is crucial to improving understanding of the tapestry of factors 
that structures, and may be leveraged to boost climate agency. In other words, probing the data 
for the study population’s motives for acting on climate change, currently or prospectively, 
warrants scrutiny.   
Figure 14: Intrinsic and extrinsic factors that motives climate action in Fijian villages 
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Table 23: The relative prevalence of Intrinsic and extrinsic factors that motives climate action across study populations in Fiji 
Village Children 
Communal 
Obligation 
Community/ 
Village God/Religion 
Self/ 
Offsprings 
Density Prev Rate Prev   Prev   Prev   Prev   
Lamiti* 4 44% 0 0% 6 67% 1 11% 0 0% 9 
Malawai* 6 25% 1 4% 8 33% 7 29% 2 8% 24 
Seaqaqa 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 0 0% 0 0% 3 
Yaqaga 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 0 0% 0 0% 2 
Totals 10 26% 1 3% 19 50% 8 21% 2 5% 38 
     * Gau village 
 
Using seven analytical units derived from the dataset to capture both intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors that motivate action (see Figure 14), the preservation of the community emerges 
as the main motive for acting on climate change across the study population, accounting for half 
of the prevalence associated with all seven factors denoting motive for action in the overall study 
population. However, the significance of this motive is marked by distinct complexity on Gau 
Island, which is consistent with their sustained ideational exposure to comprehensive climate 
change adaptation activities.  
While the data suggests a single factor (community/village) motivates action on Yaqaga 
Island and across the Seaqaqa settlement, three factors motivate the population on Gau Island 
(see Table 23). These are community/village, children and religion, which account for combined 
village totals of 42 percent (14 of 33), 30 percent (or 10 of 33) and 24 percent (eight of 33), 
respectively. The fact that the analytical unit children is distinct from that which captures 
references to one’s own children means this is an expansive outlook. It is independent of but 
intimately linked with the general communal disposition. It suggests empathy and care for 
others, particularly the young, is an operative factor. Taken together, it shows a communal 
motive with a prevalence of nearly three-quarters (73 percent or 24 of 33). So important is the 
communal motive that one respondent, who registered agency framed with religious 
conditionalities (distinct from religious fatalism), cited communal obligation as her motive for 
action (see Excerpt 17, Dialogue A). This offers further support for my earlier observation of the 
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complexity of religious values in a context where ideational exposure, climate knowledge and 
knowledge acquisition sources are high. Also, when read in context, the six percent prevalence 
(two of 33) attributable to the preservation of self/offspring, which is found in the data associated 
with the older women in Malawai Village, is found to be secondary and connected to expressions 
of communal preservation.   
The high prevalence of the communal motive across all three study populations supports 
my earlier reading of how the duty bound or communal disposition in indigenous Fijian 
communities—where traditional structure, seniority and authority are privileged such that a lack 
of youth-specific consultation—masks limited youth inclusion in and influence over decision-
making processes about climate action, particularly on Gau Island. This suggests climate action 
decidedly focused on ‘the whole’ is likely to find greater support in these contexts. However, the 
gendered and age-based division of labour and routine tasks, which are perceptibly impacted by 
climate change in variable ways, strongly suggests that group specific integration into project 
decision-making should transcend the limited macro-group (male and female) formation—
observed to varying degrees across the three study populations, to include youth, as detailed in 
the subsection on macro-group variations across the field sites. This is so as tasks and roles are 
gendered and undifferentiated across families in each context, so with male and female adult 
inclusion already variably accounted for across projects, youth, who have designated duties 
based on their age in traditional and indigenous Fijian society, in addition to their gendered 
duties, is a missing macro group in the decision-making processes. So, providing subject-matter 
or task-specific information (fishing, farming, sanitation, etc.) to age-based gendered cohorts and 
specifically including each group in the decision-making processes—rather than only project 
activities—taps the highly resonant communal motive observed, including risk perception and is 
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likely to boost both knowledge levels and agency and invariably, other factors such as project 
perception. The salience of this point is illustrated in the subsection on the range of salient 
gender and age macro-group variations observed in the dataset that is indicative of gaps across 
various critical dimensions. 
Excerpt 16: The potency of communal obligation in Malawai Village militates religious-oriented fatalistic impulses 
Dialogue A: Motive for Action – Religion and Communal Motive – Young Women Focus Group – Malawai 
Village, Gau Island 
Interviewer: How did you learn about climate change? 
Respondent 2: Based from the Bible- Mathew 24 talks about climate change  
Respondent 1: Before 
Respondent 3 & 4: Same  
Interviewer: Your education system talks about climate change? Do you think you can do something about climate 
change? 
Respondent 2: The time will come and we have to face it. I just learn from that. 
Interviewer: You three said that you can do something about it? 
Respondent 4: I believe we have to plant more mangroves and don’t throw garbage into the sea. Sometimes we use  
small nets to catch small fish and wait for high tide to catch big fish. Some use fish poisoning because it is easy to 
kill the fish instead of standing for long hours waiting to catch a fish. 
Interviewer: So, people still use that now? 
Respondent (ALL): NO!  
Interviewer: What do you think people use fish poisoning? 
Respondent 2: To kill the fish  
Respondent 4: They don’t think of others they just think about themselves.  
Interviewer: so selfish? Do you know anybody using that? 
Respondent 4: Too many to mention but I just can’t say it 
Interviewer: Can you tell me about the activities in the village, the trees you’ve plant? 
Respondent 4: Our husbands are building seawalls and we’re planting mangroves.  
Interviewer: So, the men don’t plant mangroves? 
Respondent 3: Sometimes 
Interviewer: So, women don’t work in building sea walls? 
Respondent (All): NO  
Interviewer: So, you think change is inevitable- you plant the mangroves, don’t use poison and small nets to catch 
fish and climate change. Why do you think it is inevitable, and doing things to limit? You told me earlier the bible 
says about climate change and you are still doing things? Why [do] you still do [those] things? Why [are] you still 
fishing properly, planting the mangroves?  
Respondent 2: I follow what [Respondent 3] said I go and plant. It is required on what Joeli [project lead, Dr. Joeli 
Vietayaki} says. 
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Climate Change Leadership  
 
Figure 15: The preferred sources of leadership on climate change in Fiji villages. 
 
 
Consistent with the high resonance of a communal motive for acting on climate change 
and risk perception, the study also shows a high preference for communal leadership on the 
multi-faceted issue of climate change. Of the six analytical units denoting the individuals or 
groups in which they prefer to repose leadership on climate change issues (self, exemplary 
person, family, community/village, traditional structures and external entities – see Figure 15), 
the data suggests the study populations overwhelmingly privilege climate action through 
traditional structures. In iTaukei contexts such as Gau and Yaqaga Islands, these structures 
include turaga ni koros (official village headmen), traditional village chiefs (head of the chiefly 
mataqali or clan) and in the atypical settlement of Seaqaqa, this includes an advisory counselor, 
which is similar to the turaga ni koros. In all three contexts these structures also include various 
village committees. 
In Lamiti Village, the preference for traditional structures is decisive, with a prevalence 
of 60 percent compared to the other factors (see Table 24). Although these structures are also 
privileged in neighbouring Malawai, there is preference for more varied leadership: 43 percent 
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prevalence for traditional structures and 38 percent for a more devolved community/village-wide 
approach. However, when taken together, community/village wide leadership on climate change 
and climate action through traditional structures accounts for 90 percent and 81 percent of the 
preferred leadership channel for climate actions in the Gau villages of Lamiti and Malawai, 
respectively. These communal avenues for action (an average of 85 percent thematic prevalence 
or 35 of 41) dwarf the marginal prevalence of external entities, which was only invoked once 
alongside communal, family and traditional structures and family and self as the preferred 
leaders on climate action. The emphasis on the communal channels of leadership on climate 
change conforms with both communities’ angst about the resilience of traditional structures 
amidst socio-cultural changes and the Gau Island project's emphasis on mobilization, action and 
ownership through these domains. It also strongly correlates with the high level of positive 
project perception and perception of influence and inclusion in the process. 
Table 24: The relative prevalence of preferred sources of climate leadership across study populations in Fiji. 
Village 
Community/ 
Village 
Exemplary 
Person External Family Self 
Traditional 
Structures 
Density Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Lamiti* 6 30% 0 0% 1 5% 1 5% 3 15% 12 60% 20 
Malawai* 8 38% 0 0% 0 0% 4 19% 0 0% 9 43% 21 
Seaqaqa 3 17% 3 17% 5 28% 0 0% 0 0% 7 39% 18 
Yaqaga 2 33% 0 0% 1 17% 1 17% 0 0% 3 50% 6 
Totals 19 29% 3 5% 7 11% 6 9% 3 5% 31 48% 65 
                 * Gau island 
The data for Yaqaga Island, which is as culturally akin to Gau as it is geographically 
identical, also shows a similar preference for traditional structures and community/village (83 
percent combined prevalence) as the primary domains in which climate change leadership should 
be reposed. At a more granular level, the preference for traditional structures accounts for half 
(three of six) of the prevalence associated with markers of climate leadership among the study 
population, while the preference for community/village level leadership accounts for one-third 
(two of six). However, the singular invocation of a preference for external leadership in Yaqaga 
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is of statistical significance (17 percent), and seems to correlate with the relatively higher 
presence of fatalism caused by failed actions (climate agency) that, as established earlier, is not 
immutable given access to expert intervention, specifically the generation-long effort to build a 
makeshift seawall to stave-off coastal erosion (a key sign/indicator of climate change, among the 
population) that is yet to yield the outcomes desired (see Excerpt 15: The mutability of fatalism 
induced by nature and failed actions on Yaqaga Island, Dialogue D). 
Although much lower, even in Seaqaqa, which is culturally distinct and atypical in Fiji 
because of its diverse ethnic composition and origin as a product of a deliberate government 
agro-economic policy, there is strong evidence of a preference for action through 
communal/village level and traditional structures—specifically their advisory counselor, who is 
appointed by the regional authorities based on self-nomination from a resident of the community 
and the assent of the community. Overall, both communal domains have a prevalence exceeding 
a half (56 percent). The community also shows a strong desire for external leadership (28 percent 
prevalence) and leadership by exceptional individuals locally and externally (17 percent 
prevalence) accounting for a combined 45 percent prevalence (eight of 18) associated with 
leadership preference. The absence of the self or kin nomination (family) registering as a 
preference suggests the outward look, which is comparable to the confidence reposed in 
communal leadership, is an expressed interest in tapping expertise not found within their place of 
abode to tackle their acute climate change induced challenges, particularly water scarcity and 
low crop yield (per signs and indicators).  
This granular look at how and where climate change leadership confidence is reposed 
strongly confirms the importance of communal level interventions with cross-macro social group 
resonance and invariably sectoral peculiarities given the gendered and age-based division of 
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labour. More importantly, it also makes manifestly clear the importance of acknowledging and 
leveraging traditional and communal leadership to ensure compliance and effective climate 
adaptation, a point also supported by varied discrete age and gender observations in 
circumscribed settings as detailed in the subsection on macro-group dynamics. This would also 
necessarily promote communal harmony, which invariably boosts both perception and overall 
success. This observation is consistent with those of indigenous scholar Joeli Veitayaki, who 
notes: 
 
Traditional leaders are born into positions of leadership and must lead, so that decision 
making is consistent with the need for resource management. The work in Vanuaso 
Tikina was easier because of the support of the chiefs who have been pillars of strength. 
Long term community support will only be assured if the leadership is fair, transparent 
and inspirational, (Veitayaki, 2001, para. 10) 
 
Crucially, it also highlights the need to enhance the efficacy of these communal 
leadership structures by accounting for contextual factors, such as technical, monetary, 
informational and logistical support, that undermines both agency and confidence in the 
communal as observed in both Yaqaga Island (failed actions) and Seaqaqa. This is underscored 
by my earlier observation of the specification of Dr. Veitayaki’s status as Kai Malawai alongside 
his technical competence by respondents on Gau (see Excerpt 1, Dialogue A), which portends 
well for equipping and privileging local champions and messengers on climate action as 
technical leaders rather than mere functionaries for the diffusion of messages across mediated 
networks. 
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Angst: Complex Challenges 
The data suggests that accounting for these technical, monetary, informational and 
logistical deficits, as well as gaps in macro-social group inclusion in decision-making and 
invariably multi-linked sectoral and task emphasis, is necessary to improve climate knowledge 
and enable communities to better identify, support and/or conceptualize and implement climate 
actions. The complexity and linkages among the broad array of issues identified as key 
community challenges (angsts), difficulties among segments of the study populations to 
recognize their connection with and rank them against climate change as a primary challenge 
underscores this observation. This is especially important as expressions of angsts have a high 
prevalence in the dataset, such that the 35 analytical units used to gauge the issues of greatest 
concern to the study population is the most expansive set in this study (see Figure 16). So 
intractable and cross-cutting are these concerns that for analytical purposes, they necessitated 
isolation from signs and indicators, and other thematic groups. 
Ten of the analytical units denoting angsts are illustrative of those ranked first relative to 
climate change by the study population. Theseare: Climate Change Impact - 1, Education - 1, 
Food Security -1, Housing - 1, Income - 1, Sanitation -1, Sea Wall Construction - 1, Transport - 
1, Water Scarcity - 1 and Wild Animals – 1 (see Figure 16 analytical units, and Table 25 for 
relative prevalence). While angsts vary widely across study populations and the study sought to 
capture how participants perceived them in relation to climate change and the impacts it induces, 
it is notable that overall climate change impact independently shows the greatest level of 
prevalence of all angsts (prevalence of 12 of 126). However, it comes in second (alongside 
education) behind transportation as the angsts people deemed most important when ranked. 
While this macro picture varies greatly across villages, it is important to note that the study 
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population generally sees angsts as climate change induced or exacerbated, including access to 
education and transportation. As such, expressions of angsts in this context can be understood as 
conscious reflection on challenges and prioritization for action.  
 
Figure 16: The range of complex concerns in Fijian villages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consistent with the observation that the ideational affordances of the sustained exposure 
to a comprehensive ecosystems-based adaptation intervention on Gau Island is a differentiating 
factor, though the number of angsts expressed in each study population is similar (Gau - 15, 
(variably in each village), Seaqaqa - 12 and Yaqaga Island - nine), the Gau subset accounts for 
five of the six instances in which the study population prioritize climate change impact as the 
chief challenge—Yaqaga accounts for the sixth, which is consistent with its direct exposure to 
coastal erosion and the dominance of that impact as a sign/perception of climate change.  
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Sanitation (eight), Lifestyle (seven) and Housing (five), which account for the other 
statistically significant angsts on Gau, though pertinent to the viability of the study population, 
are rarely ranked above climate change as a key angst: housing and sanitation both registering a 
priority ranking once, alongside income. This separation of manifestly and latently linked angsts 
from climate change among the Gau subset is consistent with the higher degree of climate 
change knowledge in that study population and their comparatively greater exposure to the 
complex linkages between their lived experiences and climate change induced impact. This 
likely affords them the ability to draw linkages when probed about the order of importance of 
their angsts, notwithstanding a tendency to use proximity as a factor in initial associations 
between impacts and action relative to climate change.  
This thesis also holds true with the Seaqaqa population. Consistent with the observation 
that the manifest link between the most primary way in which the Seaqaqa population 
observes/perceives climate change (water scarcity) and the proximity thesis, water scarcity and 
climate change impact feature as the two primary angsts, but of the two analytical units, only 
water scarcity, which impacts daily routines (proximity to the home/self), is ranked as a top 
problem (prevalence of nine). But, given the established ideational and knowledge gaps 
discussed earlier, this is likely indicative of a dissonance between cause and impact among the 
Seaqaqa study population. This is especially notable, as I have contended, because of the 
manifest relationship between their primary angst (as well as sign/indicator of climate change) 
and the general problem of climate change. However, the proximity thesis is reinforced by the 
fact that though climate change impact is noted as a central problem (specification, not rank) 
with a prevalence of five, a rate greater than in any single village on Gau (three in Lamiti and 
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four in Malawai), it is not ranked above any of the other specified challenges, which are more 
vividly linked to climate change, but more distally so: transport (two), food security (one). 
Though Yaqaga Island is the only study population subset other than Gau to show any 
prevalence for climate change impact as the top ranked angst, it does not explicitly feature in 
their top three angsts. Education (four), health centre (three), transport (two) and sea wall 
construction (two) account for the most grounded/prevalent angsts in the population subset. 
However, when probed, all these challenges/angsts are justified by the unpredictability of the 
weather and the varying social costs it induces (see Excerpt 18, Dialogue A). Consistent with the 
observation that ideational affordances boost climate change knowledge and capacity, as evident 
in this study population's exposure to a broad-based disaster risk education exercise, the village 
only ranks its transportation (two) and educational angsts above climate change impact (four) 
when asked to compare their angsts because of immediacy and risk perception, as the links 
between the range of angsts expressed and climate change are relatively well understood. 
The prominence of education as an angst among the study population is consistent with 
the high score it received on the Infrastructure Prioritization Index that was constructed based on 
the project directed community risk assessment conducted in November 2013. Its reoccurrence 
as an angst is highly significant. Due to the limited resources of the circumscribed project 
intervention, the community and project team were compelled to pursue needs prioritization. 
While relatively progressive for discounting voting and privileging consensus based on ideation, 
needs prioritization still truncates people's fundamental needs/angsts. So, while children 
explicitly figure in the need prioritization process and underpin the transportation and education 
angsts observed in my data, the village had to make them secondary because only one thing 
could be ranked first in each category (economic, social and coastal and water infrastructure) and 
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receive funding from the project. To bridge this obvious divide, the project declared the first 
ranked and funded infrastructure was a multi-purpose building/evacuation centre—a single 
room, albeit large—that it proposed for use as a classroom and a community hall when not 
needed as a disaster shelter. While this makes for excellent project reporting to a project donor, 
the lack of follow-on resources or support to realize the possibilities or expansive leveraging 
opportunities created by this circumscribed intervention remains unfulfilled and a source of 
primary angst. The larger implication here is that piecemeal or circumscribed interventions can 
undermine climate change agency and project perception when adaptive capacity is segmented 
through ranking or voting procedures to render them fundable. It reinforces the need to and 
efficacy of addressing climate adaptation as a complex challenge rather than a discrete 
phenomenon. This invariably means establishing partnerships and/or working with communities 
to articulate how, where and with whom to collaborate to establish linked actions, where 
resources (project cycle, funding, staffing, among others) preclude comprehensive responses by a 
singular entity or project. 
Excerpt 17: Angsts are complex and intricately linked with climate change 
Dialogue A: Angst –  Education vs Climate Change –   Older Male Focus Group –  Yaqaga Island 
Interviewer: Apart from climate change what are some of the problems, issues in the village with work, the 
challenges in the village? No other problems? Could be anything? Think about the problem here that will make 
life easier here. 
Respondent 1: School, health centre and the transport 
Interviewer: When you wake up tomorrow which one will you put as number 1, you think school is a bigger 
problem? 
Respondent 1: School our kids needs to start from kindergarten 
Respondent 2: Like for now here the weather is good, when the weather is not friendly they will stay at home 
till Wednesday. 
 
Table 25: The relative prevalence of the range of ranked and unranked complex concerns across study populations in Fiji. 
Village 
Afforestation Ageing CC Impact CC Impact    -1 
Distillery 
Cost Education Education -1 Totals 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Lamiti* 0 0% 1 3% 3 10% 0 0% 0 0% 2 6% 1 3% 31 
Malawai* 1 3% 0 0% 4 11% 5 13% 0 0% 1 3% 1 3% 38 
Seaqaqa 0 0% 0 0% 5 14% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 35 
Yaqaga 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 4 18% 4 18% 22 
Totals 1 1% 1 1% 12 10% 6 5% 1 1% 7 6% 6 5% 126 
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Village 
Electricity Evacuation Centre 
Fertilizer 
Cost Flooding 
Food 
Security 
Food 
Security - 1 Health Centre Totals 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Lamiti* 0 0% 2 6% 0 0% 0 0% 2 6% 1 3% 0 0% 31 
Malawai* 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 38 
Seaqaqa 2 6% 0 0% 1 3% 1 3% 2 6% 1 3% 0 0% 35 
Yaqaga 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 3 14% 22 
Totals 2 2% 2 2% 1 1% 1 1% 6 5% 2 2% 3 2% 126 
                
Village 
Ice Plant Income Income - 1 Lifestyle Market Access 
Poisoning 
Fish Rate of Action Totals 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Lamiti* 0 0% 3 10% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 31 
Malawai* 0 0% 2 5% 0 0% 7 18% 1 3% 1 3% 0 0% 38 
Seaqaqa 0 0% 2 6% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 35 
Yaqaga 1 5% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 22 
Totals 1 1% 7 6% 1 1% 8 6% 1 1% 1 1% 1 1% 126 
                
Village 
Relocation Road Sanitation Sanitation -1 Sea Wall Construction 
Sea Wall 
Construction 
- 1 
Totals 
  
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate    
Lamiti* 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 31   
Malawai* 0 0% 0 0% 8 21% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 38   
Seaqaqa 1 3% 3 9% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 35   
Yaqaga 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 9% 1 5% 22   
Totals 1 1% 3 2% 8 6% 1 1% 2 2% 1 1% 126   
                
Village 
Transport Transport -1 Water Scarcity 
Water 
Scarcity - 1 
WIld 
Animals 
Wild 
Animals - 1 Totals   
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate    
Lamiti* 3 10% 4 13% 1 3% 0 0% 4 13% 2 6% 31   
Malawai* 3 8% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 38   
Seaqaqa 0 0% 2 6% 4 11% 9 26% 0 0% 0 0% 35   
Yaqaga 2 9% 2 9% 1 5% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 22   
Totals 8 6% 9 7% 6 5% 9 7% 5 4% 2 2% 126   
 
Macro-Group Variations: Varied Age and Gender Dynamics 
While the preceding observations offer insight into overarching approaches to boost 
climate agency, knowledge levels and action, the data suggests substantial fissures in macro-
social group inclusion in decision-making, as well as varied, pronounced group distinctions 
(primarily age and gender, but also ethnic in Seaqaqa) across multiple critical dimensions that 
reinforce the need to provide subject-matter or task-specific information (fishing, farming, 
sanitation, etc.) to age-based gendered cohorts and specifically including each group in decision-
making processes rather than only physical project activities and enforcement. A closer look at 
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varied significant gaps across these cohorts reveals discrete population segments in need of 
differential information and engagement (formal and informal) in these contexts in order to 
effectively boost knowledge levels, agency, motive, action and other factors such as project 
perception. The macro-group data referenced below is outlined in the respective field site macro-
group appendix (See Appendix H.1 to H.12, I.1 to I.12 and J.1 to J.12 for macro-group data for 
Fijian projects on Gau Island, Yaqaga Island and Seaqaqa, respectively). 
For both Gau and Yaqaga islands, which were both exposed to multi-sectoral climate 
adaptation initiatives, the data related to knowledge levels and signs perceived offers significant 
support for the provision of subject-matter or task-specific information (fishing, farming, 
sanitation, etc.) to age-based gendered cohorts. On Gau, the data shows maximal levels of 
positive perception of personal inclusion and influence in the project for all groups, except for 
young men who account for the entirety of other perceptual markers along discrete communal 
lines. Those in Malawai only report a lack of youth consultation with discernible level of 
disengagement, while their peers in Lamiti only report neutral perceptions. Consistent with the 
importance of project intervention in structuring climate knowledge, this cohort is the least 
knowledgeable on Gau, with knowledge gaps accounting for the totality of their knowledge 
markers, whereas it only accounts for a quarter for young women, only 17 percent for older men 
and zero for older women. Women, particularly older women (88 percent) show more climate 
knowledge as a posteriori accounts for 83 percent of their knowledge markers (88 percent for 
older women and 75 percent for younger women), whereas it only accounts for 59 percent of 
older men and zero for younger men. So, while there is no conclusive gendered or age division in 
knowledge, young men are decidedly more in need of targeted edification and inclusion in 
climate change adaptation intervention in this context. 
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A similar pattern is evident on Yaqaga. While the data shows no clear indication of older 
women’s processing of climate change information that is manifestly indicative of climate 
knowledge, their direct involvement in the project and keen insights into non-project related and 
distal efforts, such as attempts at building a makeshift seawall for almost two generations, 
strongly suggest a considerable degree of experiential and likely a posteriori knowledge. No 
other cohort mentioned this development without prompting. Of the remaining cohorts, young 
men demonstrate the greatest degree of knowledge gap, with the indicator accounting for the 
totality of relative prevalence for knowledge, compared to zero for older men and just a third for 
young women. A posteriori knowledge, the only other indicator for the subset, is dominant for 
both young women (two-thirds) and older men (maximal) relative to all other possible indicators 
of knowledge. 
 Attenuating these knowledge gaps and broadening existing knowledge levels in discrete 
cohorts is underscored by direct associations with perceptions of signs and indicators. On Gau, 
signs and indicators are strongly gendered in a manner consistent with the division of labour. 
Signs associated with the sea (coral health, fish stock and sea-level rise), the domain across 
which women perform routine sourcing of protein and seaweed, are more readily cited by 
women. Women account for five of six invocations of coral health at similar levels across 
cohorts (3:2, in favour of older women) and the sign accounts for similar levels of prevalence for 
each cohort relative to the range of other signs they perceived (10 percent versus nine percent, 
respectively, compared to 0.001 percent for older men and zero for younger men). Similarly, 
Fish Stock accounts for a greater share of the signs perceived by women than men (25 percent 
versus 16 percent). Conversely, men cite signs associated with the domain of the land (coastal 
erosion, crop yield/soil health and soil erosion) where they are tasked with farming primarily for 
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subsistence and building and maintaining structures. Older men, in equal measure across the two 
villages, account for all but one reference to coastal erosion on Gau.  
Similarly, while crop yield/soil health accounts for nearly a third (28 percent) of all signs 
mentioned by men, it represents under a tenth of those cited by women. This gendered 
distinction is evident across age-cohorts, where it is four times more resonant among older men 
than older women (29 percent versus seven percent), and two and half times more resonant 
among young men than young women (33 percent versus 13 percent). While the data suggests a 
marginal age correlation in favour of elders (24 percent versus 21 percent), this is inconclusive as 
older men account for the majority of prevalence associated with the sign, while older women 
account for the least. A similar pattern is observed with soil erosion, where men account for 70 
percent of all references to this sign and  a greater share of the signs they perceive relative to 
others compared to any other cohort (14 percent compared to 10 percent), both older men (14 
percent) and younger men (13 percent) outpace their female counterparts (older women 10 
percent and younger women nine percent) in terms of prevalence relative to other signs 
perceived. 
On the other hand, health, usually the concern of elders, is distinguished by an age and 
gender marker, as the entirety of the sign is accounted for by older men across both villages. 
Similarly, when taken together, climate and weather, which have no particular gendered 
dimension or differentiated consequence, show no conclusive age and gender correlation. 
Women are marginally more likely to cite these combined signs (24 percent compared to 19 
percent) and both older women (27 percent compared to 20 percent for men) and young women 
(21 percent compared to 13 percent for young men) outpace their male counterparts in terms of 
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the sign’s prevalence relative to the others they perceive, but the similarly in resonance across all 
cohorts, except young men undermines the salience of this correlation. 
In furtherance of the case for cohort-specific information provision, climate actions cited 
by the study population conforms with the macro groups most likely to be engaged in leading 
them across various gendered and aged cohorts. Male oriented actions such as planting trees, 
cultivation of sandalwood and the management of the taboo or no take area are entirely 
accounted for by men, primarily older men. However, in some instance, such as crop 
diversification and sandalwood, the prevalence is entirely associated with older men in Malawai 
Village, who have been directly engaged to pilot these efforts. While young men do not account 
for any prevalence associated with those two stated actions and only account for a single mention 
of planting trees and tiri-planting, the prevalence associated with tiri taboo/no take accounts for a 
greater share of the actions they cite than older men (one-third compared to 17 percent, zero for 
women). Similarly, seawall construction accounts for a greater share of the actions they note (44 
percent) than it does for any other group (33 percent for young women, 20 percent for older 
women and 15 percent for older men). While there is no definitive gendered distinction as there 
is only marginal difference between the share of overall actions—sea wall accounts for 
comparable levels across both genders (25 percent women and 19 percent men), as older women 
outstrip men while younger men outstrip young women—there is a very clear age distinction on 
perceptions of seawall construction as a climate action (youth 41 percent compared to 15 percent 
for elders). The higher prevalence of both tiri planting and taboo/no take climate actions relative 
to other signs mentioned by young men, compared to other cohorts on Gau, is consistent with 
both the youth and male dynamic that marks these tasks. This can be accounted for by the overall 
gendered division of tasks that renders these actions male duties: the physical labour-intensive 
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nature of both activities and security implications associated with patrolling on the coasts renders 
them primarily suitable for younger and fitter labourers.  
Unlike Gau, there is no clear gendered or age correlation between the relative prevalence 
of signs perceived and customary duties on Yaqaga, primarily because of the circumscribed and 
communal nature of the climate change intervention that neither engaged with or functionally 
leveraged and reinforced communal gendered division of labour. While fish stock, which is 
directly associated with women’s routine fetching of protein for daily sustenance, accounts for a 
quarter of relative prevalence for all indicators perceived by women, decisively more than the 
less–than-tenth associated with men, older men (12 percent) and women (14 percent) have 
comparable levels of relative prevalence on this indicator. And though the data suggests a youth 
tilt, this is only associated with young women, for whom fish stock is their primary indicator, 
accounting for a third of all the signs they observe. 
Similarly, while, crop yield and coral health account for a third more of relative 
prevalence for men than women, these are entirely associated with older folks and while the 
former is associated with the male domain of work, the latter is linked with the female domain 
(at least for routine tasks). But, the data confirms the observation on Gau that climate actions 
cited by the study population conforms with the macro groups most likely to be engaged in 
leading them across various gendered and aged cohorts. This is palpable even as young men and 
older women account for the totality of climate actions observed in the dataset for Yaqaga Island, 
none of which are directly associated with the project. The taboo/no take activity, which is a 
primarily young male task due to the physical risks and intensity involved in the patrolling, 
accounts for the totality of actions observed by young men, whereas it accounts for two-thirds for 
older women. The ongoing two-generation long effort to build a makeshift seawall accounts for 
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the remainder of relative prevalence for older women. So, both an age-based gendered 
involvement and an age-based experiential variable marks the distinctions observed, 
respectively. 
In Seaqaqa, the associations regarding signs vary across age, gender and ethnic cohorts 
but at comparable levels, except for young men who, even in this context of knowledge 
deficiency, are particularly disadvantaged. But, this consistency in the resonance of signs across 
the cohorts at comparable levels is consonant with the low levels of climate knowledge among 
the study population, which precludes them from conceiving of the climate adaptation activity 
underway in their village as a climate action. Both men and women cite water, the settlement’s 
most palpable indicator of climate change, as their most resonant relative to the others observed 
at similar levels (53 percent compared to 48 percent), which is consistent for all cohorts, except 
young men (all Itaukeis – 14 percent, Indo men - 57 percent, Indo women - 48 percent, older 
Itaukei men - 50 percent, young men 28 percent). Similarly, crop yield/soil health accounts for 
similar levels of relative resonance as a sign for all cohorts except young men, which means the 
data’s suggestion that Itaukei men, when clustered, are distinct, is less an ethnic marker than an 
age distinction and a likely engagement indicator at both the project and communal level. For 
this young cohort, weather is a more highly perceptible indicator as it accounts for the greatest 
share of relative prevalence of the indicators they note (43 percent), at almost twice the levels 
shown by all other cohorts that report similar levels of relative prevalence for this indicator 
(older men - 19 percent, older women - 19 percent, Indo men - 20 percent, Indo women - 17 
percent, Itaukei men - 28 percent, but just 25 percent for older Itaukei men—the same for their 
female counterparts). These indicators reinforce the low climate information base from which 
efforts to boost climate knowledge, agency and action in this context must emerge. 
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While the overwhelming absence of youth from the multi-ethnic enclave of Seaqaqa, due 
to socio-economic and cultural changes, precludes conclusive probity of the macro-group 
observations along the same contours pursued for Gau and Yaqaga Island, there is strong support 
for the overall observation from a gendered, and likely ethnic perspective. Across this atypical 
multi-ethnic enclave, women report no sense of personal influence or inclusion, which suggests 
negligibility because the project employed a sector specific (farming) and direct engagement 
strategy that invariably skews towards men, particularly older men with property rights, because 
of the gendered nature of work that marks such as a male domain. Consistent with this socio-
cultural observation, older men account for the totality of positive perception for the subset in 
equal measure across ethnic groups and in equal proportions relative to other markers of project 
perception (50 percent each) and neutrality marks the entirety of project perception for young 
men, which is consistent with observations among young men elsewhere, notwithstanding the 
sampling constraints noted. However, it is instructive to note that Indo men account for the 
totality of prevalence associated with negative project perception in this subset and its resonance 
is equivalent to their other marker of project perception (positivity). 
While, the knowledge valence associated with Itaukei women in not discernible from the 
subset, the researcher can reliably contend that it is akin to levels observed among Indo women 
(from Navundi only) and young men across metrics because of the similarity in their engagement 
with the project, the dominant and decisive initial source of climate knowledge in this context. 
Older men account for the majority of a posteriori knowledge in the subset (three of five), and 
the knowledge marker accounts for three quarters of prevalence relative to knowledge gap, their 
only other knowledge marker. This distinguishes older men as the most knowledgeable in the 
subset, which is consistent with their higher level of direct engagement with the project. 
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However, there are ethnic distinctions, which may also be indicative of engagement levels. 
Specifically, a posteriori accounts for the totality of knowledge markers associated with Indo 
Men, particularly in Navundi, but only accounts for a half for Itaukei men overall and this holds 
true across youth (all Itaukei men) and older male cohorts. Itaukei men also exhibit the highest 
level of knowledge gap relative to other knowledge markers in this subset at one-half and in 
identical fashion across age-cohorts, while women (Indo women from Navundi only) exhibit the 
lowest level of premium a posteriori climate knowledge. The two other markers of knowledge 
associated with the cohort also account for a third each of relative prevalence. This suggests they 
exhibit a knowledge gap similar to that of Indo men (a third compared to a quarter). The third 
marker is experiential knowledge, for which they account for the totality in the data for the 
subset, which points to the possibility that probing and linking information provision (formal and 
informal) for women in this context can simultaneously help attenuate gaps and broaden their 
knowledge base in a manner that is highly resonant. 
My observations about knowledge levels and engagement is consistent with cohort and 
gendered dynamics associated with climate knowledge acquisition. The data only shows 
prevalence associated with this metric for older Indo men and women (Navai only), which is 
consistent with probing the question of knowledge based on its emergence and the distinction of 
these two groups as most manifestly knowledgeable as established earlier. Project intervention, 
the primary means of initial climate knowledge acquisition in this subset, accounts for the same 
share of relative markers of initial climate knowledge for both groups (50 percent each). 
However, though women exhibit overall lower levels of manifestly credible climate knowledge 
(a posteriori), their initial sources are entirely manifestly credible, with news being their only 
other initial source of climate knowledge. This strongly suggests that either these manifestly 
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credible sources of initial knowledge are insufficient, due to the depth of content, levels of 
exposure, among other factors, or the intervening dominance of experiential knowledge 
(informal networks and systems), which is difficult to assess, is an incumbering factor. This is 
also supported by observations on both Gau and Yaqaga Islands, where groups with lower levels 
of climate knowledge report acquiring initial climate knowledge from formal and manifestly 
credible sources at comparably higher levels relative to other sources. This is the case on Gau 
where all groups, including young men (80 percent—40 percent each for school and project 
intervention) but except older women (29 percent), report manifestly credible sources (news, 
project intervention and school) as their primary initial means of climate knowledge acquisition 
despite maximal levels of knowledge gaps relative to other forms of knowledge. 
Similarly, on Yaqaga, while young men who also exhibit maximal levels of knowledge 
gap but do not demonstrate any climate knowledge acquisition source, young women, who have 
substantially higher knowledge gaps than older men, cite manifestly credible sources (school) for 
the totality of their climate knowledge acquisition, whereas such sources (project intervention) 
only account for a half for older men. Observation and variable other primarily informal sources 
before the project that are of undiscernible credibility equally (25 percent each) account for the 
remainder of their knowledge acquisition sources. While inconclusive in the Yaqaga subset, the 
age association with observation as a significant means of climate knowledge acquisition for 
older folks is also supported by the data for Gau, where older women disproportionately cite 
observation (43 percent) as their primary initial source relative to others. This strongly suggests 
that some common-sense age and macro-group associations hold true and can form the basis on 
which to frame information provision that boosts agency, action and knowledge for older 
cohorts, particularly as in both instances observation is resonant with groups with relatively 
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higher levels of knowledge. However, evidence of young women in Malawai accounting for the 
entirety of prevalence associated with the Holy Book as a source of knowledge and a level equal 
to manifestly credible sources like school (25 percent each), confounds other common-sense 
notions such as the salience of scripturally premised knowledge bases being more resonant 
among the elderly. 
The variations in knowledge bases and perceptions, as well as discernible consistency in 
risk perception, strongly suggest that variations in motives across cohorts may also function as a 
critical pillar in boosting climate agency, knowledge and action, which is underscored by the 
data. Overall, there is no significant distinction between men (39 percent) and women (43 
percent) on the community/village motive, the most resonant motive on Gau, relatively to other 
motives, even though both older men (marginally, at 37 percent to 33 percent) and younger men 
(double, at 100 percent to 50 percent) outpace their female peers in terms of the prevalence of 
their communal motive relative to others. However, there is a decisive age distinction with youth 
being more explicitly communally driven relative to other motives (60 percent compared to 37 
percent), with both cohorts outpacing their gendered elders. Older men in both villages also 
account for a wider range of motives, including the entirety of God/Religion (primarily in 
Malawai with seven of eight) and the majority of children, with the exception of one attribution 
associated with young women in Lamiti. However, even in terms of resonance relative to other 
motives, children account for a third of prevalence for older men (primarily in Malawai—six of 
nine for men) and just a quarter for younger women in Lamiti. Consistent with other 
observations of specifications associated with circumscribed localities, young women in 
Malawai account for the entirety of prevalence associated with communal obligation and their 
older gender counterparts account for the entirety of self/offspring. Importantly, even with 
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amalgamating the various motives that are ostensibly communal or inclusive, these observations 
across cohorts holds true. 
The communal orientation of youth is also supported by the data for the Yaqaga subset, 
particularly on the broader rather than communal disposition of young women. Young women 
account for the totality of the subset’s only motive for action (the community/village), which is 
consistent with the communal preference for leadership in the subset, for which young women 
account for the entirety of the community/village indicator, at twice (50 percent) the level they 
cite a preference for external leadership (26 percent) in terms of relative prevalence, which they 
also solely account for. While also communal, their male peers (as with young men on Gau at 71 
percent for traditional structures), as well as their female elders show maximal preference for 
traditional structures. Consistent with their high level of fatalism due to trial and errors, older 
men deferred on the leadership measure. 
Regarding leadership on Gau, an age dynamic similarly consistent with observations 
about motive emerges that reinforces the higher communal orientation of the youth on the island. 
Youth, particularly young men, privilege communal leadership relative to other forms both in 
terms of traditional structures (56 percent) and the community/village (33 percent) compared to 
their elders (44 percent and 32 percent, respectively). While there is also a clear gender dynamic 
for traditional structures, where it is more pronounced for men overall, relative to other markers 
of leadership than women (51 percent compared to 20 percent, respectively), there is no such 
dynamic on the community village marker, where the motive is marginally more resonant for 
women (38 percent) than men (28 percent), but varies across gendered age cohorts such that 
older women outpace older men, while young men outpace young women. While both gendered 
age cohorts register identical levels of resonance for community/village relative to other 
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leadership preferences, when combined as an indicator of a communal disposition, youth appear 
demonstrably more communal (89 percent compared to 77 percent for elders). Men also emerge 
as more communally disposed than women (79 percent compared to 58 percent) and this is 
consistent across age cohorts as older men outpace older women (78 percent to 50 percent) and 
young men (85 percent) also outpace younger women at 40 percent). Of the two remaining 
motives, older folks variably account for the majority of their relative prevalence: older men in 
Lamiti account for the entirety of preference for external leadership and though the entirety of 
self-preferences for climate leadership is associated with men in this village, it is primarily 
associated with older men (two of three). Similarly, older men from Malawai account for the 
majority of family members (four of five), alongside young men (one of five) from their locality.  
However, in Seaqaqa, the most resonant leadership preference (external) is distinctly 
marked by age and gender, such that older men from across the settlements privilege it as their 
primary source of climate leadership relative to others and at comparable levels across the three 
groups of older men (50 percent each for Indo men across Navai and Navundi and two-thirds for 
older Itaukei men from Rokosalase). Similarly, men from circumscribed localities account for 
the entirety of the preference for an external person, primarily older men from Navai (a third) 
and younger men from Rokosalase (a fifth), for which it was substantial though differential 
levels of relative prevalence. Older women from Navai account for the totality of prevalence 
attributable to women in the dataset and it is entirely associated with traditional structures, which 
points to the possibility of a higher degree of relative preference among these women for this 
form of leadership (maximal) compared to all categories of men (young Itaukei men from 
Rokosalase at 60 percent, 17 percent for older men from Navai and a third for older Itaukei men 
from Rokosalase—older men at 18 percent overall). Men, specifically older men from Navundi 
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and younger men from Rokosalase equally account for the totality of prevalence associated with 
the only other marker of leadership preference—community/village—but with substantially 
different levels of relative preference (one-half compared to a fifth, respectively). 
While there are discrete variations across gender and age that are variably associated with 
climate knowledge, the range and credibility of knowledge sources, signs, actions, motives and 
leadership preferences that can be leveraged to boost climate agency, macro group distinctions in 
levels of agency and the factors that undermine it also offers insights for the effective provision 
of subject-matter or task-specific information (fishing, farming, sanitation, etc.) to age-based 
gendered cohorts that will not just boost knowledge but enable effective action, particularly 
because levels of climate knowledge do not directly correlate with higher levels of agency (the 
motive or willingness to act). For instance, on Gau, climate agency, i.e. optimism, is greatest 
among young men (100 percent), who have intractable levels of knowledge gap and older 
women (91 percent) relative to other markers of agency. Meanwhile it is lowest among young 
women, who register 57 percent, which is comparable to levels among older men at 63 percent. 
While the data shows a clear difference along gendered lines, this is inconclusive as older 
women outpace older men, while younger men outpace younger women by an even larger 
margin. There is also no discernible difference in terms of age as optimism accounts for the same 
level of prevalence for both youth and elders (67 percent) relative to other makers of agency. 
Overall, it is noteworthy that older men across both villages account for a broader range 
of dispositions regarding agency. Of the four remaining markers of agency, older men account 
for the totality of two (resource gaps and fatalism, solely associated with the cohort in Lamiti in 
the former instance and two of three in the latter). Older men in Malawai account for the vast 
majority of prevalence associated with religious fatalism (15 of 18), with younger women from 
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their village accounting for the remainder. Elders in Lamiti account for the totality of prevalence 
associated with failed actions, largely men (two of three).  
Framing climate change information provision in a manner responsive to various cohorts’ 
levels of agency and specific factors that constrain it will invariably transcend knowledge 
improvements and enhance capacity to act, which will thereby add purpose to the manifest 
willingness to act in contexts marked by low capacity. The varied levels of mutability associated 
with the specified forms of fatalism in Gau and elsewhere, as observed earlier, reinforce this 
point. This is a critical observation as fatalism, an indicator of a lack of optimism, as observed on 
Gau, is especially high among engaged project participants and older folks across all 
populations. On Yaqaga Island, there is a strong correlation between gender and climate agency, 
such that women (both subsets) exhibit maximal levels of agency (optimism) and men are 
distinctly fatalistic. However, while there is a clear indication of failed actions as a significant 
explanatory factor for the fatalism that marks older men (accounting for a third of relative 
prevalence), which can be tackled because of its demonstrable mutability (see Excerpt 15: The 
mutability of fatalism induced by nature and failed actions on Yaqaga Island, Dialogue D), there 
is no clear indication of what underscores fatalism for young men’s maximal level of fatalism. 
However, it strongly correlates with their maximal relative knowledge deficits. 
A similar picture is also evident in Seaqaqa that supports the age (elderly) association 
with fatalism, but without corresponding support (or significant contradiction) for the gendered 
dimension, particularly because of the inconclusive ethnic and enclave specificity of the non-
conforming observation. Specifically, fatalism is solely associated with older folks (men and 
women in Navai and Rokosalase). It is decidedly oriented towards nature for women in Navai, 
the only cohort for which it shows prevalence apart from the mixed probing group with older 
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men. However, it is relatively more intractable for these women (three in eight) than for the 
mixed male probing group, which, like young men on Yaqaga strongly correlates with 
intractable levels of knowledge deficit and perceived limits in influence and inclusion. At an 
even more granular level, while fatalism is marked by age distinction, it accounts for a greater 
share of relative prevalence for Itaukei women (a third) than any other cohort but at a level 
comparable to Indo men from Navai (30 percent) and three times greater than for older Itaukei 
men. While not a conclusive correlation, this observation supports the broader point about the 
salience of framing information provision for varied macro-group formations well beyond the 
generally accepted male and female divide to effectively respond to factors constraining agency, 
boost knowledge levels and enable effective action. This is also supported by a closer look at 
top-level data for positive agency for the subset. Overall, across all cohorts in this multi-ethnic 
enclave, men exhibit more climate agency (optimism) than women relative to other markers of 
agency and at comparable levels (older men - 67 percent, compared to older women - 47 
percent), except for younger men (100 percent). However, the apparent decisive gendered 
correlation is attenuated by circumscribed peculiarities that transcend ethnic boundaries. 
Specifically, while older men and women in Navundi (both Indos) exhibit maximal optimism 
regarding climate agency, which distinguishes them from their respective gendered peers 
(optimism accounts for a third of relative prevalence for Itaukei women and a quarter for Indo 
women in Navai), it accounts for 70 percent and 50 percent for their respective male 
counterparts.  
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the relatively small sample sizes across project associated populations, 
this chapter offers considerable insights into the affordances and limitations of three distinct 
climate adaptation initiatives across villages in Fiji, particularly as it relates to ideational 
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affordances (knowledge and ability to mobilize it). It reveals differentiated perceptions of the 
initiatives, levels of inclusion, the state, sources and credibility of climate knowledge, which are 
directly associated with agency, actions, risk perception and the understanding and ranking of 
complex interlinked concerns (angsts). Emblematically, both Gau and Yaqaga Island, where 
climate change information provision, sources and knowledge levels are, respectively, more 
sustained and widespread and macro-group inclusion is more broad-based, show higher levels of 
knowledge operationalization than Seaqaqa—specifically, recognition of climate actions, 
articulation of risk perception and recognition of the links between climate change and chief 
local challenges. These observations strongly correlate with issue formulation and enactment 
through communicative and adaptive actions, which underscores the need for sustained cross-
sectoral intervention frames even where actions are discrete. Issue recognition and agency, for 
instance, are highest on Gau and Yaqaga, where comprehensive ecosystems-based and multi-
sector but issue-specific projects were enacted over a sustained period, respectively. Conversely, 
knowledge levels and operationalization in Seaqaqa, which was exposed to a time-bound, 
circumscribed and issue-specific intervention with manifest climate connections, is so fractured 
that there is no recognition of current or past climate action. 
The chapter also offers insight into overarching approaches needed to boost climate 
agency, knowledge levels and action, specifically the possibility for effective framing based on 
and in response to the dominant food security perceptual valence, communal interpretive 
disposition on risk, leadership and motive. Theoretically, among other things, the chapter points 
to the complexity that marks factors such as religious and nature-oriented fatalism that 
undermine, but can be effectively directed to some degree, to improve agency. Their complexity 
means assertions of the import of frames should be situated in context and are likely highly 
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subjective even where worldviews, such as faith traditions, are shared. Religious-oriented 
fatalism observed in Malawai Village, for instance, does not promote inaction but demarcates a 
clear limit to which action is necessary, warrants support and can or will be viewed as 
efficacious. In a phenomenally logical fashion, it decisively separates necessary short-term 
actions with direct benefits (utility) from panaceas, while linking participation with end-time 
preparatory rituals or duties. However, the mutability of religious fatalism observed in that Gau 
Island village contrasts with more fixed expressions and convictions held across faith traditions 
(Hinduism, Christianity and traditional retentions) in the multi-ethnic enclave of Seaqaqa. The 
absence of initial and explicit immutability evident in fixed forms of religious fatalism means the 
openings that can be enabled by framing environmental stewardship as a matter of morality and 
ethics or a religious duty of care, akin to Pope Francis’s (2015) second Laudato Si’ Encyclical 
“On Care for our Common Home,” are conditional and variable even within faith traditions in 
the same context. 
Relatedly, the geographically, culturally and programmatically varied chapter also points 
to the high importance of spatial variables, including proximity to domains (land, sea, 
waterways, among other things) affected by climate change-induced events strongly influence 
the signs/indicators of climate change that define people’s perception of climate change. 
Poignantly, water, which does not register among the study populations on the relatively pristine 
islands of Yaqaga and Gau, dominates the frame through which the study population in Seaqaqa, 
an arid inland region, perceives climate change. Similarly, the sea and related domains (coastal, 
etc.) did not emerge as perceptual markers in Seaqaqa (a settlement in the deep interior), whereas 
they are first-order signs/indicators across the coastal villages on Gau and Yaqaga. 
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The chapter also challenges the proximity thesis by probing compelling evidence of 
proximal bifurcation of climate change indicators, signs and action that could pave the way for 
optimizing climate knowledge, agency and action by focusing on improving proximal and multi-
level distal perceptual blocks to climate and environmental messages, changes and actions. The 
extant literature suggests that climate perception, action, agency and knowledge singularly 
conform with proximity, such that temporally and spatially distal frames are ineffective 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Moser, 2010; O’Neil & Hulme, 2009; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; 
Weber, 2006) and highly proximal ones are effective (Galloway, 2010). However, the chapter 
suggests that while especially proximal actions (routine, domestic and income generating) are 
recognized as ongoing project activities, they are not identified as climate change actions even 
where climate knowledge and operationalization are high. Similarly, distal and specialist actions 
(re-emergence of bird species and use of submerged fish aggregation devices) are not recognized 
as climate actions, which suggests perceptibility is not singularly a factor of proximal or distal 
relevance but also cognition. 
At a programmatic level, the analysis also highlights macro-social group fissures that are 
largely associated with differential inclusion in decision-making. These distinctions are also 
associated with and compounded by pronounced group dissimilarities (primarily age and gender, 
but also ethnic in Seaqaqa) across multiple critical dimensions that reinforce the need cohort-
specific inclusion into decision-making processes and the differential informational and 
engagement needs of discrete populations segments in order to effectively boost knowledge 
levels, agency, motive, action and invariably other factors such as project perception. These 
highly circumscribed and cohort-specific distinctions and needs are consistent with the 
significance of the complexity of frames observed and the structuring effect of contextual factors 
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on climate change perceptions. So, while the chapter clarifies significant leverage points, namely 
the dominant food security frame, shared risk and motive disposition, alongside a preference for 
communal leadership, the communicative needs necessitated by these climate change impacted 
communities are multiple and chiefly dialogic and likely informal and on-going. 
More broadly, the differentiated affordances and limitations associated with the three 
projects and the significant variations in the macro-group dynamics across villages, indicates the 
possibility that both the adaptation pathways or futures being pursued and the communication 
approaches necessitated vary significantly. Accordingly, I will draw upon the contextual and 
theoretical insights outlined here, alongside findings from India and Belize, to map the contours 
of the adaptation pathways or futures being enabled by discrete climate adaptation efforts, and 
articulate how they might be refashioned to effectively boost capacity and mount commensurate 
responses to the challenges observed, including the associated communication approaches 
warranted by each pathway. 
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Chapter Seven: Indian Case 
 
The onset of global climate change lays bare the Indian paradox. While often derided for 
being the world’s third largest polluter, this vast and populous sub-continental nation’s equally 
significant place among the most vulnerable to climate impacts is not as widely known and 
contemplated. Even on a discrete measure of climate risk (coastal geographical exposure), 
India’s large-scale exposure and vulnerability to hazards dwarf highly legitimate fears about 
climate impacts and sea-level rise that generally accords primary focus to small island and low-
lying developing states (SIDS), particularly those in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. With 
virtually a quarter billion people living within 50 kilometers of its nearly 8,000 kilometers of 
coastline that spans half of all states and 87 cities and towns in proximal distance (Goswami, 
2010), the scale of vulnerability to sea level rise is compounded. This contributes to increasing 
disaster risk that is already manifesting in the loss of lives, assets, livelihoods, cultural domains, 
increasing food insecurity, etc., across a wide-range of communities.  
While economic estimates offer limited insights, the Asian Development Bank’s 
projection that these and wider climate risks could cost the Indian economy 1.8 percent per year 
and nearly a tenth of total economic activity by the end of the century (Ahmed & Suphachalasai, 
2014), offers credible insights into the likely ripple and compounding social costs of limited 
budgets for investment in social services, improving infrastructure to enable growth and/or the 
indebtedness economic contraction promotes amidst efforts to merely cope with climate impacts. 
It also underscores the poverty-response frame for global ecological disruption that marks India’s 
long history of working on environmental issues, including the negotiation of the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the active participation of 
former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the 1972 Stockholm Convention that led to the creation 
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of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Widely acknowledged as a first among 
global political figures, the Indian Premier’s landmark “Man and Environment” speech decidedly 
linked poverty and the environment (Gandhi, 1972). She contended that without solving the 
problem of poverty, efforts to protect the environment would falter because existential 
imperatives of food, shelter and clothing are paramount concerns for the poor. 
Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters? For instance, unless we are in a position 
to provide employment and purchasing power for the daily necessities of the tribal people 
and those who live in or around our jungles, we cannot prevent them from combing the 
forest for food and livelihood; from poaching and from despoiling the vegetation. When 
they themselves feel deprived, how can we urge the preservation of animals? How can 
we speak to those who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers 
and the air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source? The environment 
cannot be improved in conditions of poverty. Nor can poverty be eradicated without the 
use of science and technology (Gandhi, 1972, Man and Environment, para 8). 
Consistent with this frame, in the lead up to the landmark Paris Conference on Climate 
Change, India touted its “long history and tradition of harmonious co-existence between man and 
nature, [noting its citizens] have regarded fauna and flora as part of their family” (India INDC, 
2015, p. 1). India submitted one of the most highly anticipated and ambitious Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) towards the fashioning of the landmark Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change (2016). India’s submission distinctly sought to strike a balance 
between addressing daunting social and economic challenges on one hand and environmental 
imperatives, the exigencies of which it is among the most vulnerable to, on the other. The 
country’s teeming population, urgent need for access to ‘decent work’, basic health services, 
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potable water, electricity and other critical services needed to improve and sustain livelihoods, 
coupled with its own status as one of the most vulnerable nations in the world, compels India to 
seek pathways to deftly manage both its social and economic aspirations while tackling climate 
change. In fact, the country’s policy framework rightly suggests that these two urgent national 
priorities are inter-related pursuits.  
The INDC prioritizes and proposes a host of investments in “no-regrets actions” to tackle 
climate change, which at once allows room for India to address the critical challenges of poverty, 
food security, infrastructural challenges, etc. that are necessary even without a changing and 
variable climate.  However, the staggering US$2.5 trillion price tag associated with realizing 
these ambitions by 2030 (India INDC, 2015) underscores the divergence between India’s 
adaptive needs and its capacity to independently tackle them, not least in financial terms. This is 
made clear by the author of India’s INDC submission: 
We have given our commitment that we will be reducing the emission intensity of our 
GDP. That means in absolute numbers our emissions are not going to decrease because 
we have large developmental goals. We have [a] development gap in terms of providing 
electricity to more than 300 million people who don’t have electricity at the moment; we 
have to provide food to 250 million people who don’t have two meals a day - one fourth 
of the [world’s] hungry people live in India. So, then, we have to provide housing for all. 
So, these are some of the important development goals which the country has to provide 
in finite years—that is, in another five to seven or 10 years (L. Rajaman, personal 
interview, August 8, 2016). 
Further, the Climate and Development Knowledge Network’s (CDKN) review of India’s 
policy space, implementation plans, ongoing work and subnational interventions across states 
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and conurbations also points to a range of operationalization and implementation issues that 
undermine the realization of what Bhatt terms “opportunities for co-creation of green 
technologies and green growth” (cited in CDKN, 2015 p.3). CDKN (2015) notes these 
opportunities include reconciling green growth and human development, recovery from disasters, 
water management, social inclusion, sanitation, the development of cooperative paradigms/multi-
stakeholder engagement and addressing gender disparities. However, the low profile of discrete 
successes at the sub-national level in integrating climate change mitigation and adaptation with 
economic imperatives in states such as Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, as 
well as this researcher’s stocktaking of a range of actions (energy efficiency, decentralized solar 
use, among others) in 2016, strongly suggest it is imperative to take a closer look at local applied 
knowledge across this country. Such probity is anticipated to reveal multilevel people-oriented 
and scalable actions that can be taken to boost adaptive capacity, mitigate climate change and 
safeguard economic growth at the same time, in accordance with the broad-based opportunities 
CDKN notes can be realized alongside successful implementation of India’s INDC. 
Table 26: The climate interventions with their associated discrete and combined field sites, implementers and funders in India 
Country Project Name Implementer Funder Villages Village Subset 
India 
Forest Forever! Forests Ecosystem Laya Assorted, mainly local 
Munagalapudu 
Laya  
  Polusumamaidi 
Nelloikota 
PRAGATI-CARE Sustainable Tribal 
Empowerment Project (PRAGATI-
CARE-STEP) 
*PRAGATI CARE-India 
Agraham 
PRAGATI  Sunaladana Palem 
Itikalakota 
 
Accordingly, this chapter probes the implementation of two integrated rural development 
initiatives that variably tackle climate impacts through mitigative and adaptive initiatives across 
seven remote Adivasi Hamlets in the East and West Godavari districts of Andhra Pradesh, 
southern India (see Table 26; Appendix Countries-Projects-Villages for all projects across the 
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three field countries). Consistent with this study’s explicit focus on climate change impacts and 
responses on the margins, these indigenous tribal communities were selected because they offer 
unique insights into the efficacy of response mechanisms at the base of a society marked by vast 
complexities. These national convolutions include multiple and distinct vulnerabilities, such as 
socio-cultural impediments like casteism that intricately stratifies and varyingly excludes 
hundreds of millions. Additionally, India’s climate reality is analogous to the global 
contestations around climate politics about risk and responsibility because of the differentiated 
ways in which peoples and regions of India contribute to, benefit from and are (or will be) 
affected by climate change-induced impacts. Specifically, these tribal hamlets are entirely 
populated by scheduled castes and tribes, the most socially, politically and economically 
excluded in Indian society. This highly vulnerable population with low capacity (poverty, 
exclusion) is mostly concentrated in the High Altitude Tribal Zone (HATZ), a geo-climatic zone 
marked by large-scale increasing exposure and vulnerability to both climatic related and man-
made hazards, including floods/village inundations due to damming, landslides and droughts. 
 Such vulnerabilities in a low capacity context means the nature, status and condition of 
natural resources in the region, primarily land, forest and water, which are critical for sustenance 
and affirming identity, are increasingly sensitive and exposed to socio-economic and 
environmental degradation. So, in a cyclical and increasingly dangerous manner, this further 
undermines already low coping capacities at an existential level and compounds already 
disproportionate and growing disaster risk. As observed in my theoretical chapter, it is this 
intricate link between social vulnerability and intensified climate change impacts that 
exacerbates the former and underpins the multi-dimensional action purview of this research. 
These contexts typify what Kasperson et al. (cited in Dow et al., 2006) describe as the 
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concentration of harm and risk among certain populations and Leichenko and O’Brien’s (2000) 
warning that climate change and globalization are likely to create “double losers” (p. 228). This 
view cogently paves the way for, as my study does, “giving special attention and consideration to 
the most vulnerable in our efforts to reduce human drivers of climate change and to ameliorate 
the human harm and suffering that will come in its wake” (Dow et al., 2006, p. 79).  
Methodologically, the case is predicated on qualitative analysis, including textual 
examination of project documents associated with the two climate change initiatives underway in 
my study sites, including communication aimed at my units of analysis during the project, 
extensive participant observation, several site visits to project installations, as well as, eight 
semi-structured focus groups with project beneficiaries and two semi-structured individual 
interviews  with project leaders that were conducted over a two-month period under relatively 
immersive conditions. As detailed in the methodology chapter, both focus groups and individual 
interviews were conducted using a common set of guiding questions (See Appendix O). These 
direct engagements with the study population yielded a sample population of 121 (see Table 27) 
drawn from the seven field sites (see Appendix F for village-level sample profile and data for 
each subset). While the sample size is moderate at only a fifth of the total adult population in the 
combined field sites, its representativeness is buttressed by a high degree of household 
representative (47%) and comparable levels of engagement across gendered and age categories. 
Table 27: The Indian sample profile based on the adult population and households across field sites. 
India 
Adult Pop. In 
Field Sites Sample 
Households 
in Field 
Sites 
Households 
Sampled Men Women 
Focus 
Groups Youth  
Total 645 121 133 62 66 55 8 53 Rate 19% 47% 55% 45% 44% 
 
Structurally, the case is formatted in accordance with an integrated typology that 
combines the two elements (transcript and project codes) of the thematic logic order (see Table 
28), a non-random procedure devised to analyze project and interview data and identify the 
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decision-making processes that underpin climate action and inaction at the village level. 
However, the analytical units gender and traditional practices, alongside other macro-group 
dynamics such as youth and age, are progressively integrated because of their high and 
comparatively more significant resonance in the dataset for this country case. As outlined under 
paradigmatic considerations in the methodology chapter, this typology is consistent with 
Gladwin’s (1980) study of non-adoption of agronomic recommendations. All codes and themes 
are defined in Appendix A, and macro group data are outlined in Appendix K.1 to K.12 and L.1 
to L.12 for study sites associated with PRAGATI and Laya, respectively. 
Table 28: The integration of the thematic logic order to inform case structure 
 Thematic Logic Order for Non-Random Data 
Analysis Integrated Thematic Logic Order  
 Transcripts Case Structure 
 Climate Action Project (Type and) Framework 
 Knowledge Project Activities 
 Climate Knowledge Acquisition Project Action and Causes Profiled 
1.  Signs/Indicators Belief Progression 
 Cause and Proximity Project Outcomes 
2.  Climate Risk Project Perception 
3.  Climate Agency Personal Inclusion and Influence 
4.  Motive for Action Knowledge 
5.  Climate Leadership Climate Knowledge Acquisition 
6.  Project Perception Signs/Indicators 
7.  Personal Inclusion/Influence Climate Action 
8.  Belief Progression Cause and Proximity 
9.  Angst Climate Risk 
10.  Traditional Practices Climate Agency 
11.  Gender Motive for Action 
12.  Schooling Climate Leadership 
13.  Project Documents Angst 
 Project Framework  
 Project Activities Cross-Cutting 
 Project Action and Causes Profiled Gender 
 Project Outcomes Traditional Practices 
 
While both projects employ a livelihood-enhancement model that seeks to boost the 
capacity of marginalized Adivasi tribal communities highly dependent on a natural resource base 
undergoing significant changes induced by climate change and variability, they differ 
significantly in scope, nature and the degree to which they explicitly address climate change. 
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The Laya Project 
The Laya Project uses an integrated rural development model grounded in the 
geographical and socio-cultural realities of Adivasi communities to empower these marginalized 
populations in the assertion of their rights and adoption of sustainable alternatives to boost their 
livelihoods amidst a confluence of challenges that functions independently and collectively to 
exacerbate their plight. The approach is based on a long process of learning through participatory 
research, experimentation and exploration of different facets of livelihoods, inclusive of the 
dynamics of land, forest, water, and practices; family and community level entitlement and 
access to the resources and micro-climate community level support systems. Laya's core work 
includes human rights, youth and women's care, micro credit and enterprise, natural resource 
management, decentralized renewable energy options and multi-level networking and advocacy.  
The project’s responsiveness to the core of Adivasi tribal communities across the facets 
outlined, particularly natural resources, is central as they are primarily affected by displacement 
and land alienation, as well as a multiplicity of threats to the region's essential high natural 
resource base, namely water, forests and minerals, with which identity, livelihoods and survival 
are intricately bounded. So, these threats, which also include a multiplicity of market demands 
from agri-business, mining, hydropower and climate change, though functioning independently, 
are intricately linked and exacerbate the plight of the Adivasis. Accordingly, ecological 
management, which underscores the rights-based integrated rural development framework 
employed by Laya, is intended to contribute “towards a dignified, locally appropriate and 
ecologically sustainable lifestyle among Adivasi communities” amidst unprecedent socio-
economic and climate change-induced environmental challenges (Rhythms in Development III, 
2013, p. 17).  
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“The macro-level challenge of climate change has implications at the grassroots level 
both in relation to mitigation and adaptation” (Rhythms in Development III, 2013, p. 11). The 
climate justice contentions at the heart of India’s INDCs makes clear that both climate response 
mechanisms must be pursued without compromising on the development aspirations of the 
marginalised. Accordingly, Laya’s rights-based integrated rural development approach creatively 
deploys mitigation responses through tribal community centric “Clean Development 
Mechanisms” collaboratively with the Fair Climate Network and promotes decentralized 
domestic energy options (micro-hydel, solar lighting and fuel-efficient cooking stoves).  
Simultaneously, its adaptation initiatives primarily surround natural resource management, 
sustainable agriculture (climate-resilient crop varieties, diversification, low carbon farming) and 
decentralized renewable energy options. Consistent with the rights-based sustainable 
development framework, it privileges the perspectives, experiences and entitlements of 
communities greatly impacted by climate change. Programmatically, this is evidenced through 
Laya’s use of vulnerability assessments to capture the perspectives of Adivasis on climate change 
to design interventions, empowering capacity building efforts with explicit gendered dynamics 
and a concerted focus on manifestly political issues such as land alienation and human rights 
through advocacy and legal representation, which are intended to boost coping capacity and 
promote resilience.  
PRAGATI Project 
The PRAGATI initiatives employ a similar rights-based integrated rural development 
approach. Its initiatives integrate efforts across three thematic areas (health, education and 
livelihoods), which are implemented with reference to the landmark Panchayathi Raj Scheduled 
Area Panchayathi Raj Extension Act (PESA Act). The PESA Act constitutionally legitimates the 
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traditional system of self-governance in areas occupied by scheduled castes and tribes (Gram 
Sabhas) around management and allocation of customary resources. Consistent with this rights-
based integrated rural development approach, PRAGATI leverages partnerships with 
community-based entities, technical centres, such as the Integrated Tribal Development Agency 
(ITDA) Krishi Virgna Kendras, to promote capability enhancement through natural resource 
management and optimization; climate resilient agricultural and forestry practices such as seed 
diversification, inter-cropping and value chain promotion for increased income and forestry 
regeneration programmes through community management. Consistent with the centrality of 
natural resources to Adivasi livelihoods and identity, the project puts ecological management of 
natural resources at the core of its efforts to support Adivasi communities in their quest for a 
“dignified, locally appropriate and ecologically sustainable lifestyle” (Rythyms in Development 
III, 2013, p. 17). It explicitly links favorable environmental stewardship with the ability of 
Adivasis to generate capabilities and assets necessary for improving their livelihood security at 
the household, community and village levels. “Without [the] forest, village[s] cannot survive. 
These people have to protect the forest…survival is dependent upon this for tribals” (J. Nalli, 
personal interview, November 2017). 
While the PRAGATI approach does not tackle climate change as frontally as Laya does, 
climate adaptation is at the core of internal project development and framing. PRAGATI 
introduces a range of actions aimed at addressing climate impacts through improved livelihoods. 
These include climate resilient agricultural and forestry practices. Climate resilience activities 
include the phasing out of podu (shifting) cultivation; value chain promotion for increased 
income; promoting bunding activity (stone wall/retainers) to improve watershed management 
and limit soil erosion; inter-cropping and seed/crop diversification, such as cashew and mango 
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planting, to encourage forest management without further undermining low capacity coping 
capabilities and combat climate induced shortages of a range of crop varieties. While resilience 
building in forestry includes regeneration programmes through community management. 
Consonant with the rights-based integrated rural development focus that privileges ecological 
management, these resilience building efforts are underscored by land development and 
mobilization activities that seek to maximize rights and entitlements afforded by the 2006 Forest 
Rights Act. 
Philosophically, this approach is akin to the provision of climate information and support 
on a need-to-know basis, as observed on Gau Island, Fiji. In this context, climate knowledge and 
actions are introduced based on arbitrary developments to influence response to and management 
of prevailing concerns rather than drive overall activities. For instance, in 2018, much of the 
agronomic interventions focused on the impact caused by heavy rains, but in 2017, agronomic 
and broader actions across PRAGATI’s three thematic areas were focused on the impact of a 
drought. This contingent and unstructured issue-specific response mechanism is used to explain 
the need for decisive climate adaptation action, including alternative cropping mechanisms. For 
instance, sorghum, which a drought dries and renders unproductive, is replaced with black gram 
or red gram, which thrives in drought conditions and aides in the prevention of soil erosion that 
affects both housing and forestry. This approach is reinforced through the provision of deeper 
explanations of proposed actions to climate-induced impacts where it is deemed necessary. This 
is exemplified by community-level engagement activities to reduce disaster risk in flood prone 
areas. These meetings with specific committees in the villages aid in creating awareness among 
the Adivasis in the river basin that highlights the potential for soil erosion and the consequence 
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of silt and decisively links activities in the hills with the disasters that can enhance and/or 
reinforce scope of knowledge. 
Given the importance of climate knowledge in structuring support for and driving climate 
action (Chess & Johnson, 2007), the difference that marks the integration of climate change and 
environment in the initiatives led by Laya and PRAGATI across different villages with a shared 
geo-political, social and climate risk profile is of great import. Multi-level comparative probing 
of the efficacy of these approaches is likely to yield insights on how to manage changing tribal 
perceptions of trees and the forest amidst modernity, which is increasingly undermined by 
droughts, emerging pests and diminishing yields that afflict agriculture, the region’s mainstay. 
Changing tribal perceptions of the forest is exemplified by how the domain has shifted from 
being a preserve consciously used for domestic purposes, to becoming a source of construction 
of pukka (permanent) buildings and more intensive activities as coping capacity dwindles.   
Project Perception and Belief Progression 
 
Table 29: The level and nature of belief progression across study sites in India 
Subset Village Immediate Progressive Totals 
Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 0 0% 1 100% 1 
Nallikota 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Munagalapudu 0 0% 0 0% 0 
PRAGATI 
Agraharam 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Itikalakota 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Palem 0 0% 6 100% 6 
Sunaladana 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Totals 0 0% 7 100% 7 
 
Table 30: The relative nature of project perception in each study site in India 
Subset Village Positive 1 Totals 
Prev Rate   
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 14 100% 14 
Nallikota 1 100% 1 
Munagalapud
u 11 100% 11 
PRAGATI 
Agraharam 0 0% 0 
Itikalakota 5 100% 5 
Palem 5 100% 5 
Sunaladana 8 100% 8 
Totals 44 100% 44 
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Consistent with the responsiveness of these rights-based integrated rural development 
initiatives to the existential precarity and systematic socio-political and economic 
marginalization of the Adivasi tribal populations, positive perception accounts for the entirety of 
prevalence associated with project perception in both village subsets (PRAGATI and Laya) and 
across all cohorts studied. However, initial receptiveness is marked by considerable reservation, 
as progressive belief in the proposed interventions accounts for the totality of the study 
population’s initial belief and receptivity. The data suggests this is attributable to a confluence of 
low knowledge levels; variations in engagement; low agency; diminishing capacity; fissures in 
traditional structures that undermine local leadership, alongside the intractable nature of the 
highly proximal challenges induced by climate variability and socio-political change and 
unrealized successes in prior attempts to cauterize historical exploitation (see excerpts 18, 35, 
and 41). Probing the data to ascertain perceptions of the interventions, particularly inclusion and 
influence, is likely to offer significant initial explanations for these observations about belief 
progression and further contextualize observations of maximal positive project perception. It also 
offers a basis for understanding the affordances and limits of these interventions for boosting 
climate knowledge, agency, motive, action and leadership consummate with the prevailing 
challenges across these contexts. 
Excerpt 18: Variations in engagement at the village level 
Older Women Focus Group – Agraharam Village, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: Are you familiar with PRAGATI? 
Respondents: Yes, they help us during floods they supply food, blankets etc. 
Interviewer: Tell me something they give you?  
Respondents: Rice, clothes, vessels, dals, blankets. 
Interviewer: Did they give anything for farm?  
Respondents: Seeds of maize, pesticides.  
Interviewer: Why did they give you seeds? Did they tell? 
Respondent 1: Yes, they said we get good crop. 
Respondent 2 & 5: Yes  
Interviewer: Have you done training by PRAGATI?  
Respondents: We don’t know. 
Interviewer: PRAGATI when giving to them have list with them?  
Respondents: Yes, they have list of families. 
Interviewer: Did they give to wives or any one? 
Respondents: Whoever in house they will give them.  
Interviewer: Would you like to learn more about climate change?  
Respondents: No. 
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Interviewer: Why don’t you want?  
Respondent: We don’t have interest. 
Interviewer: Would like to learn more about climate change?  
Respondents: Yes, if they teach here only.  
Interviewer: Before PRAGATI started giving seeds, did they ask you what you want or simply give you seeds? 
Respondents: [Cross talk] Seeds given to only 10 families in our village.  
Respondent 5: I got the seeds because I have own land. 
Respondent 1: We don’t get seeds we don’t have own land. 
Respondent 2: We don’t get seeds we don’t have own land. 
 
Personal Inclusion and Influence 
 
Table 31: The relative nature of perception of personal inclusion and influence in each study site in India 
Subset Village Mixed - 2 Positive 2 
Youth 
Consultation Totals 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev 
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 4 19% 12 57% 5 24% 21 
Nallikota 0 0% 3 75% 1 25% 4 
Munagalapudu 0 0% 6 86% 1 14% 7 
PRAGATI 
Agraharam 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 1 
Itikalakota 0 0% 4 80% 1 20% 5 
Palem 0 0% 21 100% 0 0% 21 
Sunaladana 0 0% 4 100% 0 0% 4 
Totals 4 6% 51 81% 8 13% 63 
 
Overall, the data (see Table 31) shows a majority of the study population believes the 
interventions were inclusive and afforded them personal influence. Three of the five codes 
denoting personal inclusion/influence are active in the overall data set (Positive-2, Youth 
Consultation, and Mixed -2). However, only the top two most grounded codes are evident in both 
village subsets: (Positive– 2: 51 of 63 and Youth Consultation eight of 63) and in the same order 
of rank (Positive-2: 30 of 31 in PRAGATI Villages, and 21 of 32 in Laya Villages; Youth 
Consultation:  seven of eight in PRAGATI Villages and one of eight in Laya Villages)). The 
third active code is only grounded in the Laya subset (four of 32). So, while the overall 
perception of personal inclusion and influence is positive with no prevalence for negative or 
neutral perceptions, it is decisively more positive in the PRAGATI subset (81 percent versus 66 
percent in Laya Villages). 
So decisively positive is the perception index in the PRAGATI subset that Positive-2 
accounts for the totality of prevalence for the theme in all villages in the subset (Sunaladana and 
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Itikalakota, four of four each and Palem 21 of 21), except Agraharam where the second code, 
Youth Consultation, registers in a single instance and accounts for the same level of prevalence 
as positive perceptions. This is consistent with PRAGATI’s contingent and unstructured issue-
specific response mechanism, which is used to explain the need for decisive actions, including 
alternative cropping mechanisms and reinforcement through community-level engagement that 
provides deeper explanations of proposed actions where it is deemed necessary. A more granular 
examination of the data across villages and cohorts reveals that the nature of engagement, 
particularly so for PRAGATI villages, where an unstructured issue-response model is employed, 
may account for the distinction between the two village subsets and Agraharam’s distinction in 
the PRAGATI subset. 
For the PRAGATI subset overall, women, primarily older women (11 of 31) account for a 
higher portion of prevalence for the theme and therefore feel more included in the livelihoods-
oriented climate change activities underway in their village, which is consistent with the 
intervention’s focus on aspects of life that are culturally designated as feminine domains across 
livelihoods and health (see emphasis on attendance at Development of Women and Children in 
Rural Areas (DWCRA) meetings over general meetings in excerpt 10). But, rather than gender as 
a durable correlating factor on this measure, it is age that shows more enduring correlation. 
Emblematically, older men also account for a higher portion of prevalence accounted for by men 
(eight of 31 versus six of 31) and both young men and young women account for the same level 
of prevalence (six of 31 each). However, these trends are overwhelmingly swayed by each age-
based gender cohort in a single circumscribed locality. In Palem, each gendered cohort across the 
young/old divide account for a disproportionate amount of the prevalence for positive 
perceptions of personal inclusion and influence for their cohort/peers across the overall 
 242 
 
PRAGATI subset: almost three-quarters for older women (73 percent or eight of 11), maximal 
for older men (six of six), two-thirds for young women (four of six) and sixty percent for young 
men (three of five), while their peers in Agraharam (young men) account for all. Palem’s 
distinction supports the likely effectiveness of PRAGATI’s issue-specific response mechanism in 
boosting inclusivity, across age and gendered cohorts where deployed (see excerpt 19). 
Excerpt 19: Direct cohort engagement, variably focused training and male-centric engagement 
Young Men Focus Group – Palem, PRAGATI Subset 
Respondents: PRAGATI means how we can increase our earning. They teach us. They gave us small plants and taught us how to plant by 
digging around the trees and putting manure. Cutting the dried leaves, how to space the trees. They bring the farmers and make them groups 
like DWCRA (Women’s group), they formed groups for farmers. They collected 50 or 100 rupees per person from each group, groups may 
have 20 people. The money is collected and kept with us only and put in the bank. If we need it, we will take it. If I need it tomorrow, for 
farms, tree cutting in jungles, problems in families, family functions like puberty function, marriages, we take the money when needed. We 
pay back the money with (25 paisa) interest to the group after a while.  
Interviewer: Okay. Thanks. And there are four groups? 
Respondents: In our village we have 13 groups.  
 Interviewer: 13 groups in the village? The guy from PRAGATI told me there are four. Are you all in the same group?  
Respondents: No sir, different groups. 
Interviewer:  All of you are different groups? None of you are in same group? See, the specifics to a question matter to me.  
Respondents: [Crosstalk] Same. 
Interviewer: So, you two are in the same group? One two, same group? And nobody else is on your group? Yeah. So we have five groups of 
the 13 represented here.  
Respondents:  Others are there.  
Interviewer: Did PRAGATI talk to you about climate change at all? Yes/no? 
Respondents: No sir. They told us to do this in rainy season, summer this… [Crosstalk] 
Interviewer:  What, what was that? Oh, they tell you what to do in the season. Did they use the words climate change to you? 
Respondent 4: Yes. 
Interviewer: What did they say to you about climate change? Wait, wait, wait, before we get … [Crosstalk]. Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. I just 
have to get the numbers. So, you said that they told you about climate change. Did Pragati tell, say anything about climate change to you? It is 
yes/no sorry 
Respondents: No. 
Interviewer: So, only one-person PRAGATI said climate change to you? Where did PRAGATI tell you about climate change?   
Respondents: Through this organization, in the meetings. They take us for meetings. They tell us what to do with change in weather. Suppose 
there is cashew … weather changes. Rampachodavaram [Place]. 
Interviewer: Layered questions about it. So, I want just specifics. What kind of training? What was the name of the training that you went to? 
Respondents: PRAGATI, cashew plantations, economic benefit. 
Interviewer:  Mm hmm cashew, okay. And at that meeting they talked about climate change?  
Respondents: Yes.  
Interviewer: Was that the only meeting that they talked about climate change? 
Respondents: We went to other meetings on the same issue. 
Interviewer: The same economic development thing? 
Respondents: Yes. Cashew, mango, weather. By planting cashew how the weather changes. Not only cashew or mango, because of these, 
how the weather changes, what changes will come they taught. 
Interviewer: You’ve given me really good info, but I need to connect everybody’s story to it. Have you all been to trainings? 
Respondents: No. 
Interviewer: So, that is an important factor for me. It is the training that distinguishes him, he knows a lot about it, because he goes to the 
training. So, that is my process. See, this is good. Umm how are you selected for the training?   
Respondents: The organization used to come and take us. In the village the elders selected four people and sent them.  
Interviewer: They selected four people and the 4 people are? you and who else? 
Respondents: They are there. They went to the fields. They are educated.   
Interviewer:  Okay. They are what? 
Respondents: Educated. 
Interviewer: They all what? 
Respondents: Went into the farm. 
Interviewer: They are at the farm now. Okay. Are they young like you? Or they older? 
Respondents: Young and old.  
Interviewer: Okay. So, they just picked four educated people. Are they all men? 
Respondents:  All are men. 
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Excerpt 20: Complexity of perceptions:  Personal influence and inclusion undermined by a lack of cohort specific engagement among young men 
Young Men Focus Group – Pulusumamidi, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: Do they ever meet with you as a young group, just like I come here and I talk to you as a set of young guys, one on one? 
Respondents 1: They talk. 
Respondent 2: They take us to meetings. But, they are for all the people. No. 
Interviewer: Oh, okay. Do you think they should meet with you as a young group? 
Respondents 1, 2 & 3: Yes. 
Interviewer: It would be beneficial. Oh, okay. If you had a suggestion, if you had ideas that you wanted to tell Laya, would you feel comfortable 
telling Laya? 
Respondents 1: Yes, they would hear. 
Respondents 2 & 3: Yes. 
 
Differences in perceptual dispositions associated with personal influence and inclusion 
across the Laya subset offers strong support for the engagement thesis emerging from the 
PRAGATI dataset. Specifically, differences in the nature and scope of engagement across 
villages structure complex perception valences, particularly among young men in Pulusumadi 
who exhibit high motive and self-identify as potential climate leaders but perceive themselves to 
be less personally included and influential in project activities (see excerpt 20). While positive 
perceptions are the most grounded in all three Laya villages and account for more than half of 
Person Inclusion and Influence's prevalence, it ranges widely: from a high of 86 percent in 
Munagalapudu and three-quarters in Nallikota, to 57 percent in Pulusumamidi. While three codes 
demarcating perceptual makers associated with personal inclusion and influence are grounded in 
the subset, this only holds true in Pulusumadi where mixed perceptions found in the dataset are 
entirely concentrated and account for nearly a fifth of the measure’s prevalence (19 percent) in 
the village. However, the other two active codes (Positive-2 and Youth Consultation) are 
grounded varyingly, although in the same order of rank, in all three villages. 
Overall, men account for a vastly greater portion of the theme's prevalence (21 of 32) 
with little variation across age groups (older 11 versus young 10). However, a closer look at the 
measures on which each cohort's perceptions are captured reveals that age rather than gender is a 
more significant factor associated with perceptions of inclusion. Young men, for instance, 
account for the totality of prevalence for youth consultation (seven of seven) and theirs is the 
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only group in the dataset where positive expressions of personal inclusion and influence does not 
account for the majority of prevalence or first ranked perception on this measure (four of 11 
versus seven of 11 for youth consultation). It is their self-identification as leaders and the 
absence (in most cases) or limitations of cohort-specific inclusion that directly undermines their 
perception of inclusion and influence over the project, as evidenced by excerpt 43. Conversely, 
young women, who do not self-identify as climate leaders—perhaps due to socio-cultural 
factors—and share the same overall positive perception of the project itself, feel the most 
personally included and influential. In fact youn women are the only cohort for which positive 
perceptions of inclusion accounts for the totality of prevalence for their expressions on this 
measure. This comports with the staging of population level engagement initiatives through 
village meetings that makes some effort to open these spaces to women and youth (young 
women) in accordance with project design. Consistent with this age-based observation, older 
folks, primarily older women (three of four) account for the totality of mixed perceptions 
(Mixed-2 (four of four), which is attributable to a lack of experience seeking to enact influence 
over the project (see excerpt 21).  
Excerpt 21: A lack of experience seeking to enact influence results in mixed perceptions of personal influence and inclusion  
Older Women Focus Group – Pulusumadi, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: Oh okay. If you had opinions, you had suggestions, do you think Laya would listen to you? 
Respondents 2: We will listen, why won’t we? 
Respondent 1: We will listen.  
Respondent 2: Will Laya listen to us is what they are asking? [Crosstalk]  
Respondent 3: We will not know if they listen or not. Because we have never told them anything. So, we do not know anything about that. 
[Crosstalk] 
Interviewer: Oh, you don’t know if they will listen or not. Oh, okay okay. (Crosstalk)  
Respondents 3: But previously they gave us plants and did other works and told us how the situation about the Girijan Rythus (Tribal 
Farmers). They said that we don’t know anything and took videos of other tribal communities and showed them to us.  
Respondent 1: Previously. 
 
However, as intimated by my observations about differential engagement levels, nature 
and scope, these trends are substantially influenced by various age-based gender cohorts in a 
single circumscribed locality. It is older men and women from Pulusumamidi who account for 
the totality of prevalence for mixed perceptions. Similarly, the village's young men account for 
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three-quarters of prevalence attributable to their cohort across the overall village subset for both 
positive expressions and in excess of 70 percent of youth consultation. Likewise, their young 
female counterparts account for 60 percent of the prevalence for their cohort in the overall Laya 
subset for positive expressions. My engagement hypothesis accounts for these distinctions. 
Specifically, the fact that a lack of youth consultation in the Laya village subset only appears in 
this circumscribed context is further reinforcement of the observation that differences in 
perceptual dispositions associated with personal influence and inclusion is an indicator of 
differences in the nature and scope of project engagement. This is so as Laya specifically offers 
special programmes for cohorts such as (older) women (crop selection) and offers fellowships 
for select tribal youths (primarily males), including those working on sustainable development 
and broader youth and livelihood coalition building activities. So, most likely, it is the variability 
and selectivity with which these programmes are implemented across villages (some rather than 
all) and among youth (particularly active or motivated) in those circumscribed beneficiary 
localities, that contributes to the distinctions.  
Taken alongside observation of the efficacy of PRAGATI’s contingent issue-specific 
response mechanism, which is underscored by deeper engagement on a need-to-know basis 
where it is deployed, probity of the affordances of variable engagement and the divergent 
approaches associated with Laya and PRAGATI’s efforts may offer insights on critical markers 
associated with project perception and levels of inclusion and influence. Specifically, 
understanding their relationship with knowledge levels, identification of cause, climate 
perception and risk, as well as motive and agency could significantly contextualize the efficacy 
of current levels of action, and inform pathways for their improvement.  
Considering the centrality of knowledge for action and change (Dutta, 2011; Freire, 1970, 
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1973), particularly on multi-dimensional issues such as climate change with existential 
implications (Bord, Fisher, & O’Connor, 1997; Grotzer & Lincoln), this warrants close 
examination of knowledge levels across both village subsets to identify the climate knowledge 
bases and subsequently probe how and to what end the various engagement levels and frames 
have structured these climate knowledge bases.  
Climate Knowledge 
 
Table 32: The nature and relative strength of various forms of detectable indicators of climate knowledge in India 
Subset Village A Posteriori Experiential Knowledge Gap Totals 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev 
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 6 43% 2 14% 6 43% 14 
Nallikota 7 54% 2 15% 4 31% 13 
Munagalapudu 3 33% 2 22% 4 44% 9 
PRAGATI 
Agraharam 3 50% 0 0% 3 50% 6 
Itikalakota 5 56% 3 33% 1 11% 9 
Palem 8 50% 6 38% 2 13% 16 
Sunaladana 7 50% 2 14% 5 36% 14 
Totals 39 48% 17 21% 25 31% 81 
 
Overall, only three of the five analytical units denoting knowledge are grounded in the 
data for the Indian case (per Table 32, A Posteriori, Knowledge Gaps, and Experiential). 
Although a posteriori—which is indicative of awareness and understanding of cause and effect—
is most grounded in the overall data and is dominant in both set of villages, it is more grounded 
in the PRAGATI Village dataset where it accounts for over half of knowledge's prevalence (51 
percent) for the village compared to just 44 percent in Laya Villages. Conversely, knowledge 
Gaps are significantly more grounded in Laya Villages (39 percent) than PRAGATI Villages (24 
percent). The data also shows that Experiential Knowledge is substantially more grounded in the 
PRAGATI Villages (24 percent) compared to 17 percent in Laya Villages). Though not 
sufficient to make a claim about the relationship between experiential knowledge and knowledge 
levels, it is important to note that both knowledge gaps and experiential knowledge account for 
identical levels of prevalence in PRAGATI Villages, but experiential knowledge is less grounded 
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than knowledge gaps in Laya Villages, which have a higher overall knowledge gap. This 
suggests a significant positive correlation between experiential knowledge (informal) and higher 
premium or a posteriori climate knowledge and/or lower knowledge gaps, which comports with 
robust assertions of the legitimacy of indigenous knowledge which is premised on experience 
and practice (Brokensha, Warren & Werner, 1980; Kohler-Rollefson, 1996; Showers, 1996). 
That the positive correlation is evident in the PRAGATI village subset—which readily deploys a 
contingent and unstructured issue-specific response mechanism at a population level varyingly in 
circumscribed settings to explain the need for decisive climate adaptation action, alongside 
deeper explanations where warranted—rather than Laya’s highly selective cross-cohort and 
population level approach to ideation, also suggests this correlation is underpinned by the 
availability of a broad tapestry of information provision (and likely formal) to a wide cross-
section of people that aids in navigating experiential knowledge. A closer look at the village 
subsets also reveals variations in both that offer strong support for this observation. First, let us 
look at the PRAGATI subset. 
PRAGATI Villages 
Of the four villages in the PRAGATI subset, only the data for Sunaladana shows 
prevalence for the three analytical units denoting knowledge in the same order of rank as the 
overall figures for the subset: A Posteriori (seven of 14), Knowledge Gaps (five of 14), and 
Experiential Knowledge (two of 14). However, premium climate knowledge (a posteriori), which 
is more grounded in PRAGATI Villages than Laya Villages overall, accounts for at least half of 
the prevalence for knowledge in all villages (50 percent in all villages (except Itikalakota where 
it accounts for a clear majority of 56 percent). 
Consistent with the observation that where information provision (primarily formal) is 
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high or significant, experiential knowledge (informal) does not undermine climate knowledge or 
exacerbate gaps, Agraharam, the only village where experiential knowledge shows no 
prevalence, has the highest knowledge gap among PRAGATI Villages (50 percent compared to 
11 percent in Itikalakota and 13 percent in Palem, where the prevalence for experiential is one-
third and 38 percent, respectively). Further, a similar scenario is evident in Sunaladana where 
knowledge gap has the second highest level of prevalence ((36 percent) and experiential 
knowledge is also relatively low (14 percent). Given the overall equitable distribution of a 
posteriori knowledge in the majority of PARAGTI Villages, what seems to obtain is a correlation 
between a posteriori knowledge in excess of the halfway mark and lower levels of knowledge 
gaps as is evident in Itikalakota, where a posteriori accounts for over half of knowledge's 
prevalence and knowledge gap is the lowest. The availability and accessibility of information 
that structures experiential knowledge at an individual level is likely to account for this. An 
assessment of the sources of climate knowledge, which is undertaken in the subsequent section, 
is likely to indicate the veracity of this hypothesis that the availability of a broad tapestry of 
credible information provision (formal and informal) to a wider cross-section of people accounts 
for this and invariably structures experiential knowledge (informal) positively. However, cohort 
level distinctions across villages consistent with the absence of cohort specific engagement on 
climate change in PARAGATI’s issue-specific/contingent approach that varies across localities 
offers strong support for this observation.  
Overall, age and gender significantly account for the prevalence of some measures of 
knowledge in the dataset, but broad variations exist across villages. Women (young and old 
equally (five of 11 each) account for nearly all the prevalence for knowledge gaps (see excerpt 
23). This is consistent with the project’s lack of explicit cohort-level engagement, such that 
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where ideational efforts are undertaken, they are at the general community/population-level (e.g. 
village meetings) function differentially and does not automatically attract women due to 
domestic commitments, cultural and socio-spatial barriers that curtail the extent to which they 
participate even when they attend, as exemplified by excerpts 22 and 27. These socio-spatial 
constraints exemplify the discursive (Dutta, 2011) and practical implications (Cornwall, 2002) of 
space and the wider micro politics of participation. Older men, who do not account for any of the 
prevalence for knowledge gaps, account for more than a half of the prevalence for experiential 
knowledge, which is consistent with my observation of a positive link between substantial 
reliance on experience knowledge and low knowledge gaps where there is a broad and accessible 
tapestry of climate information. This consonance between a privileged population subset (older 
men), access to a wider tapestry of climate information, that likely positively structures their use 
of experiential knowledge and lowers overall knowledge gaps, is akin to the Donohue and 
Olien’s (1970) knowledge gap hypothesis. But, rather than an infusion of information into the 
body politic exacerbating knowledge gaps along socio-economic lines, it does so in accordance 
with gendered socio-political status and socio-spatial access and comfort. 
Excerpt 22: Socio-cultural dynamics undermines the benefits of population level engagement for women 
Older Women Focus Group - Palem, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: Okay. Next question is, before PRAGATI did these things, did they ask you what you want or did they just come and give you 
seeds? 
Respondents: Yes, Sir! 
Respondents: Yes, they ask. 
Respondents: Yes, when they first came here they asked. 
Interviewer: Asked everyone? Oh, okay and then they said yes. Has PRAGATI ever talked to you about climate change? 
Respondents: They tell, sir, about this and that. Because we are women, we won’t come always. The men will know as they listen more. We 
do all household work also, so, not always do we come. 
Interviewer: But, in the village meetings that you went to, they didn’t talk about climate change?  
Respondents: No, sir. 
Respondents: No. They generally tell more when the men gather. The men listen and tell us.  
Interviewer: How often do you go to the village meetings?  
Respondents: They put those meetings once a month. We attend the meetings once a while. Once in a while we go the hospital. [Laughs] 
[…] 
Respondents: Groups of women meetings which we conduct, also happen only once a month. 
Respondents: We collect some money and take them to a bank in another place when needed. 
Interviewer: The village meeting, how often do they go to the village meeting? 
Respondents: We also go to those meetings once a month. 
Interviewer: And how often are the village meetings? 
Respondents: Monthly once. 
Interviewer: So, they go to all of them then? 
[Translator and Interviewer are confused with the fact that both the meetings are separate] 
Respondents: [Laughs] 
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[Translator asks the question again] 
Respondents: They keep four to five leaders in each group. Five people they take to the Mandals. [Crosstalk]. We generally go to all 
meetings, sometimes we do not go when busy.   
Interviewer: And [YOU] never heard the words climate change in the meetings? 
Respondents: No, Sir [in sync]. When they talk to men, they will know more.  
Interviewer: Not about the men, we want to know about you.  
Respondents: No. 
Interviewer:  Have they ever used the word environment in the meeting? Did they talk about the environment? 
Respondents: No [in sync]. 
Respondents: [Crosstalk] No, sir. There was a meeting last month. I don’t know [if] I heard about it. We don’t know about these things, sir. 
Respondents: We do other work, sir; so, we must have forgotten.  
Interviewer: If you had ideas, would you be okay telling it to PRAGATI?  
Respondents: Yes, sir. They will listen. If we want them to bring something, they will bring. They will bring what we want. They won’t say 
no, ever. If we want anything, they will bring.  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Respondents: If we want anything, they will bring them to us. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Respondents: They will call out our name and give us. They will ask us person by person and give what we want. 
Interviewer: […] So, you don’t know a lot about climate change, [but] would you like to learn some more about climate change? 
Respondents: Yes, sir. 
 
  While the data offers reinforcement of the view that older folks more readily tap and 
have access to a broader and likely more relevant range of experiences from which to draw and 
articulate climate knowledge, such that older men and women taken together account for nearly 
three-quarters of the prevalence for experiential knowledge (74 percent), young women (18 
percent) and older women (27 percent) account for similar levels of prevalence overall, but it is 
relatively more significant for young women than older women (23 percent compared to 15 
percent).  Notwithstanding the clear gender imbalance in knowledge gaps, there is no evident age 
or gendered correlation for a posteriori or premium climate knowledge in the subset. On the 
combined gender dimension, both men and women account for similar levels of prevalence (52 
percent versus 48 percent).  
Similarly, in terms of age categories, young men (eight) and young women (five) account 
for similar levels of prevalence to older men (four) and older women (six) (combined:13 of 23 
compared to 11 of 23). However, this apparent gender and age evenness can be attributed to 
young men from Palem as they account for more than a quarter of the analytical unit's prevalence 
in the overall data (six of 23). The distinction of this cohort is significantly accounted for by a 
single participant, who was one of four youth identified by their elders to participate in “deeper 
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explanations” through capacity building efforts led by PRAGATI that focused on crop 
diversification and resilience (see excerpt 19). The implication here is that where a cohort is 
exposed to PRAGATI’s issue, context and domain specific ideation efforts, deeper technical 
explanations to community identified youths could create champions that can further boost 
knowledge levels at the village level by sharing their heightened learning with an already 
familiarized and expectant audience. But there is no evidence that this has occurred in a 
systematic manner, which positions the issue specific response as a single-level intervention with 
modest outcomes relative to more promising ecologic mechanisms for structuring multifactorial 
population behaviour and knowledge (Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz, 2008). 
So, although the overall data suggests young men are the only group where a posteriori 
knowledge exceeds half the prevalence for knowledge (see excerpt 30) and therefore supports 
the observation of meaningful correlation between that occurrence and low levels of knowledge 
gaps (10% or one of 10), this is only applicable to young men from Palem for whom a posteriori 
accounts for all prevalence for knowledge. But this also holds true for some categories of women 
sampled in specific localities: young women in Sunagalapudu (one of one), and older women in 
Itikalakota (two of two). Probity of the data associated with the Laya subset offers support for 
the observations drawn from the PRAGATI village subset from different vantagepoints.  
Excerpt 23: Intractable Levels of Knowledge Gaps among older women 
Older Women Focus Group -  Agraharam, PRAGATI  
Interviewer: Have you heard word climate change?  
Respondents:  No. 
Interviewer: Do you notice any problem in farm?  
Respondents 1, 2 & 5: Back ache. 
Interviewer:  Is there any problem with planting?  
Respondent 1, 2 & 5:  We plant maize, paddy.  
Interviewer:  Did you notice any problem in farm during planting?  
Respondents 1, 2 & 5:  When we were in age we are strong, but now we are weak.  
Interviewer:  But the things your planted, how they growing?  
Respondents 1, 2 & 5: Depends on availability of water. 
Interviewer: Do you have water problem?  
Respondents 3 & 5: Yes, from long years back. [Cross talk] Presently, we prefer to cultivate chilli because it consumes less amount of water.  
Interviewer: What do you think is causing water problem?  
Respondents: We don’t have motors, so that is the problem. 
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Laya Villages 
In accordance with the structured cohort-level selectivity with which Laya undertakes 
focused information provision across localities, Munagalapudu is the only village in the subset 
where the three analytical units that account for knowledge do not show prevalence in the same 
order of rank as the data for the overall subset. It is the village with the highest knowledge gaps 
(44 percent, compared to 43 percent in Pulusumadi and 31 percent in Nallikota) and the only 
instance where the analytical unit is the single most grounded measure of knowledge. It is also 
the village where a posteriori knowledge accounts for the least prevalence for knowledge (33 
percent, compared to 43 percent in Pulusumadi and 54 percent in Nallikota) and the highest level 
of experiential knowledge relative to other markers in the subset (22 percent, compared to 14 
percent and 15 percent in Pulusumadi and Nallikota, respectively).  
This correlation between high knowledge gaps and low a posteriori knowledge alongside 
substantial levels of experiential knowledge in Munagalapudu supports the assertion of a 
meaningful correlation between lower levels of knowledge gaps (consequently, higher levels of 
knowledge) and substantial levels of experiential knowledge where a broad tapestry of climate 
information is available to a wide cross-section of people. It is further underscored by the fact 
that, Nallikota, the only village where a posteriori accounts for more than half of knowledge's 
prevalence also has the least grounded knowledge gaps. However, probity of the data associated 
with the Munagalapudu’s young men, a cohort only outstripped by their male elders for premium 
climate knowledge, shows the extent to which the village’s restricted access to and availability of 
climate information creates a dependence on the grapevine and observations even for the young 
(see excerpt 24). This constrained environment for public knowledge acquisition supports Yang 
and Ho’s (2017) contention that climate knowledge gaps in low capacity contexts constitute “a 
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social issue that needs collective action” (p. 278). 
Excerpt 24: Climate information vacuum creates dependence on the grapevine and observations even for the relatively more informed. 
Young Men Focus Group - Munagalapudu, Laya Subset 
Interviewer; Are you seen this happening in your village already or you think it is going to happen?  
Responder 1: We already seen because we here from childhood, so we see. 
Interviewer: Do you talk to your parents and old age people about this change? 
Responder1: Yes.  
Interviewer: Would they listen to you? 
Responder: Even they know about this, they don’t talk with agricultural officers or presidents. Because they stay about three months in farms. 
Interviewer: Why it is so, working for people, or on your own land? 
Respondent 1: They stay in our fields only, but my parents never meet with agricultural officers, never came here. 
Interviewer: Did you tell this to your parents go and see to them?  
Interviewer: Where did you hear about climate change for the first time? 
Respondent 1: Radio.  
Respondent 2: Tv. 
Respondent 3: Someone from outside. 
Interviewer: Who from outside? 
Respondent 3: Traders. 
Interviewer: Random traders?  
Respondent 3: The wholesale market guy. [Crosstalk]. Middle man, he buys from us and sell our product in markets  
Interviewer: What did he say, the middle man? 
Respondent 3: He tell about predictions on rain fall, explaining about why lost the last year crop. [Crosstalk] Last year I lost the crop because 
of rain, so he says be careful, rain will come in two days. 
Interviewer: What did the middle man tell you last year about crop loss due to the climate change? 
Respondent 3: He says that it is because of rainfall. 
Interviewer:  What you think these heavy rains are because of climate change? 
Respondent 3: Rainfall doesn’t follow seasons; even other than rainy season we have rainfall. 
Interviewer:  Middle man is from your village? 
Respondent 3: No, he is from outside. 
Interviewer: Middle man is from village/city? 
Respondent 3: He is from another village. 
Interviewer: Middle man is tribe? 
Respondent 3: Yes, he is from our community only. 
 
Age and gender significantly account for the prevalence of knowledge in the dataset. 
Older men, for instance, account for two-thirds (fourof six) of the prevalence for experiential 
knowledge, while men (young - six of 16 and old seven of 16, respectively) account for more 
than 80 percent (13 of 16) of a posteriori knowledge's prevalence, which is consistent with the 
heightened level with which older men are directly engaged across both projects, particularly 
older men who are culturally vested with the rights and privileges of ownership, leadership and 
management of assets and resources, relative to other groups. However, circumscribed localities 
account for much of these observations. Specifically, older men in Pulusumadi (five) and young 
men in Nallikota (five) account for more than 60 percent (10 of 16) of the prevalence for a 
posteriori knowledge in the dataset, but this is consistent with the variation with which Laya 
introduces climate adaptation initiatives across localities, including the nature and extent of its 
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targeted initiatives that include women and exemplary youth for specific initiatives. 
Although women overall have higher levels of prevalence for knowledge gaps (eight of 
14 versus six of 14), which is consistent with studies (11 of 16 reviewed by Davidson & 
Freundenburg (1996)) that have found lower levels of technical knowledge among women 
regarding environmental concerns, all age groups account for the same level of prevalence for 
knowledge gaps (four of 14) except young men for whom it is least grounded (two of 14). Young 
men, the only group for whom a posteriori knowledge exceeds half of the prevalence for 
knowledge has the lowest level of knowledge gaps, which is consistent with the overall 
observation of a significant association, but this is because of young men’s moderately better 
access to emerging educational opportunities (basic literacy, numeracy and primary schooling as 
observed in Munagalapudu where two of the young male respondents reached the 10th standard). 
Like the observation in the PRAGATI subset of a link between engagement and knowledge 
levels, population level engagement, which socio-spatially disadvantages women due to time 
constraints and its usual male membership, is the sole mode of engagement in Munagalapudu for 
all (see excerpt 25) and even in localities with relatively higher knowledge levels, where this 
limited engagement modality only affects women, its socio-spatial disadvantages in terms of 
time and male-centredness affect participation and knowledge levels (see excerpt 27). 
Excerpt 25: Population level engagement is the sole mechanism employed in Munagalapudu 
Young Men Focus Group –  Munagalapudu, Laya Subset 
Interviewer:  Have they talked with young people separately? 
Respondents: No, they conduct meeting for whole village. 
Interviewer: Do you have a youth group? 
Respondents: No. 
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Knowledge Acquisition 
 
 
Table 33: The relative prevalence of initial sources of climate knowledge in India 
Subset Village 
Before project Extreme Event Friends/Peers News Observation 
Project 
Intervention 
School Density 
 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 0 0% 0 0% 1 11% 0 0% 1 11% 4 44% 3 33% 9 
Nallikota 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 0 0% 0 0% 2 
Munagalapudu 0 0% 0 0% 1 14% 3 43% 1 14% 2 29% 0 0% 7 
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 0 0% 2 20% 2 20% 0 0% 0 0% 3 30% 3 30% 10 
Itikalakota 1 5% 1 5% 1 5% 9 41% 10 45% 0 0% 0 0% 22 
Palem 0 0% 0 0% 2 13% 5 33% 6 40% 1 7% 1 7% 15 
Sunaladana 0 0% 0 0% 1 11% 8 89%   0% 0 0% 0 0% 9 
Totals 1 1% 3 4% 8 11% 25 34% 20 27% 10 14% 7 9% 74 
 
As noted earlier, an assessment of the sources of climate knowledge is likely to indicate 
the veracity of my hypothesis, particularly the extent to which the information provision of the 
interventions defines climate knowledge. Overall, there is indeed a wider tapestry of initial 
climate knowledge acquisition sources associated with the PRAGATI subset (seven compared to 
five for Laya Villages, per Table 33), which shows lower overall levels of knowledge gaps. 
However, manifestly credible and formal sources (news, project intervention, school) account for 
more initial climate knowledge acquisition in Laya villages. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that experiential knowledge and its acquisition modality (observation) correlate 
positively with higher knowledge levels where a broad and accessible tapestry of information is 
available. Nonetheless, the significant difference in knowledge gaps between PRAGATI and 
Laya villages amidst distinctions in the nature of their knowledge acquisition sources, such that 
Laya villages where knowledge gaps are higher are more readily exposed to manifestly credible 
initial acquisition sources suggests the nature, frequency and scope of available manifestly 
credible sources may be significant factors. The significance of the nature, frequency and scope 
of available manifestly credible information is particularly reinforced by the fact that project 
intervention singularly accounts for more than a third of initial knowledge acquisition in the 
Laya subset, alongside the earlier observations of cohort level distinctions in climate knowledge 
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across the subset. Theoretically, this suggests heightened contentions about the decisiveness of 
frames in response to historical preoccupation with information provision (Moser, 2010; Nisbet, 
2009) is contingent upon structural and utility factors (nature, frequency, scope, availability and 
access). 
Specifically, scrutiny of the data reveals that the three main modes of climate change 
knowledge acquisition for the overall case are News (25 of 74), Observation (20 of 74) and 
Project Intervention (10 of 74). School (seven of 74) and Friends/Peers (eight of 74) also register 
significantly. Extreme events and knowledge acquired before the project via unspecified means 
also register statistically but only in the PRAGATI Village subset. While the top three modes of 
climate change knowledge acquisition feature both news and observation, they vary in order of 
rank. The project intervention (formal) is the most common source of initial climate change 
knowledge acquisition for Laya Villages (one-third prevalence), while it's a distant fourth for 
PRAGATI Villages (seven percent prevalence) behind News (39 percent), observation (29 
percent) and Friends/Peers (11 percent). While observation ranks as the second most important 
source in both set of villages, it is more grounded in the PRAGATI subset (29 percent versus 22 
percent), which is consistent with the inward-looking orientation of PRAGATI Villages observed 
in their local preference for climate change leadership in spite of the evident knowledge related 
resource gaps that undermines their climate change agency. 
Although news is the most grounded initial source of climate change knowledge 
acquisition in PRAGATI Villages and school features alongside the project intervention as the 
fourth most important factors (nine percent each), the combined prevalence of these manifestly 
credible sources of knowledge (54 percent) is offset by the high prevalence of combined 
manifestly unreliable sources (39 percent), namely observation (based on the knowledge related 
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resource gaps) at 29 percent and Friends/Peers/Grapevine at 11 percent. This differs from the 
scenario observed across Laya Villages, where manifestly credible and formal sources of 
knowledge acquisition, namely news (17 percent), project intervention (33 percent) and school 
(17 percent), account for two-thirds of the prevalence for knowledge acquisition. Combined 
manifestly, unreliable and chiefly informal sources account for one-third of climate change 
knowledge acquisition in Laya Villages. 
PRAGATI Villages 
While news, observation and friends/peers are the top three sources of initial climate 
change knowledge acquisition for the overall PRAGATI subset, at a more granular level, this 
does not hold true for any single village in the subset. Palem and Itikalaka, which are the only 
two villages for which all three factors register prevalence in the top three, do so in a slightly 
varied order but identically (observation, news, peers/friends/grapevine) and at comparable 
levels—observation - Palem 45 percent versus 40 percent in Itikalakota; news - Palem one-third 
versus 41 percent in Itikalakota and Peers/Friends/Grapevine - Palem 13 percent versus five 
percent in Itikalakota). While no other factor shows prevalence in Palem, extreme event 
(cyclones and floods) and unspecified before project learning are statistically evident in the 
Itakalikota dataset with identical prevalence of five percent each. Considering the issue-specific 
response mechanism used to provide climate adaptation information, this may account for the 
higher level of climate knowledge among older women in this context, who by virtue of their 
leadership in the domestic sphere, would be directly engaged in relief efforts and the associated 
outreach activities.  
Despite the high overall depth of prevalence associated with observation in the 
PRAGATI subset, it is absent from the Agraharam (as is experiential knowledge) and 
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Sunaladana subsets. In fact, friends/peers/grapevine is the only factor in the top three for the 
overall PRAGATI dataset that is evident in Agraharam with a prevalence of 20 percent. It is also 
the only village in which the project intervention and school account for the top initial source of 
climate change knowledge acquisition with a prevalence of 30 percent each. Extreme events, 
specifically a major flood in 2006, account for the only other factor in this village. This scenario 
offers strong support for the assertion that the nature, scope and duration of the provision of 
climate information is consequential. Agraharam benefits from an issue-specific information 
provision mechanism and has relatively greater access to manifestly credible climate information 
sources, including the project intervention, yet it is the village with the lowest level of climate 
knowledge in the PRAGATI subset. This assertion is underscored by excerpt 26, which 
highlights circumscribed issue-specific climate information provision around an extreme event 
(Dialogue A) and how a contextual and issue-specific modality can negate knowledge 
enhancement opportunities through subsistence responses to climate related disasters (Dialogue 
B).  
Excerpt 26: The limited nature and scope of climate information provision 
Dialogue A: Older Men Focus Group – Agraharam, PRAGATI 
Subset; Limited scope of climate information provision 
Dialogue B: Older Men Focus Group, Agraharam, PRAGATI 
Subset; The intervention’s subsistence focus response to climate 
impact excludes climate information provision 
Interviewer: Have you heard word climate change? 
Respondents: Yes, we heard the word.  
Interviewer: Where did you hear first time? 
Respondent 1: Some NGOs  
Respondent 2: Some independent organizations conduct meetings 
and create awareness. 
Respondent 3: When Godavari overflow I heard the term climate 
change. [Cross talk] In 2006 Godavari overflow and create heavy 
damage, we lost our shelter, food and everything. That time 
government release funds to NGO and they do their services to us, 
like food supply, blanket supply, etc. 
Interviewer: Who came and told you climate change is the cause? 
Respondent 3: Because of cyclone, flooding will take place and we 
lost our shelter, district officials and village officials are coming and 
tell us about flood. 
Interviewer: Who came and told you climate change is the cause? 
Respondent 3: VRO, MRO and PO will  
Interviewer: Do you think your village is affected by climate 
change?  
Responder 1: Yes, now we are cultivating chilli, if any cyclone or 
heavy rain take place we lost our fields. 
Interviewer: Do you know about PRAGATI? 
Respondents: Yes, we know. Cross talk: they help us in emergency 
times and educate us to know about our rights. 
Interviewer: What they during floods? 
Respondents: They give food, rice, dall, etc.  
Interviewer: Did they give any seeds? 
Respondents: Yes, they give only once. 
Interviewer: Did they tell why they giving seeds to you? 
Respondents: Yes. 
Interviewer: What did they tell you? 
Respondents: We can get more yield, reduce the water usage and 
time of crop also decrease. 
Interviewer: Did ever say anything about climate change? 
Respondents: No. 
 
This constellation of factors indicates gaps in the scope, nature, degree/duration, 
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availability and/or accessibility of the climate information offered through manifestly credible 
sources. However, the nature of the manifestly credible source of climate information may be a 
distinguishing factor. Specifically, the Sunaladana Village dataset reveals only two sources of 
initial climate change knowledge acquisition, both of which feature in the top three for the 
overall dataset (news and friends/peers/grapevine). It is the only village in which news is the 
main initial source with a prevalence of 89 percent. This means there's a substantially higher 
degree of prevalence for manifestly credible sources of initial climate change knowledge 
acquisition, specifically news, in Sunaladana (89 percent), which also has a level of premium 
climate knowledge on par with all PRAGATI Villages, except the outlier of Agraharam. This 
accounts for the distinction among young women in Sunaladana in terms of premium climate 
knowledge observed earlier, as they explicitly cite the news and reading the newspaper (dated 
editions) as their initial source of climate knowledge acquisition. Elsewhere, combined 
manifestly credible sources account for 60 percent in Agraharam (30 percent each from school 
and project intervention); 47 percent in Palem (news – one-third; school and project intervention 
– seven percent each)); 41 percent in Itikalakota (news, only factor). News’ distinction as a 
source is likely associated with the nature and utility of a range of frames in tackling knowledge 
gaps. Specifically, whereas the project intervention presents climate change with issue, context 
and domain specificity that narrows the scope of knowledge provided, news coverage of climate 
change as a translating process from scientific to public audiences (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2011) is 
more general and descriptive of a wider range of issues, domains and contexts. This is also 
bringing into focus Nisbet’s (2009) relevant detailing of a range of climatic frames, but contrary 
to his suggestion of different frames for different audiences, the implication here is that frame 
specificity may be less effective for attenuating knowledge gaps in particularly low capacity 
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contexts. 
While there is no consistent gendered and age-oriented variation in the credibility of 
initial modes of climate change knowledge acquisition in the dataset, it is important to note that 
older interviewees (81 percent), particularly older men (two-thirds of whom are from Palem), 
account for most of the prevalence for observation in the subset, which is consistent with the 
high association between experiential knowledge and this older cohort due to the broader range 
of life and event experiences they can draw from. But comparable levels of prevalence for this 
measure associated with older women (25 percent) and young men (19 percent) in Itikalakota, 
who account for the remainder, offers further support for the observation that while significant 
common-sense notions about the resonance of knowledge sources such as observation among 
elders should not foreclose opportunities to leverage observation and experiences to attenuate 
knowledge gaps among some cohorts of youth.  
While men account for all the prevalence for manifestly credible sources, such as project 
intervention in the subset, with equal distribution across age groups albeit varyingly across two 
of the four villages, women account for just over one-third of the prevalence for news overall but 
a high of two-thirds in Sunaladana. Though the overall figure is consistent with the assertion that 
men have more leisure time than women (see excerpt 22), young women, particularly in 
Sunaladana (18 percent), account for comparable levels of prevalence for manifestly credible 
sources of initial climate change knowledge acquisition to men of all age groups (27 percent 
compared to 32 percent for older and younger men, respectively).  It is older women who seem 
to have the least exposure to manifestly credible sources of initial climate change knowledge 
acquisition. The project’s population level approach to information provision (access 
availability) and disparate focus during gendered engagement (frames) are explicitly faulted for 
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this by young women in Palem (see excerpt 27).  
Excerpt 27: Population level engagement and disparate focus during gendered engagement undermines women’s climate knowledge 
Young Women Focus Group – Palem, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: Did they all say the same? I need new ones. Can we do anything about climate change? 
Respondents 1: We can’t do. 
Respondents: 2, 3 & 4: No. 
Interviewer:  No. Oh! Okay. Has PRAGATIi talked about... Why can’t we do anything about climate change? 
Respondents 1: Because we don’t know what it means. 
Respondents: Don’t know. 
Interviewer: Because you don’t know. Okay, good. Has PRAGATI ever talked about climate change? 
Respondents 1: Maybe they told the men. We did not hear. They stay with the men most of the time.  
Interviewer: Oh okay, okay. Do you go to the meetings of PRAGATI? 
Respondents 2 & 3: Yes. 
Interviewer: How often? 
Respondent 1: Women mostly go to DWCRA [Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas] meetings generally. Because they 
happen early in the morning.  
Interviewer: Oh, so they also meet with the men and women separately to discuss separate issues?  
Respondent 1: Ahh [vocal cue of affirmation] 
Respondent 2: Yes. 
Respondent 3: Men as men and women as women. 
 
Also, young people, particularly young men in Agraharam (three of four), account for all 
the prevalence for school. Young women in Palem account for the remaining prevalence (one in 
four). This correlates with the changing nature of society where educational opportunities are 
opening up for youngsters but in a manner consistent with the broader socio-cultural realities that 
accords educational and other benefits to men rather than women. This is underscored by similar 
observations in the Laya subset. In Pulusumamidi, the only village where school captures 
prevalence as an initial source of climate change knowledge acquisition, it is only men—
specifically young men—who cite this, which, as observed, may be indicative of broader socio-
cultural realities that accord educational and other benefits to men rather than women.  
Laya Villages            
 
Overall, project intervention (33 percent), observation (22 percent), school and news (17 
percent each) are the most grounded sources/modes of climate change knowledge acquisition. 
Friends/Peers/Grapevine is the only other statistically significant mode in the subset with 
prevalence in excess of a tenth (11 percent). However, Munagalapudu is the only village in 
which all four factors (and news in particular) are featured and in a varied order, as news (43 
percent) shows the highest prevalence, followed by project intervention (29 percent) and 
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observation and friends/peers/grapevine with prevalence of 14 percent each. This underscores a 
high degree of prevalence (71 percent) for the combined manifestly credible initial sources of 
climate information (namely, news 43 percentand project intervention 29 percent), marginally 
less than Pulusumamidi, where these manifestly credible sources are most grounded (78% 
percent). Consistent with my observation about the likelihood of consequential gaps in the scope, 
nature, degree/duration, availability and/or accessibility of the climate information available and 
accessed through manifestly credible sources in these contexts, both of these villages also 
demonstrate the highest level of knowledge gaps in the Laya subset and at comparable levels (44 
percent and 43 percent in Munagalapudu and Pulusumadi, respectively). The import of nature 
and scope of information provision is also underscored by a dependence on the grapevine with 
little depth and credibility as observed in excerpt 24. 
This is especially important for understanding the efficacy of the ideational affordances 
of the interventions. Like Agraharam in the PRAGATI subset, Pulusumamidi, which essentially 
ties with Munagapalpudi for the most intractable level of relative knowledge gap in the Laya 
subset, is the only village in the subset where project intervention is the dominant mode of 
climate knowledge acquisition (44 percent). As noted, the project-level information provision 
modality is narrowly framed in response to context, issues and domain. Meanwhile, Nallikota, 
which shows no prevalence for manifestly credible sources of climate change knowledge 
acquisition and only records prevalence for observation, has the lowest level of knowledge gap 
in the Laya subset. Considering the similarity in education levels across the villages, alongside 
the positive correlations noted between observation and experiential knowledge and knowledge 
levels, this strongly suggests a measure of credibility in significant forms of experiential 
knowledge and observation as a mode of climate knowledge acquisition. However, there is also 
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strong evidence that knowledge gaps in this dataset are associated with the nature and scope of 
the information provision mechanism employed by Laya akin to those observed in the 
PRAGATI subset. The project intervention is likely absent from the Nallikota dataset as an 
initial source of climate knowledge acquisition because of Laya’s employment of a population 
level subsistence frame in its climate resilience building responses, such as seed-dispersal to 
encourage multi-cropping. As excerpt 28 shows, the subsistence frame is often devoid of 
relevant supporting information such that beneficiaries of a climate resilience building activity 
do not perceive and/or know it as such. 
While there is no consistent gendered variation in the credibility of initial modes of 
climate change knowledge acquisition in the dataset, it is important to note that older men 
account for all references to project intervention in Pulusumadi, but older women account for all 
references in Munagalapudu. This is consistent with the variation with which Laya implements 
initiatives that specifically targets specific cohorts such as women. But it is men (mostly older - 
three-quarters), who account for all the prevalence noted for news. Though statistically small, it 
correlates with assertions by older women in Nallikota (and their peers in Palem, see excerpt 22) 
that men generally have more leisure time. This suggests social constraints that undermine access 
to and the availability of a wide tapestry of credible climate information sources, including news 
and the frequency with which women and youth can participate in population level engagements, 
are significant factors. 
 In Munagalapudu, for instance, though women sampled cite the project intervention as 
their dominant initial source of knowledge, they also stoutly report the fact that mostly men are 
aware of activities as they often miss meetings due to other obligations. This infrequent exposure 
to the information provision sessions offered by Laya may account for the correlation between 
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maximal levels of knowledge gaps relative to other measures of climate knowledge for this 
cohort of women alongside their entirely manifestly credible initial climate knowledge 
acquisition modality. Conversely, the older men in Pulusumadi, who have access to a broad 
tapestry of manifestly credible initial sources that transcends the project with its circumscribed 
focus on the activities it prioritizes, exhibit one of the highest levels of premium climate 
knowledge (a posteriori). Conversely, the limited range of credible climate information 
acquisition sources available to young women is underscored by young women from this locality 
(see excerpt 29). These observations underscore the view that addressing climate change, even 
through adaptation, is a complex socio-cultural and political issues (Moser, 2014; Pelling, 2011). 
Excerpt 28: Climate resilience responses with a subsistence frame devoid of information undermines recognition of actions and knowledge 
Older Women Focus Group - Nallikota, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: When did you hear term climate change? 
Respondents: We never heard the term.  
Interviewer: What about the Laya project, what do they do? 
Respondents: They give us plants to cultivate, they supply cooking equipment (stove) and water filters. 
Interviewer: When you were given this, they didn’t tell about climate change? 
Respondent 1: They didn’t say. 
Respondent 2: We don’t know clearly [if] they say or not. We are busy with day-to-day activities. 
Interviewer: When Laya came giving seeds, did they ask if you wanted seeds or did they give directly? 
Respondents: They ask us and give seeds, give us pulses, vegetable, seeds, etc. 
Interviewer: Did they ask men and woman or only men when giving the seeds? 
Respondents: They ask us both men and women. 
 
Excerpt 29: Limited and infrequent access to climate information among young women 
Young Women Focus Group - Pulusumamidi, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: Have you ever heard the term climate change? 
Respondents 1: No 
Respondent 2: Yes 
Respondent 3: No 
Interviewer: You heard [to R2]. Where did you first learn about climate change? 
Respondent 1: Here only, in this village only we heard. The rain will come, the clouds. In the 
village generally some people talk, so I heard those words. 
Respondent 2: Outside they talk, and I heard. 
Interviewer: When was this? 
Respondents: We heard when the people were talking about five to six years back. 
Interviewer: Was it a village meeting? Or just random people in the village? 
Respondents: No. When all were just talking, we heard. 
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Signs and Indicators 
 
Table 34: The relative prevalence of signs and indicators of climate change in India. 
Village 
Crop Yield/Soil 
Health 
Health Pollution Socio-Cultural 
Change 
Soil Erosion Weather 
Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Pulusumamidi 11 42% 2 8% 1 4% 0 0% 1 4% 13 50% 26 
Nallikota 8 47% 4 24% 1 6% 0 0% 0 0% 5 29% 17 
Munagalapudu 10 67% 0 0% 0 0% 1 7% 0 0% 5 33% 15 
Agraharam 11 61% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 7 39% 18 
Itikalakota 10 53% 1 5% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 10 53% 19 
Palem 25 71% 2 6% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 17 49% 35 
Sunaladana 11 61% 3 17% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 6 33% 18 
Totals 86 58% 12 8% 2 1% 2 1% 1 1% 63 43% 148 
 
A closer look at the nature and range of signs and indicators, a measure of climate 
knowledge and operationalization, strongly suggests that the high overall level of knowledge 
gaps observed in the dataset is associated with the nature, scope and duration of climate 
information provision and availability. Comparatively, the prevalence of signs and indicators of 
climate change in both villages are on par with what is observed in the Fijian villages with 
weaker climate ideational exposure. Per Table 34, Laya Villages, which benefit from more 
explicit ideational work, show six core signs and indicators of climate change, compared to four 
in the data set associated with PRAGATI villages, which benefit from a more unstructured and 
contingent issue-specific mechanism. This compares to eight and seven in Seaqaqa and Yaqaga, 
respectively, in the Fijian subset. Notwithstanding the smaller range of signs and indicators 
perceived in this case, which is associated with knowledge levels, the highly proximal, 
immediately discernibility contradicts assertions in the extant literature that communicating 
climate change is distinctly challenging because of the “invisibility of causes, distant impacts and 
a lack of immediacy and direct experience of impacts” (Moser, 2009). 
Overall, crop yield (58 percent), weather (43 percent) and health (eight percent) are the 
signs and indicators with the greatest prevalence. Socio-cultural change (1.4 percent), pollution 
(1.4 percent) and soil erosion (0.68 percent) are the only other discernible indicators with relative 
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prevalence. These indicators have almost identical prevalence in both set of villages. The direct 
relationship between weather, crop yield and soil erosion, as well as health strongly underscores 
a dominant food security frame and highly palpable health frame in these contexts. The 
dominance of these manifest climate perceptual markers (linking climate variability and rainfed 
agriculture, as well as various vector-borne maladies) is consistent with the livelihoods focus of 
both project interventions and the direct existential impacts being experienced. This clarifies the 
relative primacy of observation as a knowledge acquisition source (second overall) and 
experience in structuring knowledge articulation (third overall). The consonance with experience 
and subsistence also indicates that articulation of climate change signs and indicators is not 
solely dependent on climate knowledge. 
  The similarities in climate perception across both set of villages offer strong 
reinforcement for these observations. While Laya villages have a slightly higher variation in the 
number of indicators, that is entirely attributable to the fact that they account for the entirety of 
the prevalence of relatively marginal signs such as pollution (two) and soil erosion (one). 
However, this greater variation in signs and indicators in Laya Villages is consistent with the 
researcher's observation of more explicit ideational work compared to PRAGATI. This justifies a 
more granular look at the village level dataset to identify, if this correlation holds. 
 PRAGATI Villages 
Overall, there's little discernable difference in total signs and indicators across PRAGATI 
Villages, with the exception of Palem, which is accounted for by the exceptional case of the 
young men focus group (Sunaladana - 18, Agraharam - 18, Itikalikota - 17, and Palem - 35). 
These young men account for the greatest level of prevalence of signs and indicators (18 of 90) 
and the broadest range (four) compared to an average of two among all other PRAGATI villages. 
This is consistent with the maximal premium climate knowledge observed among this cohort 
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relative to other knowledge markers. As indicated earlier, this cohort’s distinction is significantly 
accounted for by a single participant, who was one of four youth identified by their elders to 
participate in “deeper explanations” through capacity building efforts led by PRAGATI that 
focused on crop diversification and resilience (see excerpt 19). This offers strong support for the 
observation that substantial explicit climate change ideational work, including information 
provision and training, positively impacts climate knowledge, paves the way for improved 
perception of interventions and personal influence, identification and participation in actions, 
risk perception, agency, motive and leadership. 
Laya Villages 
This engagement thesis is supported by data associated with Laya villages and partially 
accounts for the broader variation of signs observed. For instance, pollution, which is grounded 
twice in the dataset, was mentioned once in two different villages by different population groups 
(older men in Pulusumadi and young men in Nallikota). As observed earlier, both cohorts 
account for more than 60 percent of prevalence for premium climate knowledge for the subset, 
which allows them to identify and link cause and effect more readily. The older men of 
Pulusumadi also account for the totality of project intervention as their initial climate acquisition 
source and likely received disproportionately more exposure to the information and training 
offerings by Laya due to the socio-spatial bias of population level engagement towards men at 
the village level. This observation is reinforced by the overall higher prevalence of signs and 
indicators among men sampled, except those in Munagalapudu which is consistent with the 
overall lower prevalence of signs in the village (15) compared to all other Laya Villages 
(Pulusumadi - 26 and Nalikota - 17) and all villages in the Indian case overall. In fact, they note 
the least number of signs (three) in the entire subset except for older women in their village. 
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Excerpt 24, which illustrates the climate information vacuum in this context, also highlights 
some of the mobility constraints that limits older men and women from accessing agronomic 
related climate information and support. 
With respect to the young men of Nallikota,  like the rest of their village, they do not cite 
any manifestly credible sources as their initial climate knowledge acquisition source, but they 
have benefited from Laya’s selective and variable cohort engagement strategy through the 
establishment of a youth group, which affords them exposure to climate information provision 
and the ability to represent their concerns at both the village and mandal levels (larger cluster of 
localities below the district level). 
Similarly, socio-cultural change and soil erosion are the only other statistically significant 
signs noted. While socio-cultural change is accounted for by different cohorts across the two 
subsets, young men in Palem (PRAGATI subset) and an older male from Munagalapudu (Laya 
subset), both cohorts are distinct for the absence of knowledge gaps, alongside sustained access 
to manifestly credible initial sources of climate information (news for older men in 
Munagalapudu, direct project engagement for the young men in Palem) that accounts for the 
totality of how they acquire climate knowledge. In both instances, the perceived socio-cultural 
alterations indicate changing levels of regard and respect for the traditional order and attrition in 
discipline levels. Though statistically marginal and seemingly indicative of a knowledge gap, 
they comport with observations of shifts in confidence away from the traditional and communal 
order that accords benefits to youth due to their perceived educational advantages (basic literacy 
and numeracy), as established in subsequent sections of this analysis. So, the real implications of 
these interconnections for cultivating climate agency and mobilizing action accords credibility to 
the articulations of socio-cultural changes as a sign of climate change, specifically a way in 
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which its impact manifests and exacerbates a socio-cultural challenge of critical proportions. In 
this sense, it functions as a subjective social limit to adaptation (Adger et al., 2008). 
This strong support for the observation that substantial explicit climate change ideational 
work, including information provision, training and direct engagement of cohorts, positively 
impacts climate knowledge, perception of inclusion and influence, and the overall intervention, 
is highly significant. Probing the range and nature of climate actions observed by the study 
populations will further illustrate knowledge operationalization, alongside the scope and efficacy 
of project level information provision and action that can simultaneously illuminate the 
intractable level of overall knowledge gaps observed and its relationship with the limited scope 
of overall climate change information provision across both projects. 
Excerpt 30: Demonstration of climate knowledge and a range of signs and indicators 
Young Men Focus Group- Palem, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: So, changes in the weather, anything else? That is one, anything else comes to mind for you? If it is the same thing, just repeat 
that it is the same thing, or just say it again.  
Respondents 3: People are not staying the same.  
Respondent 4: We are not getting the yields like before. [Crosstalk] The crops used to grow well then, now they are not growing. The weather 
has changed a lot. 
Interviewer: How do you think your village is being affected by this change in the weather and climate change in general? 
Respondents: In the rainy season to walk around it is difficult.  
Interviewer: Any other way? 
Respondents: [Crosstalk] That is different, this is different. What problems in rain he is asking? In rainy season we get health issues malaria, 
typhoid, malaria, typhoid. Mosquitoes. Water stocked in places and mosquitoes.   
Interviewer: What kind of diseases? 
Respondents: Malaria, typhoid, fever, elephantiasis, cerebral malaria is less. We get.   
Interviewer: For you guys [directed at other participants], is there anything happening on the farm? Anything climate change is causing there? 
Having any issues there? Any problem on your farm that you think climate change is causing it? 
Respondents: [Crosstalk] Because of changing weather, there is no rain in proper time after growth. 
[…] 
 Respondents: People are having problems  
[…] 
Respondent 2: Problems on the farm, when the flowering comes, insects come. With heavy rainfall and water storage the crop gets destroyed 
Respondent 3: With no rains the flower also drops  
 
Excerpt 31: Engagement gaps and limited demonstration of climate knowledge and signs perceived 
Older Women Focus Group -  Pulusumamidi, Laya Subset 
Respondents: Green farms is one issue (Saplings on the field), green farms only. If there is rain, it is creating a problem. Green gram, Red 
gram are sprouting now. The Red Gram is now flowering well, it will get spoilt if there is rain. That is an issue. On Cotton farm, the fruits are 
breaking open. If there is rain, the fruits become black and get spoilt. [Crosstalk] The fruit gets spoilt and there is no flowering. Next is the 
Paddy fields, the fields with abundant water are fine. For the farms not having any water, if there is no rain, the farms dry up and we can’t 
spray any fertilizers also.  
Interviewer: And, has anybody talked to you about these problems that you are having?  
Respondent 1: What? 
Respondent 2: No one told us. 
Interviewer: No one. Are you familiar with Laya? 
Respondents 1, 2 & 3: Yes. [Crosstalk] Laya means… we know about them. But, we do not know what programmes and all. 
Interviewer: And Laya never talked to you about the, and Laya hasn’t talked to you about these problems you are having on the farm? 
Respondents: No, Sir. 
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Climate Actions 
 
Table 35: The relative prevalence of climate actions identified by study populations in Indian villages 
Subset Village Crop 
Diversification 
Filters & 
Water Supply Hydropower Inaction Irrigation 
Land 
Development 
Multi-
Cropping & 
Seed 
Dispersal 
Planting Trees 
Afforestation 
Soil 
Enhancement 
Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate   
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 26 48% 0 0 0 0% 18 33% 3 6% 
7 
13% 54 
Nallikota 1 6% 2 13% 0 0% 2 13% 0 0 0 0% 10 63% 0 0% 
1 
6% 16 
Munagalapudu 0 0% 7 18% 5 13% 13 33% 0 0 0 0% 11 28% 0 0% 3 8% 39 
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 1 6% 0 0% 0 0% 6 35% 0 0 0 0% 9 53% 0 0% 1 6% 17 
Itikalakota 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 9 60% 0 0 4 27% 0 0% 0 0% 2 13% 15 
Palem 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 11 28% 1 0 6 15% 6 15% 5 13% 11 28% 40 
Sunaladana 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 11 52% 0 0 6 29% 3 14% 1 5% 0 0% 21 
Totals 2 1% 9 4% 5 2% 78 39% 1 0 16 8% 57 28% 9 4% 0 0% 202 
 
Nine of the 13 codes denoting climate change actions are varyingly grounded in the India 
case (seven in each set of villages). Per Table 35, they include: crop diversification, filters and 
water supply (Laya Villages only), hydropower (Laya Villages only), inaction, irrigation 
(PRAGATI Villages only), land development (PRAGATI Villages only), multi-cropping, 
planting trees and soil enhancement. Inaction is the most grounded analytical unit in the case 
overall (39 percent). The high relative prevalence of this marker of climate action is highly 
significant as it specifically captures declarations that there is no climate action underway in the 
village, in addition to little or no mention of the phenomenon and how it affects the area during 
the intervention. It is directly associated with the intractable levels of overall knowledge gaps 
(more than one-third for Laya Villages and approximately a quarter for PRAGATI Villages) 
since both village subsets are exposed to interventions that have declared climate adaptation and 
mitigation activities with disparate population level reach through varying means across 
localities. This is especially significant as perceived inaction, which suggests considerable gaps 
in knowledge levels and knowledge operationalization, is evident at comparable levels in both 
sets of villages (38 percent in Laya Villages compared to 40 percent in PRAGATI Villages). The 
marginally higher levels of climate action observed in the Laya subset is consistent with the 
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higher relative prevalence of the project intervention as a knowledge acquisition source in the 
subset. Crucially, the strong association between knowledge gaps and failure to recognize 
climate actions in these contexts is contrary to Leiserowitz’s (2003) finding that there is no 
significant relationship between accurate knowledge of climate change causes and responses 
among Americans. The manifest relationship between the range of climate resilience building 
and coping agronomic and resource management activities underscores the consequential nature 
of the climate knowledge gaps. 
While multi-cropping (28 percent) and soil enhancement (12 percent) are the second and 
third most grounded climate actions noted by the overall study population, their order of 
importance varies. While the order holds true for Laya Villages (inaction (38 percent), multi-
cropping (36 percent) and soil enhancement (10 percent), the latter is only the fourth most 
grounded action in the PRAGATI subset (15 percent). Inaction (40 percent) and multi-cropping 
(17 percent), which are similarly ranked in each subset; and land development (17 percent), 
which is only evident in this subset, are more grounded. PRAGATI Villages also account for the 
only instance of irrigation evident in the data, whereas Laya Villages account for all the 
prevalence for filters and water supply and hydropower. These variations are consistent with the 
contextual nature of climate change impacts and the location specificity of actions necessitated. 
Planting trees (five percent) and crop diversification (less than one percent) are the only other 
statistically significant climate actions in terms of prevalence that are common to both set of 
villages. They are also similarly grounded in each set of villages. Notwithstanding these 
contextual variations, it is important to underscore the thematic consistency between the primary 
climate actions and the primary signs and indicators perceived by the populations and their direct 
relationship with the most elemental concerns/needs of the study population: food security and 
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subsistence challenges. Specifically, multi-cropping is the most grounded specified activity in 
both subsets and when considered against all other actions directly associated with food security 
in each subset (crop diversification, soil enhancement and land development), this theme that 
underscores action accounts for a heightened majority (53 percent) and a plurality of actions (47 
percent) in PRAGATI and Laya villages, respectively. 
However, there are significant variations across localities within both subsets that 
reinforce the observations proffered about the importance of substantial explicit climate change 
ideation work, including information provision, training and direct engagement of cohorts, for 
improved climate knowledge and its effective operationalization. 
PRAGATI Villages 
While inaction shows the most prevalence of all codes indicative of climate action in the 
PRAGATI subset, it varies widely across villages (a high of 60 percent in Itikalakota, 52 percent 
in Sunaladana, 35 percent in Agraharam compared to 28 percent in Palem). The 
disproportionately higher level of inaction observed in Itikalakota is directly associated with the 
differential level, scope and nature of PRAGATI’s engagement with different villages, as well as 
the paucity of accompanying information, which is consistent with the subsistence-frame 
observed earlier. Specifically, much of the climate inaction noted in this context is underscored 
by specification of engagement on other measures of livelihood enhancement and coping. Older 
men in Itikalakota, for instance, note rarely encountering proponents of the project and only 
receiving a fifth of their request for kallu, the fruit of the palm tree, under a seed dispersal 
initiative. But gaps in the information provision mechanism is also a factor as where broader 
livelihoods receipts are noted as being received from PRAGATI’s partner organization, ITDA, 
they are still not perceived as climate actions, in large part because of the subsistence-response 
frame employed, which the data suggests is devoid of accompanying information (see excerpts 
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32 and 26). 
Conversely, the much lower overall level of engagement in Palem is underscored by 
significant levels of targeted engagement on integrated action, including direct engagement and 
training of young men. So, context, both as a consequence of the manner and extent to which 
climate change impacts are evident in a village and differential pursuit of climate activities 
across villages are primary factors in structuring perception and reporting of activities as climate 
actions in these contexts. This is consistent with the positive correlation between substantial 
experiential knowledge/observation as a knowledge acquisition source and higher levels of 
premium climate knowledge (a posteriori). 
Excerpt 32: Subsistence climate response frame devoid of accompanying information precludes recognition of climate action 
Older Men Focus Group – Itikalakota, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: Are you familiar with ITDS?  
Respondents: Yes.  
Interviewer:  Do you think them doing good work?  
Respondents: Yes.  
Interviewer: How you benefited from ITDS?  
Respondents: Land development, land levelling, they helped us floods [Cross talk] They [are] helping us depending their budget sum of our  
villagers are benefited from ITDS and they said others will benefited in second turn. They [are] supporting us. 
Interviewer: Do you have own land?  
Respondents: Yes.  
Interviewer: Have they talked about climate change? 
Respondents: No. 
Interviewer: Would you like to talk about climate change?  
Respondents: We feel good.  
Interviewer: Have they given any seeds to you?  
Respondents: No, we got seeds from government. 
Interviewer: Did they teach you how to do farm?  
Respondents: We know from my childhood because our family is agriculture family. 
Interviewer: Did they give any tips to you?  
Respondents:  No.  
Interviewer: Have they talked about weather changes?  
Respondents: No.  
Interviewer: Are you familiar with cashew planting them doing that?  
Respondents: Yes, but we didn’t receive cashew plants/seeds.  
Interviewer: Did you think they are doing work?  
Respondents: Yes.  
 
Variations in prevalence for perceived markers of climate activity reinforce the 
observation of the consequential nature of contextual impacts and differential implementation of 
actions. Although land development, multi-cropping and soil enhancement are the three most 
grounded climate actions in the PRAGATI Villages overall, none of the villages show 
prevalence for all three. Multi-cropping, the most grounded specified action, is absent from the 
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Itikalakota dataset and is most grounded in Agraharam (nine of 17), the only village where a 
specified action accounts for the majority of prevalence for climate action. Similarly, land 
development is absent from the Agraharam dataset but shows comparable prevalence across the 
three villages where it's evident (38 percent in Sunanalada and Palem and 25 percent in 
Itikalakota). Soil enhancement is also absent from one village (Sunaladana) but is almost entirely 
accounted for by Palem (79 percent). These variations are indicative of the contextual nature of 
the climate change activities people are likely to pinpoint, as further illustrated by the fact that 
prevalence for all other specified actions is even more associated with circumscribed cohorts in 
discrete localities—specifically, planting trees: two villages - Palem five of six and Sunaladana - 
one of six; irrigation -Itikalakota only, (one of one) and crop diversification: Agraharam only 
(one of one). As observed, this contextual factor is at one level due to distinctions in how climate 
change-induced changes and variability differentially affect localities such that those with 
already limited access to water (Itikalakota) are rendered more disadvantaged and active on that 
measure. Also, it offers robust support for the contextual engagement factor as many of these 
activities are technical (e.g. soil enhancement) and would necessitate special training/capacity 
building that resource constraints would only permit offering to a select group, such as the young 
men in Palem, who benefited from such (see excerpt 19), which credibly explains the village’s 
distinctions.  
Gender and age feature more significantly in the nature of climate actions noted across 
PRAGATI Villages, but not in a manner that is determinative. Consistent with observations of 
lower knowledge levels and a narrower range of climate knowledge acquisition sources of 
manifest credibility, alongside the socio-spatial barriers to their participation in population level 
engagement and information provision, women account for the greatest of the prevalence for 
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inaction in PRAGATI Villages (57 percent), particularly young women (32 percent). This obtains 
in all villages except Itikalakota, where older men account for the majority of inaction's 
prevalence (56 perent) and women only account for one-third. The gendered differentiation in 
Itikalakota is associated with direct engagement of women in this village through training 
programmes. But, overall, the fact that young men account for a fairly comparable level of 
prevalence for inaction overall (19 percent compared to 32 percent for young women), suggests 
there's a youth dynamic at play in the PRAGATI subset. This may be attributed to the fact that 
older men are more likely to be engaged about village matters and older women were in this rare 
instance the beneficiary of a targeted training programme. Further, these women exhibit a 
maximal level of premium climate knowledge relative to other knowledge markers that is largely 
associated with observation (80 percent prevalence), which underscores the contention that 
observation and experiential knowledge correlate positively with improved knowledge where 
sustained and manifestly credible climate information is provided and accessed. The implication 
here is that it also positively structures knowledge operationalization, specifically the 
identification of climate actions.  
Despite the cohort level dynamics observed, no single group accounts for the majority of 
the prevalence of all specified actions. Women account for comparable levels of prevalence for 
all actions or outpace the level accounted for by men. Even for land development, a traditionally 
male-oriented task, women account for seven of 17 compared to nine of 16 for men and outstrip 
men for the prevalence of soil enhancement (nine of 14 versus five of 14). Men, however, 
account for more of the prevalence for tree planting (five of six), but youth, particularly young 
men, account for most of this prevalence overall (four of six and three of six, respectively), 
which is consistent with the tendency to task young men with more labour-intensive tasks due to 
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their relative fitness. A similar youth association is also evident in the prevalence for land 
development, where youth account for nine of 16, but young women account for slightly more 
than young men (five of 16—equal to older men, versus four of five). However, it is the converse 
for soil enhancement, where older folks outstrip younger folks for the prevalence noted for soil 
enhancement (nine of 14, particularly older women who account for nearly half (six of 14). This 
differs for multi-cropping, for which there is an equal split across mixed gender age-groups 
(youth versus older) and both young men and women have similar levels of prevalence (four of 
18 and five of 18, respectively), which is consistent with the heightened perceptibility and reach 
of the food security concerns and efforts to tackle them. 
Laya Villages 
 
The Laya subset offers considerable support for the contextual implications of climate 
action perception and identification on both dimensions (varied climate impacts and differential 
activities across localities) and associations with knowledge levels. While inaction is a common 
theme overall, Nallikota is distinct. Inaction only accounts for 12.5 percent of the prevalence for 
climate action in the village, compared to nearly a half in Pulusumamidi and one-third in 
Munagalapudu. Nallikota’s distinction is consistent with the availability of cohort level 
engagement through a youth group, which affords young men exposure to climate information 
provision and the ability to represent their concerns at both the village and mandal levels (larger 
cluster of localities below the district level). Further, the village also reports the highest level of 
premium climate knowledge in this subset and the lowest amount of knowledge gaps. This 
reinforces the view that while variable implementation of activities and variation in climate 
impacts influence declarations of inaction, climate knowledge level is a likely more enduring 
factor, particularly as both interventions have multi-layered climate adaptation and mitigation 
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activities at their core. 
In terms of action specificity, multi-cropping, which is the second most grounded climate 
action for Laya Villages overall, is the most grounded in Nallikota (63 percent), compared to a 
third in Pulusumadi and 28 percent in Munagalapudu. Nallikota also accounts for the only 
instance of crop diversification as a climate action in the dataset. Consistent with its significantly 
higher level of inaction, fewer specific climate actions are grounded in the Pulusumamidi dataset 
(four: multi-cropping, planting trees and soil enhancement) compared to the other Laya Villages 
(four each: crop diversification - Nellikota only, hydropower - Munagalapudu only, filters and 
water supply, multi-cropping and soil enhancement.   
As observed, earlier, that the variations in specific actions are particular to circumscribed 
localities, which is indicative of the contextual nature of the climate change actions people are 
likely to identify. While multi-cropping is the single most common specific action across all 
villages, actions associated with the challenges in the particular localities seem to follow 
varyingly. Soil enhancement (seven of 54) and planting of trees (three of 54) are the only other 
factors grounded in Pulusumamidi, with the latter only showing prevalence in this subset. 
Similarly, while filter and water supply are noted as the second most grounded specific climate 
action in both Nallikota (two of 16) and Munagalapudu (seven of 39), the next most grounded 
factor in each village only shows prevalence in their specific dataset (hydro-power in 
Munagalapudu (five of 39) and crop diversification in Pulusumamidi (one of 16) because of the 
incorporation of these particular activities in the localities. Rudimentary climate actions such as 
soil enhancement, which is the third most grounded specific climate action for Laya Villages 
overall, is ranked the same with nearly identical prevalence in both (eight percent in 
Mungalapudi and six percent in Nallikota). This contrasts with what is observed in 
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Pulusumamidi, where it is the second most grounded specific climate action with a prevalence of 
13 percent. 
While gender does not correlate with any major variance in the climate actions noted at a 
general level, this masks substantial gendered differences at a more granular level. Overall, 
women account for the majority of prevalence for inaction (63 percent), but this should be 
considered an outlier as the gendered dissonance is largely accounted for by Pulusumamidi, 
where women account for more than three-quarters of the prevalence for inaction in the village 
and nearly half for all PRAGATI Villages (20 of 41).  However, it is important to note that the 
age of women in Pulusumamidi does not account for this, as young and older women equally 
account for this strong level of prevalence for inaction (10 of 26 each). The importance of this 
observation is heightened by the fact that even in Nallikota, where inaction is least grounded, it is 
women who account for the entirety of its prevalence. Munagalapudu differs as older men 
account for the majority (eight of 13) of inaction's prevalence in that subset, which is consistent 
with the fact that their female counterparts are decidedly more engaged with the project, 
accounting for all prevalence associated with the village for project intervention as an initial 
source of climate knowledge. The gendered distinction is further reinforced by the fact that, 
overall, older men account for the greater prevalence for all specified actions (multi-cropping: 17 
of 39), soil enhancement (six of 11), hydropower (three of five), planting trees (two of three) and 
crop diversification (all), except filters and water supply, for which women account for over half 
of its prevalence (56 percent). The latter is consistent with water’s direct importance for 
women’s duties within and dominance of the domestic sphere, but more broadly, these 
observations strongly support the view that the nature and scope of engagement structures 
climate knowledge and climate knowledge operationalization. Specifically, people and groups—
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particularly women—with little, lower and/or no engagement or access to climate information 
less readily identify activities underway in their locality as climate actions, even where they 
acknowledge participation or benefits of even manifestly climate adaptive and/or mitigative 
actions. 
 So important is the nature and scope of climate information provision for knowledge 
accrual and mobilization in terms of recognition of climate action that older men in 
Munagalapudu, who exhibit the lowest level of knowledge gap, are the least knowledgeable 
locality in the subset. They easily cite inaction on climate change while readily stating a litany of 
comprehensive climate resilience building efforts, ranging from agronomic support to clean 
energy (see excerpt 16). The distinguishing factor seems to be the absence of associated 
information and explanation. The gendered manifestation of this scenario that particularly 
benefits older men is reinforced  by the fact that while there is a discernable difference in the 
depth of climate actions noted by older men and younger men—which still accrues benefits to 
younger men relative to younger women through associative work groups and privileged access 
to training where a youth focus is employed— is that there is no statistically significant trend 
pointing to similar differences and opportunities between older and younger women because of 
the near uniform absence of broad-based engagement of women. The underlying factor here is 
socio-cultural, as men are customarily privileged with property rights, which means older men 
are usually owners of the land and inevitably more likely to be primarily and directly engaged for 
adaptive and mitigative actions in a resource-intensive context.  
Excerpt 33: The enactment of multi-level agronomic and clean energy adaptive and resilience building actions without accompanying 
information undermines perception and understanding of climate actions 
Older Men Focus Group – Munagalapudu, Laya Subset 
Interviewer:  Can you tell me some of the things that Laya is doing in the village? What are some of the things they’re working on?  
Respondents: Here sir, they did some work related to agriculture, some days they worked on water issue, next they saw that we are facing 
many issues, they did the power station also.  
Respondents: **Crosstalk** 
Respondents: Some work they are doing sir. They did 3 works sir. Seeds they gave. 
Respondents: Seeds, beans, bottle gourd, seeds they gave.  
Respondents: Turmeric they gave, ginger, sweet potato. 
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Respondents: They gave brooms also.  
Interviewer:  What about power? I see multiple connections. 
Respondents: ** Crosstalk about the background of how the power station came into the village** 
Interviewer: So, you had hydropower from Laya and now there is regular, regular fossil fuel power?     
Respondents: That is the power thing that Laya people built (pointing to hydro power mechanism). After that these powerlines from outside  
came.  
Respondents: *Crosstalk** 
Interviewer: What was that? 
Translator: Before, Laya supplied power from this local power station. Now government has supplied regular power and agriculture and also 
for the water they worked upon. 
Interviewer: What did they do for the water?  
Respondents: They put pipes, sir. They put pipes and put filters and asked us to take water from these filters. Because the water we get is 
muddy. 
Interviewer: Great, he [pointing] was saying something.  
Translator: The pipes, the pipes water they gave them.  
Interviewer: Is there anything else you wanted to say? 
Respondents: [Crosstalk] They gave that only, sir. 
Interviewer:  Same. Okay. 
Respondents: That is what they did sir. They did good works only sir. We faced lot of problems sir, now as they did that water …. We don’t 
need to go to the canal and bring water […] 
Interviewer: Ahh, so, before, do you think your water problem is a climate change problem or it’s just a…. what do you think? What do you 
think caused your water problem?  
Respondents: It is because of that only, sir., In summer it is getting dried up and we are having issues. Now we don’t have issues as we are 
getting water in summer also because Laya people have built this.  
Respondents: Yeah, based on the weather only this water is also changing. Because there is nothing else that is influencing, the water is 
reducing. 
Interviewer: What water? What, what water? Water in the pond, water from where? 
Respondents: The pond water, sir. 
Respondents: Pond, sir. 
Interviewer: So, he is saying this [pointing]; what are you saying? 
Translator:  He was also saying the same. 
Respondent: So, what do you think is causing that? 
Respondents: It is due to the weather only, sir, because on the ground (Inaudible). The water content in the ground reduces.   
Interviewer: So, the soil is retaining enough water and the water table is going down? And you think...(Mumbling). Hmm, the, you said that 
Laya used to do the pumping of the… hydro and then the government did the electrical stuff? Which do you prefer? Do you prefer the hydro, 
or do you prefer the government power?  
Respondents: Now one thing sir, we feel that what Laya people gave is good. Now the government also supplied.  So, we started using that as 
we felt it will not be good [referring to intermittence]. Both are good sir. When we don’t have power in one, we use the other. 
Respondents: [Laughs] But, previously Laya people only supplied first. Government did not do. 
Interviewer: So, it is intermittent?  
Respondents: Sometimes it doesn’t come. When a tree falls, or some problem somewhere we will not have power two, three or four days. The 
power comes with these gaps. 
Interviewer: Yeah, but my question is: Which do you prefer? Do you prefer the hydro or do you prefer the government supply? 
Respondents: Both are good only, sir. When we do not have supply in one, we use the other.  
Translator: Which is more beneficial?  
Respondents: Both sir, but, Laya is better as it is free. We have to do, sir. Government supply, we have to pay 100 rupees or 60 or 70. We are 
paying, we cannot help it. We cannot leave what we got sir, so using it.  
Respondents: If there is any issue in Laya power supply, we collect 10 rupees from each house and get it repaired. It is our decision.      
[…] 
 Interviewer: Does anybody disagree? Does anybody have another opinion? You don’t have to all say the same thing. 
Translator: Just because he told, you don’t need to same. Tell what you feel is right.  
Respondents: We think both are good, sir. Don’t we? We are using both equally.  
Interviewer: Just a minute, minute… We have to manage it more. Because it’s for everybody. 
Interviewer: Is anyone more reliable than the other?  
Respondents: Laya will be there continuously. It will not change. If we do something, then it will be a problem.  Government we don’t know 
as it is supplied from outside? 
Respondents: Because Laya supply is not cut off it is better 
Interviewer: How is Laya thing pumped? Is there any… gasoline…. 
Respondents: [Crosstalk] They built a stone wall, then a pit with a hole. It will not reduce 
Respondents: They built a wall high and built a pit and on either side of the stream from the hill, the water comes as a stream down the hill 
and it comes to the Laya organization built thing. Power comes then. [Reference to a gravity dam]. 
Interviewer: Okay, so it is like a dram. Okay, unlike the government one. Okay. Does... has anybody explained to you the Laya hydro thing 
that Laya does and how the government power gets to you?  
Respondents:  No.  
Respondents: No, sir. 
Respondents: We don’t know how the power gets generated in Laya thing also sir. But after seeing and observing, we don’t know much sir. 
Interviewer: Okay oh because this is open they can see. But nobody has ever explained. Is that what everybody thinks? Yes, or no? 
Respondents: No 
[…] 
Interviewer: […] So, when Laya comes to talk to you and gives you seeds, do they tell you anything about artificial fertilizers and natural 
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fertilisers or they just give you the seeds?   
Respondents: They tell us to stop using the fertilizers and use the natural manures and protect the seeds which Laya gives us. Because this 
will help reduce your costs for farming. Millets, corn… 
Respondents: Stop using these fertilisers is what they tell.   
Interviewer: Yeah. But, when they do come, do they ever explain the link between what is happening, the problems happening in your farm 
and climate change? Do they, do they tell you anything about climate change? 
Respondents: No, sir. 
Respondents: No. 
Interviewer:  It is a yes or no [prompting a hesitant participant]. 
Respondents: No. They told us about fertilizers 
Interviewer: Yes or no. 
Respondents: [Crosstalk] But they never told about weather changes. If we follow them, they give seeds that they give are according to the 
weather also… [Crosstalk]. But, we don’t put those seeds 
Interviewer: They are not planting them? My question is, do they tell you anything about climate change when they come to talk to you. 
Respondents: No.  
 
 
Against the backdrop of low knowledge levels, alongside broad perception of climate 
change signs and indicators amidst gaps in ability to associate acknowledged mitigative and 
adaptive interventions as climate change actions, probing the data to identify perception of cause 
may indicate critical leverage points for attenuating knowledge gaps, boosting climate agency, 
action and leadership. 
Cause and Proximity 
 
Table 36: The relative prevalence of perceived causes of climate change across study populations in India 
Subset Village 
Humans International Local National Nature 
Density Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Nallikota 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Munagalapudu 1 25% 1 25% 1 25% 1 25% 0 0% 4 
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Itikalakota 4 40% 1 10% 1 10% 3 30% 1 10% 10 
Palem 4 57% 0 0% 3 0% 0 0% 0 0% 7 
Sunaladana 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 
Totals 10 45% 2 9% 5 23% 4 18% 1 5% 22 
 
Overall, five codes (four in Laya and five in PRAGATI Villages) identifying cause and 
proximity have prevalence in the case (see Table 36). God/Religion is the only inactive code in 
the overall dataset. The higher prevalence of markers of cause and proximity in the PRAGATI 
subset is consistent with observation of higher premium climate knowledge and lower 
knowledge gaps. The general data suggests responsibility for climate change is perceived to be 
more immediate or locally oriented (national and local/village level responsibility outstrips 
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international (nine of 22 versus two of 22). In order of rank, Humans (10 of 22), Local (five), 
National (four), international (two) and nature (one) account for the prevalence of the theme that 
captures climate change responsibility. A more granular turn shows this holds true for both 
village subsets, but with variations across localities that are of significance. Whereas the two 
markers of local attribution of cause (national and local/village) account for twice (50 percent 
versus 25 percent) the relative prevalence associated with the distal causes (international) for the 
Laya subset, the proximal factors account for six and half times more than distal ones (39 percent 
compared to six percent, respectively) in the PRAGATI subset. This significant trend towards 
explicit attribution of local responsibility suggests the general reference to humans is likely 
local—an observation strongly supported by the type of human activities identified. The highly 
localized nature of the attribution of cause in these contexts, conflicts with scientific facts in 
proximal terms.  
While the consensus is that climate change and variability in this dispensation are 
fundamentally anthropogenic, which is in alignment with the first order ranking of human 
attribution in the dataset, responsibility is decisively attributed to global industrial forces (other 
countries, their industries and citizens (humans). Further, as contended at the outset of this 
chapter, the differentiated nature of cause and responsibility in a complex environment such as 
India fundamentally shows that sub-national attribution of cause is more accurately reposed 
outside of this rustic village. Probing the subsets reveals variations that suggest this confounding 
internalization of blame or responsibility is simultaneously related to the knowledge gaps and the 
nature, scope and duration of information provision associated with the context-dependent nature 
of the resource use and management interventions underway in the localities under investigation. 
This is reinforced by the fact that though nature, a significant secondary cause and the primary 
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means through which impacts manifest, only marginally features in the PRAGATI subset with 
relative prevalence of six percent.  
PRAGATI Villages 
 
The PRAGATI subset features the overall active codes in the same order with Humans 
accounting for a half of prevalence (nine of 18); local at more than a fifth (22 percent); national 
at 17 percent; and international and nature with prevalence of six percent each. The observation 
that climate change causes are perceived as local is discernibly so in two of three villages in the 
subset where this measure is accessible (Palem and Itikalakota). However, there are distinctions 
in the proximity of attribution of cause. In Palem, where only two codes are active—Humans (in 
general) and Local with comparable levels of prevalence (four of seven and three of seven, 
respectively), the manifestly proximal attribution of cause accounts for 43 percent of relative 
prevalence and is maximally internalized at the village level. While Itikalikota, which shows the 
greatest variation in codes (all five that are active in the dataset), exhibit a similar level of 
proximal attribution of cause (40 percent) and ranks Humans as its primary single cause (40 
percent), shifts the proximity of cause away from the village. Rather than internalizing it, it is 
reposed at the national level. Specifically, national attribution of cause accounts for three-
quarters (three of four) of the relative prevalence for the total for local attribution for the village. 
It also accounts for the entirety of the prevalence for national causes in the overall data set (three 
of three), alongside the only instance of international and nature-induced causes with marginal 
prevalence of one each. In Sunaladana, where only one code registers (and in a single instance by 
older men), it is accounted for by Humans in general. While this suggests a neutral disposition, 
the general trend towards local attribution and the nature of the human activities noted strongly 
suggests localized attribution, as the cohort specifically proffered this human attribution of cause 
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in association with the need to judiciously use resources in a resource-dependent context where 
climate impacts are manifest. Consistent with its distinction as the village with the highest 
knowledge gap in the PRAGATI subset and the limitation of knowledge acquisition sources to 
informal networks (friends, peers and the grapevine), Agraharam shows no prevalence for any 
cause. 
The strong variation of the attribution of cause and proximity in PRAGATI Villages 
strongly correlates with gender and age. Older women, who show a higher level of knowledge 
gap, account for none of the prevalence of cause. Young men, who have a higher overall level of 
awareness about climate change, account for nearly half of all the prevalence of all specification 
of causes (eight of 18), but this is almost entirely accounted for by the young men of Palem 
(seven of eight), who also account for the entirety of cause attribution in their village. This is 
consistent with the distinction of this group in terms of knowledge level, the tapestry of 
manifestly credible initial climate knowledge acquisition sources available to and accessed by 
them, including “deeper explanations” through capacity building efforts led by PRAGATI that 
focused on crop diversification and resilience, alongside information provision (see excerpt 19). 
Further, older men and young women account for the same level of prevalence (five of 18 each), 
which suggests there's a strong correlation with age (youth 13 of 18 versus older folks five of 
18). Consistent with their apparently higher levels of climate change knowledge, young men 
account for more than half of the human attribution of cause (five of nine).  
While Young women view the cause of climate change to be distant (accounting for two-
thirds of national attribution's prevalence (two of three) and all of nature's (one of one), young 
men foreground local responsibility, accounting for three-quarters of local attribution of cause's 
prevalence (three of four). However, in both instances, these age and gendered observations are 
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entirely accounted for by circumscribed localities (young men in Palem (three of four) for local 
and young women in Itikalakota (two of three), who benefited from very different levels of direct 
engagement and deeper learning through the climate intervention underway in their respective 
villages). This divergence in attribution of cause and the differences in the levels of engagement 
between the young men of Palem (direct and targeted) and the young women in Itikalakota (non-
specific to absent) strongly supports my assertion that the confounding internalization of blame 
or responsibility is simultaneously related to the nature, scope and duration of information 
provision associated with the context dependent nature of the resource use and management 
interventions underway in the localities under investigation. This is underscored by the fact that, 
in Itikalakota, where close reading of the data only shows limited direct engagement with older 
women, both cohorts who report markers of cause (young women and older men) interpellated 
non-localized attributions against the backdrop of observation and news structuring their climate 
knowledge. As excerpt 34 shows, even amidst knowledge gaps, due to scarcity of time that 
undermines young women’s abilities to access climate information, among other factors, their 
highly textured and accurate observational and experiential knowledge enables them to apportion 
cause attribution amidst a wave of complexities. 
Excerpt 34: Compelling experiential and observational knowledge enables effective apportioning of cause attribution amidst complex impacts 
Young Women Focus Group – Itikalakota, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: Have you heard word climate change?  
Respondents: No.  
Interviewer: You work on the farm; do you face any problems in farm? 
Respondents: We face general problems because we are in field for morning; 9am to evening, 4pm. [Cross talk]  
Respondents: We not getting enough employment like in past. Because of over population. One project [Polavaram Dam] is running 
here. Because of that some village people are came [sic] here to live. Because of project we are getting floods frequently. 
Interviewer: Do you have any problem during planting plants on your farm? 
Respondents: Because of heavy rains, floods are seen because of that we lost our crop.  
Respondents: Some plants are [do] not required more water; high amount of water damages the yield.  
Interviewer: What are the plants that require low amount of water?  
Respondents: Pulses… Black gram, green gram, dal [types of lentils]. Our agriculture mainly depends upon rainfall. 
Interviewer: Are you getting more rain or less rain? 
Respondents: We [are] getting very? rainfall, but we [have] heavy rainfall because of cyclones. 
Interviewer: Are you getting more cyclones comparing with past or not?  
Respondents: Frequency of cyclones getting high, floods also seen here. We didn’t [see] floods like this in our lifetime.  
Interviewer: Have you faced this type of floods before? 
Respondents: We face floods but not this much intensity. Because of the project water is stagnated here. 
Interviewer: What project? 
Respondents: Polavaram project 
Interviewer: What you think causing flooding?  
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Respondents: Because of Polavaram dam water is stagnated in our farms. [Crosstalk]. In polavaram dam they construct walls on farms 
and stop the flow of water so water is stagnated we get floods.               
 
In the case of older men in Itakalakota, they account for the only instance of international 
attribution of cause in the dataset and while they still localize the attribution of cause (50 percent 
- local and national) its equal distribution between local (village) and national suggests, they 
have a more neutral disposition on the location of cause, but it is proximally more removed from 
the village. 
Laya Villages 
 
This is supported by the data for the Laya subset, where young men in Munagalapudu, 
for whom news is responsible for half of relative prevalence for their initial climate knowledge 
acquisition sources, account for all the prevalence for climate change cause in this subset in a 
manner identical to older men in Itikalakota. 
Climate Risk 
Table 37: The relative prevalence of climate and vulnerability risk markers perceived across study populations in India 
Subset Village Children - 2 
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers Equal Risk Farmer - 2 
Hillside 
Dwellers Me Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 0 0% 0 0% 5 50% 3 30% 1 10% 1 10% 10 
Nallikota 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 
Munagalapudu 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
PRAGA
TI 
Agraharam 0 0% 1 25% 2 50% 0 0% 1 25% 0 0% 4 
Itikalakota 0 0% 0 0% 4 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 
Palem 0 0% 0 0% 9 75% 3 25% 0 0% 0 0% 12 
Sunaladana 0 0% 1 20% 4 80% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 5 
Totals 1 3% 1 3% 27 71% 6 16% 2 5% 1 3% 38 
 
The propensity for localization of cause attribution, which is contrary to scientific reality 
and consistent with the high levels of knowledge gaps observed in the data, is consequential. It 
“means a variety of factors other than scientific knowledge of causes and solutions are being 
used to form climate change attitudes, preferences and behaviours” (Maibach, Roser-Renouf, 
Leiserowitz, 2008, p. 495), which accords heightened importance to identifying what factual 
aspects of knowledge is most important for aiding people to discern and manage current and 
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projected risks, optimize agency and action. This is key, as palpable resource limitations mean 
the faulty internalization of responsibility for anthropogenic climate change in these villages is 
likely to undermine climate agency, motive and leadership, not least where the faulty 
internalization is predicated on a falsehood such as “open defecation” (see excerpt 36). So, 
probing climate risk perception in these environments of high internalization of risk is likely to 
further illuminate the operationalization of this proximal cause perception and clarify leverage 
points that can aid in capability enhancement (climate agency, action and leadership) through the 
provision of climate information, activity design and implementation.  
Overall, Table 37 shows six analytical units that denote climate risk are grounded in the 
dataset for the Indian case (Equal Risk - 70 percent, Farmers-2 - 16 percent, Hillside Dwellers 
five percent and Me, Coastal/Riverside Dwellers and Children, with prevalence of seven percent 
each). However, they are varyingly associated with the datasets. Consistent with the higher levels 
of climate knowledge in the subset, five are grounded among PRAGATI Villages which 
accounts for all the prevalence for Children-2 and Coastal/Riverside Dwellers, whereas four 
climate risk groups are grounded in the Laya Villages, which accounts for all the prevalence for 
self-specification (Me). This means the top three perceptual markers of primary climate risk in 
both villages are consistent with the overall data and in the same order.  
While equal risk is the most grounded perception of climate risk in both villages, it is 
significantly higher in PRAGATI Villages where it exceeds three-quarters (19 of 25) of the 
relative prevalence for climate risk in the data for the subset compared to 61.54 percent or eight 
of 13 in Laya Villages. Laya Villages show a significantly higher propensity towards risk 
specificity (46 percent versus 24 percent) and account for the only instance of personalized 
expression of disproportionate climate risk (Me, with a prevalence of three percent overall and 
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eight percent in the Laya dataset). The latter prefigures evidence of a more inward 
looking/communal disposition among PRAGATI Villages, specifically the fact that the 
population across PRAGATI Villages specify twice as many groups as being at disproportionate 
risk to climate impacts (four: Children-2, Coastal/Riverside Dwellers, Farmers-2 and Hillside 
Dwellers) than Laya Villages (two: Farmers-2 and Hillside Dwellers). Comparatively lower 
knowledge gaps may also account for this difference, but scrutiny of the subset and village level 
data shows that context is a significant factor in declarations of primary risk perception.  
PRAGATI Villages 
 
While equal risk is the most grounded perception of climate risk across all PRAGATI 
Villages, no single village in the subset reflect the same order or degree of risk perception. This 
collective risk disposition conflicts with findings by Bord et al. (1998) and McDaniels, Axelrod 
and Slovic (1996) that individuals distance themselves from climate risk such that the threat is 
perceived to be greater for others than themselves. In Itikalakota, equal risk accounts for all the 
prevalence for climate risk, while it accounts for 80 percent (four of five) in Sunaladana, three-
quarters in Palem and a modest 50 percent in Agraharam, the village with the most varied 
climate risk perception categories (three: coastal/riverside dwellers (one); equal risk (two) and 
hillside dwellers (one). The fact that three of the four group-specific identification of climate 
change vulnerability feature in circumscribed localities (Children-2 in Sunaladana, Coastal 
Riverside/Dwellers in Agraharam, Farmer-2 in Palem and Hillside Dwellers in Agraharam) 
underscores the importance of context in structuring climate change perceptions. Agraharam, 
which accounts for the only instances of coastal/riverside dwellers and hillside dwellers in the 
subset, is subject to flooding due to its location by the Godavari River. This proximity to the 
river exacerbates risk for the specified groups in different ways: on one hand, the construction of 
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the Polavaram Dam along the course of the Godavari inundates some fields and coastal homes, 
which renders those in proximity more vulnerable (see excerpt 29); whereas a hillside dweller’s 
distance from the water renders their rainfed agricultural activities and land less productive in 
increasingly long periods of drought (see excerpt 35). 
While there is no overall gendered disparity in climate change risk perception, it is 
important to note that older men in Palem account for all the prevalence for farmers as a 
particularly vulnerable group. This is likely attributable to the intractable nature of their 
agricultural challenges given this cohort disproportionately accounts for observation as a climate 
knowledge acquisition mode among PRAGATI Villages (two-thirds) and crop yield/soil health 
and weather account for the totality of signs they perceive. Similarly, their women, (particularly 
older women (five of nine), account for a higher level of the prevalence for equal risk (eight of 
nine) in the village and for PRAGATI Villages overall (eight of 19). While the data suggests this 
is particularly circumstantial rather than evidence of a more communal feminine disposition or 
ethic of care, it correlates with the fact that the only instance of children being specified as the 
most vulnerable group emerged from the older women cohort in Sunaladana. It is important to 
note that the young men cohort from Palem, which benefited from capability enhancement in a 
focused manner through the intervention and exhibit lower levels of knowledge gaps, account for 
no prevalence for climate risk. This is significant as higher levels of climate knowledge 
ostensibly correlate with recognition of signs and risk identification/specification. The 
implication here is that the nature and scope of the context dependent climate information 
provision mechanism through this resource use and management interventions is limited. 
Laya Villages 
 
The contextual nature of climate risk perception is supported by the dataset for the Laya 
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subset. The village of Pulusumamidi accounts for the entirety of the variation in climate change 
risk perception in Laya Villages. As such, the observations made about the propensity of Laya 
Villages to specify risk are entirely attributable to this village. However, equal risk is still the 
dominant perceptual marker in this context, accounting for half of the prevalence for climate risk 
in the data for the village. The specification of farmers as a disproportionate risk category 
accounts for a third of relative prevalence, which is consistent with crop yield/soil health and 
weather accounting for the totality of the signs and indicators of climate change they perceive 
(seven of seven) and the narrower but maximal agricultural nature of the range of climate actions 
identified by this village (multi-cropping, planting trees and soil enhancement). This suggests a 
particularly acute agricultural challenge in the locality. The specification of hillside dwellers and 
the only instance of personalized declaration of exceptional risk each account for a tenth, both of 
which are associated with location/contextual disadvantages. Nallikota and Munagalapudu only 
show prevalence for equal risk. Overall, there's no significant gendered and age correlation in 
perceptions of climate change risk, which conflicts with palpable evidence of a gender gap in 
environmental risk concern dating back to Kay and Gitlin’s (1949, cited in Davidson and 
Freudenburg, 1996) finding that women “express higher levels of concern about potential 
environmental and technological risks than do men” (p. 302), particularly when issues have local 
manifestations (Brody, 1984; Mohai, 1992). However, the lack of differentiation in these 
collectivist and traditional contexts (in terms of parental status, employment) and disassociation 
with knowledge are likely accountable for the divergence between my observation and those 
drawn from almost entirely Western contexts. 
Evidence of a decisively communal risk disposition and intractable levels of 
internalization of cause underscores these factors as highly important leverage points for 
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improving agency, action and leadership. It strongly reinforces the contention that it is “not 
possible to make progress on defining dangerous climate change, or in developing sustainable 
responses to this global problem, without recognizing the central role played by social or 
individual perceptions of danger” (Dessai et al., 2004, p. 11). Given the import of observation for 
knowledge development, the highly proximal and discernibly existential manifestation of 
impacts in these contexts, it strongly suggests that privileging the internal risk 
disposition/perspective rather than external and scientific perspectives is more important and 
likely more enabling.  
However, this communal disposition must be approached carefully as the internalization 
of risk is associated with specified actions (including faulty acts such as defecation, see excerpt 
36), which, if associated with distinct groups, can further undermine communal harmony in a 
low information context where traditional structures are fissuring (see excerpt 31). It is also 
likely to negatively impact climate agency, which is highly constrained by informational and 
other capability deficits. These observations are of theoretical import. First, this distinctly socio-
cultural elicitation and analysis of risk effectively demarcates a non-psychometric approach that 
paves the way for understanding climate actions and intentions rather than a discursive and 
highly conceptual exercise of rating risks, as is common in discrete psychometric studies, namely 
Kempton (1991) and Lofstedt (1991), examining dimensions of climate change and individual 
perceptions. 
 Secondly, the observation of a primary socio-cultural risk perspective/disposition that 
offers a critical leverage point for enabling effective action and structuring knowledge 
improvement mechanisms attenuates a crucial gap in climate risk communication about the 
communication needs of marginalized communities (Agyeman, Doppelt, Lynn & Hatic, 2007; 
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Vaughn, 1995). Third, the strong collective motive and collective risk disposition suggests 
societal threat (a transcendental disposition) rather than individual perception of threat or loss is 
more operative in these contexts, an observation consonant with sociotropic motives in the 
political science literature rather than risk communication’s assertion of personal threat’s 
primacy in motivating behaviour (Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz, 2008). However, it 
also definitively shows that delving into the socio-cultural to ascertain resonant frames 
associated with risk disposition is insufficient for enabling effective climate action when 
knowledge gaps inaccurately structure cause internally.  
Considering the necessity of substantial agency for effective mobilization of populations 
and the success of climate change interventions (Adger et al., 2008), closer scrutiny of the nature 
of climate change agency in these contexts is paramount, as it offers specific points of action for 
enhancement and/or clarification through message framing, project (re)design and 
implementation.  
Excerpt 35: Socio-cultural changes benefits youth and undermines the traditional and communal order associated with seniority and respect. 
Older Women Focus Group – Agraharam, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: You talk about the rainfall; is there we can do anything about this?  
Respondents: Rainfalls (sic) are slow,  
Interviewer:   Is there anybody most affected by rainfall?  
Respondents: People who are far away from water bodies they affect most.  
Interviewer:   Who leads you guys to teach about climate change?  
Respondents: Who interested, preferably youth. [Cross talk]. If we lead, youth will not listen to us  
Interviewer:  Why youth not listen to you?  
Responders:  Because of age factor they will listen to us, they think that, they are knowledgeable then us, and always drunk they were in state  
                      Even not listen us what we saying to them. 
 
Excerpt 36: Knowledge gaps undermine positive knowledge seeking disposition and accurate multilevel specification of cause and actions 
Young Men Focus Group - Mungalapudi, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: Do you want to learn more about climate change? 
Respondent: Yes 
Interviewer: Who should lead you? 
Respondents: Ourselves [pointing at members of the group].  
Interviewer: Why should you guys lead? 
Respondents: We are here for longer periods, so we can lead. 
Interviewer: Have you ever heard of 1.5 to Stay Alive? 
Respondents: No. 
Interviewer: Have you heard the term COP – Conference of the Parties? 
Respondents:  No. 
Interviewer: Do you think we can do something for climate change?  
Respondents Yes! 
Interviewer:  What do you need to do about climate change? 
Respondents: Stop pollution, ban the plastic and stop open defecation. 
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Climate Change Agency 
 
Table 38: The relative prevalence of forms of climate change agency across study populations in India 
Subset Village Fatalism 
Mixed - 
Agency 
Nature 2 - 
Agency Optimism 
Resource 
Gaps Density 
Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev 
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 4 16% 5 20% 1 4% 7 28% 11 44% 25 
Nallikota 2 22% 0 0% 1 11% 4 44% 3 33% 9 
Munagalapudu 4 27% 4 27% 2 13% 2 13% 8 53% 15 
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 10 45% 1 5% 6 27% 4 18% 13 59% 22 
Itikalakota 6 40% 3 20% 4 27% 0 0% 7 47% 15 
Palem 10 45% 1 5% 6 27% 4 18% 13 59% 22 
Sunaladana 9 33% 3 11% 3 11% 7 26% 14 52% 27 
Totals 47 32% 14 10% 17 12% 27 19% 76 52% 145 
 
The data expressed in Table 38 shows low and highly constrained levels of agency across 
the study populations. In terms of overt articulations of agency, explicit fatalism accounts for a 
significantly greater share of prevalence for markers of agency – approximately a third (32 
percent) compared to less than a fifth for Optimism (19 percent). This distinction is heightened 
by evidence of highly constrained agency. Specifically, resource gaps, which are largely 
associated with fatalism and mixed agency, constitute the most grounded analytical markers of 
climate change agency in both sets of villages. Resource gaps, which accounts for over half of 
the prevalence of all markers of climate agency (76 of 145) in these villages, is entirely 
associated with a lack of climate change knowledge. In most instances some respondents have 
never heard the term climate change and acute levels of incapacitation on crucial measures of 
subsistence.  
Nonetheless, these incapacitations are indicative of constrained agency as they are all 
expressed alongside a strong desire to learn more about the phenomenon, the range of ways it 
does and will impact their lives and how they might respond (see excerpt 19). The implication 
here is that though resource gaps are associated with fatalism, it does not always lead to fatalism: 
it stirs curiosity, as is evident from the calls to learn more and mixed agency (approximately a 
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tenth of relative prevalence overall), which figures at identical levels in both sets of villages (10 
percent for PRAGATI Villages and nine percent for Laya). Beyond an association with 
knowledge gaps, the non-identification of the term climate change is also consistent with 
assertions by the Brazilian indigenous leader Jorge Terena, (cited in Davis and Ebbe, 1995) that 
Western conservation language (sustainable development, traditional knowledge etc.) is not 
readily recognized in indigenous and traditional communities, but as I have established through 
dialogue, the meanings and implications of these constructs are discernible and accorded with 
profound opinion intensity.  
 Nature, which is also associated with fatalism, is the only other statistically significant 
indicator of climate change agency in the Indian case with prevalence of 12 percent. The 
curiosity that marks constrained climate agency in these contexts contrast with Lorenzoni, 
Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh’s (2007) assertion that individual barriers to communicating 
climate change is necessarily associated with the trifecta of a lack of knowledge, lack of desire to 
find out information and a lack of locally and personally relevant and accessible information. 
The data convincingly points to the likelihood that in contexts where subsistence and the 
traditional and communal order are directly and perceptibly threatened by climate impacts, a lack 
of knowledge is readily declared and associated with an overwhelming knowledge seeking 
disposition in all but one instance. In fact, perceptibility of signs and climate risk appear to so 
profoundly structure and spur an impetus to act that, akin to the Fijian case, it overrides or 
precludes climate denialism (undetected), which is conventionally held to be a product of 
knowledge gaps. 
Although both sets of villages are more fatalistic than optimistic, fatalism is significantly 
higher in PRAGATI Villages (36 percent) than Laya Villages (26 percent). This is significant 
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because while Laya Villages are exposed to more explicit climate change information due to 
programme design, PRAGATI Villages show lower overall knowledge gaps and higher premium 
climate knowledge, which one would expect to accord greater or equal levels of agency, where 
access to resources to mobilize agency is equal or comparable. The data suggests that it is the 
strong association of climate change impacts with nature and its perceived impermeability that 
accounts for the higher level of fatalism in PRAGATI Villages, which have experienced less 
explicit ideation. So significant is this factor that PRAGATI Villages account for more than 
three-quarters of the prevalence of Nature as a form of fatalism. The substantial prevalence 
associated with nature, as an explanatory factor for fatalism, particularly in PRAGATI Villages, 
alongside the largely knowledge related resource gaps and high curiosity to learn and do more 
about climate change in these contexts strongly indicates the mutability of the social and 
cognitive barriers to climate action in these contexts. The high likelihood that tailored 
information and technical support can address the expressed nature-oriented fatalism observed in 
these contexts decisively underscores this contention (see excerpt 37). 
Variations in the factors undermining climate agency across villages warrant probing of 
the village subsets that is useful for optimizing agency and enabling effective actions, which is 
addressed in the subsequent section. But, it is noteworthy that religion does not register as an 
explicit or implied factor associated with agency across these study populations, whose lives are 
structured around and by religious ritualism, veneration of deities, vibrant and pious pandugas 
(festivals), sacred narratives and funerary practices. However, there is strong socio-cultural 
evidence that at a performative level, pandugas such as Vittanala Panduga (seed festival) and 
other religious practices can be used to boost agency in these contexts. 
The Adivasis observe a wide array of these performative religious activities throughout 
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the year, many of which are “related to various stages of agricultural operations: land 
preparation, sowing, harvesting consumption as well as well-being of crops, fertility of soil, 
timely rainfall and forest related activities” (Laya, 2005, p. 35). The scale of direct relationship 
between agronomic activities and pandugas is illustrated by Appendix N.1 to N.5. The festivals 
have close bearing with the sustainability of livelihoods in two seemingly conflicting ways that 
are consonant with the dialectics of freedom and control (Papa, Singhal, & Papa, 2006). It drives 
consumption, such that a family spends more than 4,500 Rupees (approximately US$60)—often 
through loans that perpetuate insecurities—in preparation for these festivities in a country where 
more than one-fifth of the population subsists on less in a month (World Bank, 2018). However, 
it also drives production, as sowing/harvesting and marketing are also greatly influenced.  
The community has demonstrated its capacity to manage its resources through the 
preservation of seed varieties, improving soil fertility, water management, etc. to meet these 
socio-cultural needs. However, they have been less successful in doing so to meet routine needs 
amidst climate variability and change that constrains resource productivity patterns. Adapting 
these rituals could aid in addressing routine needs and broader capability enhancement that 
boosts community level climate resilience in these low capacity contexts. This observation 
supports Titilola’s (1994) contention that sustainability, particularly amidst unprecedented 
geologic change that compounds vulnerabilities, is best achieved by according the socio-cultural 
equal, if not greater, importance to physical and biological constraints.  
More broadly, leveraging the direct and operative relationship between agronomic 
activities and pandugas noted above to boost capabilities amidst climate change and variability in 
these indigenous tribal communities foregrounds one of indigenous knowledge systems’ distinct 
advantages relative to Western knowledge: as a holistic and transdisciplinary system, it unifies 
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the religious, spiritual and livelihoods, unlike Western science, which even demarcates firm 
boundaries across aspects of livelihoods (agriculture, forestry, natural resource management, 
human health, among others) (Duhaylungsod, 1994; Reichel, 1994). This also reinforces the 
profound limitations of managing environmental and climatic risk from a purely positivist 
standpoint in an era of post-normal science and impact that were established in the review of 
climate risk disposition. 
PRAGATI Villages 
 
Explicit fatalism is dominant relative to explicit optimism in all PRAGATI Villages, 
ranging from 45.45 percent in Agraharam and 40 percent in Itikalakota to 33 percent in 
Sunaladana and 29 percent in Palem. While Agraharam’s first order rank correlates strongly with 
the relatively higher levels of knowledge gaps in this village, Itikalakota’s second order rank 
with comparable levels of fatalism contradicts its first order rank for premium climate 
knowledge relative to all other villages in this subset. Palem’s rank as the least fatalistic also 
does not comport with its secondary status relative to Itikalakota in terms of lower levels of 
knowledge gaps relative to other markers of knowledge. However, the comparable levels of 
fatalism in both villages suggest that the expected correlation between knowledge and agency is 
not discounted by this observation and that the contextual nature of climate change impact and 
variation in the nature and scope of response mechanisms may account for differences in the 
levels of fatalism observed across localities. This contextual observation is underscored along 
other dimensions based on discrete variations in the nature of agency. 
 Palem, the PRAGATI Village with the lowest level of explicit fatalism is also the only 
village that shows no prevalence for nature as an associated factor, whereas Agraharam, which 
accounts for the highest level of fatalism records the highest level of nature-associated 
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explanatory factors (Agraham and Itikalakota at 27 percent each and 11 percent in Sunaladana). 
Itikalikota is the only village where explicitly positive climate change agency is absent but 
mixed-agency accounts for 20 percent of the level of agency captured in the data (significantly 
higher than the other villages: 13 percent in Palem, 11 percent in Sunaladana and five percent in 
Agraharam). Explicit positive climate change agency is highest in Sunaladana at 26 percent, 18 
percent in Agraharam and 11 percent in Palem. These two observations indicate that perception 
of cause, another contextually influenced measure of climate perception with implications for 
agency, structures climate agency in varying ways. Palem and Sunaladana, which positions the 
cause of climate change to be more highly proximal (localized), show lower levels of explicit 
fatalism than Itikalakota, which singularly accounts for distal factors (international and nature) in 
the subset. Agraharam accounted for no prevalence related to cause and proximity, which 
suggests its fatalism is decidedly attributable to resource gaps, the informational and technical 
elements of which can be addressed to attenuate nature attributional constraints on agency to 
some degree.  
Excerpt 37: Nature-Oriented Fatalism Induced and Constrained by Knowledge and Broader Resource Gaps 
Young Men Focus Group - Itikalakota, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: What do you think is causing climate change? Do you think we can do something about this?  
Respondent 1: We can’t do anything. Water is coming from upstream so if we create artificial ponds it will help during flooding and it helps 
in summer to get water.  
Respondent 1& 2: No. 
Respondent 4: We can’t do anything, water is coming from upstream so if we create artificial ponds it will helps during flooding and it helps 
in summer to get water.  
Respondent 5: No  
Interviewer: Why can’t you do? (Only for Respondents-2, 3,5) 
Respondent 2, 3, 5: We don’t aware of that.  
Interviewer: Do you want to learn more about climate change?  
Respondents: Yes, we are ready to learn. 
 
Laya Villages 
 
While explicit fatalism doubles explicit optimism (36 percent compared to 15 percent) in 
the PRAGATI subset, they are more evenly matched in the Laya subset (26.42 percent compared 
to 24.53 percent, respectively). This correlates with the lower prevalence of nature as an 
explanatory factor for fatalism (7.55 percent or four of 53 vs 14.13 percent or 13 of 92). Since 
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knowledge-related resource gaps and mixed agency are identical in both sets of villages (9.43 
percent in Laya villages and 9.78 percent in PRAGATI Villages), the data is supportive of my 
assertion that nature associations with climate change impact is more likely to predispose people 
towards fatalism than a general lack of knowledge. A more granular look at the data for the 
subset is also supportive of the veracity of my assertion that this may be attenuated by 
information provision and resources.  
While the overall data for Laya Villages reveal that explicit fatalism is marginally more 
prevalent, Munagalapudu is the only village in the subset where explicit fatalism outpaces 
explicit optimism (fatalism 27 percent or four of 15 vs optimism 13.33 percent or two of 15). 
This conforms with the observation that the village has the highest knowledge gaps in the subset, 
accounts for half of the prevalence of nature's prevalence in the Laya data subset (two of four) 
and a quarter of the prevalence of markers of climate change agency for the village (two of 
eight). But, it is also the only village in the subset where an information seeking resource 
disposition dominates the articulation of climate agency (resource gaps 53 percent), which is 
exemplified by excerpt 38.  
Considering the substantial level of constrained optimism observed in both sets of 
villages, alongside a compelling knowledge seeking disposition and curiosity despite 
informational and broader resource gaps, it is credible to conclude that the motive to act is 
substantial and like the dominant collective risk perception, climate motives are largely 
independent of climate knowledge in accordance with findings by Leiserowitz (2003). 
Understanding the nature of this resilient motive to act on climate change amidst both capability 
and resource gaps will clarify another critical climate perception marker that can be used to 
(re)frame messaging and (re)formulate climate action, boost agency and action. 
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Excerpt 38: Climate agency constrained by informational gaps, insufficient technical support, limited and inefficient alternatives 
Older Men Focus Group - Munagalapudu, Laya Subset 
Respondents: The yield is getting lesser, sir. The investment is increasing  
Respondents: One thing sir, we are using these artificial fertilizers, sir. What is happening is that many diseases are also coming. We can’t 
change anything, sir. We have to change ourselves by putting natural manures. It will be good as we are used to this artificial fertilizers  
and pesticides. Plants are getting diseases.  
Interviewer: Yeah. Okay. So, you are having problems with your crop yield and the soil health. Is there any other problem you are having on 
the farm? 
Respondents: What else will we know, sir? That is the issue that we are facing on the farm. If we use the natural manures and pesticides it will 
be useful. Soil has no potency, sir. We are spraying the fertilizers as the plants are taking away the nutrients, the plants are getting new diseases 
and we are spraying new pesticides. It is only there for a while and the fertilizers are only useful for only a crop.       
Interviewer:  So, why is that you keep using the artificial ones? 
Respondents: We are using the things we have; but the fertilizers from outside are looking better, so we are bringing them. [Laughs]. If we 
don’t get anything, we are bringing them from outside.    
Respondent:  People in the village are not willing to work hard here. If we do that it will be better like before. The crops will also be like 
before. We will also be like before. 
Translator: Why are you people using the artificial fertilizers then? 
Respondent: In those days (Not audible) if we bring these fertilizers it will be good... [inaudible]. Millets, corn, sweet potato we used to crop 
without putting fertilizers we used to crop during our days. We used to crop paddy also without any fertilizers, grow and eat them.  
Now for everything they use fertilizers, for egg plant, tomato, inaudible. That is why these problems and also knee joint pains.   
Interviewer: So, the health effects. So, why do you keep using… The question is why do you keep using?   
Respondents: Laughs why as in… [laughs] 
Interviewer: Wait, I want to hear from you. Like, why do you keep using the [artificial] fertilizers? 
Respondents: We feel that if we do not put those fertilizers the crops are not growing. Now it has changed, the climate has changed. We used to 
eat well. Now these guys cannot eat like what we used to eat and work. So, these guys are using fertilizers as they don’t want to work like us.  
Respondents: [Crosstalk] 
Interviewer: Oh, the mechanization. So you think the problems you have on the farm is because of the fertilizers? That’s what you think is the 
main cause for it? 
Respondents: Because of the fertilizers it is getting reduced. The soil has no nutrients. The people are losing their strength.   
Interviewer: Okay. Alright, do you think that is a problem you can fix? 
Respondents:  How can we, sir? 
Respondent:  No, sir. Instead of spraying pesticides on one part which is affected by the insects, they are spraying on all the field. [Laughs]. So 
the plants are dying. [Crosstalk] 
Interviewer: Okay, so who is giving you the artificial fertilizers? Where do you get them?   
Respondents:  We buy them, sir. 
Interviewer: The buy? This is why…. (Someone enters probably) sorry.  Hmmm, so yeah, so when Laya comes to talk to you and gives you 
seeds do they tell you anything about artificial fertilizers and natural fertilizers or they just give you the seeds?  
Respondents: They tell us to stop using the fertilizers and use the natural manures and protect the seeds which Laya gives us. Because this will 
help reduce your costs for farming. Millets, corn… Stop using these fertilizers is what they tell.   
Interviewer: Yeah. But, when do they come do they ever explain the link between what is happening, the problems happening in your farm and 
climate change, do they do they tell you anything about climate change? 
Respondents: No, sir. No. 
 
Motive for Action 
 
Table 39: The relative prevalence of Intrinsic and extrinsic factors that motives climate action across study populations in India 
Subset Village 
Children Community/ Village Self/Offspring’s Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 0 0% 2 100% 0 0% 2 
Nallikota 0 0% 2 100% 0 0% 2 
Munagalapudu 0 0% 1 50% 1 50% 2 
PRAGA
TI 
Agraharam 1 20% 4 80% 0 0% 5 
Itikalakota 0 0% 3 100% 0 0% 3 
Palem 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Sunaladana 0 0% 2 100% 0 0% 2 
Totals 1 6% 14 88% 1 6% 16 
 
Per Table 39, three codes indicative of motive for action on climate change are grounded 
in the overall data (Community/Village (14 of 16) and children and self/offspring (one of 16 
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each). Community/Village, which is the most grounded unit associated with the motive for acting 
on climate change is also the most grounded factor in each set of villages (90 percent for 
PRAGATI Villages and 83 percent for Laya Villages). The other two factors that register 
statistically occur in singular instances in different villages (children - one of 10 in the 
PRAGATI subset and Self/Offspring one of six in the Laya subset), which means each subset 
only registers two of the three active codes in the overall dataset. Considering the expansive 
nature of the reference to children, this means the communal indicator accounts for the totality of 
motive in the PRAGATI subset. This maximally communal orientation is consistent with the 
higher relative prevalence for equal risk perception in PRAGATI subset. This overall communal 
motive further underscores my observation that without due care, addressing the knowledge 
deficit accrued internalization of risk could undermine communal harmony, if the specified 
actions are linked to particular groups and areas in these generally small and cohesive contexts. 
This is especially problematic where the internalized specification of cause is faulty and people 
specific, such as open defecation (see excerpt 36). Motive’s largely independent functioning 
relative to climate knowledge also reinforce the added need for due care in leveraging these areas 
to boost agency and effective climate action. At a broader level, the data shows a degree of 
village and cohort-level specificity in the articulation of motive to act on climate change that 
strongly correlates with knowledge levels, which suggests that motive is largely, but not entirely 
independent of knowledge as Leiserowitz (2003) established. Probing the village subsets lays 
this bare. 
PRAGATI Villages 
Community/Village accounts for 90 percent of the prevalence for motive for action in the 
PRAGATI subset. It is the only factor accounting for prevalence in Sunaladana (two of two) and 
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Itikalakota (three of three). It accounts for 80 percent of prevalence in Agraharam where 
Children, the only other code with any prevalence in the subset is active (one in 10). 
Interestingly, there is no discernible prevalence for motive for action in Palem, but the 
decisiveness of the disposition across the subsets and the village’s high perception of risk as 
being equal means it is credible to conclude they also hold a communal motive. It also suggests 
there is no correlation between knowledge levels and expression of motive as Palem, particularly 
its young men who have been afforded specific attention, have relatively high knowledge levels 
and the second lowest knowledge gap in the subset. Furthermore, the village with the highest 
level of relative knowledge gaps, Agraharam, articulates a wider range of motives 
(community/village and children). This divergence between climate knowledge and ability to 
express motive comports with the general knowledge-seeking disposition that underpins 
articulations of resource gaps that constrains agency. The implication is that the willingness to 
act on climate change (motive) is independent of knowledge, but its mobilization (agency) is 
constrained by resource gaps, specifically informational and technical capabilities (see excerpt 
38).  
The overall communal disposition of this subset is consistent with the emerging trend of a 
more communal turn in PRAGATI Villages overall, which also strongly correlates with their 
overall tendency to look more inwardly for climate change leadership (as detailed in the 
subsequent section, also see excerpt 39) notwithstanding high levels of knowledge gaps. 
However, explicit motive for action is only evident from circumscribed populations even at the 
village level and singular age and gender populations in circumscribed localities account for the 
totality of prevalence for their peers as a whole in the overall dataset. Specifically, young women 
from Agraharam, who account for 44 percent of the prevalence for community/village for the 
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entire subset and 80 percent of the prevalence for motive for action for the village overall, are the 
only young women who account for any prevalence in the overall dataset. Older women and 
older men from Sunaladana, who equally account for the totality of prevalence for motive of 
action in their village (one of two each for Community/village), are the only older men and 
women who account for any prevalence in the overall dataset.  
Young men, who account for a third of the prevalence for community/village overall 
(entirely from Itikalakota), are the only cohort to account for prevalence in more than one 
circumscribed locality because young men from Agraharam account for the single instance of 
prevalence for Children as a motive for action in the overall dataset. This means there's a clear 
correlation between youth in the circumscribed localities noted and the ability to express motive 
for acting on climate change (young men and women - eight of 10) versus older men and women 
- two). While there is no age or gendered correlation between premium climate knowledge and 
age and gender, these observations reinforce my contention that articulation of motive is not 
dependent on knowledge levels, as men and women articulate motive at the same rate (50 
percent each in terms of prevalence) despite evidence of a clear gendered imbalance in 
knowledge gaps that favour men, especially older men. 
Excerpt 39: Knowledge gaps constrains climate agency even among the relatively knowledgeable who are designated leaders, demonstrate 
positive knowledge mobilization, risk specification and a communal motive 
Young Men Focus Group - Agraharam, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer:  How is climate change affecting the village? You started telling rain is any other way affecting village?    
Responders: No more changes except level of water. [Cross talk] When Godavari overflowed we lost all our houses and furniture.  
Interviewer: Is there any other way other than overflow of river affecting the village by climate change?  
Respondents: During floods transportation is problem, we can’t get food from outside. 
Interviewer: Is there anything happening on farm? Did you face any problems?  
Respondents: It depends up on soil fertility, if soil fertility is less that farm can be use for one time only. Flowering will stop and destroy. 
Unripe fruits fall down, pest infections  
Interviewer: Do you think, can you do anything about this problem?  
Respondents: We are trying stop by spraying different pesticides.  
Interviewer: Is there anybody most affected by this?  
Respondents: Flooding takes place low-lying areas, flood not takes place in sandy farms of village. 
Interviewer: Do you have own farms?   
Respondents: Yes, I have own farm.  
Interviewer: Is that your farm nearer to river or not?  
Respondent: Yes, my farm is nearer to river. 
Interviewer: Do you think you’re most affected?  
Respondent: Yes.  
Interviewer: Do you think we can do anything about climate change?  
Respondents: Even if we want to do, we can’t do anything, because changes take place in weather. We can’t do anything.  
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Interviewer: Would you like to learn more about climate change?  
Respondent 1: Yes, we want to know but we don’t have anybody to teach us.  
Interviewer: Why do you want to learn more?  
Respondents 1, 2, 4, & 5: If we learn we will benefit.  
Respondent 3: For agriculture. 
Respondent 6: To learn about pests and pest infections. 
Interviewer: Who should lead you to learn more about climate change? 
Respondents: Elders ask us to learn and do  
Interviewer: The elders asked young women or men? 
Respondents: Both men and woman.  
Interviewer: Why elders telling you to learn? 
Respondents: Our life period is short compare with you. If you learn you can teach to next generation.  
Interviewer: Do you feel ready learn?  
Respondents: Yes. 
 
Laya Villages 
 
The data from the Laya subset supports these observations at both village and cohort 
levels. As established, the explicit communal motive accounts for 83 percent of prevalence for 
motive for action in this subset. In fact, it accounts for the totality of prevalence for motive in all 
villages, except Munagalapudu which has the highest knowledge gap in the subset. 
Self/offspring, which is a personalized articulation of motive, is the only other code active in the 
dataset and registers in a single instance that accounts for half of overall prevalence for motive of 
action in the village (one of two each). However, this personalization of motive is associated 
with a collective generational purview of risk and where climate leadership ought to be reposed, 
specifically the fact that by virtue of being young, the respondent and his peers will be directly 
subjected to the projected climate impacts in their village (See excerpt 36). 
Akin to the observations in the PRAGATI subset, explicit motive for action is only 
evident for circumscribed populations even at the village level and singular age and gender 
populations in some circumscribed localities account for the totality of prevalence for their peers 
in the overall dataset. Specifically, young men in Munagalapudu, who account for the totality of 
prevalence for motive for action in their village (as described above) are the only set of young 
men in this subset to register prevalence overall. Similarly, older men in Polusumadi, who 
account for a half of the prevalence for motive for action in their village alongside older women 
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(one of two each), are the only set of older men in the overall Laya subset to show prevalence for 
the theme. Older women from Nallikota, who account for the totality of prevalence in their 
village (two of two) and their peers in Pulusumadi (one) account for the totality of prevalence for 
motive for action associated with older women (three of three). This means there is a clear 
correlation between older women in these circumscribed localities and the ability to express 
motive for acting on climate change. Specifically, older women from these two villages account 
for a half of the prevalence for motive for action in the Laya dataset, matching the overall 
prevalence attributable to men overall (older men - one of six and younger men - two of six). 
While no clear overall gendered conclusion can be drawn, it is significant as young women 
registered no prevalence on this measure. 
Except for older men from Pulusumamidi, no cohort’s relative distinction for articulating 
motive comports with high knowledge levels. In fact, the data for the overall subset, as detailed 
earlier, show women overall as having higher levels of knowledge gaps, with no notable 
exception for older women in Nallikota and Pullusumadi. Even more compelling, young men, 
the sole cohort in this subset for whom premium climate knowledge (a posteriori) accounts for a 
clear majority of their climate knowledge markers, articulated no clear motive. 
This substantial support for the general independence of motive from climate knowledge, 
alongside compelling levels of a common motive (communal) amidst high levels of fatalism but 
even higher levels of constrained agency, is indicative of the mutability of some consequential 
socio-cultural limits to climate action in low capacity contexts. This is supported by the fact that 
the ostensibly dominant marker of agency in terms of relative prevalence (resource gaps or 
constrained agency) can be tapped through capability enhancement informationally and 
technically, even where it is underpinned by the seemingly impermeable (nature-oriented 
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fatalism). As contended earlier, the latter is mutable because it is articulated with information 
deficits rather than the fixity that underpins a biospheric or transcendental disposition. These are 
significant insights for optimizing climate agency and mobilization for efficacious action to the 
extent that there is more clarity about the core mitigating factors (resource gaps of both an 
informational and technical nature), perceptual valence(s) and motive (both of which are 
communal). Theoretically, these insights specify social limits to climate adaptation, their levels 
of mutability and pathways for leveraging them, which builds upon conceptual propositions of 
socio-cultural limits (Adger et al., 2008; Moser, 2010). Accordingly, the next section probes the 
data to identify the study population’s disposition towards climate leadership. 
Leadership 
 
Table 40: The relative prevalence of preferred sources of climate leadership across study populations in India 
Subset Village 
Community/ 
Village Elders 
Exemplary 
Females 
Exemplary 
Men 
Exemplary 
Person External Youth Density 
Prev Rate Prev  Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 2 10% 0 0% 0 0 0 0%   0% 16 76% 3 14% 21 
Nallikota 2 40% 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 1 20% 1 20% 1 20% 5 
Munagalapudu 1 10% 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 2 20% 4 40% 3 30% 10 
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 4 27% 4 27% 0 0 0 0% 5 33% 0 0% 2 13% 15 
Itikalakota 3 38% 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 3 38% 0 0% 2 25% 8 
Palem 0 0% 0 0% 1 0.063 2 13% 9 56% 0 0% 4 25% 16 
Sunaladana 2 20% 0 0% 1 0.1 0 0% 7 70% 0 0% 0 0% 10 
Totals 14 16% 4 5% 2 0.024 2 2% 27 32% 21 25% 15 18% 85 
 
Seven markers of climate change leadership are evident in the overall dataset (see Table 
40). The markers are community/village, elders, exemplary females, exemplary men, exemplary 
person, external, and youth. Traditional structures, family and self, show no prevalence in the 
dataset. The ideational deficit, which is also evident from the high knowledge related resource 
gap in the study population functions as an explanatory factor for the absence of self and family 
as climate change leaders. The absence of traditional structures as a focal point for climate 
change leadership is due to the fact that there is no formal communal or village level 
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organizational structure, family or individual in whom customary authority is reposed. So unlike 
Fiji, where there is a chief or in Belizean Mayan communities where there is an Alcalde, whose 
roles are both customarily and legally regarded, traditional and indigenous structures are more 
diffused. This is a significant contributory factor for community/village only featuring as the 
fourth most grounded source to which the villages look for climate change leadership (16 
percent). However, the intractable resource gaps appear to be a more significant factor given the 
high communal disposition in terms of risk perception and motive (see excerpt 40). 
Excerpt 40: Resource gaps and the scale of challenges undermines confidence in the traditional and communal order for climate leadership. 
Older Women Focus Group -  Pulusumamidi, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: Oh, you don’t know if they will listen or not. Oh okay okay. (Crosstalk)  
Respondent 2: But previously they gave us plants and did other works and told us how the situation about the Girijan Rythus(Tribal Farmers). 
They said that we don’t know anything and took videos of other tribal communities and showed them to us.  
Respondent 1 & 2: Previously 
Interviewer:  Aha. Doing what? 
Respondents 1: You tribal people are facing these issues and they showed us Videos related to that. Issues like tilling, hill region problems, 
agriculture they took videos on tribals and showed them to us. 
Respondent 2 & 3:  They showed us those videos 
Interviewer: Oh. So, there is a lot of ancestral…. things… like… okay. Umm… You said that you want to know more about climate change. 
Who should lead you to get you to know more?  
Respondent 1: It will be good if some outsider teaches us about these things 
Respondent 2: From us, no one will go anywhere. Even if we teach other people, they will not listen to us. [Crosstalk] You should come and 
teach us. Or else. No one will listen to us.  
Respondent 1: Even you people saw this. When you called people to come and discuss about issues, people did not come. Why will the 
people come later? 
Respondent 2: Just because we want to know, we came. 
Respondent 3: If the people should listen they will come. 
Respondent 2: But, generally the people will not listen to us.  
Interviewer: Oh, so you will listen to people from outside?  
Respondents 2 & 3: You people should only help. 
Respondent 2: You should be there, but we also should be there. We should lead from the front and you can support us from behind. Right? 
Interviewer: Who should lead? So, the whole village she is saying? I need specifics, who, who?  
Respondents: Who as in, all of us. Even though we are young, our hair greyed up and we are looking old. Small or young, all are of same age 
and should go together 
 
Consistent with the high level of knowledge and technical capacity resource gaps at 
population levels that undermine climate change agency (optimism) in these contexts, the data 
strongly suggests that these resource gaps also undermine the mobilization of communal agency. 
This is particularly evident in the diminished level of confidence with which climate leadership 
is reposed communally or along traditional lines that privilege seniority. This observation further 
underscores my contention that without careful management of the faulty internalization of cause 
in these traditionally collective contexts, issue specific and contextual climate information 
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provision mechanisms can undermine communal harmony, which is primarily structured around 
traditional age and gender patterns in these socio-economically and politically homogenous  (all 
the same caste) contexts. Specifically, the overall data indicates that exemplary persons (27 of 
85), external (21 of 85) and youth (15 of 85) are the three main sources of climate change 
leadership preferred. This is highly significant for the decisiveness with which resource gaps 
(knowledge, technical capacity and monetary resources) shift confidence from the traditional and 
communal disposition. All three specified categories, which account for approximately three-
quarters of all prevalence for preferred avenues of climate leadership, are comprised of persons 
believed to have a higher level of education overall (usually a grade or two, ability to affix a 
signature and/or basic literacy), greater understanding of climate change, or are deemed more 
capable of learning sufficiently to teach others. This is underscored by self-identification as ideal 
climate leaders due to self-assessed knowledge advantages and declaration of a greater stake 
among youth, particularly young men who have been afforded issue-specific informational and 
technical training, underscores this observation (see excerpts 36 and 43). 
This observation is reinforced by distinctions between the village subsets that strongly 
correlate with levels of resource gaps as well as the overall diminished communal purview 
relative to tradition, risk perception and motive in both contexts. It gives profound credence to 
Korma’s (1995, cited in Kohler-Rollefson, 1996) contention that “book knowledge and 
schooling undermine the appreciation of practical indigenous knowledge” (p. 11) and structures. 
It also suggests that while indigenous knowledge can enable environmental management, per the 
high levels of credibility established for experiential knowledge and observational acquisition of 
climate knowledge and the effective mobilization of resources for festivals even in times of 
scarcity, it is no panacea amidst unprecedented geologic change (Dutse et al., 2015) and its 
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utility may have been exceeded (Adugna, 1996; Argawal, 1996; Zwahlen, 1996). While both sets 
of villages repose similar levels of confidence in youth as climate leaders (19 percent in Laya 
Villages versus 16 percent in PRAGATI Villages), Laya Villages, which exhibit a greater level 
of resource gaps (46 percent versus 44 percent in PRAGATI villages, relative to other markers of 
agency), account for all preferences for external leadership in the data.  
The comparable levels of resource gaps across the subsets are so operative that 
PRAGATI villages, which are more collective, based on their maximally communal motive and 
relatively higher perception of shared risk, also primarily repose climate leadership confidence 
outside of collective or communal structures. While the overall higher communal disposition in 
this context precludes explicit specification of external leadership (no prevalence) amidst 
intractable resource gaps, these collective localities account for the near totality of discrete or 
specified leadership based on knowledge and technical capacity advantages. Specifically, they 
privilege climate leadership from exemplary persons (in general and gendered) from any locality 
(60 percent relative prevalence for the subset and the near totality for the overall dataset, 90 
percent) and groups marked by knowledge and capacity advantages (youth - 16 percent).  
While groups and exemplary individuals marked by knowledge and technical capacity 
advantages account for more than three-quarters (76 percent) of preferred sources of climate 
leadership in PRAGATI Villages, the nature of the greater variation in their climate change 
leadership preferences also underscores their relatively higher communal or inward-looking 
disposition. In addition to its tendency to specify exemplary leadership from any source rather 
than decidedly externalizing preference in any instance, specific reference to community/village 
is relatively higher (18 percent compared to 14 percent in Laya villages) and it is the only subset 
where a marker of traditional leadership (age) is accorded confidence for climate leadership. 
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Specifically, elders account for nearly a tenth (four of 49) of the subset’s relative preference for 
climate leadership and the entirety in the overall dataset. The subset also accounts for the only 
instances of gendered specification of leadership (exemplary females and exemplary men each 
with two percent prevalence). These observations are associated with discrete domestic and 
socio-cultural experiences as all instances were proffered by elderly women in discrete locations 
(older women in Palem account for both references to exemplary men; older women in 
Sunaladana and Itikalakota account for one of each reference to exemplary women), who 
varyingly cite men's penchant for drinking and overall perceived irresponsibility, women's 
preoccupation with a range of manual work and men's direct involvement with cultivation as 
explanatory factors (see excerpt 41).  
 
Excerpt 41: Barriers to accessing available climate information, knowledge gaps, and fissures in the social order undermines confidence in 
traditional and communal structures 
Older Women Focus Group Sunaladana, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer:  Would you like to learn more about climate change? 
Respondents: Yes, but we can’t go because of daily agricultural works in our fields. 
Interviewer:  Who do you think should lead your village to learn more about climate change? 
Respondent 1: Educated persons.  
Respondent 2: Educated ladies.   
Respondent 3: Interested persons.  
Respondent 4: Educated persons.  
Interviewer: Why educated ladies? 
Respondent 2: Men are drinkers, so they don’t have interest.  
 
The unconditional interpellation of elders is entirely associated with the village of 
Agraharam, specifically young women who account for three-quarters of the leadership marker’s 
prevalence, alongside their male elders who account for the remainder. This is highly 
illuminating. Although confined to Agraharam in the Palem subset, for which the data does not 
show any discernible association with observation or experiential knowledge as a primary 
knowledge form or initial climate knowledge acquisition source, it emerges in a manner 
consistent with the prevalence and consequential nature of observation as a form of climate 
change knowledge among older folks, particularly older men, and its distinctly higher import for 
young women relative to older women (23 percent compared to 15 percent - see review of 
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knowledge). Specifically, the young women of Agraharam who solely reposed confidence in 
their elders as climate leaders also cite stories/tales from their elders. So, rather than a gendered 
indicator of a more feminine communal disposition or ethic of care, it is more strongly 
suggestive of a route for knowledge transfer towards young women, who are typically at a 
gendered disadvantage, where youth-centric engagement efforts are present in a locality and 
socio-cultural change accrues educational opportunities for youth (young men account for all 
references to school, per analysis of knowledge acquisition sources). 
PRAGATI Villages 
 
Notwithstanding overall consistency in the data, there are discrete village and cohort 
level observations that reinforce my observation that resource gaps, particularly knowledge and 
technical capacity, can undermine the mobilization of communal agency where issue specific 
and contextual climate information provision mechanisms of a limited scope inadvertently 
reinforce the faulty internalization of cause attribution in low capacity communal contexts. As 
contended, this in turn magnifies the incapacitation of traditional structures and frays communal 
confidence and harmony. For instance, PRAGATI Villages show very similar levels of 
preferences for climate change leadership with the three leading preferences being exemplary 
person (49 percent), community/village (18 percent) and youth (16 percent). However, Palem 
and Sunaladana are distinct as there is no prevalence associated with confidence in 
community/village for climate leadership in Palem and none in youth in Sunaladana. Both 
Villages also record the highest level of preference for exemplary persons, including gendered 
specifications) irrespective of age or origin (three-quarters in Palem and 80 percent in 
Sunaladana), as well as the same level of premium climate knowledge relative to other 
knowledge markers (50 percent each).  
 312 
 
With respect to Palem, both the resource gap and information provision modality are 
interpellated. The village’s maximal deferment of confidence in both the communal and 
traditional structures correlates with clear evidence of focused information provision and 
technical capacity enhancement in an issue specific manner in the locality, even among young 
men, which exceeds that which is discernible in other villages in this subset and the highest level 
of relative prevalence for resource gaps in the overall PRAGATI subset (57 percent). Though the 
locality’s young women account for no discernible preference for climate leadership, which is 
consistent with their marginalization in related engagements, it is reasonable to conclude that 
they share the general leadership disposition observed in the village because of similarities in 
constrained agency (resource gaps accounts for 60 percent for young women and 50 percent for 
young men). So, cross cohort (age and gender) commonality in this locality underscores the 
durability of the population level disposition towards resource deficient traditional and 
communal structures (informational, technical, monetary, etc.) that underscores the maximalist 
shift in confidence from all collective internal sources.  
Similarly, the distinction observed in the Sunaladana dataset supports the assertion of a 
link between resource gaps and fissures in confidence in communal and traditional structures. 
Comparable levels of prevalence for resource gaps (51 percent), which constrains agency, 
alongside the second highest level of knowledge gaps in the subset (36 percent) accounts for the 
absence of youth and marginal (second lowest in the subset) support for communal leadership 
(20 percent) in Sunaladana. The absence of evidence of organized youth structures or specific 
engagement in this locality also comports with its absence from the dataset. 
Agraharam is distinct as the only village in the subset where confidence in the communal 
and traditional order account for the majority of leadership preference (53 percent). As observed 
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earlier, Agraharam accounts for all prevalence evident for elders, which is primarily associated 
with young women (three-quarters), who as established earlier, cite stories/tales from their elders 
which correlate with a likely pattern of climate change knowledge acquisition for this cohort in 
the absence of direct engagement. Other than this outlier, the prevalence of resource advantaged 
non-communal and non-traditional leaders (exemplary person and youth at seven) is almost 
twice that of the communal (four). However, even in this context where the communal and 
traditional order retains confidence, the resource gaps, particularly knowledge and broader 
fissures in the traditional order profoundly undermine confidence as detailed by older women of 
Agraharam (see excerpt 42). 
Excerpt 42: Fissures in the social order, knowledge gaps and broader capability constraints undermines confidence in the traditional and 
communal order 
Older Women Focus Group - Agraharam, PRAGATI Subset 
Interviewer: You talk about the rainfall, is there we can do anything about this?  
Respondents: Rainfalls are slow,  
Interviewer: Is there anybody most affected by rainfall?  
Respondents: People who are far away from water bodies they affect most.  
Interviewer: Who [should] lead you guys to deal with climate change, to teach about climate change?  
Respondents: Who interested, preferably youth. [Cross talk] If we lead youth will not listen to us.  
Interviewer: Why [would the] youth not listen to you?  
Responders: Because of age factor they will not listen to us. They think that, they are [more] knowledgeable than us, and always drunk. They  
were in state… even not listen us what we saying to them. 
 
Though youth feature as a significant source of leadership in the dataset for PRAGATI 
Villages across three of the four villages (a quarter of the prevalence for both Palem and 
Itikalakota and 13 percent in the more seniority-oriented village of Agraharam which accounts 
for all references to the elderly), varying segments of the study population (age and gender) hold 
this view. The variation is in large part due to the socio-cultural changes underway that accords 
educational and issue specific capability enhancement to young people, but primarily young 
men. Overall, older folks (five of eight), particularly older men (four of eight) are more likely to 
cite the youth as a repository of potential climate change leadership. At the other end of the 
spectrum, young women reveal no preference for youth as a potential repository of climate 
change leadership, unlike their male peers for whom its mention is strongly associated. It is 
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young men (two in Itikalakota and one in Agraharam) who account for the remainder of the 
unit's prevalence. This gendered distinction among young people in discrete localities is 
consistent with the observation of training and educational advantages being variably provided to 
and readily accessed by some young men. The emergence of the youth category across localities 
and by non-youth cohorts also highlights the fact that these young men (and potentially young 
women) represent a significant potential local population to tap as climate leaders and 
champions.  
Laya Villages 
 
The data associated with the Laya subset also supports the assertion of a link between 
resource gaps of various sorts and fissures in confidence in communal and traditional structures. 
Overall, four analytical units denoting climate change preferences have prevalence in the Laya 
villages: external - 21 of 36, youth - seven of 36, community/village - five of 36 and exemplary 
person three of 36, the most palpable of which is the majoritarian preference for external 
leadership (58 percent compared to none in PRAGATI Villages). The decisive preference for 
external leadership in this subset is consistent with its substantially weaker communal 
disposition, specifically a lower communal motive and an inclination for risk specification 
including personalization, alongside relatively higher knowledge gaps but greater explicit 
optimism. 
While there is overwhelming explicit preference for external leadership in Laya Villages, 
it varies widely, such that it only accounts for a clear majority of preference in Pulusumamidi (76 
percent, 40 percent in Munagalapudu and 20 percent in Nallikota), all instances conform with the 
observation of fraying confidence in the traditional and communal social order in a manner 
directly related to capabilities amidst considerable climate impacts. Pulusumamidi, where the 
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preference for external leadership is most entrenched, also accounts for the entirety of risk 
specification in the subset and the totality of personalization in the overall dataset. This low 
communal outlook and confidence correlates with the villages’ intractable level of knowledge 
gaps (one percent less than Munagalapudu, where it is lowest) and a similarly distinct level of 
broader resource gaps that undermine agency.  
While Munagalapudu, the only village to outstrip Pulusumamidi in terms of knowledge 
gaps and resource constraints in this subset, is substantially less disposed to seek external climate 
leadership, the external sources accounts for a plurality of relative preference for climate 
leadership (40 percent) and the vast majority of its preferences (90 percent) is associated with 
non-communal and non-traditional groups and individuals noted for their enhanced capabilities 
(youth and exemplary individuals of any gender and from any source). The higher resource gaps 
observed in Munagalapudu (53 percent) relative to Pulusumamidi (44 percent) is likely to have 
had a lower impact due to the perception of cause. Specifically, the data suggests that 
Munagalapudu, which accounts for all prevalence for attribution of climate change cause in the 
Laya subset, attributes cause and proximity more equitably between the village and the outside 
world. In fact, unlike PRAGATI villages which the data suggests internalize/localize cause 
attribution at the village level, Munagalapudu localizes (village and nation) but shifts 
responsibility away from the village (nation and international). This significant perceptual 
valence is likely to structure the confidence with which the village reposes confidence for 
climate leadership. This comports with the complete absence of explicit preference for external 
leadership in the PRAGATI subset which internalizes cause but privileges capable groups and 
individuals in accordance with its comparably higher and maximal collectivity. 
Though explicit preference for climate leadership in Nallikota at the communal level 
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accounts for a plurality of relative preference, groups associated with enhanced capability also 
account for the majority (60 percent) of its preference (youth, external, exemplary persons). The 
fact that explicit preference for communal/village leadership is twice that of explicit external 
preference comports with the village’s maximal communal disposition in terms of risk 
perception and motive, the combination of which is unique in this subset. 
As observed with PRAGATI Villages, youth are deemed a potential repository of climate 
change leadership and at a higher but compellingly similar level (19 percent in Laya Villages 
compared to 16 percent in PRAGATI Villages). This finding is consistent with Al-Hassan et al.’s 
(2013) recommendations based on his study of indigenous agronomic climate strategies in 
Northern Ghana. However, young men feature more prominently as the subset who proffer this 
preference (71 percent in Laya subset versus 38 percent in PRAGATI Villages) and young 
women who accounted for zero in the PRAGATI subset account for nearly one-third in the Laya 
subset (29 percent). Notably, the young women of Munagalapudu who account for the entirety of 
the preference for youth among young women, specifically cite capabilities, “educated youth… 
from the village will be better,” which comport both with the relatively higher tendency to 
localize leadership amidst the most intractable resource gaps observed in the subset and a lower 
tendency to localize cause and responsibility. 
Excerpt 43: Self-identification as ideal climate leaders due to self-assessed knowledge advantages exemplifies shifts in the traditional order 
Young Men Focus Group - Pulusumamidi, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: Do you think anybody in the village is more affected by climate change than anybody else? 
Respondents: No. 
Respondent 2: No, all of us face the same issues. 
Interviewer: Oh, okay. Great. Is climate change something we can do anything about? 
Respondent 1: We can’t do anything about it. 
Respondent 2: When the person in front is telling, sir, we will try to follow. But we can’t. 
Interviewer: Yeah, so you’d like to learn more about climate change? 
Respondents: Yes. 
Interviewer: Who do you think should help to lead, who in the village should lead on, or in general should lead on getting you to learn more 
about climate change? 
Respondents: Youth. 
Interviewer: The youth should? Why should the youth do it? 
Respondents 1: Because the elders did not study much and we studied something at least, we will learn and teach them. 
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Angst: Complex Challenges 
Table 41: The relative prevalence of the range of ranked and unranked complex concerns across study populations in India 
Subset Village Ageing CC Impact 
CC Impact - 
1 Drainage Education Electricity 
Fevers and 
Diseases Density  
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 1 3%   0% 5 14%   0% 5 14% 1 3%   0% 37  
Nallikota 0 0%   0% 1 9%   0%   0%   0%   0% 11  
Munagalapudu 1 7%   0%   0%   0% 1 7%   0%   0% 15  
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 4 10%   0% 1 3%   0%   0%   0% 4 10% 40  
Itikalakota 0 0% 1 2% 7 16%   0%   0%   0%   0% 43  
Palem 0 0%   0% 12 19%   0% 1 2% 5 8% 3 5% 63  
Sunaladana 0 0%   0% 4 15% 1 4% 2 8%   0% 3 12% 26  
Totals 6 3% 1 0% 30 13% 1 0% 9 4% 6 3% 10 4% 237  
 
 
 
Subset Village Flooding 
Food 
Security 
Health 
Centre Housing - 1 Land 
Local 
Institutions 
Market Access 
Density  
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 37  
Nallikota 0 0% 1 9% 1 9% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 11  
Munagalapudu 0 0% 1 7% 2 13% 0 0% 0 0% 1 7% 0 0% 15  
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 5 13% 2 5% 2 5% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 40  
Itikalakota 11 26% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 2 5% 0 0% 0 0% 43  
Palem 0 0% 4 6% 3 5% 1 2% 3 5% 4 6% 0 0% 63  
Sunaladana 1 4% 0 0% 2 8% 0 0% 1 4% 0 0% 0 0% 26  
Totals 17 7% 10 4% 10 4% 1 0% 7 3% 5 2% 2 1% 237  
 
 
 
  
Subset Village 
Money 
Lenders 
Over 
Population Road Sanitation 
Storage 
Facility Streetlights Transport Density  
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 3 8% 0 0% 9 24% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 37  
Nallikota 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 9% 11  
Munagalapudu 0 0% 0 0% 3 20% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 13% 15  
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 1 3% 0 0% 5 13% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 5 13% 40  
Itikalakota 1 2% 1 2% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 43  
Palem 1 2% 0 0% 3 5% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 3 5% 63  
Sunaladana 0 0% 0 0% 3 12% 0 0% 0 0% 2 8% 0 0% 26  
Totals 6 3% 1 0% 24 10% 1 0% 1 0% 2 1% 12 5% 237  
 
  
  
Subset Village 
Undeclared - 
1 
Village 
Issues - 1 
Water 
Scarcity 
Water 
Scarcity - 1 
WIld 
Animals Work Density    
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate    
Laya 
Pulusumamidi 0 0% 0 0% 9 24% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 37    
Nallikota 0 0% 1 9% 5 45% 1 9% 0 0% 0 0% 11    
Munagalapudu 0 0% 1 7% 2 13% 0 0% 0 0% 1 7% 15    
PRAG
ATI 
Agraharam 0 0% 0 0% 9 23% 0 0% 0 0% 2 5% 40    
Itikalakota 0 0% 4 9% 5 12% 0 0% 0 0% 9 21% 43    
Palem 1 2% 0 0% 9 14% 0 0% 3 5% 6 10% 63    
Sunaladana 0 0% 1 4% 6 23% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 26    
Totals 1 0% 7 3% 45 19% 1 0% 3 1% 18 8% 237    
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The highly consequential implications of climate resource gaps of a technical, monetary, 
informational and logistical nature in these low capacity resource-dependent localities, where 
climate change impacts are perceptually and functionally noted for undermining subsistence, 
climate agency and the traditional and communal disposition, are compounded by profound 
levels of complex and interlinked challenges (angsts) that are varyingly associated with climate 
impacts. On one hand, there are socio-political and economic challenges (such as exploitative 
and predatory money lending that entraps the vulnerable who mortgage possessions and even 
themselves through bondage systems in a bid to secure temporary support for subsistence and/or 
fund definitive rites of passage (marriage, religious festivals, etc.) that are independent of climate 
variability, but disrupt even moderate coping responses to extract profit) that undermine already 
low information provision and exacerbates knowledge gaps (see excerpt 44). Such factors 
highlight the deeply political nature of climate adaptation activities (Moser, 2010; Pelling, 2011) 
and underscore my theoretical design that privileges a multi-perspectival and systemic approach 
to adaptation responses that transcends scientific and technical considerations in favour of a 
social change agenda. Moreover, there are also discernible difficulties in substantial segments of 
the study population to recognize how their wide-ranging complex and interlinked challenges are 
connected to the phenomenon and their ability to logically rank them against climate change as a 
primary challenge. This underscores consensus in the literature that climate change impacts 
cannot easily be isolated because they interact in complex ways (Paavola, 2006; Pelling, 2011) 
and are readily perceived as such in contexts where knowledge and practices are holistically 
interpreted and experienced (Galloway, 2010). 
As observed in the previous chapter, this is important as expressions of angsts, which are 
even more extensive in this case study (10 in Fiji versus 27 in India), have a high prevalence in 
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the dataset, such that the 35 analytical units used to gauge the issues of greatest concern to the 
study population is the most expansive set in this study (see table 41). So intractable and cross-
cutting are these concerns that for analytical purposes, they necessitated isolation from signs and 
indicators and other thematic groups. The coexistence of discernible local manifestations of these 
complex climate impacts alongside profound knowledge and broader resource gaps and a 
dominant knowledge seeking disposition contradicts Nisbet’s (2009) assertions that people 
dismiss the urgency of climate change because of its complexity. In fact, the data shows that the 
discernibility of complex impacts at a subsistence level often structures opinion intensity so 
decisively that amidst resource gaps it is compelling socio-cultural changes in the collective and 
traditional order (see climate leadership) and prevails in the absence of all elements of climate 
denialism. Theoretically, this illustrates the strong possibility that complexity and profound 
discernible impacts rather than accurate knowledge of causes of climate change are the most 
powerful predictors of intention to take voluntary actions in low capacity resource-dependent 
contexts where climate impacts are manifesting in ways that undermines subsistence. This is in 
accordance with Leiserowitz (2003), who found no noteworthy link between accurate knowledge 
of climate change cause and solutions and reported or intended actions, rather than Bord, 
O’Connor and Fisher (2000, cited in Maibach, 2008), who established that accuracy of 
knowledge of cause is the primary predictor of action. 
Twenty-seven codes indicating angsts or primary concerns have prevalence in the overall 
dataset. However, 12 of these concerns are unique to circumscribed localities, primarily in the 
Laya subset (three-quarters). Overall, Water Scarcity is the most grounded angst, accounting for 
a combined total of a fifth of the prevalence of all angst in the dataset (46 of 237: Water Scarcity 
(45) and Water Scarcity-1 (one)). It also ranks as the most grounded angst in the dataset for each 
 320 
 
set of villages (25 percent for Laya Villages and 17 percent in PRAGATI Villages, which is 
consistent with the nature of the two primary ways through which climate change impacts are 
perceived in this resource-dependent context where rainfed agriculture is a mainstay (crop yield 
and weather) and modern water connectivity infrastructure is absent. Overall Climate Impact (31 
of 237 (combined – ranked and unranked)), Road (24 of 237), Work (18 of 237), Flooding and 
Transport (12 of 237) are the only angsts to account for at least five of the relative prevalence for 
Angst. So, these dominant angsts will form the basis of scrutiny. However, angst rank varyingly 
across the two subsets in terms of prevalence beyond the first ranked concern, which is 
consistent with my observations of both the contextual nature of communal concerns, climate 
impact, response modalities and even engagement/mobilization approaches. Accordingly, a 
closer look at subset and discrete village data is warranted. 
Excerpt 44: Profit seeking moneylenders obstruct climate resilience coping strategies and undermines information provision and knowledge gaps 
Young Women Focus Group - Pulusumamidi, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: So, did, does Laya use the words climate change to you? 
Respondent 1: Yes. 
Interviewer: What did Laya tell you about climate change? 
Respondents 1: What do they tell? Nothing much. They tell us mostly about agriculture, agriculture. 
Interviewer:  They talk, what do they say? 
Respondent 1: They tell us about agriculture and also if we need anything, they us, the people. About the weather means they tell us about 
rains if they will fall. Weather, weather change means, we are poor people, right? You are given the seeds from the Devasthanam (Religious 
Trust), grow the crops well.  
Respondent 2: They told us like you told us about changes in weather and the crops will grow better. 
Respondent 1: Farm lands, Weather, Laya foundation told us not to put any fertilizers and grow the crops. But, the money lenders tell us to 
put these fertilizers, if you do not put the fertilizers, the crops will not grow better. But, Laya foundation people told us to use the natural 
manure which they prepare and send, and the crops will grow better. With the use of chemical fertilizers you people, you people will get some 
diseases. 
 
PRAGATI Villages 
 
Of the 27 codes denoting Angsts that are active in the overall dataset, only 24 are active 
in the PRAGATI subset. While Food Security-1, Sanitation and Water Scarcity are inactive, both 
angsts with the “-1” designation are indicative of rank relative to climate change to probe 
knowledge operationalization amidst complex realities. So, though they show no prevalence as 
first order concerns, the specific issues they denote show prevalence in the dataset. Water 
Scarcity (17 percent), Climate Impact (15 percent – combined), Climate Impact (24 percent) and 
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Climate Impact-1 (one percent), Work and Flooding (10 percent each), Road (seven percent) and 
Fevers and Diseases (six percent) are the most significant angst in the subset, accounting for 
prevalence in excess of five percent. At a general level, the fact that the specification of climate 
impact as a first order concern only accounts for four percent of the prevalence associated with 
climate impact (one of 25) in a context where the core concerns are induced and/or exaggerated 
by climate change profoundly underscores the knowledge gaps in these contexts. 
This is even more apparent across villages given the highly contextual nature of this 
socio-cultural and climate change perceptual lens. The individual units of analysis used to 
capture angsts register varyingly and collectively, they register significantly different levels of 
prevalence across circumscribed localities. Specifically, although all villages, except Palem (17) 
register 11 codes denoting angst, only three have prevalence across all four villages (Water 
Scarcity, Climate Impact-1 and Road) and only seven register prevalence in at least three villages 
(Work and Flooding - 1 each, Road - 12, Fevers and Diseases - 10, Food Security and Health 
seven each, Land - six and Money Lenders - three. They are also variably accounted for by 
specific gendered and age groups, which further reinforces the contextual nature of angsts in the 
dataset. However, there is no decisive overall correlation between gender and angst because men 
(54 percent) and women (46 percent) account for similar levels of angst. The marginally higher 
level associated with men comports with their higher level of premium climate knowledge 
overall. In fact, men account for nearly 80 percent of the demonstrated ability to rank climate-
impact as the primary concern when asked to compare their stated concern (the core of which are 
climate induced/exacerbated challenges) with climate change. Climate knowledge appears so 
directly related to this factor that both cohorts of men account for similar levels of prevalence (42 
percent for older and 38 percent for younger men), but nearly 50% (four of nine) of this 
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demonstration of knowledge operationalization among young is accounted for by those from 
Palem, who have had the rare benefit of direct engagement and capability enhancement. 
Similarly, in much the same way capability enhancement among discrete cohorts rather 
than gender per se accounts for expression of angsts and the effective operationalization of 
climate knowledge to rank concerns relative to climate impact, the data shows seniority and 
leadership designation rather than age accounts for the expression of angsts. Older folks account 
for marginally more (52 percent) of the prevalence of Angsts than young people (48 percent) and 
all groups, except young women, account for at least a quarter of prevalence. The fact that young 
men, who account for the most prevalence (27 percent), outpace older men (27 percent and older 
women (25 percent) outpace younger women (21 percent) underscores this observation. What 
this indicates is both a relationship with responsibility, which is associated with seniority (older 
men and women) and communal validation of self-identification for leadership (see excerpt 43) 
alongside explicit expressions of a greater stake among young men in Munagalapudu (see 
excerpt 36). In the latter instance, this is reinforced by the fact that young men from Palem 
account for more than 40 percent of total angsts expressed by their peers in the subset and they 
both self-identify and are validated as potential climate leaders. 
Capability enhancement, particularly knowledge, appears to function similarly even at a 
population level. Consistent with the highly contextual nature of angsts observed, Water 
Scarcity, the most grounded angsts in the dataset, is only so primarily grounded in Sunaladana 
and Agraharam. These are the two villages with the highest levels of knowledge gaps in the 
subset (a half in Agraharam and a third in Sunaladana) and despite the manifest connection 
between their primary concerns and climate variability they are less likely to rank climate impact 
as their first order concern in terms of relative prevalence for angsts (Agraharam three percent 
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and Sunaladana 15 percent). In Palem and Itikalakota where knowledge gaps are lower, 
accounting for just more than a tenth of relative prevalence for knowledge markers (13 percent 
and 11 percent, respectively), climate impact accounts for higher – 19 percent and 16 percent, 
respectively. In fact, climate impact as a ranked concern is the most grounded relative to all 
angsts expressed in the village and though flooding is the dominant concern in Itikalakota, it is 
the only context where climate impact is specified as a concern without prompting. Broader 
aspects of capability enhancement, including specialist knowledge, technical know-how, 
monetary and logistical support, the scope of which exceeds the informational and technical 
affordances of PRAGATI’s efforts also structure the expression of angsts at a population level. 
Specifically, Angsts are greater in the villages with the lowest knowledge gaps (Palem and 
Itikalakota), but these villages also show among the most intractable levels of explicit fatalism 
(absence of agency). Specifically, Palem is the most fatalistic; Itikalakota, despite its vastly lower 
level of knowledge gaps (11 percent) relative to Agraharam where it is highest (50 percent), 
shows comparable levels of fatalism and angsts with Agraharam (40 percent fatalism compared 
to 45 percent and 43 angsts compared 40, respectively in each village). 
The high levels of angsts observed across villages and its comparable prevalence across 
age and gendered cohorts, as well as, the prevalence of palpable resource gaps and a measure of 
fatalism across cohorts, including those with knowledge and broader capability advantages, 
strongly underscores the consequential nature of information provision. Specifically, insufficient, 
issue and context specific climate information provision in low capacity resource-dependent 
communal contexts is also likely to undermine agency and collective motive by causing 
disenchantment, even among the relatively knowledgeable and skilled. The likely negative 
implications of this approach for mobilizing agency and enabling effective action consummate 
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with the challenges underway and projected is heightened when considered alongside 
observations of its relationship with fissures in the communal order, by exposing the intractable 
incapacitation of collective and traditional structures to lead and act on current subsistence 
challenges that are projected to intensify without the provision of pathways for accessing the 
necessary resources and faulty internalization of cause attribution and responsibility.  
Laya Villages 
These observations are reinforced by the data associated with the Laya subset. Consistent 
with the observation of a direct link between knowledge levels and perception and management 
of the complexity of climate impacts in these low capacity resource-dependent localities, the 
Laya subset, which has higher levels of knowledge gaps and lower premium climate knowledge, 
only accounts for a fifth of the knowledge operationalization observed in terms of linking and 
ranking primarily climate induced and/or exacerbated concerns against climate change. This is 
also consistent with the view that information provision, especially if insufficient—even if more 
profuse and diffused—without the necessary resources to address problem identification, 
undermines agency, motive, the traditional and communal order and causes disentrancement. 
This is precisely the implication when both subsets are compared.  
The relatively more knowledge deficient Laya villages are less perturbed, accounting for 
less than a third of all angsts in the overall dataset. As established in the previous sub-section, the 
Laya villages are also less fatalistic (26 percent versus 36 percent PRAGATI Villages) and their 
relative level of explicit optimism is greater than what obtains in the PRAGATI subset (a quarter 
compared to 15 percent). This scenario supports the observation of a knock-on attenuation of 
confidence in the traditional and communal order even though it is the Laya villages that 
explicitly externalized leadership because socio-culturally PRAGATI Villages are far more 
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communal, per higher collective risk perception, the absence of personalization of risk and 
maximal communal motive. As established in the previous sub-section, this is also apparent at 
the village level. 
There is also corroboration at the village level for a link between knowledge 
operationalization and perception and management of complex challenges in terms of linking 
and ranking expressed angsts that are climate induced and/or exacerbated with climate change 
(see excerpt 28). Munagalapudu, the village with the lowest level of climate knowledge (highest 
knowledge gap and nearly no premium climate knowledge) is the only village in the subset 
where no respondent associated or ranked their expressed angsts with climate change. The 
village explicitly ranks Road as the most grounded angst (three of 15), which accounts for a 
comparable level of prevalence with Water Scarcity (two of 15) alongside Health Centre (two of 
15) and Transport (two of 15). This is highly significant and underscores the link drawn with 
knowledge operationalization, as the village does not link and/or rank climate impact as a 
dominant concern even when probed. This is despite Water Scarcity’s manifest connection with 
climate impact and their pronounced concerns about subsistence challenges (see signs and 
indicators) in this rainfed agriculture dependent locality and their expressed concerns about 
transportation and broader accessibility issues when it rains or floods.  
Consistent with its relatively higher premium climate knowledge and lower knowledge 
gaps, the linking and ranking of climate risk in Nallikota accounts for a greater share of total 
expression of angsts than in Pulusumamidi. Further, this expression of knowledge mobilization is 
entirely associated with older men and young men, who show higher relative levels of premium 
climate knowledge and lower knowledge gaps overall. But, even within these relatively more 
knowledgeable cohorts across these low capacity contexts, knowledge and broader capability 
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constraints undermine perceptual management and action on complex challenges, including 
those manifestly associated with climate impact and variability such as water scarcity (see 
excerpt 45).  
More generally, the cohort level variations are also indicative of the broader contextual 
nature of the expression of angsts due to the variable ways in which climate change impacts are 
distributed, actions enacted and perceptions are grounded. A third of the codes denoting angsts in 
the overall dataset that have prevalence (nine of 27) are inactive in the Laya subset. Of the 18 
active codes denoting angsts that have prevalence in the subset, only three register prevalence 
across all three villages: Water Scarcity (16 of 65), Transport (four of 65) and Food Security 
(three of 65). In addition, though the subset is only comprised of three villages, only five angsts 
register in two villages (CC Impact-1 (six of 63), Education (six of 63), Health Centre (three of 
63), Ageing (two of 63) and Village Issues-1 (two of 63), which means less than half (eight of 
18) of the active codes in the subset have prevalence in at least two villages. 
Consistent with the cohort associations notable alongside knowledge mobilization, angsts 
are variably accounted for by specific gendered and age groups in general, which further 
reinforces the contextual nature of angsts in the dataset. However, there is no overall correlation 
between gender and angst as men (five percent) and women (48 percent) account for similar 
levels of angst. Age correlates more strongly with expressions of angsts. Older folks account for 
nearly 60 percent (36 of 63) of angsts' prevalence, which also obtains when the data is 
disaggregated. Specifically, older men account for significantly (eight percent) more prevalence 
than young men (19 of 63 versus 14 of 63) and older women also significantly (six percent) 
outstrip young women (17 of 63 versus 13 of 63).  
However, as observed in the PRAGATI subset, responsibility associated with seniority 
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(older men and women) and self-designation and validation are likely significant factors here 
given the age distinction noted and the fact that young men, who are socio-culturally privileged 
for leadership, engagement, education and broader capability enhancement opportunities 
narrowly outstrip young women and express concerns at comparable levels to older men. The 
apparent comparability of young women and young men in this subset is also supportive of the 
observation that the expression of angsts is more associated with leadership and seniority as the 
only expression of preference for youth as climate leadership in the entire dataset is associated 
with young women in the Laya subset who notably cite educational capabilities (see subsection 
on Climate Leadership). 
Also consistent with the observations in the PRAGATI subset is the highly contextual 
nature of angsts. Water Scarcity, the most grounded angsts in the dataset, is the most grounded 
angsts in two villages but only uniquely so in one—Nallikota (five of 11 – all other active angsts 
register single instances of prevalence). In the second village, Pulusumamidi, it shows the most 
prevalence, but not solely. Road accounts for the same level of prevalence (nine of 37 each). As 
noted, Road is explicitly ranked as the most grounded angst in Munagalapudu (three of 15) and 
though Water Scarcity (two of 15) ranks second in the village subset, it does so alongside a 
medley of other angsts that are equally grounded (Health Centre and Transport). 
Excerpt 45: Knowledge and broader capability gaps undermines perceptual management and action on complex challenges including those 
manifestly associated with climate change impact and variability 
Older Men Focus Group - Nallikota, Laya Subset 
Interviewer: What are the two biggest problems in your village? 
Respondent 1: Drinking water scarcity in summer.  
Respondent 2: We have to beyond the hill to get water.  
Respondent 3: Transportation is also here, we don’t have vehicles. 
Interviewer: Where do you get water from now? Is that from pipe? 
Respondents: We get water from well and hand pump.  
Interviewer: Do you think water problem is climate change problem or not? 
Respondent: No. [Cross talk] We have water in rainy season, in summer we have water scarcity. We see every year. 
Interviewer: Do you think your community want to know more about climate change? 
Respondents: We want to know, but we don’t have anybody to teach. 
Interviewer: Who should lead your community to teach about climate change? 
Responders: We want educated person. 
Interviewer: That person should come from your community or outside or it doesn’t matter?  
Respondents: It doesn’t matter to us. 
Interviewer: What is the cause of climate change?  
Respondent 2: Because of uneven rainfall  
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Interviewer: What is the cause of uneven rainfall?  
Respondent 2: We don’t know.  
 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the relatively small sample sizes across project associated populations, 
this chapter offers considerable theoretical and practical insights into the affordances and 
limitations of two rights-based, integrated rural development initiatives with substantial climate 
adaptation and mitigation components that are being implemented with varying degrees of 
explicit reference to climate change and accompanying information across seven Adivasi tribal 
hamlets in southern India. It illustrates that irrespective of the visibility of the integration of 
climate change into the interventions, the issue, context and domain specificity with which they 
are conceptualized and varyingly implemented have had limited impact in boosting capability at 
a population level—specifically climate knowledge, agency and action at both perceptual and 
active levels. Where deployed, both PRAGATI’s contingent and unstructured issue-specific 
response mechanism with conditional provision of deeper explanations and Laya’s special 
programmes for cohorts and highly selective youth outreach have had positive impacts on 
climate knowledge that are operationalized across critical dimensions associated with 
identification of signs, cause, risk perception, motive and agency. 
The study shows a significant positive correlation between experiential knowledge 
(informal) and higher premium (a posteriori) climate knowledge where a broad tapestry of 
information (chiefly, formal) is available and accessible to a wider cross-section of people. The 
availability of a range of credible information structures experiential knowledge positively, 
which comports with robust assertions of the legitimacy of indigenous knowledge premised on 
experience and practice. While this form of knowledge is primarily associated with ascendancy 
in age, evidence of climate knowledge transfer between older men and young women suggests 
leveraging observational knowledge to boost capabilities and action transcends target groups 
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privileged by common-sense notions. However, the nature, frequency and scope of available 
manifestly credible sources is likely to be determinative. Whereas the project intervention 
presents climate change with issue, context and domain specificity that narrows the scope of 
knowledge provided or negates it altogether in favour of a subsistence-response frame, news 
coverage of climate change (chiefly radio broadcasts) as a translating process from scientific to 
public audiences is more general and descriptive of a wider range of issues, domains and 
contexts. This means the effectiveness of frames is contingent upon structural factors (their 
nature, frequency, scope, availability and access); particularly, multiple relevant frames rather 
than singular frames, as well as associative information during all forms of response efforts, are 
likely to be more effective in attenuating knowledge gaps in predominantly low capacity 
contexts. 
The chapter also offers compelling evidence that in an era of post-normal science, the 
socio-cultural is as important as physical and biological limits in boosting capabilities amidst 
unprecedented geological change and achieving sustainability. In terms of capabilities, this is 
evident from the vantage point of gender and age, risk disposition, motive and leadership 
preferences. Several factors have reinforced intractable levels of knowledge gaps and agency 
among women, particularly older women, namely the limited, selective and contextually 
dependent cohort-level engagement, particularly those aimed at women and youth. Additionally, 
general community/population-level (e.g. village meetings) modalities do not automatically 
attract women due to domestic commitments and other time constraints, and cultural and socio-
spatial barriers often curtail the extent to which they participate even when they attend, primarily 
functioning differentially when women join.. These broad socio-cultural factors have also limited 
women’s access to the broader tapestry of manifestly credible sources of climate information 
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shown to be potentially decisive in attenuating knowledge gaps due to its multi-frame nature 
(news). This reinforces the knowledge gap hypothesis but accords it a fundamentally gendered 
and youth (to a lesser degree) dimension. 
Consonant with the primacy of sociotropic motives delineated in political science, rather 
than individual motivation in risk communication, the analysis foregrounds the prominence of 
compelling collective motive and communal risk disposition, which exists alongside a faulty 
internalization of cause. Owing to the significance of observation for knowledge development, 
the highly proximal and discernibly existential manifestation of impacts in these contexts, which 
are perceived in primarily food security and health terms, the chapter suggests privileging the 
internal risk disposition rather than external and scientific perspectives to effectively boost 
adaptive capacity. However, of great import, it warns that the communal disposition should be 
carefully managed as the internalization of risk is often associated with specified actions, 
including faulty acts such as defecation—which, if associated with distinct groups, can further 
undermine communal harmony in a low-information context where traditional structures are 
fissuring. It is also likely to negatively impact climate agency, which is highly constrained by 
informational and other capability deficits. 
This is reinforced by strong evidence of informational and broader resource gaps 
undermining the mobilization of communal agency, particularly the decisiveness with which 
resource gaps (knowledge, technical capacity and monetary resources) has shifted confidence 
from the traditional and communal order. Significantly, the analysis highlights that a lack of or 
constrained agency does not necessitate fatalism. Contrary to the western-centric literature on 
individual barriers to communicating climate change in low-capacity, resource-dependent 
contexts where subsistence is fundamentally impacted, curiosity and a knowledge seeking 
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disposition are palpable to the extent that even the traditional order is reimagined, according 
privileges to relatively knowledgeable cohorts such as young men, who disproportionately 
benefit from emerging capability enhancement opportunities. 
More broadly, the primacy of the socio-cultural in tackling the impacts of post-normal 
science is reinforced by evidence of its utility for boosting adaptive capacity and achieving 
sustainability—particularly, the possibility of using Vittanalapanduga and other religious 
festivals that are integral to Adivasi existence to boost food security and manage and diversify 
crop varieties in these contexts because of the scale of their direct relationship with various 
stages of agronomic activities, as illustrated by Appendix N.1 to N.5. While this relationship has 
been used to successfully navigate resource constraints and enact festivities, resource gaps of 
varying forms and the scale of challenges undermine leveraging the links to enhance routine 
capabilities and needs. 
So, the deployment of a socio-cultural elicitation and analysis of the collective risk 
disposition and motive, in relation to perception of cause, leadership, agency and angsts, etc. can 
attenuate critical gaps in climate risk communication about the needs of marginalized 
communities not afforded by highly discursive and conceptual psychometric approaches used to 
examine dimensions of climate change and individual perceptions. It is an unambiguous 
indication that attenuating climate change knowledge gaps and associated capabilities necessary 
for effectively boosting agency and action requires more than cogent translation of science and 
information provision, even through highly resonant frames. 
 332 
 
Chapter Eight: Belizean Case 
Small islands and low-lying developing states across the Caribbean and Central America 
are among the most vulnerable to climate change impacts. Their small sizes, open economies, 
high reliance on natural resources and indebtedness exacerbate their risk to a changing and 
variable climate. Belize, which is as geopolitically and culturally complex and significant as it is 
ecologically, typifies how climate-induced challenges exacerbate the region’s existing economic, 
social and natural frailties and complicates policy-making as states pursue development 
objectives. This small, ethnically and linguistically diverse Central American country of 
approximately 300,000 people, which is more culturally, economically and politically aligned 
with its anglophone Caribbean neighbours because of a shared colonial heritage, is home to the 
majority of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System, the world’s second longest reef system, that 
supports fragile ecosystems. Belize’s status as a critical frontier of world ecology is also 
reinforced by immense land-based assets. Under complementary policy and system plans, 103 
clusters of forestry spanning at least a quarter of the country forms a vast national protected area 
system (NPAS) that supports one of the widest arrays of species in the Americas (PACT, 2017). 
While a mainland territory, more than 1,600 small islands, including significant population 
centres, are also nestled along its extensive low-lying coastline.     
 Despite being a net sink for greenhouse gases (absorbing more than it emits), Belize’s 
wide-ranging regionally and globally significant sensitive natural assets and high exposure to 
natural hazards, including being prone to hurricanes and other natural disasters, ranks it among 
the states most likely to be adversely affected and least likely to develop adequate protective 
mechanisms (IPCC, 2007). The country’s existing and projected climate impacts includes sea-
level rise—a one-metre increase of which threatens three-quarters of the properties in the 
country’s vital tourism sector, half of all airport and seaport infrastructure, other critical 
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infrastructure and its primarily coastal population, a third of which is concentrated in the chief 
commercial hub of Belize City, which is below sea level (Simpson et al., 2012). More intense 
and frequent tropical storms, hurricanes and floods are also projected, which necessitates both 
mitigation and adaptation actions that include comprehensive management and protection of 
marine, coastal and land assets, infrastructure and human security given the population’s 
concentration in coastal centres and the natural resource base of the economy. The scope of the 
mitigative and adaptive actions required are typified by recent hydro-meteorological events, 
namely Hurricane Richard in October 2010, flooding in 2008 and Tropical Storm Arthur in May 
2008, that resulted in significant losses to productive sectors such as agriculture, which is 
vulnerable to even minor shifts in temperature and rainfall, both of which are expected to change 
significantly. Agriculture, the country’s third largest foreign exchange earner behind tourism and 
petroleum, is already being impacted by water scarcity, more frequent droughts and greater 
incidence of pests and diseases that constrains timely and effectively propagation and maturation 
of crops, including stables such as rice, maize and beans and render some varieties unviable 
(Simpson et al., 2012). So significant are these direct livelihoods impacts that the country 
explicitly contends that climate variability and change undermine sustainable development goals 
(Liliendaal Declaration, cited in CCCCC, 2010).  
Belize’s high socio-economic and physical exposure undermines its response 
mechanisms because they require significant and sustained investment that it can ill afford on its 
own. Fiscal complications, including two debt defaults in a decade alongside limited economic 
growth and intractable levels of poverty, have so constrained the imagination of socio-economic 
planners that they prompted the proposed decisive petro-economic reorientation of the economy, 
including oil exploration along the Barrier Reef on which its current economic base depends 
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(Hall, 2018) and other infrastructure projects in ecologically sensitive areas.   
 However, concerted civil and legal challenges thwarted such efforts and significant 
adaptive and mitigative actions are underway in Belize that reflect the regional position on 
climate change as expressed in the Liliendaal Declaration and complements the priority sectoral 
actions outlined in the Regional Framework for Achieving Development Resilient to Climate 
Change and the associated Implementation Plan that guides climate change policies and actions 
across the Caribbean Community, a regional integration movement to which Belize belongs. The 
foundational policy and action plans highlight current and projected climate risk and their direct 
livelihoods impacts as critical factors undermining sustainable development goals (Liliendaal 
Declaration, 2009). So, despite being a minute emitter of greenhouse gasses, the Caribbean’s 
multi-sectoral plan privileges a strategic shift towards a low carbon economy. Fossil fuel 
consumption, a major driver of climate change, costs US$37 billion of its already limited foreign 
exchange earnings and further reduces the potential for economic growth (CCCCC, 2015). This 
primarily mitigative action, which also improves climate adaptivity, is complemented by cross-
sectoral emphases in agriculture, tourism, coastal sector and health. 
Table 42: The climate interventions with their associated discrete and combined field sites, implementers and funders in Belize 
Country Project Name Implementer Funder Villages Village Subset 
Belize 
The Cohune Palm Nut 
Renewable Energy Project 
Caribbean Community 
Climate Change Centre  
European Union 
(EU) 
 CCCCC 
  Flowers Bank  
The Ya’axché Agro-forestry 
Project 
Ya’axché Conservation 
Trust   
United Kingdom 
Department for 
International 
Development (UK-
DFID) 
 
Ya’axché  
Trio, Indian 
Creek, and San 
Miguel 
 
 
 
Accordingly, this chapter probes the implementation of two distinct climate interventions 
in geographically and ethnically distinct traditional (Creoles) and indigenous (Quiché Maya) 
communities in central and southern Belize, respectively, that, in the first instance, primarily 
reflects the region’s low-carbon objectives and, in the second, foregrounds livelihoods 
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considerations that underpin the sustainable development considerations in the foundational 
documents (see Table 42 and Appendix D). Both Quiché Maya and Creole communities 
represent two of four major ethnic groups in Belize, but consistent with this study’s explicit 
focus on climate change impacts and responses on the margins, the four villages studied were 
selected because they uniquely reflect a combination of socio-economic marginality, heightened 
exposure to climate impact and the efficacy of ongoing climate action emblematic of regional 
prioritization.       
Akin to both the Fijian and Indian cases, this study is grounded on qualitative analysis, 
including textual examination of project documents associated with the two climate change 
initiatives underway in my study sites, including communication aimed at my units of analysis 
during the project, extensive participant observation, several site visits to project installations, as 
well as 15 semi-structured focus groups with project beneficiaries and contextual insights from 
several unstructured conversations with project leaders that were conducted over a two-month 
period under immersive conditions. As detailed in the methodology chapter, both focus groups 
and individual interviews were conducted using a common set of guiding questions (See 
Appendix O). These direct engagements with the study population yielded a sample population 
of 74 (see Table 43) drawn from the four field sites (see Appendix G for village level sample 
profile and data). While the sample size is just under a fifth of the total adult population and 
households in the combined field sites, its representativeness is buttressed by equal levels of 
engagement across gendered and age categories. 
Table 43: The Belizean sample profile based on the adult population and households across field sites. 
Belize 
Adult 
Pop. 
in 
Field 
Sites 
Sample Households in Sites 
Households 
Sampled Men Women 
Focus 
Groups Youth 
Total 438 74 449 70 37 37 15 35 Rates 17% 16% 50% 50% 47% 
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Structurally, the case is also formatted in accordance with an integrated typology that 
combines the two elements (transcript and project codes) of the thematic logic order (see Table 
44), a non-random procedure devised to analyze project and interview data and identify the 
decision-making processes that underpins climate action and inaction at the village level. 
However, the analytical units gender and traditional practices, alongside other macro-group 
dynamics, such as youth and age, are progressively integrated because of their high and 
comparatively more significant resonance in the dataset for this country case. As outlined under 
paradigmatic considerations in the methodology chapter, this typology is consistent with 
Gladwin’s (1980) study of non-adoption of agronomic recommendations. All codes and themes 
are defined in Appendix A, and macro group data are outlined in Appendix M.1 to M.12 for 
Belizean study sites. 
Table 44: The integration of the thematic logic order to inform case structure 
 Thematic Logic Order for Non-Random Data 
Analysis Integrated Thematic Logic Order  
 Transcripts Case Structure 
 Climate Action Project (Type and) Framework 
 Knowledge Project Activities 
 Climate Knowledge Acquisition Project Action and Causes Profiled 
1.  Signs/Indicators Belief Progression 
 Cause and Proximity Project Outcomes 
2.  Climate Risk Project Perception 
3.  Climate Agency Personal Inclusion and Influence 
4.  Motive for Action Knowledge 
5.  Climate Leadership Climate Knowledge Acquisition 
6.  Project Perception Signs/Indicators 
7.  Personal Inclusion/Influence Climate Action 
8.  Belief Progression Cause and Proximity 
9.  Angst Climate Risk 
10.  Traditional Practices Climate Agency 
11.  Gender Motive for Action 
12.  Schooling Climate Leadership 
13.  Project Documents Angst 
 Project Framework  
 Project Activities Cross-Cutting 
 Project Action and Causes Profiled Gender 
 Project Outcomes Traditional Practices 
 
 337 
 
While both projects have substantial livelihoods components that seek to boost the 
capacity of communities to contend with climate change and variability, they differ significantly 
in intervention frame (adaptation versus mitigation), scope, nature and the degree to which they 
explicitly address climate change. 
The Ya’axché Agro-forestry Project 
The Ya’axché Project is an adaptation intervention that promotes sustainable rural 
livelihoods through comprehensive agro-forestry actions in the Maya Golden Landscape and 
Maya Mountain North Forest Reserve of Toledo District in Belize. This agro-forestry 
intervention, which combines agriculture and forestry to prevent soil erosion and boost 
biodiversity, indirectly benefits 5,500 people who live within six villages across the Maya 
Mountain Corridor, an extensive protected area. The corridor also includes the Bladen Nature 
Reserve, the crown jewel of Belize protected areas and a Mesoamerican biodiversity hotspot that 
has been accorded the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) highest 
protection status. While the project is funded by external entities, namely the UK DFID and the 
CCCCC, Ya’axché Conservation Trust, which was institutionalized by Mayans for the 
promotion of ecologically sensitive activities, privileges sustained, direct and targeted 
engagement with more than 200 direct beneficiaries. A mixture of direct engagement 
mechanisms—including individual and collective demonstration farming, trainings, extension-
related services, routine group meetings at the village level, selective international learning 
exchange opportunities, as well as collective and self-management monitoring systems—are 
used to promote a range of actions: the elimination of slash and burn farming to reduce 
deforestation for agricultural purposes, improved farming practices, energy conservation, 
watershed protection, soil development and climate smart practices. The climate-smart practices 
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include plant selection, replanting barren areas and management to simultaneously improve food 
security and safeguard a national carbon sink amidst climate change and variability.  
Ya’axché’s targeted, sustained and direct approach to agro-forestry oriented climate 
adaptation primarily focuses on experimentation at the pace of those engaged, particularly 
through the planting of cocoa and coffee to capitalize on high global demand to increase farmers’ 
income. In excess of 30,000 cocoa plants have been cultivated to date. The intervention also 
includes the harvesting of mature trees as a source of timber for home and commercial use, 
planting fruits, vegetables and root crop to simultaneously enhance food security and income by 
stabilizing and restoring soil fertility. Smart farming practices have also been introduced that are 
as important for the environment as they are for income generation. These innovative farming 
practices include the planting of widely spaced rows of trees with companion crops (alley 
cropping) and the cultivation of some crops primarily for the benefit of the soil rather than for 
consumption or trade (cover cropping). By safeguarding this national carbon sink through these 
activities, Ya’axché’s agro-forestry intervention enables the continued benefits of a vital natural 
asset that acts as a natural filter for both the air and watersheds, reduces flood risk and controls 
the climate through shade provision, among other ecological, research, heritage and scenic 
values. However, the conceptualization of this expansive agro-forestry initiative, which is 
enacted in a highly targeted and user-dependent fashion through experimentation and 
participatory learning, articulates no explicit macro-level political engagement beyond 
interfacing with the state for formal declaration and use of protected areas.  
The Cohune Palm Nut Renewable Energy Project 
On the other hand, the Cohune Palm Nut Renewable Energy Project is a highly technical 
mitigation intervention primarily aimed at tackling climate change by reducing dependence on 
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imported fossil fuel with a complementary livelihood enabling component. Specifically, it seeks 
to demonstrate the technological and socio-economic viability of producing fuels and food from 
naturally harvested (fallen) Cohune Palm Nuts, a renewable natural resource found in the tropical 
forest of Belize, which provided food to ancient Mayan civilisations. 
The project is being implemented in Flowers Bank, the historic village from which the 
deciding votes were cast in 1797 to seal Belize’s standing as Central America’s only English-
speaking nation. The small village, which rests on a narrow segment of the banks of the 
enormous Belize River, primarily depends on natural resources for its livelihood and on biomass 
fuels for household energy, particularly for the preparation of meals. These activities, the 
residents and their possessions are all susceptible to the impacts of climate change and 
variability. In addition to frequent flooding, which often maroons some villagers for extended 
periods, a major vulnerability of the community is their traditional approach to agriculture and 
subsistence farming, which depends on coordinating the start of rainy seasons, land preparation 
and planting. Improved climate modelling suggests significant changes in precipitation and 
weather events will make food production across communities like Flowers Bank less reliable 
and more food insecure. Accordingly, the project employed a community development 
framework and mobilized the village’s sole institutional mechanism, the Flowers Bank 
Community Group, to launch an innovative pilot initiative for the commercial production of 
virgin cohune oil and cohune-based cosmetics to provide a livelihoods boon for the village. In so 
doing, the project tackles the community's climate-induced and/or exacerbated food security 
challenges through income generation.  
Under the stewardship of the Flowers Bank Community Group, an organization with 13 
members (mostly women - nine), what started as an inefficient manual survival effort has 
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morphed into an efficient mechanised system of producing cohune oil in commercial quantities 
that is improving the earning power of residents and revealing a novel approach to climate 
change. This mechanised intervention offers a critical safety net to the community. Only a few 
years ago, the nearby Williamson Clothing Factory, which employed more than 400 people 
(mostly women) closed, forcing many to return to what was long viewed as a difficult but stable 
income generating activity: cohune oil production and trading. The project is on the cusp of 
opening a five-tonnes-per day cohune nut processing facility owned and managed by the 
community that can produce virgin cohune oil for cosmetic products, high-quality meal and 
smokeless charcoal that conforms to American import standards. The community’s cohune 
harvesting, and production activities complements ongoing data gathering for a national scale 
project on climate change resilience building through sustainable fuel alternatives. During the 
pilot phase, this included the demonstration and documentation of the economic, social and 
technological benefits and viability of producing fuel and food at commercial scale from 
naturally harvested cohune palm nuts in Flowers Bank. The data collected is being used to 
support the deployment of cohune nut processing in areas with adequate cohune population to 
support a five-tonnes-per day or greater processing facility.  
While both climate change interventions are distinct in scope, primary sectoral focus, 
programmatic design and implementation, they feature varying but significant levels of 
community level engagement that accords them a degree of endogenous responsiveness. 
Specifically, both interventions evolved from locally conceptualized and enacted actions, such as 
the planting of cocoa in the Ya’axché villages and the livelihoods component of the Cohune 
Palm Nut Project. So, both projects channeled external support along clearly articulated and 
practiced dimensions for the expansion of endogenous actions and interests. The targeted and 
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beneficiary dependent experimental engagement approach used in the Ya’axché intervention, 
which is distinct from the population level engagement employed for the complementary 
livelihoods and renewable energy Cohune Palm Nut Project, is significant and warrants probing 
to determine the efficacy of these divergent engagement modalities for the scaling of pre-defined 
and enacted community adaptive actions. Clear distinctions in the political consciousness and 
ambition of the projects conceptually is also of heightened analytical importance. Whereas the 
Ya’axché intervention lacks manifest political consciousness, the Cohune Palm Nut Project is 
conceptually emblematic of the scale of the response demanded by the frontally political and 
transformative climate justice narrative distilled in the theoretical outlined. So, multi-level 
probing of the complementary livelihoods and systemic focus of the Cohune Palm Nut Project, 
which seeks to ameliorate and tackle the primary cause of climate change and variability, 
respectively, provides a rare prism through which to observe the enactment of complex responses 
crucial for enabling socio-cultural and economic adaptive capacity sufficient for the realization 
of new possibilities.  
Belief Progression and Project Perception 
 
Table 45: The level and nature of belief progression across study sites in Belize 
Subset Village 
Mixed - 1 Positive 1 
Density Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Ya’axché 
Indian Creek 4 20% 16 80% 20 
San Miguel 0 0% 3 100% 3 
Trio  1 5% 19 95% 20 
CCCCC Flowers Bank 0 0% 17 100% 17 
Totals 5 8% 55 92% 60 
 
Consistent with the endogenous genesis of both interventions, belief progression for both 
village subsets is positive (see Excerpts 48 and 56). This endogenous character also structures an 
overwhelmingly positive perception of the scaled initiatives (92 percent prevalence), which holds 
true across all villages, accounting for the entirety of project perception in both Flowers Bank 
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and San Miguel, 95 percent in Trio and 85 percent in Indian Creek (see Table 45). While 
positivity accounts for the entirety of project perception in both Flowers Bank and San Miguel, 
overall population disposition towards the scaled intervention offered by Ya’axché is attenuated 
by mixed perceptions with prevalence, averaging eight percent in the villages of Trio (five 
percent) and Indian Creek (15 percent). On closer examination, it is evident that mixed project 
perception observed in these two contexts is primarily (80 percent) accounted for by distinct 
groups: two cohorts in Indian Creek (young women - 60 percent and older men - 20 percent) and 
older men from the Trio cocoa group (20 percent).  
It is important to note that both sets of men who register prevalence for mixed perception 
are directly engaged and their identical level of mixed-perceptual disposition is also 
complemented by similar levels of positive project perception (20 percent in Indian Creek and 17 
percent in Trio). This similarity in perceptual disposition of the Ya’axché led scaled agro-
forestry project among directly engaged cohorts in two of three villages studied suggests the 
nature and quality of project engagement has a significant impact on its resonance and impact 
(see Excerpt 46, Dialogue A - Respondent 4 and B - Respondent 2). This observation is also 
reinforced by the fact that contestations about engagement practices, particularly a failure to 
follow through on promises and engagement with the relatively privileged (landed and 
motivated), structures the entirety of mixed perception among young women in Indian Creek, 
who are tangentially engaged for the provision of catering services because of their proximity to 
Ya’axché’s field station, which gives them distinct insight into the operationalization of the 
project (see Excerpt 47).  
The engagement thesis is further underscored by the perceptual disposition of other 
cohorts that are primarily engaged indirectly. Overall, older women and young men have 
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uniformly positive perceptions of the project, while their counterparts (older men and young 
women) have textured (positive and mixed) perceptions of the project. However, for young 
women, this is entirely accounted for by those in Indian Creek. Elsewhere, the young women 
cohort has uniformly positive perceptions of the project. It is also instructive to note that even in 
Indian Creek, where young women have textured views of the project perception, it is equally 
split between mixed and positive (50 percent each). So, apart from the directly engaged subsets 
of older men and the young women of Indian Creek, all cohorts have uniformly positive 
perceptions of the project.  
However, older women in Indian Creek and San Miguel from the Ya’axché subset and 
young men in Flowers Bank from the CCCCC subset registered no prevalence on any measure. 
This suggests no engagement or connection with the climate change project intervention. Taken 
alongside the significantly lower positive perceptual dispositions of the directly engaged for the 
Ya’axché intervention compared to the indirectly and unengaged, strongly suggests challenges 
with the nature and efficacy of the engagement modalities employed by both scaled versions of 
the endogenous climate actions. This necessitates an assessment of perceived personal inclusion 
and influence to determine the inclusiveness of these scaled-up versions of endogenous climate 
adaptation responses, and further contextualizes project proception, including the attrition in 
positive disposition among those directly engaged. It also offers a basis for understanding the 
affordances and limits of these interventions for boosting climate knowledge, agency, motive, 
action and leadership consummate with the prevailing challenges across these contexts. 
Excerpt 46: The nature and quality of project engagement impacts its resonance (positive). 
Dialogue A: Older Men Cocoa Group Focus Group – Trio, Ya’axché 
Subset 
Dialogue B: Older Men Focus Group -  Indian Creek, Ya’axché Subset 
Interviewer: Is Ya’axché doing a good job? Yes, or no. 
Respondent 1, 2 & 3: Yes.  
Respondent 4: Sometimes it is good but sometimes they are late 
on listening to us. 
Respondent 5: Well, Ya’axché have been an essential part, so I 
think they are doing a great job and I know for a fact that this is just 
Interviewer:  Do you participate in that? 
Respondents 1, 2, 3:  Yes. 
Respondent 4: No. 
Respondent 5: Yes, but not with cocoa with Inga.  
Interviewer: Do you think Ya’axché is doing a good job? 
Respondent 1: Yes. 
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the beginning and they will be with us during the entire process 
and the climate change is one of our topics. They mentioned that 
we are cultivating our self of being fully aware. So, yes, Ya’axché is 
excellent performing when they are spreading the knowledge.  
Respondent 6: Ya’axché is doing well.  
Respondent 2: Yes, because they are training the people. But the thing that 
Ya’axché needs to do… I think they need to involve all the communities to 
have a training because it is not only four or five people have farm; all the 
communities have the farm. So, I think that is the way Ya’axché need to do it. 
All the village or whosoever they are training.  
 
 
Excerpt 47: The nature and quality of project engagement impacts its resonance (mixed). 
Young Women Focus Group - Indian Creek, Ya’axché Subset 
Interviewer: Do you think Ya’axché is doing a good job? Why? 
Respondent 1: They are doing good most of the time, […] but in most cases they would go to people and they would say we will be doing 
this, we will be helping you and sometimes they don’t and they would go […]. Maybe I would say that I would prefer they [help] somebody 
that [is] really [in] need, but I am not sure. But I am just saying maybe they will go to people that have better life. I would advise that they 
go to somebody else that is really in need. 
Respondent 2: Yes, because in some part they do something good. Yes, but in each women’s group they give catering and they bring people 
from other country, like you [are a] visitor, to see our craft those are some that Ya’axché is doing good. 
 
Personal Inclusion/Influence 
 
Table 46: The relative nature of perception of personal inclusion and influence in each study site in Belize 
Subset Village Mixed - 2 Positive 2 
Youth 
Consultation Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Ya’axché 
Indian 
Creek 2 14% 12 86% 0 0% 14 
San Miguel 0 0% 2 100% 0 0% 2 
Trio 3 16% 16 84% 0 0% 19 
CCCCC 
Flowers 
Bank 1 17% 4 67% 1 17% 6 
Totals 6 15% 34 83% 1 2% 41 
 
Three of five analytical units denoting perceptions of personal inclusion and influence 
over the interventions are varyingly active in the overall dataset: three in Flowers Bank and two 
in the Ya’axché subset (see Table 46). Overall, the projects are perceived to be inclusive, with 
positive perceptions of personal inclusion and influence over their implementation accounting 
for 83 percent of relative prevalence. Mixed perceptions (15 percent) and a desire for youth 
consultation (two percent) account for the remaining prevalence. However, consistent with the 
variation with which perception markers register across study populations, youth consultation is 
only evident in the Flowers Bank subset accounting for just eight percent of relative prevalence. 
This is consistent with the absence of any form of youth-specific groups in the community (see 
Excerpt 71), which is distinct relative to the other villages in the dataset where at least informal 
activity groups thrive. Mixed perceptions also account for the level of relative prevalence for 
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perceived personal inclusion and influence. The fact that the project itself is viewed positively 
(maximal level of positive prevalence) in Flowers Bank but a statistically significant segment of 
the population has mixed views about their personal influence/inclusion over the climate 
intervention is indicative of the study population’s ability to compartmentalize and assess the 
scaling up of a locally determined climate and livelihoods action, and the means and processes 
by which the expansion occurs. This compartmentalization comports with observations by 
Kabeer (1994) about the high import of the kinds of information (scientific, positivist, external or 
local and experiential) and knowers (neutral and detached or committed and involved) privileged 
in development interventions.  
The implication is that engagement modalities are central structuring factors for 
perception and efficacy of climate interventions even where its genesis is endogenous. 
Specifically, where it is or perceived to be insufficient, it undermines both perception and critical 
elements necessary for enabling climate action (namely, knowledge and motive). This is 
underscored by similar levels of positive and mixed perception of personal influence and 
inclusion over the implementation and management of the intervention in Flowers Bank and all 
villages in the Ya’axché subset, except San Miguel where positive views account for the entirety 
of the prevalence. Specifically, positive perception accounts for 83 percent of relative prevalence 
in Flowers Bank, 84 percent in Trio and 86 percent in Indian Creek and mixed perception 
accounts for 15 percent, 16 percent and 14 percent, respectively. The distinctions in perception 
of the project and personal inclusion and influence in both Indian Creek and Trio support the 
observation of the structuring effect of engagement modalities across contexts and groups.  
 While Indian Creek, particularly young women in the locality, registered a high degree of 
mixed perception in terms of their views of the project, the village registered less prevalence for 
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mixed perception in terms of personal inclusion/influence (14 percent compared to a quarter) and 
young women in the locality felt entirely included. This suggests direct exposure to the project 
intervention may have undermined/attenuated their reception to its proclaimed benefits and 
intents, particularly their perception of how and whether promised benefits are dispensed, per 
Excerpt 47 (Excerpt 48 from Flowers Bank offers reinforcement for this observation). 
Conversely, older men in Indian Creek and younger men in Trio, who accounted for marginal or 
no prevalence for mixed perception of the project in the localities, respectively, show a higher 
level of mixed perception regarding their personal inclusion/influence over the project (a quarter 
(one of four) to 100 percent (two of two) and none (zero of one) to two-third (two of three), 
respectively). This suggests both the nature of the activities through which the study population 
is directly engaged and the nature and scope of their engagement (some or none) strongly 
correlate with overall perception of influence and views of even locally conceptualized projects 
when scaled. A cohort level examination of the data supports this observation.  
 Overall, all cohorts have positive perceptions of their personal influence/inclusion except 
three discrete cohorts: older men in Indian Creek, young men in Trio and young women in 
Flowers Bank. Mixed perceptions account for two-thirds (two of three) of prevalence in each of 
the first two instances and perception is equally distributed across positive, mixed and a desire 
for youth engagement in the latter (a third or one of three each). Overall, older women feel the 
most included with positive perceptions of personal influence/inclusion accounting for the 
entirety of prevalence for this measure, while young men feel the least included (six of eight or 
three-quarters). Young women and older men show comparable levels of perceived 
inclusion/influence (83 percent and 81 percent, respectively). So, while the overall picture 
suggests women feel more included, a more granular examination reveals a less direct/significant 
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association between gender and perceived inclusion and influence with discernable contextual 
differences that comports with variations engagement across villages and cohorts under both 
interventions.  
Despite population-level engagement in Flowers Bank, for instance, older residents are 
more involved with different aspects of the intervention than youth. Mature women primarily 
manage and staff the cohune nut processing facility, while some older men were engaged in its 
construction, as well as ongoing interface with the external institutional supporter, the CCCCC, 
during the data collection process and manual work related to the complementary renewable 
energy pilot. This distinct age-bias in population engagement in Flowers Bank is consistent with 
younger cohorts, particularly young women, accounting for the totality of mixed perception 
regarding personal influence and inclusion for the village and the totality of expressed concern 
about a lack of youth consultation, as well as the lack of any youth structure in the village (see 
Excerpt 71).  
On the other hand, the villages in the Ya’axché subset varyingly benefit from targeted 
and sustained engagement based on expressed interest and engagement in agro-forestry and 
related conservation activities (see Excerpt 49). So, although the dominant engagement modality 
disposes itself to greater engagement with men engaged in agro-forestry, the scope and extent of 
engagement varies across localities and in some contexts contextual differences allow for distinct 
cohort engagement patterns in specific localities, such as the direct engagement of young women 
in Trio in beekeeping as a climate-sensitive conservation and livelihoods activity (See Excerpt 
57). Distinctions in engagement patterns are also evident among older women in San Miguel and 
young men in Flowers Bank, who registered no prevalence on any of the two measures under 
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consideration. This suggests no engagement or connection with the climate change project 
intervention.        
These distinctions in engagement patterns, which structure project perception across 
cohorts and villages associated with both climate interventions, are highly significant as they are 
likely to also impact climate knowledge. This warrants an examination of climate knowledge, 
which is central for action and change (Bord, Fisher, & O’Connor, 1997; Dutta, 2011; Freire, 
1970, 1973; Grotzer & Lincoln), across both village subsets to ascertain the extent to which the 
engagement modalities have structured them. An examination of climate knowledge in these 
contexts is also likely to offer insights necessary for contextualizing the efficacy of current 
action, improving existing and informing new pathways for action consummate with the climate 
change induced impacts being experienced and projected. Specifically, it offers a basis for 
understanding and mobilizing the relationships between cause identification, climate perception 
and risk, as well as motive, and agency that must underpin effective response mechanisms.  
Excerpt 48: Mixed perception of influence and inclusion over the formalization of a traditional practice. 
Young Women Focus Group – Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset 
Interviewer: […] Do you think the Cohune palm project is a good project? 
Respondent 3: Yes.  
Interviewer: Why would you say that?  
Respondent 3: We have something that has been traditional throughout our community and have been carried on generation from 
generation and with them being able to find a[n] easier way to do it; nonetheless that, back in the day it was so hard. And they did not give  
up. New intervention and machine helping them to do it and we have the produce in abundance. I think it’s a good project.  
Interviewer: Yeah. And you think the 5Cs is doing a good job?  
Respondent 3: In? 
Interviewer: In supporting. 
Respondent 3: Well, for me when they were working on…because they had build a portion of the project; we had initially got the building 
and some reason I think that they had lacked in terms of the execution of that portion. Because when we had gotten that project before... 
We had lobbied to get a vehicle and we saw a vehicle…We thought it would have been for us at the end of the project, but they did not give 
it to us. So, transportation is one of the issues in terms of getting the nuts from further communities rather than right here, locally. Because 
we do get it from outside sources.  
Interviewer: Do you think… If you tried to make suggestions to them, would they listen?  
Respondent 3: Well, nothing beat a trial but a failure. So! 
Interviewer: Have they been receptive to community’s feedback? 
Respondent 3: Not really, but in terms of when we have express[ed] our concern about the transportation, and that was the initial reason 
we had purchase[d] the vehicle and knowing the size of the vehicle they got… but since then we haven’t heard anything. And that’s one of 
the contributing factors in limiting [us].  
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Excerpt 49: Ya’axché’s comprehensive focused and sustained engagement is variably available and accessed. 
Older Men Focus Group – Indian Creek 
Interviewer: Are you all involved with Ya’axché? 
Respondent 1: To me, I start to work with Ya’axché in cocoa farm[ing]. Before, what Ya’axché used to do is just select who all who is [sic] 
willing to do farming in the farm, so that is the first thing Ya’axché used to do before. So, who all willing to participate in that.  
Interviewer: Do you participate in that? 
Respondents 1, 2 & 3: Yes. 
Respondent 4: No.  
Respondent 5: Yes, but not with cocoa; with Inga.  
Interviewer: Do you think Ya’axché is doing a good job? 
Respondent 1: Yes. 
Respondent 2: Yes, because they are training the people. But this, the thing that Ya’axché need to do, I think they need to involve all the 
communities to have a training because it is not only four or five people have farm. All the communities have the farm, so I think that is the 
way Ya’axché need to do. I[nvolve] all the village or who so ever they are training.  
Respondent 3: Well, in my case, yes; they are doing a very good job because they promote any opportunity for the farmers. They give 
opportunity for any training or anything what the person like to do, too. Like, for example, he [pointing at Respondent 5] is just doing Inga, 
all the cropping and this one [pointing at respondent 2] is doing other farming and more of us are doing some cocoa farming. But, Ya’axché 
is the one who give us the knowledge and the opportunity to learn about those things because, before, myself, I doesn’t [sic] know about 
farming but since I adapt myself to farming with Ya’axché, so I start to come up with my idea. Also, they have to put their input and I also 
have to put my input so that we work together.   
Respondent 4: Oh, yes, they are doing a good job. They are promoting farmers and not only with cocoa [and] Inga, with other things. Just 
last month, Mr. [Respondent 3’s name redacted] said he went [on an] exchange visiting trip to Cuba to see other farmers [and] what they 
are doing. So, they took some farmers to take a look, to [learn what] other farmers, what they are doing.  
Respondent 5: Well, maybe it is good if they are helping like one of my child [sic] started [referencing a scholarship]. They were helping. It is 
good when I see they [sic] help.  
Interviewer: If you had suggestions would Ya’axché listen to you?  
Respondent 1: Well, in my case, yes, they do! But, they don’t do it right away. They take time because remember they have to monitor 
things and put things together. So maybe we already forget about it, so when […] they come and put the idea about it, but they do listen. 
Respondent 2: Yes. 
Respondent 3: Well as I said I am just new to this. I will not say yes or no because am just new. Just last year we went to Honduras and there 
is where I started. November last year [2017, three months prior to the interview date]. I will not complain. Just [last] month they  
took me to Cuba.  
Climate Knowledge 
 
Table 47: The nature and relative strength of various forms of detectable indicators of climate knowledge in Belize 
Subset Village A Posteriori Experiential 
Knowledge 
Gap Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Ya’axché 
Indian Creek 9 28% 4 13% 19 59% 32 
San Miguel 2 12% 0 0% 15 88% 17 
Trio 23 66% 3 9% 9 26% 35 
CCCCC Flowers Bank 10 71% 0 0% 4 29% 14 
Totals 44 45% 7 7% 47 48% 98 
 
Three of the five codes denoting knowledge are varyingly active in the dataset: Two in 
Flowers Bank and San Miguel and three in Indian Creek and Trio (see Table 47). Overall, 
knowledge gaps account for the greatest degree of prevalence (50 percent). However, it is only 
the dominant indicator of knowledge in San Miguel (88 percent) and Indian Creek (59 percent). 
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In Trio and Flowers Bank, knowledge gaps account for a quarter and 29 percent of the 
prevalence associated with knowledge, respectively. It is a posteriori or premium knowledge that 
accounts for the majority of prevalence in both contexts with similar levels of resonance (66 
percent and 71 percent, respectively). Excerpt 21 and 28 illustrate the operationalization of a 
posteriori knowledge in Trio and Flowers Bank, respectively, where it is greatest. Conversely, a 
posteriori knowledge or premium climate knowledge is lowest in San Miguel (12 percent), which 
is marked by low overall ideational exposure to climate change information but exhibits 
explicitly positive climate change agency.  
While a posteriori knowledge is also low in Indian Creek, it is more than twice the level 
in San Miguel, accounting for 28 percent of prevalence for knowledge. Indian Creek is also 
distinct in that it is one of only two villages where experiential knowledge (13 percent)—partly 
guided by project intervention—structures knowledge patterns, which improves the overall 
knowledge profile of the village (41 percent in Indian Creek compared to 28 percent in Trio). 
The experiential knowledge unit of analysis is significant in that it only registers in the two 
villages from the Ya’axché subset (Trio and Indian Creek) where segments of the population are 
directly engaged in practical climate change demonstration activities, which includes the 
provision of climate information, guidance/training and tangible resources. Further, both villages 
account for similar levels of prevalence for experiential knowledge overall (three of seven and 
four of seven, respectively) and comparable levels of resonance at the village level (nine percent 
compared to 13 percent, respectively).  
The implication is that there is likely a positive relationship between direct project 
engagement (chiefly, formal or structured), experiential knowledge (informal) and the 
development of accurate and/or substantial climate knowledge (a posteriori or premium). Excerpt 
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50 illustrates the possibility of this structuring relationship between the manifestly credible 
information provided by projects and experiential knowledge. The implication is that the limits 
and incapacitation of traditional knowledge, both as an independent and legitimate knowledge 
form (Adugna, 1996; Argawal, 1996; Reichel, 1993) and in relation to the unprecedented 
environmental change and variability (Showers, 1996; Zwahlen, 1996), may be attenuated by 
substantial, focused and targeted information provision. This is underscored by substantial 
concerns about the failure of agricultural techniques and practices that have been cultivated and 
effectively deployed for centuries, which puts those who are change averse or slow to change at 
an existential disadvantage (see Excerpts 51 and 60). 
Excerpt 50: Project intervention positively structures experiential knowledge. 
Older Men Cocoa Group Focus Group – Trio, Ya’axché Subset 
Interviewer: Have you ever heard of the term climate change? 
Respondent 1: Well for me I have heard about it. I don’t know how to say that [estimating the point of learning]. From a long time ago, I 
plant tomato, cabbage, watermelon, but from then I start to plant cocoa [and] now there is a problem. Long time ago when I started to 
plant tomato, cabbage there was not a lot of animals but when I try [to] plant a little bit now, a lot of animals, lot of sickness, and I noticed 
that sometimes it’s? and then it’s rainy and with the roots it’s like it’s cook?? when a lot of sun now and […] before it wasn’t like this. 
Respondent 2 & 3: Yes.  
Respondent 4: Yes. I heard about climate change. 
Interviewer: Where exactly did you hear about climate change? 
Respondent 1: Well, I heard from when I started to plant cocoa and that was when I started [to] know about how to use the chemical not 
like before I didn’t know about it but now started to hear how to use the chemicals and at the church. 
Respondent 2: Well, I have get (sic) to hear about it when we actually come as a group, as a cocoa group we have been attending a lot off  
training that is where I heard about it and […] in what I’ve [been] learning right now, [it] is the kind of work we’re doing [that] is taking care 
of the land, the soil, you know, because before people just fall and burn the place. They use pesticides. So, I think there is where I am 
learning the big change right now, not using fire or chemicals. I mean there is what I learn [that] the change [in] the nature from before and 
what I am learning in my cocoa, it is really a good working. I am not using burning. I am not using chemicals. 
 
Excerpt 51: Project intervention attenuates limits and incapacitations in traditional knowledge 
Older Men Focus Group - Indian Creek, Ya’axché Subset 
Interviewer: Where did you first hear of climate change? 
Respondent 1: Well, sometimes I attend a workshop, I forgot what the project name, but I went to attend a workshop. 
Respondent 2: Well, me too. I can’t recall which project mentioned about those climate change, but I know I have heard it. I have heard 
more or less.  
Respondent 3: Well, me, when I hear about climate change [was] with the project with Ya’axché conservation. That is the one that come up 
with this climate change system, we doesn’t (sic) know, but right now we are experiencing that. It is changing because you could see the 
weather right now. It is not supposed to be flood[ing], rainy; it is supposed to be dry season right now. We have followed that it is true that 
the climate is changing.  
Respondent 4: When I heard about it, we are getting to hear about it through Ya’axché conservation trust. They say we are having climate 
change now. 
Respondent 5:  Like how he [pointing at respondent three] said when the times comes for sunny and when it is time [to plant], no more 
rain.  
Interviewer: So, when you hear climate change, what does it mean to you?  Is there anything different about now that is different from back 
in the days? 
Respondent 1: That the weather changes when it is sunny season or rainy season, but sometimes it changes and sometimes it is not the 
time when it is supposed to be. 
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Respondent 2: What climate change means to me that nowadays, as you see, and as I was growing up when it is time for dry season it is 
time for dry season and now it is like it is mixed up with the rain and dry. So, you know that our crops is not coming up good; that 
sometimes rain and dry. 
Respondent 3: Well in my case or in my part, I know this is especially with the farm when coming to do the farm with the climate change for 
like how it stand [over the] last two years. The cocoa we produce, it in time like this season we already start to harvest the cocoa, but right 
now [late January 2018] we are not harvesting cocoa maybe till ending of March. That is the way how I noticed that this is climate change 
because before there was no ‘lot a cold’ like this for this area. That is a climate change for me or for the plants, for the people, you know; 
especially the cocoa right now. It is not producing due to the climate change right now. It got… especially, this month that just went, it is too 
much cold and it is affecting the plants. I think that is climate change that we are facing.  
 
However, varied combinations of age and gender correlates with knowledge levels, 
which is consistent with the male bias embedded in a targeted and sustained intervention because 
of its focus on a primarily male domain (farming and agro-forestry activities) in the contexts 
where the Ya’axché intervention is underway. This is exemplified by the fact that older women, 
who consistently show lower ideational levels, are the only cohort for which knowledge gaps 
account for the majority of prevalence associated with knowledge levels (nearly three-quarters, 
compared to 50 percent for young men, 48 percent for young women and 30 percent for older 
men). This is most pronounced among older women in Indian Creek and San Miguel where 
knowledge gap is most intractable (accounting for 85 percent and 75 percent of each cohort’s 
prevalence for knowledge, respectively). The knowledge gaps observed among women in these 
localities are consistent with discernible marginalization or disengagement under the existing 
targeted and selective climate intervention modalities underway in their villages. As Excerpt 49 
suggests, women in Indian Creek are tangentially engaged for service provision to Ya’axché 
(catering and ancillary work), which gives them some exposure by virtue of proximity and 
women in San Miguel are entirely disengaged such that all women in the sample population in 
the area report no familiarity with the term climate change—specifically, no recollection of 
hearing the term or being informed about its impacts. 
However, older women in Trio show no knowledge gap and their counterparts in Flowers 
Bank only record a third (one in three).  While there is no discernible evidence of direct 
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engagement, older women in Trio are distinctly more knowledgeable than their counterparts in 
the Ya’axché subset because of knowledge transfer due to the longer duration of the sustained, 
focused and targeted agro-forestry intervention underway in their community. This suggests that 
over time, even limited population level engagement accrues significant impact, which is 
consistent with the advantages of ecological models of behaviour change that privileges both 
people and place-based drivers of behaviour (Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz, 2008). 
Specifically, by engaging practitioners (farmers) in a domain (farming) of high import to all to 
resolve discernible challenges over a sustained period, Ya’axché’s resonant intervention frame 
accrued population wide knowledge advantages. Considering the limited scale of the intervention 
because of its resource-intensive and targeted nature, time is a consequential factor for the 
positive knowledge transference noted. This means the emphasis on scale in ecological 
approaches should be considered against time in forecasting the success of activities with sub-
maximal intervention levels.      
The comparable level of knowledge gap among older women from Flowers Bank with 
men overall means the age and gendered climate knowledge disadvantage associated with older 
women obtains in the Ya’axché subset rather than the population level intervention supported by 
the CCCCC through a largely female-led community institution in Flowers Bank. More broadly, 
a posteriori knowledge accounts for near identical levels of prevalence for all other groups: 52 
percent each for young women and older men and 50 percent for young men. Consistent with the 
observation that experiential knowledge is driven by ideational exposure and age acting in 
concert, older folks, primarily older men from Trio and Indian Creek (85 percent), account for 
the entirety of prevalence associated with experiential knowledge. The likely implication is that, 
what Cornwall (2002) calls the micro-politics of participation and engagement, which is 
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substantially structured by the in-built male inclusion bias of Ya’axché’s gendered domain 
engagement modality, is also subject to equally consequential structuring factors that are likely 
associated with situated practices, including media access and use.     
 Given distinctions in engagement patterns, particularly in the Ya’axché subset, there is 
need to probe climate knowledge acquisition sources to better understand how climate 
knowledge is being structured. This will aid in understanding why every cohort, except all older 
women in the subset besides those in Trio, exhibit highly similar levels of premium climate 
knowledge. Such a probe will also illuminate the climate knowledge distinctions noted among 
older women, specifically why those in both Trio and Flowers Bank do not exhibit the intractable 
levels of knowledge gaps and low a posteriori or premium climate knowledge observed in San 
Miguel and Indian Creek.   
Climate Change Knowledge Acquisition 
 
Table 48: The relative prevalence of initial sources of climate knowledge in Belize 
 
Per Table 48, eight of the 10 codes indicating initial source of climate change knowledge 
acquisition are active in the overall dataset in varying fashion across villages (seven in Trio, four 
in Flowers Bank and three in Indian Creek and San Miguel each). Overall, the three most 
manifestly credible sources of climate knowledge evident in the dataset are the most grounded or 
dominant: school at more than a third (34 percent), news at more than a fifth (22 percent) and 
project intervention at 15 percent relative prevalence. However, informal sources such as the 
grapevine (denoted by friends/peers/relatives) and observation each account for more than a 
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tenth of prevalence: 14 percent and 10 percent, respectively, with varying resonance across 
localities.  
In San Miguel, which is the only village where manifestly credible sources of initial 
knowledge acquisition do not account for the greater prevalence, the grapevine 
(Friends/Peers/Relatives) accounts for a half of the prevalence of all codes denoting initial source 
of climate change knowledge acquisition for the village and observation accounts for the same 
level of prevalence as news (one each or 25 percent each). This strongly correlates with 
conventional wisdom that older folks, who constitute the totality of the sample population for the 
village, tend to rely on traditional networks, practices and knowledge to make sense of the world. 
This is also supported by the data that shows that young people, specifically young men in 
Flowers Bank, only registered a single instance of prevalence for the grapevine (one of eight) 
and zero for observation. The high dependence on the grapevine and observation (75 percent of 
relative prevalence) as sources of climate knowledge in San Miguel, amidst a paucity of 
manifestly credible sources of climate knowledge, comports with the village’s distinction as 
having the highest level of knowledge gap in the entire dataset (88 percent).  
The connection between a lack of manifestly credible sources of climate knowledge and 
knowledge gaps in San Miguel is underscored by the weakness of the available information 
networks and general knowledge seeking disposition of the population, as illustrated by Excerpt 
52. It also highlights the fact that although indigenous knowledge, amenable through observation 
and sustained practice, is elemental to sustainable practices, it has limitations. However, these 
limitations are not confined to technical or capacity/utility exhaustion, as highlighted by Adugna 
(1996), Argawal (1996), Dore and Nogueira (1994), Showers (1996) and Zwahlen (1996), who 
point to the scale of contemporary environmental challenges, but even ideational gaps and 
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incapacitations that must be taken as a starting point for action and other forms of knowledge 
operationalization. 
Excerpt 52: A lack of manifestly credible climate sources results in dependence on weak information networks. 
Older Men Focus Group– San Miguel, Ya’axché Subset 
Interviewer: Where did you hear about it last year?  
Respondents 3: I have a brother who work[s] in government, who [is working on a] development in Belmopan right now. He talk[s] about it; 
he is from the government. Maybe they have meeting, so he come to me to tell the rest of the brothers that climate changes, it [sic] already 
coming. Maybe too much dry or too much rain. I don’t know what it brings, so last year I get to hear it before. I don’t hear about it. 
Interviewer: I understand. So, would you like to learn more about climate change? 
Respondents 1: Yeah, I want to know what would be next for the climate. 
Interviewer: And where did you first hear about climate change? 
Respondents 1: Well, actually, we are working up the hydro-mile, right in our group [and] we take a break and we discuss about it and we 
talk about it and I think they see it on internet with the weather and from there I find out. 
Interviewer: What group are you working in? What is a hydro-mile? 
Respondents 1: Hydro-mile, it [is] just a part time job. It is a company that produce electricity. 
 
In all other villages, which exhibit at least twice as much prevalence for premium climate 
knowledge as San Miguel, manifestly credible sources of climate knowledge account for at least 
two-thirds of the relative prevalence for climate change knowledge acquisition, specifically: 84 
percent in Indian Creek (26 percent and 58 percent for project intervention and school, 
respectively); 70 percent in Flowers Bank (50 percent and 20 percent for news and school, 
respectively) and 69 percent in Trio, the village with the widest array of active codes (31 percent, 
25 percent and 13 percent for school, project intervention and news, respectively).  
School, which is the single most grounded indicator, only ranks first in Indian Creek and 
Trio as initial knowledge sources, while news, the second most grounded indicator overall, is 
only ranked first in Flowers Bank. Consistent with the contextual variation in initial sources of 
knowledge, project intervention, which is the third most grounded indicator, is only active in two 
villages (Indian Creek and Trio) and does not account for the majority of prevalence in any. In 
fact, it ranks second in both with identical levels of prevalence of 26 percent and 25 percent, 
respectively. It is significant that the project intervention does not figure as an initial source of 
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climate knowledge in Flowers Bank, the village with the highest level of premium climate 
knowledge, while it is equally operable in Indian Creek and Trio.  
The similarity in the relatively low levels of knowledge gaps in both Trio and Flowers 
Bank (a quarter and 29 percent, respectively), as well as relatively high and comparable levels of 
premium climate knowledge (66 percent and 71 percent), suggest the nature of the climate 
knowledge acquisition sources is significant. Specifically, Trio, which has access to the widest 
tapestry of initial climate knowledge acquisition sources, has the lowest level of knowledge gaps 
in the dataset. However, Flowers Bank, which depends on initial climate knowledge acquisition 
modalities that are more enduring (news) and comprehensive (news and schooling) than a 
domain specific project-oriented information provision mechanism, has the highest level of 
premium climate knowledge and is only narrowly outstripped by Trio for having the lowest level 
of climate knowledge gaps.  
Moreover, the primacy of news (chiefly radio and television in these localities) as a 
knowledge acquisition modality in Flowers Bank and its absence from the dataset for the 
Ya’axché subset further underscores the observation of the significance of the nature of 
manifestly credible climate acquisition sources, particularly their scope, frequency and 
accessibility. As established in the previous chapter, whereas the project intervention presents 
climate change with issue, context and domain specificity that narrows the scope of knowledge 
provided, news coverage of climate change as a translating process from scientific to public 
audiences (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2011) is current, more general and descriptive of a wider range 
of issues, domains and contexts.  
So, information provision mechanisms function akin to multilevel and single-level 
interventions, where the former conforms with the more nascent ecologic view of effectively 
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enabling behaviour change. This observation is also supported by the fact that San Miguel, which 
exhibits the highest level of prevalence for manifestly credible sources of initial climate 
knowledge, is also the village with the second lowest level of climate knowledge and primarily 
cites a distal and past source that is no longer accessible (schools – 58 percent). The village so 
decisively relies on this initial source of knowledge that it accounts for more than twice their 
dependence on their only other current credible source, which is a domain specific modality (the 
project intervention at 26 percent).          
There are also significant cohort-level distinctions across the localities in climate 
knowledge acquisition that further illuminates the climate knowledge distinctions observed. 
Overall, young people and older folks account for comparable levels of prevalence associated 
with manifestly credible sources of climate change knowledge acquisition (52 percent and 48 
percent, respectively). However, the sources vary significantly. Young people account for just 
short of the totality (95 percent) of prevalence associated with school, which is consistent with 
the relatively recent introduction of climate change in the Belizean curriculum. Even the 
remaining prevalence is attributable to a male in the older cohort (Flowers Bank) who is on the 
younger end of the spectrum. Whereas, older folks account for more than three-quarters (77 
percent) of the prevalence associated with news and the entirety of prevalence associated with 
project intervention.  
While the overall data suggests men have vastly greater access to credible sources of 
information about climate change because they account for two-third of the prevalence 
associated with manifestly credible sources of information (28 of 42 – 12 for school, nine for 
project intervention and seven for news), a more granular look suggests a more durable age 
rather than gendered dynamic. Young women account for the same level of prevalence associated 
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with news as young men (15 percent each) and comparable levels for school (40 percent for 
young women compared to 55 percent for young men). In fact, it is older women who are most 
deprived of access to credible information: a mere tenth of prevalence for manifestly credible 
sources, all of which is associated with the older women of Flowers Bank. This reinforces the 
observation that access to manifestly credible climate knowledge acquisition sources that offer 
comprehensive information in a sustained fashion is more efficacious because older women in 
Flowers Bank do not exhibit the same intractable levels of knowledge gaps and low premium 
climate knowledge observed among their peers overall in the Ya’axché subset.  
It further clarifies the heightened ideational disadvantages of older women overall that 
have been observed. Their narrow access to manifestly credible sources of climate knowledge 
contrasts with all other cohorts for whom credible knowledge acquisition sources account for at 
least two-and-a-half times as much relative prevalence: approximately one-third for older men 
(36 percent) and young men (31 percent) and a quarter for young women (24 percent). Older 
men also account for the entirety of prevalence associated with project intervention as a source 
of climate knowledge acquisition, which further underscores the observation that they have had a 
higher or more credible level of ideational exposure, which, as established in the subsequent 
section, is evidenced by the cohort accounting for a vastly greater portion of the prevalence for 
signs/indicators and a wider array of indicators.     
As observed earlier, the knowledge deficit associated with older women is absent from 
Flowers Bank, which is the only village not included in the Ya’axché subset and was exposed to 
a different project, one that targeted a community in general and is largely managed by women.  
In this context, the data shows a more balanced distribution of prevalence associated with 
manifestly credible sources across cohorts: older women, young men and young women each 
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account for 21 percent of the prevalence for manifestly credible sources. So, while the overall 
knowledge deficit among older women offers very narrow support for the consensus in the extant 
literature that women often exhibit lower technical knowledge about environmental concerns—
11 of 16 studies reviewed by Davidson and Freundenburg (1996), the operable factors are most 
likely situational (access, engagement and availability) rather than a lack of motive or a 
knowledge seeking disposition (see sub-sections on agency and motive) as implied by these 
findings.  
Furthermore, while these situational factors manifest in knowledge distinctions that 
supports Tichenor, Donohue & Olien’s (1970) knowledge gap hypothesis, in terms of 
information or knowledge advantages rather than economic, the consonance of the nature and 
scope of information provision modalities even when manifestly credible substantially delimits 
even more recent incarnations of this hypothesis (Boykoff, 2011; Yang & Ho,2017). Place of 
worship, village meeting and extreme events are the only other active codes denoting climate 
change knowledge acquisition sources in the overall dataset and they each register single 
instances of prevalence in circumscribed localities and groups: older men in Trio for the first two 
and older women from Flowers Bank for the third (extreme events).    
 A closer look at the nature and range of signs and indicators, a measure of climate 
knowledge and operationalization, strongly suggests that the climate knowledge distinctions 
observed are associated with the nature, scope, and duration of climate information provision and 
availability. Comparatively, the prevalence of signs and indicators of climate change in both 
villages is on par with what is observed in the Fijian villages with weaker climate ideational 
exposure, and the Indian dataset, which is also marked by ideational deficits. 
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Signs and Indicators 
 
Table 49: The relative prevalence of signs and indicators of climate change in Belize 
 
Nearly 80 percent of the total prevalence (65) associated with signs and indicators is 
accounted for by the larger Ya’axché subset. However, only seven of the 13 codes denoting signs 
and indicators are varyingly evident in the overall dataset. Per Table 49, they are: Weather (54), 
Crop Yield/Soil Health (28), Pollution (17), Health (12), Fish Stock (four), Soil erosion (three) 
and Forest Fires (one). The primarily agricultural lens through which concerns about weather 
changes are expressed, alongside pronounced concerns about crop yield/soil health and notable 
references to fish stock underscores a primarily food security climate change perceptual frame. 
Excerpt 53 typifies the food security frame. The consistency with which both weather and crop 
yield/soil health feature as chief perceptual markers of climate change and variability across all 
localities underscores this observation. This means food security is a critical frame for the 
enactment of efforts to optimize climate knowledge and enable action in these contexts. 
Excerpt 53: Climate Change is perceived through a strong food security frame. 
Older Men Focus Group – Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset 
Interviewer: Have you ever heard the term climate change? 
Respondent 1: […] Especially in the weather pattern. Because… in the past, we use to depend on the weather; especially the rainfall to take  
care [of] some of the crop[s]. Like this year right here…usually in December [or] January, you get reasonable amount of rain that would keep 
the soil moist and…and this year, here, it hadn’t (sic) rain for almost a mouth. It got so dry that…it affects the  
crop, which is unusual. So that is what I call like the climate change. You can’t…the weather pattern is not like before…that you know that 
rain would come January [or] February…and then it start[s] deteriorate. And then you go in into March and you go into May and then it gets 
dry…and then it maybe it starts to rain June [or] July…But um… you can’t depend on that anymore. Because when you look…when you were 
hoping to see dry its rain and when you look when you hope you would see dry that is when it brings rain. […] 
Interviewer: What about you? Have you heard of the term “Climate Change”? 
Respondent 2:  Oh yeah! Its… It’s like a buzz word now. 
Interviewer: Aha? 
Respondent 2: Yes! […] I have noticed the changes in weather pattern. Like for instance, we use to do milpa farming. Right, so, January, late  
January onto early February you would start cutting down the forest to make your milpa…you and then, you would burn in May and so on, 
get ready for the rain in the end of May [to] early June. But that has changed now. The…you can maybe cut milpa the whole year round 
because you get a small amount of rain and then like you get more dry (sic), dry season than rainy season. And, so, like people who are 
 362 
 
farming now, have to adjust themselves or you have to be depending on maybe have some kind of water source because you can’t really be 
dependent on the weather like before. So, these are some of things that we notice about the weather. And we out here try to study the 
weather a lot right…so we can adjust ourselves to suit the weather… so that we can grow our crops…and you know?  
Interviewer: What’s “milpa Farming”? 
Respondent 2: That’s like, we…we’d call it plantation! You’ll plant your rice, your cocoa, your plantain. Everything.  
Interviewer: Oh...Multi-cropping? [But slash and burn is done in preparation]. 
Respondent 2: Right. 
 
Weather, pollution and crop yield account for the top three most grounded signs and 
indicators of climate change across all villages in both subsets, except San Miguel where the 
sample population is distinct: older folks who rank weather, health and crop yield as their 
primary sign/indicators of climate change (50 percent, 38 percent prevalence and 13 percent, 
respectively). So significant an indicator/sign of climate change is weather among the study 
population, which depends on rainfed agriculture, that it accounts for at least half of the 
prevalence for the code in all villages (60 percent in Indian Creek, 56 percent in Flowers Bank 
and 50 percent in San Miguel), except Trio. In Trio, weather accounts for approximately a third 
of relative prevalence, alongside the broadest array of signs/indicators across all villages (six of 
seven codes versus five in Flowers Bank and three each in San Miguel and Indian Creek). The 
broader array of signs/indicators in Trio suggests higher ideational exposure. This is consistent 
with the village’s distinction for having the lowest knowledge gap, second highest level of 
premium climate knowledge and widest array of manifestly credible initial sources of climate 
knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, even though some signs are contextual, as noted below, the 
totality of signs associated with each locality from highest to lowest correlates directly with each 
village’s rank in terms of knowledge gaps (lowest to highest).  
So, Flowers Bank, which ranks second to Trio in terms of the number of signs/indicators 
perceived, also ranks second to Trio for having lower levels of knowledge gaps. As observed in 
the previous subsection, Flowers Bank also primarily depends on news, a current and readily 
accessible source of manifestly credible climate change information that generally spans a range 
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of domains. Conversely, San Miguel and Indian Creek, which have the highest levels of 
knowledge gaps (triple and double, respectively, the average for Trio and Flowers Bank) 
perceive the least range of signs/indicators, approximately half the range perceived in Trio and 
Flowers Bank. Both villages also have circumscribed access to manifestly credible sources of 
climate knowledge: an overwhelming dependence on a distal source that is no longer accessible 
(school) in Indian Creek and the absence of credible sources altogether in San Miguel. This 
strongly underscores the import of a quality factor (nature and scope) to be included in the 
knowledge gap hypothesis for it to be more relevant in understanding how information provision 
mechanisms are likely to structure climate knowledge and operationalization.    
 Crop yield/soil health, the second most grounded indicator/sign of climate change 
accounts for a more consistent level of prevalence than weather across villages, except San 
Miguel, as indicated above. This reinforces the primacy and consistency of the food security 
climate change perceptual frame in these contexts. The indicator accounts for more than a 
quarter (27 percent) of relative prevalence in Trio and more than a fifth in both Flowers Bank 
and Indian Creek (22 percent and 21 percent, respectively). Pollution, the third most grounded 
sign/indicator, varyingly grounded across villages due to contextual factors as illustrated by 
Excerpt 9. Pollution accounts for the same level of relative prevalence in the dataset for both 
Indian Creek and Trio (18 percent each), where the indiscriminate aerial spraying of pesticides 
by a neighbouring agro-industrial corporation is the focus of heightened community concern 
about health and safety. Elsewhere, pollution only accounts for seven percent in Flowers Bank 
and zero in San Miguel. Health, which rounds off the four most grounded signs/indicators in the 
dataset, varies from a high of 38 percent in San Miguel to 14 percent in Trio and a mere four in 
Flowers Bank and zero in Indian Creek.      
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While the high prevalence of health as a sign/indicator in San Miguel is likely a reflection 
of the sampling distinction (only older men and women) that highlights an older demographic’s 
heightened susceptibility to maladies with age, explicitly contextual and knowledge factors 
account for health’s significant relative prevalence in Trio. As Excerpt 55 shows, even amidst 
substantial climate knowledge limitations there is heightened concern about and direct linkage of 
climate change and increased diseases in the village. This comports with anticipated climate 
change-induced increases in vector borne disease, airborne allergens caused by higher 
concentrations of pollen and moulds (Taylor, Chen, Bailey, 2009). Airborne allergens can 
contain potentially infectious organisms and allergenic plant material which exacerbate asthma 
and allergies, especially for vulnerable members of the community. These impacts are already 
manifesting in Belize, with the spread of newly emerging vector-borne diseases such as 
chikungunya and the heightened prevalence of others such as malaria and dengue. Furthermore, 
the risks to food security and water quality observed in the dataset also have manifest health 
implications of a heightened fashion for an older demographic that is dependent on a fraying 
collective order (see Excerpts 72 and 73) for subsistence. This means both contextual and 
knowledge valences structure the perception of climate change signs and indicators, which is 
reinforced by the three remaining active codes.  
Excerpt 54: Contextual developments often structures signs, including over determinate forms such as Agro-industrial pollution in Trio. 
Older Men Focus Group - Trio, Ya’axché, Subset 
Interviewer: Is there anybody in the community that you think is more affected by climate change or is it the same? 
Respondent 1: Ahh, well that is what all of us feel the changes, where we at the field with other farmers, there’s we suffer sun, we suffer 
water and all of we suffer these. 
Interviewer: And what do you think? 
Respondent 4: Well, for me let’s say like that question you are making, what I see and what I know and what I have lived and also where I 
work. It is more in the farms, the past year they were applying nematicides. 
Respondent: Its goes to the water, then diseases come from there. 
Respondent 4: And also to the creeks, the drainage, so there [onwards it] will go to the river. See the disease that affected last year. 
Respondent 2: On their eyes, pure blood. Where [did] it came (sic) from up? The plane! 
Respondent 1: Came from the air to the creek, affects the fish and then no more fishes (sic). Aha, no more fishes (sic), but drought. 
Interviewer: So, you were saying everybody is affected the same? 
Respondent 1: Yes. 
Interviewer: […] Who does the airplane spray[ing]? Spraying [from] the airplane? 
Respondent 2: The spraying, well the truth is that we do not know who. 
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Respondent 3: Before it was for [agro-industrial producer A (name redacted)]. 
Respondent 1: But now it is for [agro-industrial producer B (name redacted)]. 
 
Excerpt 55: Heightened concerns about direct links between weather changes and increased maladies. 
Older Women Focus Group – San Miguel, Ya’axché Subset 
Interviewer: Is there anything happening in the village that you think with the weather that is different?  
Respondent 1: Only when it is cold now.  
Interviewer: What do you think is causing that? 
Respondent 1: I don’t know what is causing it. 
Interviewer: Is that causing any problem in the village? 
Respondent 1: No. I don’t think so. I think it only bring[s] sickness, [which] it is causing to our kids. 
Respondent 2: The same thing when it brings sickness, but we can’t help it. 
Respondent 3: The same thing because you see when it’s cold like this it brings a lot of things and if you don’t pay attention to something, it 
will hurt you more because it is cold. 
 
Fish stock, forest fires and soil erosion are entirely grounded in distinct localities and are 
accounted for by specific population groups in those areas. Fish stock, which accounts for three 
percent of the prevalence for signs/indicators, is only active in Trio and is entirely accounted for 
by older men (both directly (25 percent) and indirectly (75 percent) engaged by the project), who 
explicitly draw upon both experiential knowledge and distinct contextual challenges with 
pollution to underscore observed diminution in fish stock. Similarly, older men in this locality 
account for the single instance of prevalence in the data associated with Forest Fires (one 
percent). Flowers Bank accounts for the entirety of the three percent prevalence observed for soil 
erosion. In all instances it is associated with land loss along the banks of the sections of the 
Belize River on which the village rests. Similarly, two distinct groups in this locality account for 
this level of prevalence: young women (two-thirds) and older women (one-third). Overall, men 
(primarily older men) account for a vastly greater portion of the prevalence for signs/indicators. 
They also register prevalence for the widest array of perceived markers of climate change in the 
dataset (six of seven, compared to five for young women, four for older women and three for 
young men). This is indicative of higher ideational exposure as both older men and young 
women have the highest level of premium climate knowledge and perceive a higher number of 
signs/indicators of climate change.  
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However, older men, who have relatively greater access to current, manifestly credible 
sources of climate knowledge, accounting for the entirety of prevalence associated with project 
intervention and more than a third for news (36 percent), perceive slightly more signs than young 
women who overwhelmingly depend on a distal source that is no longer accessible (school). This 
is significant as the perception of signs and indicators is a crucial indicator of knowledge 
mobilization, which is likely more effective and substantial where knowledge sources are current 
and substantial.  
While men overall (primarily older men), account for nearly two-thirds (or 76 of 119 – 58 
of which are accounted for by older men alone) of the prevalence for the theme, all other cohorts 
account for comparable levels of prevalence (older women: 23; young women and young men: 
18) and young women, who have the same level of premium climate knowledge as older men, 
narrowly outstrip young men. This is also reinforced by the fact that Trio, the village with the 
most organized, comprehensive and sustained climate change-oriented activity, which is 
primarily focused on engagement within a domain dominated by older men (climate smart agro-
forestry farming), shows the greatest degree of gendered and overall cohort disparity in terms of 
prevalence for climate change signs/indicators. Older men (direct and indirect beneficiaries) 
account for more than 60 percent (35 of 56) of the prevalence for the theme in the village, 
compared to Flowers Bank, where young women account for half of the theme’s prevalence, 
alongside older men and older women who are equally matched at 25 percent each and Indian 
Creek, where older men, young men and young women account for similar levels of prevalence 
(nine, eight and seven, respectively). Even in San Miguel, where only older men and women 
were sampled, there is relatively similar levels of prevalence (five and three, respectively). So, 
the overall gendered disparity noted is largely accounted for by Trio, which has the most 
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comprehensive and sustained engagement programme, including a dedicated institutionalized 
mechanism for the management of an agro-forestry concession area within a critical nature 
reserve. This suggests the nature of the sustained and comprehensive engagement process in 
Trio, one of only two villages where the intervention is an initial source of climate information, 
is a differentiating factor that accrues knowledge operationalization advantages.  
An assessment of the range of perceived climate actions underway in the villages relative 
to the array declared by the interventions is likely to clarify the efficacy of the nature of 
information provision and broader engagement modalities. It will illuminate why the same level 
of knowledge operationalization observed for the identification of signs and indicators is absent 
from the dataset for Indian Creek, where project intervention is also a primary credible initial 
source, as well as the absence of knowledge operationalization distinctions among primary 
beneficiaries in Flowers Bank (older women).  
Nonetheless, the observance of a durable and dominant food security frame that is widely 
perceived across localities and cohorts, as well as the discernibility of other compelling 
contextual signs/indicators, even where climate knowledge is limited, comports with indigenous 
“articulations of struggles to sustain environmental identity and heritage in the face of threats to 
the physical resources that shape their living ecology and the threats to values, beliefs, 
behaviours, histories, and languages” (Anchorage Declaration, 2009, cited in Figueroa, 2011, p. 
232)). This is in stark contrast with the primarily western and urban extant literature that casts 
communicating climate change as distinctly challenging because of the presumed “invisibility of 
causes, distant impacts and a lack of immediacy and direct experience of impacts” (Moser, 
2010). This means probing the nature of perceived climate actions in relation with the contextual 
and knowledge structured distinctions in signs may also clarify a productive course of action. 
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Specifically, the comparative analysis will further clarify multiple resonant frames and messages 
for specific cohorts and localities that Nisbet (2009) suggest can optimize understanding, 
knowledge operationalization and action. 
Climate Action 
 
Table 50: The relative prevalence of climate actions identified by study populations in Belizean villages 
 
A half of the 18 markers of climate action are active in the overall data for the Belize case 
(see Table 50). All nine active codes are evident in the Ya’axché subset but only one, inaction, is 
active in the CCCCC subset (Flowers Bank). This is significant, as inaction indicates that the 
sample population does not know that there is climate change action underway or was conducted 
in their community. Per Excerpt 56, this is even evident in instances where they were directly 
engaged and lead coordination of activities at the cohune nut production facility. This is 
indicative of the nature and quality of the ideational component of the activity.    
 While Flowers Bank is the only village where inaction accounts for the entirety of 
prevalence for climate change action, it is the most grounded indicator of action in all villages 
(41 percent in Indian Creek and a third in San Miguel), except Trio, where the level of 
organization and texture of sign and indicators suggests higher and more sustained engagement, 
which boosts ideational levels. But even in Trio, agroforestry, which accounts for half of the 
prevalence for climate action in the village, only narrowly outstrips Inaction (38 percent). 
Beekeeping, which accounts for 12 percent of prevalence in Trio, is the only other active code in 
the dataset for the locality. These three factors (inaction, agroforestry and beekeeping) also 
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figure in the top three most grounded actions in Indian Creek, the only other village where the 
project intervention discernibly structures climate knowledge, but in a different order.  
The three factors (Inaction - 41 percent, Agroforestry - 26 percent and Beekeeping -12 
percent) also feature alongside the broadest array of active codes denoting climate change 
activity in the overall dataset (six). Planting trees (nine percent) and bird conservation and school 
clean-ups (six percent each) are the other active codes. San Miguel, which is also marked by a 
relatively higher number of active codes denoting climate change activity in their locality (five of 
nine), shows a distinct order of resonance for actions that are more evenly distributed. While 
inaction is its most resonant indicator with prevalence of a third, the second and third most 
grounded actions (agroforestry and multi-cropping) each account for more than a fifth of 
prevalence. Similarly, river buffer and taboo/no take, which are the only other actions with 
prevalence in the subset each account for approximately a tenth (11 percent each).   
 Overall, the data suggests men are vastly more aware of specific climate change actions 
underway in the localities studied in Belize, primarily because project engagement is largely 
framed around their culturally defined work. Overall, men account for more than two-thirds of 
the specified climate change actions evident in the dataset (all of which are in the Ya’axché 
subset). This is a significant gendered disparity as older men and younger men account for nearly 
identical levels of prevalence for this indicator (14 versus 13) and both outstrip their female 
peers (older women - seven, young women - six). Trio is the only village where this gendered 
disparity is not observed. While men, who account for a significantly greater portion of the 
sample in Trio and invariably account for a greater degree of prevalence associated with 
specified actions (62 percent), a more granular look shows a more even distribution across 
groups. Both sets of men (direct and indirect beneficiaries) account for 24 percent each; women 
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(young and older) each account for 19 percent and young men account for 14 percent. This is in 
part due to the direct engagement of young women through beekeeping in the village, which has 
discernible climate-adaptive elements (see Excerpt 57). 
Consistent with the observation that ideational exposure is a determinative feature of 
climate change interventions in people’s ability to articulate signs/indicators, actions, cause and 
other variables, older men who tend to be the primary beneficiaries of the project, account for the 
least level of prevalence associated with inaction (10 percent), which is entirely accounted for by 
a group of indirect beneficiaries in Trio. All other groups in the Ya’axché subset account for 
comparable levels of prevalence for inaction: older women - a third, young women - 30 percent 
and young men - more than one-quarter (27 percent). Against the backdrop of the complete 
absence of perceived climate action in Flowers Bank, where a dual livelihoods and energy 
climate initiative is underway, the high prevalence and first order rank of inaction in all contexts 
except Trio strongly indicate that the endogenous origins of these scaled actions that reflect 
strategic regional climate response priorities do not preclude them from structural limitations that 
manifest in engagement practices and ideational deficits.  
With respect to Flowers Bank, the data strongly suggests a clear separation of the two 
components: livelihood (adaptation) and renewable energy (adaptation and mitigation) and the 
absence of an information provision mechanism that cauterizes the potential transformative 
impacts of a conceptually comprehensive intervention that tackles both the root cause of climate 
change (fossil fuel consumption) and boosts adaptive capacity to navigate climate impacts. The 
implication is that the intervention in Flowers Bank boosts adaptive capacity but from an entirely 
subsistence or economic frame. 
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 The manifestation of an economistic and subsistence frame where an endogenously 
conceived initiative ought to have enabled transformation adds credence to Webster and 
Engberg-Pederson’s (2002, cited in Holland, Brockles and Abugre, 2004) critical distinction 
between strategies by the disadvantaged to access resources and those that influence policy 
design and implementation with redistributive and equity motives. So palpable are the 
knowledge operationalization deficits induced by the absence of an information provision 
mechanism that directly engaged respondents do not even perceive the production of smokeless 
charcoal from a renewable source (naturally harvested cohune) as a climate-smart outcome of 
their upgraded facility. These negative ideational outcomes limit the population’s ability to fully 
grasp and effectively structure the transformations made possible by the intervention because 
information and communication are pre-requisites for creating entry points for transforming 
social structures (Dutta, 2011). So, while the project is marked by endogenous origins rather than 
exogenous pre-determination, it manifests in a manner consistent with what Masaki (2004) 
observes as the instrumentalization of participation in development processes that undermines 
grassroots impulses.      
Conversely, what obtains in the Ya’axché subset is a product of the narrow reach of a 
variably targeted, sustained and comprehensive intervention across localities (see Excerpt 49). 
Through this modality, groups engaged for longer periods (older men) and localities where 
multiple cohorts or groups are engaged (older men and young women in Trio), exhibit 
knowledge advantages, including knowledge mobilization (perception of signs/indicators and 
actions). Trio’s distinction on these measures is underscored by the fact that its directly engaged 
cohorts, particularly the self-mobilized cocoa and coffee farmers, constitute Ya’axché’s initial 
pilot group, which means they have had decisively more exposure tailored to their specific crop 
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focus (see Excerpt 13) or distinct domain of interest (see Excerpt 57). This offers reinforcement 
of the inference drawn earlier about climate knowledge transference patterns in Trio over time 
and the contention that the emphasis on scale in ecological approaches should be considered 
against time in forecasting the success of activities with sub-maximal intervention levels.  
 The fissures in climate knowledge and its operationalization, as well as the limitations of 
the intervention’s information provision mechanism both clarify critical targeted audiences and 
their climate information needs, as well as illuminate the nature and conditions under which 
information provision mechanisms can be effective in boosting knowledge operationalization at 
multiple levels (population and cohort levels). Knowledge operationalization, such as the 
perception of signs/indicators and identification of actions, is critical for enabling effective 
climate responses. Probing other markers of knowledge mobilization, such as cause and 
proximity, is therefore likely to further clarify the utility and limits of the existing information 
provision mechanism and critical leverage points and frames for optimizing climate knowledge 
and action in these contexts. Cause and proximity are particularly important given the 
observation that climate change is primarily perceived through a food security frame in these 
contexts. 
Excerpt 56:  Subsistence and economic frame devoid of Information undermines awareness of climate action even among the engaged 
 Young Women Focus Group - Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset  
Interviewer: [Is] there any climate change work taking place in your village?  
Respondent 2: I don’t think so. 
Respondent 1, 2, 3 &4: No. 
Interviewer: No. You’re [pointing at Respondent 1] in training to do the Cohune project, right? [Respondent 1 nods affirmatively]. Do you 
think that has anything to do with climate change? Yes, or no? What do you think? 
Respondent 1: Well…I don’t know. I am not sure.  
 
Excerpt 57: Sustained engagement around focused activities boosts perception of signs and accrues knowledge operationalization advantages. 
Young Women Focus Group – Trio, Ya’axché Subset  
Interviewer: Are you involved with anything Ya’axché doing in the village? 
Respondents 1, 2 & 3: Yes. 
Respondent 4: No. 
Interviewer: What do you do with Ya’axché? 
Respondent 1: Beekeeping. 
Respondent 2: Well, in the school, in beekeeping  
Respondent 3: Beekeeping. too. 
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Respondent 4: Nothing.  
Interviewer: What does Ya’axché do with you with the beekeeping? 
Respondent 1: Well, we gather for us to know about beekeeping and they help in giving the box where they keep the bees. 
Interviewer: And that’s what all of you do with Ya’axché? 
Respondents 1 & 2: Yes.  
Interviewer: Is there anything about climate change that Ya’axché is doing? 
Respondent 1: I think it is with the beekeeping, like the food for the bee. Like when it’s flowering time, the flower is there for them to feed 
on. 
Respondent 2: Well, I don’t know. 
Interviewer: Is Ya’axché doing anything on climate change in the village? 
Respondent 1: I don’t know, but maybe they are with the farmers that plant cocoa.  
Respondent 2: Well, I don’t know.  
Respondent 3: I don’t know. Maybe.  
Respondent 4: I don’t know.  
Interviewer: Are you familiar with the concession area? 
Respondent 1: Yes, we know a little bit.  
Respondent 2, 3, 4 & 5: Yes.  
Interviewer: Do you think that has to do with climate change? 
Respondent 1: When I hear that, it is about the people who are planting cocoa. They save their land; they don’t kill the animals; they don’t 
use chemicals in their farm.  
Respondent 2: Well it is the same thing on what she said.  
Respondent 3: Same thing.  
 
 
Excerpt 58: Sustained and focused engagement among the self-mobilized accrues knowledge mobilization advantages in Trio. 
Older Men Cocoa Group – Trio, Ya’axché Subset  
Interviewer: So, does Ya’axché talk to you guys about climate change […]? 
Respondent 1: Yes, we understand a lot, but we have not do [sic] it now, until now we are talking about that. 
Interviewer: […] He [respondent 2] was telling us some of the things Ya’axché has being working on. So, now, what are the activities you are 
doing in the forest, with whatever you are working on with Ya’axché? Can tell me? 
Respondent 4: Well, our activity is that one [cocoa planting/agro-forestry.] We have been saying that. 
Respondent 2: That we are working in the sense on the plan that the forestry and the minister has advise us how we should handle and cut 
down all trees [in the] forest. Always to leave 50 percent per say. 
Respondent 5: We are trying to work out that plan and to see, as how I said, we are just starting just getting to the third year [2015 to 
2018], and now I am not sure if we can see the changes but there we are getting step-by-step. 
Interviewer: Yes, and you are working in the same thing. Is there another, you are not a member of the cacao group. You are a member of 
the group of the community. Ahh, I see. So, OK. […] Do you think Ya’axché is doing a great job yes or no that? 
Respondent 4: Well, for me, I saw it and I think it work[ed] quite good [sic]; and about the mountains, we started to work and Ya’axché 
came and we plant cocoa. So, the Forestry [Department of Central Government] said [named of Respondent 4 redacted], you cut down 
trees to plant cocoa, so you have to plant some in return as well, but not doing now because [I] am not cutting down trees. Now I have to 
cut down some trees because there is too much shadow and [with] too much shadow the cocoa doesn’t [sic] grow good [sic]. Now there is 
some cocoa, and these are clean, so you can see if the cocoa is growing and the trees. [Then] I [will] see if [it] is good job about Ya’axché. 
[Crosstalk] 
Respondent 3: Well, with what I see now I think yes, I would say that it is a good starting, like how I said there are things I don’t know, in 
many lives and people had brought to us, so like the mind understand a little better and is see that on Ya’axché. 
Interviewer: What are some good results you are seeing? 
Respondent 3: Well the results are that let’s say like how I say not to work anymore at the company but to work on our own, not to use 
chemicals, use everything organic, let say like when I go to the company, I have always work temporally there and it is very different, aha  
because the forest would not feel the fumes of the poison rather good air, what we do there we feel it a lot, the changes there are 
sometimes, like in the summer here, is too much heat and in the company, we cannot stand it, when we go to the forests how we feel here 
now so it feels there. 
Interviewer: And [do] you think Ya’axché is doing a good job? Yes, or no. 
Respondent 2: Yes, it’s OK. It’s a change now for us. It’s a protection for plant and trees. 
Interviewer: Sure. 
Respondent 5: Well, I think yes because I have some meetings with Ya’axché group and the intentions are very good. In addition, also to the 
community and I have seen the help in the Cocoa Group. They helped. I live in the highway and I see them very frequently that they are 
enhancing the interest in helping the group and the community. It is very interesting and very good what they do. 
Interviewer: […] Did Ya’axché ask you about your opinion before they develop the project or did they just come and say let’s do this? 
Respondent 4: Well, we started to plant cocoa but first we planned to plant coffee from the first time. So, we leave coffee to plant cocoa, 
after we talked with Forestry and Ya’axché, we decided for cocoa. Look at me, Ya’axché help[ed] me a lot. For example, they built a bridge 
to cross the river to take out the cocoa harvested like in two years. 
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Interviewer: So, the idea to plant cacao, [it] is yours, not Ya’axché? 
Respondent 3: Yes. 
Respondent 4: Yes, it’s our idea. 
 
Cause and Proximity 
 
Table 51: The relative prevalence of perceived causes of climate change across study populations in Belize. 
Subset Village God/Religion Humans International Local National Nature Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Ya’axché 
Indian 
Creek 0 0% 3 30% 2 20% 1 10% 2 20% 2 20% 10 
San 
Miguel 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 2 
Trio  2 3% 29 46% 2 3% 29 46% 1 2% 0 0% 63 
CCCCC Flowers Bank 5 23% 6 27% 0 0% 6 27% 0 0% 5 23% 22 
Totals 7 7% 38 39% 4 4% 36 37% 3 3% 9 9% 97 
 
All six codes associated with cause and proximity are active varyingly in the overall 
dataset (see Table 51). Even in the Ya’axché subset, where all codes are active, five are 
registered in Trio and Indian Creek each, but only one registers in San Miguel. In Flowers Bank, 
four codes associated with the theme are active. Overall, human and local action account for the 
greatest degree of prevalence associated with cause and proximity, accounting for 39 percent and 
37 percent, respectively. Nature is the only other analytical unit to register in at least three 
villages in the subset. Attribution of cause to humans ranks first in terms of prevalence in all 
villages except San Miguel, where nature accounts for the entirety of the prevalence for cause 
and proximity. Although attribution of responsibility is overwhelmingly attributed to human 
activity across the majority of villages, which is consistent with scientific consensus, this is to 
varying degrees. In both Trio and Flowers Bank, human activity ranks first in terms of 
prevalence alongside local activities (29 each in Trio and six each in Flowers Bank). This 
suggests a tendency to localize cause and impact compared to San Miguel where it’s entirely 
externalized to nature and Indian Creek where a broader array of externalization accounts for 60 
percent of prevalence associated with cause and proximity for the locality: International, 
National and Nature, each with 20 percent relative prevalence. Local attribution of cause only 
 375 
 
accounts for a tenth of relative prevalence in Indian Creek, which is in stark contrast to the 46 
percent in Trio and 27 percent in Flowers Bank.    
While the localization of cause, which is especially pronounced in Trio where ideational 
exposure is relatively greater, conflicts with scientific consensus on climate change that 
attributes responsibility at spatial and systemic levels removed from these subsistence and semi-
industrialized contexts, a range of prevailing contextual challenges illuminates this perceptual 
disposition. Specifically, emerging contentions about chemical use and pollution practices at 
commercial plantations adjacent to Trio overdetermines perception and attribution of the cause 
and proximity of climate change (see Excerpt 54). So, while there is a connection between the 
industrial farming activities that structures perception of cause and proximity in this context, 
there is need for relevant information provision to improve understanding and knowledge 
operationalization. Addressing this critical knowledge operationalization gap is important for 
mobilizing agency and motive, which are central for effective climate action. Addressing the 
substantial level of localization of cause in Flowers Bank, where it accounts for more than a 
quarter of perceived cause and proximity, is even more central.  
While the localization observed in Trio is primarily attributable to a specified commercial 
actor with no binding connection to the community, the tendency to localize cause observed in 
Flowers Bank is diffused across the population. While the actions profiled, namely deforestation, 
and slash and burn, are legitimate factors, at the village scale they are overdetermined. These 
specified actions are also construed alongside faulty links such as improper garbage disposal. 
Improved information provision mechanisms that address these fundamental gaps in climate 
knowledge and its operationalization are likely to limit the negative impacts of overdetermined 
and faulty localization of the cause of a fundamental challenge in a small village where the 
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mobilization of social cohesion is central for addressing current and projected climate change 
impacts. The contextual nature of the localization of cause and associated knowledge 
deficiencies in both contexts comports with the contention that “a variety of factors other than 
scientific knowledge of causes and solutions [are] being used to form climate change attitudes, 
preferences and behaviours” (Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz, 2008, p. 495). However, 
the existence of substantial accurate attribution of cause, as well as perception of signs means 
there are durable frames around which knowledge improvement may be enacted.   
 There are also distinctions in the externalization of responsibility for climate change that 
have strong associations with ideational exposure. In Flowers Bank, externalization of cause 
accounts for 46 percent of relative prevalence (God/Religion and Nature 23 percent each) and a 
mere eight percent in Trio (God/Religion and International at three percent each and National at 
two percent). Externalization of cause in Flowers Bank and San Miguel are entirely accounted 
for by factors outside of the control of humans. In Flowers Bank, God/Religion and Nature show 
equal levels of prevalence on this measure (five of 22 each), while nature accounts for the 
entirety in San Miguel. Conversely, nature is the only externalization outside of the control of 
humans to show prevalence in Indian Creek. Nature only accounts for a third of the high degree 
of externalization (60 percent) observed in the data for Indian Creek. In Trio, where 
externalization is less than eight percent, only one factor outside the control of humans is cited 
(God/Religion at three percent). Other external factors or spheres of action (national and 
international at five percent), where human decision-making can be decisive, outweighs the 
prevalence for God/Religion. So, Trio, the village with the most sustained, comprehensive and 
tailored climate change intervention mechanism, alongside the widest tapestry of manifestly 
credible and current sources of climate change information (news and project intervention), more 
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accurately attributes cause to humans—notwithstanding the overdetermined or hyper-localization 
caused by prevailing agro-industrial activities in proximity to the village. Relatedly, while 
externalization is consistent with the holistic and culturally bounded nature of indigenous 
knowledge (Duhaylungsod, 1993; Reichel, 1993), the higher prevalence of externalization of 
cause outside of the control of humans associated with the only two villages (Flowers Bank and 
San Miguel) where the project intervention does not feature as a primary initial source of climate 
change information, strongly supports the observed link between ideational exposure, primarily 
through the project and other manifestly credible and current information provision mechanisms 
(namely news).   
The unique combination of a sustained, comprehensive, tailored and practical information 
provision mechanism (the project intervention) alongside another current modality that provides 
broad and readily accessible information is likely to function in complementary fashion to 
positively structure climate knowledge and operationalization such that Trio has the lowest 
climate knowledge gap. This is underscored by the fact that San Miguel, where no manifestly 
credible initial source of climate change information is cited and the Ya’axché-led intervention is 
most belated, is maximally disposed towards externalization of cause outside of the control of 
humans. Similarly, Flowers Bank, where the data suggests the CCCCC-led intervention is 
marked by subsistence and economics and devoid of information provision (see Excerpt 56) and 
the population’s only currently available credible source is news, ranks second for 
externalization of cause outside of the control of humans. Further, there is a lower level of 
seemingly immutable externalization of cause for humans in Indian Creek compared to Trio, 
where news is cited as an initial source and discrete cohorts are also benefiting from the 
comprehensive, tailored, sustained and practical Ya’axché-led intervention. The implication is 
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that the practical element of the information provision mechanism, which includes international 
knowledge exchange (per Excerpt 49) is likely decisive.      
 There is no consistent gendered orientation with respect to cause and proximity. Young 
women and older men, who have higher levels of premium climate knowledge, are least likely to 
externalize cause. Young women entirely attribute cause to local activities by humans, whereas 
externalization associated with older men’s attribution of cause only accounts for five percent of 
relative prevalence (God/Religion, Nature and International registering equal levels of 
prevalence: two percent each). Considering both cohort’s relative knowledge advantages and 
earlier observations about the nature and challenges associated with the localization of cause in 
these contexts, this further underscore substantial gaps in the scope of the information provision 
mechanisms available in the villages. On the other hand, older women and young men 
externalize cause at comparable and substantial levels: Two-thirds and 55 percent, respectively.  
However, young men’s externalization of cause is equally split between factors humans 
can (national - three and international - three, six of 22 each or 27 percent) and cannot control 
(nature - five and God/Religion - one, 27 percent), which is consistent with the cohort’s 
dependence on school as a primary source of credible climate knowledge, which is distal and 
their limited involvement in project interventions across all localities. Meanwhile, older women 
externalize along dimensions that are entirely outside of their control (God/Religion - five and 
Nature - three3, eight of 12). This is consistent with the observation that older women are the 
least likely to cite manifestly credible sources of initial climate knowledge acquisition, are the 
least informed about climate change impacts due to lower levels of ideational exposure and 
engagement across the Ya’axché intervention sites and the absence of information provision 
where they are directly engaged in Flowers Bank through the CCCCC-led intervention. 
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However, it is instructive to note that the religious externalization among older women is largely 
accounted for by the cohort in a circumscribed locality (Flowers Bank). Young men in the 
dataset, primarily from Indian Creek, also show a distinct tendency to externalize along unique 
dimensions: they account for the greater prevalence for externalization along three of four 
dimensions: nature (five of nine), national (three of three) and international (three of four). This 
strongly correlates with their higher initial exposure to climate change knowledge in manifestly 
credible contexts: namely, school.   
As anticipated, substantial distinctions in the perceived cause of climate change and its 
proximal position to the villages and humans reinforce observed fissures in climate knowledge 
and operationalization across localities and cohorts. While these distinctions underscore 
limitations in both the nature of the information provision mechanisms offered by the projects, or 
the lack thereof in Flowers Bank, they lay bare critical issues/developments (pollution related to 
agro-industrial activities, values (God/Religion) and biospheric or nature dispositions) about the 
cause of climate change with which information provision and action must interact generally and 
for some cohorts in particular, to effectively structure climate knowledge and operationalization. 
However, it also underscores a need to probe the nature of the substantial levels of seemingly 
impermeable attribution of cause among discrete population groups and localities because 
perception of cause structures agency, which is critical for mobilizing populations for effective 
climate action. Additionally, the localization of cause variably observed in the dataset 
necessitates an exploration of climate risk perception to delineate how the varied dispositions 
and values interacts with climate information provision mechanisms to structure another 
indicator of climate knowledge operationalization. Accordingly, the subsequent section explores 
climate risk perception to further inform climate knowledge operationalization and underscore 
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the analysis of agency necessitated by evidence of perceived limits to action and disproportionate 
localization of cause.  
Climate Risk 
 
Table 52: The relative prevalence of climate and vulnerability risk markers perceived across study populations in Belize 
Subset Village 
Coastal/ 
Riverside 
Dwellers Elderly Equal Risk Farmer - 2 Me Density 
Rate Prev Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Ya’axché 
Indian Creek 0 0% 4 29% 6 43% 4 29% 0 0% 14 
San Miguel 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 0 0% 0 0% 3 
Trio  0 0% 0 0% 10 67% 5 33% 0 0% 15 
CCCCC Flowers Bank 2 11% 0 0% 13 72% 2 11% 1 6% 18 
Totals 2 4% 4 8% 32 64% 11 22% 1 2% 50 
 
Five of the nine codes denoting climate risk are active in the Belize dataset: three in the 
Ya’axché subset and four in the Flowers Bank subset (see Table 52). Overall, equal risk accounts 
for nearly two-thirds of prevalence associated with climate risk (64 percent). Farmers are also 
perceived to be particularly vulnerable, accounting for more than a fifth (22 percent) of the 
prevalence associated with climate risk overall. The elderly (four of 50), coastal/riverside (two of 
50) and self/me (one of 50) are the only other active markers of perceived climate vulnerable 
groups that registered prevalence. However, they only register in circumscribed localities: Indian 
Creek in first instance and Flowers Bank for the latter two. The location specificity of these three 
markers of risk is indicative of the importance of context in structuring the nature of climate risk 
perception and the observation in the previous section that climate perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviours are structured by a range of factors other than climate knowledge (Maibach, Roser-
Renouf & Leiserowitz, 2008). Indian Creek is a largely ageing context in which the limited 
adaptive capacity of the elderly is of concern (see Excerpt 59), whereas Flowers Bank is 
physically distinct from the other villages as it is on the banks of a major river, which figures in 
the declaration of risk specification of both coastal/riverside and self/me not withstanding 
knowledge operationalization challenges in discerning climate action (see Excerpt 60).   
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This pinpoints the possibility that farmers are the only specific group perceived as 
distinctly vulnerable across the study populations (all villages except San Miguel where only 
equal risk registers prevalence). Farmers are specified as a vulnerable group most notably in 
Trio, where the category accounts for a third of the prevalence for climate risk. In Indian Creek, 
farmers accounts for 29 percent of prevalence alongside the elderly, while it accounts for just 
more than a tenth (11 percent) in Flowers Bank. While the specification of farmers is consistent 
with a high dependence on rainfed agriculture and the primarily food security frame through 
which climate change impacts are perceived, the higher prevalence of specification of farmers in 
Trio and Indian Creek is also consistent with the villages’ comparatively more sustained 
exposure to a practical intervention mechanism focused on the domain of farming.  
 However, equal risk is the primary way climate vulnerability is viewed in Belize across 
all villages sampled. Equal risk accounts for the entirety of prevalence associated with climate 
risk in San Miguel; 72 percent in Flowers Bank, where the broadest distribution of 
risk/vulnerability is observed (four codes) because of its contextual distinction (the village is on 
the banks of a major river) and two-thirds in Trio. It is only in Indian Creek that equal risk does 
not account for more than half of the prevalence denoting climate risk (43 percent), but it still 
ranks first ahead of the specification of the elderly and farmers, which are the only other active 
units in the subset (with equal prevalence of 29 percent each). This overall tendency to view 
climate risk as equally distributed is consistent with the overall communal nature of the villages.  
The primacy of farming for subsidence and employment in these contexts further 
underscores the collective or shared risk perception in these contexts, as constraints in farming 
interpolates all households. This underscores another contextually critical master frame, 
alongside food security, for the provision of essential information of greatest import for 
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understanding and navigating prevailing and projected climate risks. The identification of these 
durable and highly resonant frames comports with Fischhoff’s (2007) observation of persuasive 
communication techniques amidst urgent geologic change. Their shared nature contrasts with 
findings from studies explicitly linking perception of climate change risk and impacts. 
Specifically, the contention that individuals perceive climate change impacts to be greater for 
others than themselves (Board, Fisher & O’Connor, 1998; McDaniels, Axelrod & Slovic, 1996). 
While the shared perception of risk holds true across demographics, gender and age 
combinations strongly correlate with the perception of risk. Whereas equal risk only accounts for 
a half of the prevalence for perceived climate risk among young men and young women, it 
accounts for a clear majority for both older women and older men (92 percent and 59 percent, 
respectively).  
Consistent with the observation that context significantly structures climate risk and 
engagement structures climate knowledge operationalization, it is older men, primarily in Trio 
where direct and sustained engagement related to climate-smart agro-forestry is underway, who 
largely account for the specification of farmers as a distinctly vulnerable group, accounting for 
nearly two-thirds of the prevalence for this measure. This observation is corroborated by the high 
perception of farmers as a uniquely affected group by older men in Indian Creek, who have also 
been directly engaged (see Except 59). The fact that older women show the least varied array of 
risk perception (two active codes but overwhelmingly favouring equal risk, compared to four 
markers of risk perception for both young women and young men and three for older men that 
are more distributed in terms of prevalence) is consistent with their lower ideational exposure. 
This further suggests that while climate risk perception is contextually and culturally structured 
(per the dominant equal risk or communal disposition), it is not entirely independent of climate 
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knowledge. This supports my hypothesis that probing climate risk perception clarifies a crucial 
element of knowledge mobilization. The implication is that at a population level, climate 
information provision modalities will be most effective where they respond to the communal risk 
disposition, but tailored messaging, practical actions and associated support responsive to the 
specific risk perceptions in particular contexts and for distinct cohorts are also highly necessary 
and likely impactful. In fact, both approaches can likely function complementarily with 
heightened outcomes (ecological approach), where they effectively mobilize the internal-risk 
disposition alongside the master and supporting frames noted due to the highly discernible and 
widely perceived existential manifestations of climate impacts.   
Having identified a primarily communal-risk disposition in the Belizean study sites and 
noted the structuring effect of substantial fissures in the nature and availability of climate 
information, an assessment of climate agency is likely to indicate the extent to which messaging 
and actions framed around this shared risk disposition—alongside perceived signs/indicators, 
primarily food security and cause—are likely to be effective. The prominence of externalization 
of cause to seemingly impermeable non-human actors (God/Religion and Nature) observed in the 
review of cause attribution also means that probing climate agency is likely to reveal both the 
limits of climate response mechanisms (information and actions) and the conditions under which 
improvements are likely to be most effective. 
Excerpt 59:  Risk specification is primarily framed around contextual demographic trends and perceived adaptive capacity deficits among the 
elderly 
Older Men Focus Group - Indian Creek, Ya’axché Subset 
Interviewer: Do you think climate change affects or will affect [..] anybody more than anybody else? 
Respondent 1: Well, when I see it now, it is that we are trying to save ourselves from it only when we see that the weather is changing. 
Well, as a farmer, we figure out which day is good to plant some of our crops, like how Mr [Respondent 2’s named redacted] said, you just 
have to know how to plant. But, like I said, we know how to balance it because we don’t know how it will be next two years if it will still be 
the same or different. Well, as far as I see, nobody is affected or maybe I don’t know.  
Respondent 2: Well, it is not affecting all of the people in our community, but I think it affect few of the people because that they don’t 
know what climate change is. [It] is different because they believe that weather. In our community of Indian Creek, we have seen some of 
the few people, they know when to plant their corn because our grandfather or whoever told us when the planting season the macabre 
season is in May the thirteenth or the fourteenth, so they tried and plant that same month in this four or five [past] years now. But it 
doesn’t work again; no more, because that time it is still a dry season for us. So, few of them plant, and yes the corn start[s] to grow, but in 
[a] few months everything is dry due to the sun. So, there is where few people start to believe that climate change is affecting. I more 
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believe it is we [sic] in planting, and now we can’t do that anymore. The planting season is in June, it is not everybody it is just few of the 
people in the communities it not a group it is just that one and two people in the community, well the person that I have seen that we 
normally talk out there. Like, we said the term; sometimes we exchange thoughts to each other. So, we could get the knowledge of what is 
happening. It is men, the farmers are the most affected.  
Respondent 3: Well in my case, […] the people who will get affected by climate change [the most] is [sic] the one that don’t adapt their self 
to the ago-forestry sustainable planting. The people who will get affected is [sic] the one who just depend on one crop or depend on the 
slash and burn that’s the one [who] will get affected because they only depend on one crop of the year, but if you adapt yourself into ago-
forestry sustainable cocoa growing or in any ago-forestry you are not going to feel the real effects of the climate change because remember 
the trees are going to bare not in one time, this one will bear this month, that one will bare next month and then that’s the climate system. 
But if the person who just depend on just the corn or the beans, they will get affected because they are used to [the] time when they first 
do their crop, but when they do that now, they will get affected.  
Respondent 4: Well, as those are saying that, the older people because they don’t really understand what climate change is. How does 
climate change affecting [sic] but like for the young generation now; they are getting study, they are getting to learn what is - about climate 
change. But not like the older people. Older farmers, you know, like my father. He doesn’t know because he [is] use [sic] to do slash and 
burn planting before. In their time, they only plant one time for the year, but now farmers get to plant two times for the year. They plant in 
May and in October or in November. That is the macabre (corn) that we plant in October and November. So, the slash and burn, they have 
proper name for that the milpa, the milpa farming planted in May. But now as you plant in May, you won’t get anything. 
 
Excerpt 60: Risk specification is structured by contextual factors (presence and proximity to rivers) even where climate knowledge and 
perception of action are constrained. 
Young Men Focus Group - Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset  
Interviewer: So, you think your village is affected by climate change? 
Respondent 2: Yeah. 
Interviewer Is there any other way you see it affecting the village? 
Respondent 2: No.  
Interviewer: Where did you first learn about climate change? Or where do you get any information about climate change?  
Respondent 2: On the news. 
Interviewer: On the news? And have you ever heard the term climate change? 
Respondent 3: Yes.  
Interviewer: Do you think your village is affected by climate change? 
Respondents 3: Yes. 
Interviewer: How? 
Respondent 3: Right now. Like the river. The river, no usually (sic) get rain this time of year.  
Interviewer: So, the river [is] overflowing and it doesn’t usually happen this time of year. Where do you get your information about climate 
change from?  
Respondent 3: School. 
Interviewer: Have you ever heard the term “climate change”? 
Respondent 4: Yes, Sir. 
Interviewer: Where? 
Respondent 4: School and from my parents.  
Interviewer: School and your parents. And do you think the village is affected by climate change? 
Respondent 4: Yes, Sir. 
Interviewer: How?  
Respondent 4: Like for example the weather. Like starting of the year, it doesn’t usually rain that much.  
Interviewer: And it’s raining a lot now…which is why you’re [pointing at respondent 3] saying the river is overflowing. Do you think climate 
change is affecting anybody more than anybody in the village?  
Respondent 4: The farmers. 
Interviewer: The farmers. What do you think is anybody affected more than anybody else?  
Respondent 2: No[t] really. 
Interviewer: No. [Is] anybody else more affected than anybody else? 
Respondent 3: People who live close to the river.  
Interviewer: People who live close to the river. OK. The river[side dwellers], what happen to those people?  
Respondent 3: They get affected by water.  
Interviewer: […] Is there any climate change project taking place in the village? You have to say it. So, Yes or No? 
Respondents 1, 2 & 4: No. 
Respondent 3: Nope. 
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Climate Agency 
 
Table 53: The relative prevalence of forms of climate change agency across study populations in Belize 
 
As highlighted by Table 53, eight of the 12 codes associated with climate change agency 
are varyingly active in the dataset: seven in each dataset (Ya’axché villages and Flowers Bank). 
Overall, resource gaps account for the greater prevalence associated with the theme (37 percent), 
significantly higher than optimism, which denotes positive climate agency (23 percent). Mixed 
agency (17 percent) and explicit fatalism (12 percent) are the other indicators of agency that 
registered relative prevalence more than a tenth. Resource gaps account for the majority of 
prevalence associated with climate change agency in all villages, except San Miguel, where 
mixed agency ranks first with 50 percent and resource gaps account for the least amount of 
prevalence in the locality (six percent). Even in Trio, where optimism shares first rank in terms 
of prevalence with resource gaps, the analytical unit accounts for more than a third of prevalence 
for the locality (34 percent). Resource gaps account for 40 percent of prevalence in Indian Creek 
and more than 45 percent in Flowers Bank, the village with the lowest level of explicit climate 
change agency (and the highest level of prevalence for explicit fatalism at 19 percent). 
Considering the Flowers Bank population’s inability to identify the climate-smart livelihoods 
activity they are engaged in as a climate action, chiefly due to the subsistence frame and 
CCCCC’s bifurcated implementation of a comprehensive initiative devoid of an information 
provision mechanism (see Excerpt 56), this suggests a positive correlation between agency and 
resource gaps, largely ideational rather than technical, monetary or otherwise. The positive 
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correlation between climate agency and resource gaps is reinforced by how informational deficits 
frame the near totality of expressed resource gaps (see Excerpts 52, 61 (Dialogues A and B), and 
62).   
The significance of the informational factor and prior observation of its efficacy through 
practical engagement is underscored by the fact that explicit climate change agency (optimism) 
is highest in Trio (34 percent) and Indian Creek (33 percent), where practical climate action with 
the provision of associative information and training are most pronounced and sustained. The 
import of the practical element is reinforced by the fact that even San Miguel, where climate 
knowledge is lowest, but has been belatedly exposed to the information provision mechanism 
available in Trio and Indian Creek, exhibits substantially higher levels of climate change agency 
(optimism) than Flowers Bank, whose only current manifestly credible source of climate 
information is news. Despite the low levels of explicit climate agency observed in the dataset, 
there is substantial mixed agency. The general knowledge seeking disposition that underscores 
expressed resource gaps, which are primarily of a knowledge deficit orientation (see Excerpts 52, 
61 and 62), suggests agency is primarily constrained rather than absent. The data shows that 
shared risk perception, range of impacts (signs/indicators) and discernibility of climate action, 
the level and perceptibility of which are structured by the nature and scope of information 
provision, shape agency. So, positive climate change agency accounted for by a combination of 
mixed agency and optimism is greatest where action is heightened and proportionate to 
perceived impacts, and risk disposition is more communal or shared. Specifically, the 
combination of mixed agency and climate optimism only exceeds 50 percent prevalence in Trio 
(54 percent – 20 percent and 34 percent, respectively) and San Miguel (63 percent –50 percent 
and 13 percent, respectively). In Indian Creek, the combination accounts for only 7 percent 
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(13.33 percent and 33.33 percent, respectively) and only 40 percent in Flowers Bank (17 percent 
and 23 percent, respectively). So, although knowledge is lowest in San Miguel (63 percent – 50 
percent and 13 percent, respectively), where risk disposition is maximally communal and though 
belated, the village perceives the greatest range of climate actions (alongside Indian Creek).   
Similarly, agency on the combined measure is second in Trio, where communal risk 
perception is dominant (two-thirds of prevalence) and although impact (signs and indicators) is 
most widely perceived, action is most sustained, comprehensive and recognized at comparable 
levels to both San Miguel and Indian Creek, while Indian Creek, which reports the same high 
level of climate actions and an identical range of impacts as San Miguel, is the least communal 
context and reports lower climate agency than both San Miguel and Trio. Furthermore, the 
combined indicator of agency is lowest for Flowers Bank, which is the second most communal 
(72 percent relative prevalence for equal risk) context but perceives no action even as it 
perceives the second highest level of impact (signs/indicators).     
A more granular look at the village level data reveals that resource gaps do not singularly 
account for the diminished levels of climate change agency. The low level of optimism/climate 
change agency in Flowers Bank is in part due to the nature of the fatalism (the absence of 
agency) found in the village. Religion, nature and failed actions account for 42 percent of the 
prevalence associated with agency. These three factors, particularly religion and nature, which 
are outside of the purview or control of humans and can function independent of resource 
provision, underscore the significantly higher degree of explicit fatalism and overall lower level 
of agency noted in Flowers Bank. So significant are these factors that the village accounts for 
half of all prevalence for nature and nearly two-thirds (63 percent) associated with religion and 
the totality of the prevalence associated with failed actions.  
 388 
 
The data suggests the dominance of the trifecta of factors that undermines agency is 
unique to Flowers Bank. In San Miguel where agency is tempered such that mixed-agency 
accounts for a half of all prevalence and fatalism matches explicit agency (optimism) at 13 
percent, it is nature (19 percent) and resource gaps (six percent) alone that curtail agency. In Trio 
and Indian Creek, where explicit fatalism is lowest (seven percent each), attenuated climate 
change agency (mixed or lack of) is accounted for by low levels of prevalence associated with 
religion and/or nature. In Trio, religion is the only other attenuating factor with prevalence of 
less than five percent, while religion and nature account for identical levels of attenuation in 
Indian Creek (2% each). It is also significant that the range of constraints associated with agency 
often manifests as fatalism but not climate denialism. Specifically, these notable constrains 
prevail amidst no discernible element of climate denialism in the data, which is contrary to 
conventional assertions of a link with knowledge deficiency. This is likely a product of the high 
perceptibility of signs, risk and, in some localities, the proportionality and utility of responses.  
Excerpt 61: Resource gaps are underscored by information and perceived power and influence deficits 
Dialogue A:  Older Women Focus Group – Indian Creek, Ya’axché 
Subset; Informational deficits frames underscores expressed 
resource gaps. 
Young Men Focus Group - Trio, Ya’axché Subset; Information and 
perceived power/influence deficits underscores expressed resource 
gaps 
Interviewer: Do you think that climate change [there] is something 
that [referencing concerns about crop failure] we can probably do 
something about it? 
Respondent 1: We don’t know what is causing that to happen. I 
don’t know if we can change that.  
Respondent 2: Maybe, yes. But, like you see, we don’t come 
together. Maybe it have [sic] a reason to come together, for our 
village to get better. But who would be in it? It is us. Like how we 
are saying a lot of days now, the knowledge from a long time ago is 
being left. Now they are saying that the believers get over, but that 
is not what it means. But if you think about it, where else to ask. We 
are supposed to pray and ask God. But that [crop failure and climate 
change] is what we don’t know how to do when there is a lot of 
sickness and problems that is coming to this world. Now that is 
where we are at fault when we don’t know where the sickness that 
is coming, come from. The world change, the people change, now it 
is the young people are growing up and that a lot of problems is 
coming on us.  
Respondent 3: I don’t know. I don’t know how to answer that. 
Interviewer: Is there any climate change work or anything to do to 
deal with climate change in trio? 
Respondent 1: Well, to me no.  
Respondent 2 & 4: No.  
Respondent 3: Well, the truth no. 
Interviewer: Would you like to learn more about climate change? 
Respondent 1: We want to learn.  
Respondent 2: Yea, it is good to learn. 
Respondent 3 & 4: Yes.  
Interviewer: Why do you guys want to learn more about climate 
change? 
Respondent 1: The first thing that I thought about this, because let’s 
say that before we don’t [sic] use to have climate like this. But right 
now, it changes, but why is this happening? I just ask myself because 
we can’t ask anyone or no more people because we want to know but 
how can we know? 
Respondent 2: I want to know more.  
Respondent 3: Well, just about the topic, in general. 
Interviewer: Based on what you tell me about climate change, [do] 
you think there is anything we can do about it? 
Respondent 1: Because before less industries, factories and fuel, but  
right now, it is in the village. You can see vehicles, motorcycles… That 
is what affect the climate, but we can’t say right now to let’s stop it 
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because you don’t have to take what the next person got. If he 
want[s] to buy this, well that is him [sic] right because he have [sic] 
the money to buy it, but if you tell him or she [sic] not to buy [it] 
because we [are] the cause [of] climate change… and we are the same 
one[s] that are causing it because we are used to it. So, we can’t say 
right now let’s stop it because we are done used [sic] to it […]. 
 
Excerpt 62: Information and knowledge deficits constrains agency but there is a maximalist knowledge seeking disposition. 
Young Women Focus Group - Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset  
Interviewer: Do you do anything with the cohune nut facility?  
Respondent 4: No, not! Actually, not with the mill. My mother makes her own oil. 
Interviewer: Ok. […] But you’re familiar with the project?  
Respondent 4: Yes. 
Interviewer: Do you think it’s a climate change project? […] 
Respondent 4: I’m…No.  
Interviewer: No. That’s fine. Remember there is no right or wrong answer. It’s just like a set of how you perceive different things. Aright? 
Would you like to learn more about climate change?  
Respondent 1: Yes.  
Interviewer: Why? 
Respondent 1: […] I would like to learn more because it’s affecting the entire world. I would say. In terms of the longer summer before, 
because I notice right here in Belize we’ve been having cold that we’re not use to. This extent of cold in Belize. Way beyond what we are 
used to so…It’s true. 
Interviewer: Would you like to learn more about climate change?  
Respondent 2: Yes, sir.  
Interviewer: Why? 
Respondent 2: Because I [do] no[t] know nothing [sic] much. 
Interviewer: Would you like to learn more about climate change? 
Respondent 3: I would like to be educated more in depth because then that way it gives you a broader picture of exactly… especially, the 
things you’re doing in your household on a whole. And then with us knowing more about climate change, we can also educate others about 
the importance of climate change as well.  
Interviewer: Yeah. Would you like to learn more about climate change? 
Respondent 4: Yes, I [am] willing because it will teach me how to help my communities, my friend[s], and my family, how to protect the 
environment.  
 
Overall, the data does not support a strict gendered or age correlation with climate change 
agency. In fact, younger women and older men account for more than 80 percent of prevalence 
associated with explicit agency (47 percent and a third, respectively), which is consistent with 
both cohorts’ moderately higher levels of premium climate knowledge (a posteriori). Conversely, 
young men and older women account for 72 percent of explicit fatalism in the dataset (39 percent 
and one-third, respectively). However, climate change agency for both young men and older 
women are undermined by different factors. While they are the only cohorts where resource gaps 
singularly rank first in terms of prevalence for climate change agency, older women are more 
affected by this challenge (39 percent of overall prevalence compared to 14 percent for young 
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men). Older women are primarily religiously fatalistic (see Excerpts 63 and 64), accounting for 
nearly two-thirds of religious fatalism in the overall dataset. Whereas, young men are fatalistic 
with a naturistic orientation, accounting for the entirety of the prevalence for fatalism associated 
with nature (see Excerpt 20).  
Overall women show a substantially higher level of resource gap than men (two-thirds of 
prevalence compared to one-third for men) and this holds true across age brackets, which may 
account for why young women who outrank older men and all other groups in terms of explicit 
climate change agency are outstripped by older men when degrees of positive agency (mixed 
agency) is also considered (47 percent compared to 60 percent, respectively). However, it 
doesn’t explain why older women who have the highest level of resource gaps show twice the 
level of general agency as young men, despite having near identical levels of explicit agency. 
This may be due to differences in the nature and texture of the informational orientation of older 
women’s resource gaps. Specifically, older women have the greatest level of knowledge gaps in 
the dataset, perceive comparable levels of signs as young men but discern less than half the level 
of climate action noted by young men. Alongside older women’s near maximally shared risk 
perception (92 percent), this suggests both their knowledge deficiencies and perceived 
uniformity in risk and benefits may account for the higher levels of agency relative to young 
men. Young men have greater knowledge, high perception of action and the highest level of risk 
specification (alongside young women).   
Consequently, to mobilize the high degree of constrained agency in these contexts 
necessitates response mechanisms (information and action) partially structured in response to 
central values (religion and nature) and experiences (failed actions and local developments such 
as agro-industrial pollution). Specifically, these response mechanisms should be cohort specific 
 391 
 
because of the variability with which these contextual experiences and values, which supersedes 
resource gaps, structures knowledge, perception and agency for discrete populations. Religion, 
for instance, while primarily invoked in a form that is fixed for some in Flowers Bank (see 
Excerpt 63), functions more fluidly in other instances both in Flowers Bank and elsewhere (see 
Excerpts 63 and 64).  
However, even in instances where religious fatalism is expressed with fixity, agency and 
action are not entirely precluded (see Excerpts 63 and 64). This suggests that religious fatalism is 
not always immutable; but even where mutability is operable, the scope for structuring 
perception of the efficacy of climate interventions and mobilizing agency towards such ends is 
restricted in accordance with pre-established convictions based on scriptural or biblical dictates 
and predictions. This means a religious frame offers circumscribed utility for efforts aimed at 
optimizing climate knowledge, agency and action in these contexts. While the variability with 
which religious values structures climate perception and permits actions is consistent with 
foundational tensions between science and religion that underpins religious environmentalism 
and climate change in particular, even within a common faith tradition (Kearns, 2011), it also 
clarifies the import of culture as an emergent and diffused thematic modality rather than an 
integrated whole with a personality writ large à la Benedict (1959, cited in Compton, 1980). 
 Specifically, the variation with which agency is constrained and/or permitted by the 
cultural and spiritual contents of religion runs counter to the view that culture necessarily hangs 
together distinctively, which precludes a holistic view to be discerned and used to craft the most 
effective messages. Rather, the data associated with the varying levels of agency among the 
religiously fatalistic and/or disposed in these natural resource-dependent contexts strongly 
supports Opler’s (1945, cited in Compton, 1980) contention that culture is best understood when 
 392 
 
its content (scriptures, dictates) is probed through principles or themes, such as a community or 
individual’s relationship with the land. The efficacy of this thematic approach to understanding 
the enactment of cultural formations has clarified the differential prospects of using the religious 
frame to communicate climate change across and within cohorts and localities where it is 
significant. It has also been used to identify how nature-oriented fatalism expressed with varying 
degrees of certainties are amenable to substantial information provision over sustained periods, 
and associated actions.  
The malleability of nature among some cohorts is typified by older women in San Miguel 
who privilege the problems caused by pigs and other wild animals over climate change, which 
they associate with normal weather variations, due to disproportionate knowledge deficits. 
However, in contexts such as Flowers Bank, where failed actions in seed and planting cycle 
experimentation functions alongside fixed and seemingly immutable fatalism, amidst 
informational deficits, response mechanisms that transcend information provision are 
necessitated. Addressing the failures in experimentation with seeds, planting cycles and efforts to 
limit soil erosion that have undermined climate agency warrants information, substantial 
financial, technical and other support mechanisms to have a positive structuring effect.  
The uniformly positive knowledge-seeking disposition in the dataset that is more 
grounded than fatalism offers reinforcement for efforts to leverage these variably resonant 
secondary frames (nature and religion). The uniformly positive and dominant knowledge seeking 
disposition is likely a product of the discernibility of the signs and indicators of climate change, 
even amidst knowledge deficits. The implication is that an existential motive spurs a search for 
knowledge, which is consistent with the notable absence of elements of climate denialism. So, 
the common and heightened knowledge-seeking disposition discerned suggests that what 
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Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh’s (2007) cite as individual level barriers to 
communicating climate change do not readily apply in highly collective resource-dependent 
contexts.  Lorenzoni et. al (2007) note the trifecta of a lack of knowledge, lack of desire to find 
out information and a lack of locally and personally relevant and accessible information as key 
individual level barriers to communicating climate change. Whereas the maximal knowledge-
seeking disposition counters criterion two, distinctions in engagement modalities and the 
significance of access, the nature and scope of even manifestly credible sources renders criteria 
one and three more socio-cultural and contextual determinants than individual factors.   
 Considering the substantial level of primarily constrained agency observed in the dataset 
amidst substantial resource gaps and the importance of motive for both enabling and mobilizing 
agency, the subsequent section probes what underscores the strong desire to act on climate 
change. Commonalities in risk perception and substantial collectivity even in risk specification, 
such as the shared engagement in farming for livelihoods, suggests an existential motive 
underpins the compelling knowledge seeking disposition and curiosity that marks the high 
resource gaps observed. However, motive is not dependent on knowledge (per Leiserowitz, 
2003) and is substantially complex. Consistent with cultural and contextual distinctions, motive 
is likely underpinned by a multiplicity of factors, some of which are more germane to particular 
groups in certain localities. So, further clarity on the nature of this resilient motive to act on 
climate change amidst both capability and resource gaps will clarify another critical climate 
perception marker that can be used to (re)frame messaging and (re)formulate climate action, 
boost agency and action. 
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Excerpt 63: Religious Fatalism and Externalization of Cause are varyingly fixed with pre-defined mutability in accordance with 
scriptural/spiritual convictions. 
 
 
Excerpt 64: Religious Fatalism expressed with greater fluidity and substantial receptivity to informational/knowledge enhancement 
Young Women Focus Group – Trio, Ya’axché Subset  
Interviewer: Do you think we can do anything about climate change? Why? 
Respondent 1: Well, I would say no because only God can deal with that.  
Respondent 2: I don’t think so because it is not me who own this planet. Then it is God who do that. He is the one who is in charge of this 
and we are the same one who cause this, too, because… I hear right now, because we same people say that we are the same one is [sic] 
causing this season. I don’t know, but we are burning the soil, or we are killing the soil and that is why when that evaporates it goes up and 
it come [sic] down again, it cause a lot of sickness that is what I hear.  
 
Older Women Focus Group - Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset  
Interviewer: Do you think climate change is something we can do anything about? 
Respondent 1: No. I don’t think so.  
Interviewer: You don’t think so. 
Respondent 1: I don’t think so. 
Interviewer: Why would you say no? 
Respondent 1: Because I would say… That’s the good Lord’s work. 
Interviewer: Do you think we can do anything about climate change? 
Respondent 2: I’d say [it] depends…maybe you can do things, maybe get lee [little] more comfortable. Depending on maybe erosion, like 
weh [what] she said [referring to Respondent 3] because they say the trees at the bank side help keep up the bank side. Sometimes the 
tree--  
Respondent 1:  People cut them down. 
Respondent 2: Yeah…people cut them down. 
Respondent 1: Sometime[s] they drop on their own.  
Respondent 5: Sometime[s] it go[es] in[to] the river by its own self.  
Respondent 3: Yeah…by itself.  
Interviewer: So, you [pointing at respondent 2] think there are things we can do to cope… 
Respondent 2:  Yeah. 
Interviewer: But that’s it? [Coping?]. 
Respondent 1: Somethings…somethings we could do. 
Interviewer: What about you? [Do] you think there is anything we can do about climate change? 
Respondent 3: I say we could plant more trees along the river side and stuff like that, but I no know if you could really do anything about 
that. Yeah, I think you could hardly do anything…because I…the climate changes…I think that’s the good Lord’s. […] Doing that. You can’t 
change that. 
Interviewer: Can’t change that! What do you think?  
Respondent 4: I think you can’t do anything about that at all. Nature!  
Interviewer: Mhm. And do you think we can do anything about it? 
Respondent 5: No. 
Interviewer: Why? 
Respondent 5: Well, if God said something will happen; it will happen, no matter what we try. It still will happen.  
Interviewer: Aha. And Ms. [Respondent 6’s name redacted]? 
Respondent 6: Well, there is certain things we can do. God say try and he will help. So no because [it is] God’s work we give up. The [river] 
bank side, we know they will broke [sic] away. But, we could plant some more trees as [Respondent 3’s name redacted] said and try to 
protect. Because sometime the reason why is because we cut the bush too much from the bank side. And the bank side [does] no have that 
support to hold [it together]. Once you cut the tree, the tree dies, the bank side just… erosion! So, there [are] somethings we could do and I 
say as God said, “try and he will help.” If we, if because…I live at the river side. And I know if the river side…If I could do some more 
thing[s]…even they say you do Caving [protective rocks that are cemented to protect infrastructure] ... Like what you see them [the 
government] do… 
Respondent 2: By the bridge. 
Respondent 6: Or on the road going to Belize. 
Respondent 2: On the road with stone and thing… 
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Excerpt 65: A primarily biospheric fatalism expressed with less fixity than religious forms. 
Young Men Focus Group - Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset 
Interviewer: […] Three of you tell me the village is affected by climate change? You’re not sure [pointing at respondent], and [I would like to 
know,] do you think climate change is something you can do about? 
Respondent 1: No. Nope. 
Interviewer: You don’t think so. Why do you say no? 
Respondent 1: Because like…maybe it’s like with the weather…mhm. 
Interviewer: And you think it is out of your control. Do you think climate change is something we can do [anything] about?  
Respondent 2: Nope. 
Interviewer: No. Why? 
Respondent 2: Because it’s like the weather. We can’t just control the weather. 
Interviewer; Do you think climate change is something we can do [something] about? 
Respondent 3: No, sir. 
Interviewer: Why? 
Respondent 3: Because we don’t have no control over that.  
Interviewer: Aright. Do you think that we could do something [about] climate change? 
Respondent 4: No, sir. 
Interviewer: Why do you say no? 
Respondent 4: Because it’s God work.  
Interviewer: Because [of] what? 
Respondent 4: It is God’s work.  
Motive for Action 
 
Table 54: The relative prevalence of Intrinsic and extrinsic factors that motives climate action across study populations in Belize 
Subset Village Children 
Community/                 
Village 
God/         
Religion 
Self/           
Offspring World Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate 
Ya’axché 
Indian 
Creek 1 33% 2 67% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 
San 
Miguel  0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Trio  1 7% 8 53% 2 13% 4 27% 0 0% 15 
CCCCC Flowers Bank 0 0% 7 37% 5 26% 3 16% 4 21% 19 
Totals 2 5% 17 46% 7 19% 7 19% 4 11% 37 
 
Overall, five of the six codes indicating motive for acting on climate change are 
varyingly active in the dataset: four in each subset but none in San Miguel and only two in Indian 
Creek (see Table 54). Community/Village is the most grounded motive for acting on climate 
change (46 percent), which is consistent with the dominant perception of shared or equal risk 
perception. While this holds true across all the villages where this theme registers, the collective 
motive only accounts for a greater prevalence in Indian Creek (two-thirds) and Trio (53 percent). 
In Flowers Bank, the localized communal motive only accounts for more than one-third of 
prevalence (37 percent). However, the village also accounts for the totality of prevalence 
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associated with preserving “the world” (21 percent), which is a broader communal motive that 
when considered alongside the narrower conception that figures elsewhere brings it in line with 
the general communal disposition that underpins the drive to learn more and act on climate 
change across study populations (58 percent).   
God/Religion and Self/Offspring are the second most grounded motives for action with 
equal levels of prevalence overall (19 percent each). However, they only register in two 
circumscribed localities: Trio and Flowers Bank. In both contexts, these motives register with 
differing resonance. God/Religion accounts for twice as much relative prevalence (26 percent) in 
Flowers Bank than Trio. This is consistent with the high level of fatalism, particularly religious 
fatalism, observed in Flowers Bank. The gap in resonance for self/offspring is smaller: 27 
percent in Trio and 16 percent in Flowers Bank. The high level of localized/self motive in both 
contexts is consistent with the tendency to distribute climate risk in these localities and the 
factors underlying these distributions. Specifically, the emphasis on specified groups, namely 
farmer’s in Trio and Indian Creek (see Excerpts 59, 60 and 63) and folks who precariously live 
on the banks of the Belize River that traverse the heart of Flowers Bank. Children, the only other 
factor denoting motive for acting on climate change to register in the dataset, is observed in 
singular instances in Indian Creek and Trio with vastly different levels of resonance (a third and 
seven percent, respectively). While motive for San Miguel village is not discernible from the 
dataset, the shared communal risk perception across villages and the shared communal motive 
observed strongly suggest this village, which maximally perceived climate risk as equal, also has 
a primarily communal motive to act. Gender and age strongly correlate with discrete motives for 
action. Older women are the only cohort whose motive for action is not communal. 
Community/village, the only explicit communal marker that registers for the cohort, accounts for 
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13 percent of prevalence for motive for action for the cohort. Even with the inclusion of children, 
which the cohort entirely accounts for, older women’s communal tendency peaks at 38 percent. 
This contrasts with 60 percent for young women, 58 percent for older men (68 percent when 
broadened to include the world, an even more manifestly communal measure) and 40 percent for 
young men (80 percent when broadened to include the world).  
Rather than a communal motive for action, it is religion that underscores action among 
older women, accounting for 50 percent of the prevalence for this measure. This motive is 
largely expressed in terms of coping in anticipation of the inevitable, which is consistent with the 
high degree of fatalism, especially religious fatalism, noted among older women (see Excerpt 
63). However, this religious motive among older women is unique to the women in Flowers 
Bank, where it accounts for 90 percent of the cohort’s motive for action. The data signals that 
older women elsewhere (the Ya’axché subset) are as communal as all other cohorts across 
villages, accounting for the totality of prevalence for children in the dataset, which represents 
two-thirds of prevalence for motive for action for the cohort in the Ya’axché subset. 
Furthermore, the religious motive is consistent with the relatively higher level of religious 
oriented fatalism among this cohort. It is also noteworthy that men from Flowers Bank account 
for the totality of prevalence associated with the world and this is equally accounted for across 
age cohorts, but with varying resonance (40 percent for the more communal young men and a 
tenth for older men).  
Consistent with the observation that men are more likely to specify groups as being more 
vulnerable, particularly farmers, an activity they are customarily charged with, they account for 
the majority of prevalence associated with self/offspring as a motive for action (71 percent). 
However, the self-motive is not gendered. As shown in Excerpt 66, it is primarily invoked in 
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relation to the disproportionate risks climate change variability pose to individual and collective 
farming pursuits and the food security implications for primarily subsisting families. The likely 
non-determinative nature of gender in expressed self-motive is underscored by the fact that it 
accounts for a similar level of prevalence among older men and young women (26 percent and 
20 percent, respectively). Unlike older men, young men registered no self-motive and older 
women only registered 13 percent. The implication is that although the dominant perception of 
equal risk is a central frame through which climate response mechanisms in these contexts ought 
to be framed, there is a multiplicity of fundamental, contextually distinct and culturally defined 
motives of varying import to different cohorts across villages. The multiplicity of motives is 
consistent with observations in the extant literature that environmental behaviours and attitudes 
are variably determined. However, rather than human progeny as the primary motive, as 
Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz (2008) established from their review of the literature, it is 
a primarily and decisively socio-tropic motive (per shared risk disposition, the communal motive 
and the shared exposure evident even in the most heightened form of specification – farmers) 
that is most significant in indigenous and traditional contexts studied across Belize.  
So marginal is human progeny as a motive that explicit concern about children only 
features in two of the seven instances in which self/offspring registered prevalence as a primary 
motive (once among older men in Flowers Bank and older women in Trio). This manifest socio-
tropic altruism also comports with the high resonance of biospheric values (concern about 
nature) in the dataset and the general integrative and holistic framework that underpins 
indigenous and traditional knowledge and culture. As established in the analysis of religious 
cause and proximity, in a holistic cultural domain, the meaning of the lifeworld and its varied 
facets are defined by contextual usage with full recognition of their interdependence, organic and 
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cyclical nature. As such, “native people imagine the world (natural and supernatural, mundane 
and magical) as balanced, alive and ever changing” (Riley, 2000, p. 196).    
Considering the differing permeability/mutability of socio-cultural and environmental 
factors explicitly undermining climate change agency, the effectiveness of climate response 
mechanisms will vary across contexts and cohorts. This is particularly likely on measures of 
message reception, motive and action where the scope of change proposed by climate 
interventions conflicts with the restricted scope permitted by some culturally and spiritually 
bounded motives and biospheric perceptual frameworks around which climate agency is 
cultivated and must be mobilized. This means tapping the high degree of constrained agency 
observed to enable effective climate action will require multi-scale and differential response 
mechanisms at both population and cohort levels to attenuate the socio-cultural and 
environmental limits to climate action. 
 The identification of highly operable socio-cultural and environmental limits to climate 
action with varying mutability across cohorts and contexts supports conceptual articulations 
about the import of socio-cultural limits to adaptation (Adger et al., 2008; Moser, 2010). Having 
identified these overall and discretely significant motives, the identification of appropriate 
champions and leaders is of critical import for effectively mobilizing them for information 
provision and associative actions that boost and operationalize climate knowledge and agency for 
effective climate action.  
Delineating leadership patterns in these contexts is of high import given the emphasis on 
foregrounding local actors to engender citizenship, achieve genuinely participatory and 
empowering interventions (Holland, Brockles, Abugre, 2004; Pratt, 2003), the limited reach of 
the engagement in the Ya’axché subset and the need to mobilize and edify residents about the 
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climate change aspects of the CCCCC-led intervention in Flowers Bank. Accordingly, the 
subsequent section probes how and where confidence is reposed for climate leadership, with 
particular attention to perceptions of internal leadership given the high overall collective risk 
perception and motive for action, alongside intractable resource gaps. 
Excerpt 66: Self Motive: Self/Motive expressed through food security frames, as well as, individual and collective pursuit of farming drives 
support for engagement and support of climate-smart actions 
Older Men Cocoa Group Focus Group- Trio, Ya’axché Subset 
Interviewer: […] Why [ is] the concession area is so important? [Referencing the community management of a major conservation area.] 
Respondent 1: Well to me the concession area is very important because we found it is not trust age. We as individual[s], we as [a] group, 
we came up with this idea as the story being told. We are landless people, and we came up with this idea. Hey, we can’t go to the 
Government to fight for a piece of land and we talk to ourselves: what can we do? We know the area well and we saw that the area have 
[sic], already have [sic] cocoa in it, in the wild cocoa growing freely on its own. The nature took care of that and we say [sic] let’s take 
advantage of it; let’s form a model and put it in writing that we want to do organic cocoa, so the concession is very important because it is a 
milestone of an achievement for this group. For this community, it is a start! It is the beginning, [a] start to show that, yes, with the people 
that have the understanding and the will of carrying this project until it reaches it[s] max, to show the rest of the country that hey! That we 
can do this, and we can be a part of climate change by doing this that we said we are doing. Yes, it is important! The piece of land where all 
of us members will benefit, hence the reason we take care of it [be]cause we know the importance. It’s the treasure that are [sic] there; the 
reason of the importance of the concession. 
Respondent 2: Well, it the same like how he was saying because without that how would we help ourself and like how we are saying we 
have to have our food. Like how I am seeing now on how to plant and to plant different plants and we are working and we are helping for 
not doing harmful things. Like with the climate change. Well, we should ease down on doing it and that is important   
Respondent 3: For me it is important for me because for working in unity and help each other and to give us an income in our family. 
Respondent 4: Well, they are saying that is where or how we help our family and that the chemicals smell very bad, but before I use 
chemical but now when I go in the banana farm I get headache and that is how I know that using chemicals is not good that is it for me. 
 
Climate Leadership 
 
Table 55: The relative prevalence of preferred sources of climate leadership across study populations in Belize 
 
Six of the codes associated with climate change leadership are active varyingly in the 
dataset: four in the Ya’axché subset and five in Flowers Bank (see Table 55). Overall, external 
leadership is preferred, accounting for nearly one-third (31 percent) of the prevalence for climate 
leadership, while traditional structures and community/village level leadership round-out the top 
three with 23 percent each. All other sources of leadership evident in the dataset account for less 
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than a tenth of prevalence overall. The substantial outward look for climate leadership is 
consistent with the high degree of resource gaps, largely ideational, noted earlier. While it ranks 
first overall, none of these traditional contexts have accorded external leadership the first rank in 
terms of prevalence, which suggests a strong communal disposition still structures their preferred 
approach to problem-solving.  
While not explicitly discernible from the data, the endogenous origin of both 
interventions is also likely structuring perceptions of ownership that constrains decisive 
externalization even amidst internal deficiencies. This is consistent with rights-based 
perspectives on participation in development that suggests meaningful engagement in processes 
to tackle local challenges through dialogue, collaboration and practice broadens people’s 
perception and appreciation of power and influence in priority-setting (Thomas, 2008). But it is 
significant that the preference for external leadership ranks second in terms of prevalence in 
every village, with San Miguel being most predisposed to external leadership (43 percent) and 
Flowers Bank being least predisposed (25 percent). San Miguel is especially noteworthy as it is 
the only sample population that is entirely comprised of older men and older women, who would 
define the traditional structures, but they show no deference towards it as “exemplary persons” 
of any origin account for the remainder (majority) of prevalence associated with their assertions 
on climate leadership. However, the higher level of climate agency (mixed and explicit), due to 
belated external action that comports with the range of impacts discerned, is the likely 
explanatory factor for the higher explicit preference for external leadership in this highly 
communal context (see Excerpt 67). The higher tendency to repose confidence in external 
leadership for climate action is also consistent with the village’s distinction as the least 
knowledgeable.         
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In the other villages, external leadership is resolutely lower. It accounts for comparable 
levels of prevalence in both Indian Creek and Trio (31 percent and one-third, respectively). 
Overall, San Miguel is the only village where total prevalence for codes associated with explicit 
internal/local leadership doesn’t register and therefore doesn’t account for a majority of 
prevalence. All other villages, while highly interested in external leadership as detailed above, 
prefer some combination of local leadership: a total of three-quarters in Flowers Bank 
(community/village – 35 percent, traditional structures – 20 percent, teachers – five percent and 
youth – 15 percent; 70 percent in Indian Creek (traditional strictures – 35 percent, 
community/village – eight percent and elders – 27 percent; and two-thirds in Trio 
(community/village – 38 percent, traditional structures – 19 percent and Exemplary group/the 
cocoa group – 10 percent).  
A variety of factors account for the varying degrees of preferences for communal 
leadership among the other villages (Flowers Bank, Trio and Indian Creek). In Flowers Bank, 
where no climate action is perceived by the population, the locality’s distinction as having the 
least preference for external leadership is consistent with it having the lowest level of agency and 
highest level of fatalism, particularly of a religious orientation with limited malleability (see 
Excerpt 63). This perception of limited pathways for action, as well as substantial premium 
climate knowledge, is likely to attenuate the desire to seek external support to enact responses, 
which they faultily do not now discern. Relatedly, the village is distinct relative to others in the 
dataset for having an active community group with population-level membership and a record of 
collectively tackling community crises—specifically, using cohune oil production as an effective 
safety net following the closure of the neighbouring Williamson Clothing Factory, a key source 
of employment.   
 403 
 
Excerpt 67:  Substantial direct engagement heightens explicit preference for external leadership on climate action 
Older Men Focus Group - San Miguel, Ya’axché, Subset 
Interviewer: If you had suggestions, do you think Ya’axché would [they] listen? Like, if you say… If they make a suggestion, or they want to 
do something, and you say: I want to do it a little more differently, would they listen? 
Respondent 1: I think yes, because we are working together. Well, like I said: it’s not with money but like with help.  
Respondent 2: Like how they take we [sic] for training to Honduras for us to see those people and for us to do the same for ours.  
Interviewer: So, you all want to learn more about climate change and you all have some ideas about it [Referencing earlier declaration of a 
knowledge seeking disposition and agreed knowledge limitations]. Who in the village [do] you believe should lead to get you to learn more 
and do some more stuff on climate change? 
Respondent 1: It will be good through Ya’axché. Like how technical people come to tell us and to come and visit our farm [and] teach us.  
Respondent 2: Same thing. 
Respondent 3: Same thing. 
 
Excerpt 68: Sustained and focused practical engagement engenders confidence in local capacity to lead on climate change 
Older Men Cocoa Group Focus Group – Trio, Ya’axché Subset  
Interviewer: Who [do] you think should lead; to get more done in the community with climate change?  
Respondent 1: Well, like for me, like us. We are getting a little bit of knowledge and knowing about climate change. It is very important to 
do it and in giving others knowledge of what we know.  
Respondent 2: In my opinion, it should be a collective group. I don’t think it is a good idea of climate change only affect one. It will affect us 
[all]. The point that I am trying to say is that this group is [to] inform of climate change and to implement it, and I feel like it is us who is 
causing it.  
Respondent 3: I think by our self that we should think who would want to lead. 
Respondent 4: Well, I think that we should learn from each other we should see if they are doing good or not, so we can follow the good 
things […]. 
Respondent 5: I think individually because if we wait for someone that will not happen.  
             
While both Indian Creek (70 percent) and Trio (67 percent) exhibit near identical levels 
of preference for communal leadership, the slightly higher preference for communal leadership 
in Indian Creek is likely a function of a higher communal motive for action (67 percent 
compared to 53 percent). This is supported by the fact that while they report comparable levels 
of climate agency and Trio reports higher levels of premium climate knowledge, as well as lower 
levels of resource gaps, Indian Creek reports a higher level of discernible actions that is of a 
more recent nature than Trio. The implication is that the perceptibility of a wider range of 
practical climate action, particularly in a context where there is a higher level of communal 
motive to act and the impacts perceived are greater, engenders greater confidence in the localized 
collective order. 
 However, the nature of the local order in which confidence is reposed is dependent on 
the range of organizational structures available (see Excerpt 68). So, Trio more readily reposes 
confidence outside of traditional structures and elders as is the case in Indian Creek. This is so as 
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Trio is distinct for having a specialist group of cocoa and coffee farmers with widely 
acknowledged knowledge advantages and Ya’axché’s focused and practical engagement with 
both members and non-members of the group is most sustained and comprehensive. Taken 
alongside the significance of the Flowers Bank Community Group in that locality’s internal 
confidence to manage climate change, new forms of local institutions (population level, 
specialist and perhaps cohort and gendered) with proven capabilities are likely critical 
mechanisms through which the substantial levels of constrained agency observed can be 
mobilized. Nevertheless, the importance of the traditional order across these villages and 
maintaining harmony in small and collective contexts, where both motive and risk perception are 
primarily shared, requires bridging structures to ensure new institutional formations are 
perceived and function as enhancing mechanisms rather than usurping existing power structures 
and roles. These bridging structures are of central importance given the heightened levels of 
contestations and fears about property rights due to the constitutional guarantees secured by 
mobilized activists (extra-traditional leadership) through robust advocacy and legal challenges 
(see Excerpt 72). The fissures in the social order caused by extra-traditional leadership and 
institutions underscore what Baer (2007) and Neumayer (2007) see as the limits of using a 
techno-economistic calculus to tackle a challenge with pervasive externalities.  
By excluding, usurping and/or undervaluing the import of the socio-cultural and 
environmental because of perceived and manifest incapacitations, particularly identity affirming 
traditional leadership structures and knowledge forms, the techno-economistic calculus functions 
counterproductively. It exacerbates the weaknesses within the traditional order, the most 
unifying and legitimate internal mechanism for the mobilization of internal agency in these 
collective contexts. So bridging structures between new institutional mechanisms and traditional 
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structures that allow the former to complement the latter is likely to enhance the vital collective 
order and thereby simultaneously clarify and strategically address “conceptual, ethical and 
practical reservations about how non-market impacts [e.g attrition in confidence toward the 
communal and traditional]” should be factored into techno-economistic assessments (Stern, 
2006, p. 187).         
Despite the overall tendency to repose climate leadership in discrete local domains, the 
high degree of resource gaps, particularly ideational shortcomings, seems to undermine 
traditional structures as the preferred route for leadership and effective action. Traditional 
structures only rank first in terms of preferred sources of climate change leadership in Indian 
Creek, where it accounts for 35 percent of prevalence. It is instructive to note that even in this 
context, where leadership through traditional structures is articulated deferentially, respondents 
have distinguished between reposing leadership in “elders” from the Alcalde, the 
established/defined traditional authority (see Excerpt 69). Even in Flowers Bank, the village 
most committed to reposing climate leadership in discrete local domains, traditional structures 
(age-based in this context) only account for a fifth of prevalence, well behind community at 35 
percent and marginally higher than youth (15 percent - see Excerpt 71). A similar pattern is 
observed in Trio, where traditional structures (Alcalde) account for 19 percent of prevalence and 
broader community/village action is most preferred (38 percent) alongside the locally identified 
exemplary group (cocoa group - 10 percent).     
Overall, this suggests climate leadership is highly contextual, in terms of institutional 
capacity, cultural structures and dispositions and is impacted by ideational levels. Distinctions in 
leadership preferences across cohorts generally and distinctions among some cohorts in 
circumscribed localities reinforce these observations. Such distinctions reinforce a need for 
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climate champions of various forms (local and external) for the effective provision of climate 
information and enactment/demonstration of associated actions aimed at both population and 
cohort levels across villages. Specifically, all groups, except older men, overwhelmingly prefer 
internal/local leadership: young women maximally favour internal leadership (traditional 
structures (44 percent), elders (22 percent), community/village and youth (17 percent each); for 
young men these structures account for 71 percent of preference (traditional structures (57 
percent) and community (14 percent)); and nearly half for older women (46 percent - traditional 
structures, community/village and teachers (eight percent each) and elders at 23 percent).  
However, there’s significant preference for an indeterminate group of exemplary persons 
(31 percent) among older women that even if largely external will still not change the overall 
dominance of internal preferences for the cohort. The high level of support for experts among 
older women irrespective of their origin, which is entirely accounted for by older women from 
San Miguel, is likely due to their disproportionate knowledge deficit. The implication is that 
heightened levels of knowledge deficits in a communal context attenuates confidence in internal 
and more so traditional structures such that older women in San Miguel, where direct 
engagement of the cohort is absent, exhibit the lowest communal motive of all cohorts and 
singularly account for all references to indeterminate excerpts (see Excerpt 70; also see Young 
Women in Flowers Bank (Excerpt 71) for the countervailing case).  
The leadership preferences of older men are also supportive of the observation that 
overall internal knowledge and broader resource gaps undermine confidence in the traditional 
order. Older men, who are most widely engaged and knowledgeable, are the most committed to 
seeking external leadership (55 percent) and registered no preference for traditional structures or 
elders, which are categories within which they are represented and hold power. Where local 
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leadership is preferred by this cohort it is largely reposed in the community-at-large (38 percent) 
and secondarily to exemplary groups in the case of Trio (see Excerpt 68). So, the core cohort 
level distinctions in preference for climate leadership are consistent with the overall observation 
of the role of ideational exposure, contextual factors, institutional capacity and practical 
engagement in structuring leadership preference for climate action.     
 Both young women and young men prefer to repose leadership in internal structures (83 
percent and 71 percent, respectively). Young women’s higher preference for internal structures is 
likely a result of their higher level of collective motive and the relative malleability of the 
primarily informational resource gaps that undermine their agency. So positively primed and 
disposed to act on climate change are young women that the cohort, entirely associated with 
Flowers Bank, self-identifies their demographic (youth) as a possible source of climate change 
leadership due to their perceived relative educational advantages (see Excerpt 71). As previously 
established, young men, who are similarly knowledgeable and engaged as young women, are 
more prone to risk specification and exhibit high levels of fatalism of a naturistic or biospheric 
orientation. Further, young men perceive a wider-range of climate responses associated with the 
Ya’axché intervention than young women, while perceiving the same level of impact. The 
implication is that young men, who are not directly engaged and aware of the nuances of the 
intervention and are less collectively motivated, more readily externalize leadership preference 
based on perceived efficacy of the intervention’s mechanism which comports more favourably 
with the scale of impacts they perceive. Considering the high and comparable salience of formal 
education as a knowledge acquisition source for both cohorts of youth (79 percent for young men 
and 80 percent for young women), the divergence in leadership preferences, alongside wider 
cohort-level distinctions associated with practical engagement, experimentation, institutional 
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capacity and other factors, suggests Korma’s assertion that “book knowledge and schooling 
undermine[s] the appreciation of practical indigenous knowledge” (1995, cited in Kohler-
Rollefson, 1996, p. 11) is likely overdetermined. Rather, waning confidence in prevailing 
indigenous knowledge forms and leadership within these contexts is chiefly structured by the 
incapacitation of existing knowledge accrued through indigenous experimentation to tackle distal 
observations and challenges. In lieu, confidence correlates with exposure to new formal and 
informal experimental knowledge systems, new internal institutional mechanisms interfacing 
with external actors and systems.  
The continued relevance of experimentation as a factor in this emergent integrative 
knowledge order underscores Showers (1996) contention that there is limited utility in separating 
conceptions of indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge for environmental researchers, 
particularly those committed to using ethnoscientific techniques to improve the design and 
communication of interventions to address unprecedented geologic change. The integrative 
nature of the emergent knowledge system is a critical manifestation of the purpose of the 
bridging structures necessitated to offset fissures in the crucial collective order. 
Excerpt 69: Preference for traditional leadership is deferentially articulated 
Young Women Focus Group – Indian Creek, Ya’axché Subset  
Interviewer: So, you want to learn more and most of you think that your village might be affected in the future. Who in the village should 
get you to learn more about climate change? 
Respondent 1: I would say the village leaders, like the Alcalde, the chairman and especially the school. 
Respondent 2: I would say the same thing and some of the elderly people too 
Respondent 3: Same thing.  
Respondent 4: It’s [true]. We have to come together. 
Respondent 5: same thing.  
Respondent 6: same thing. 
Interviewer: Why should those people lead? Why should the Alcalde [and] the elders lead? 
Respondent 1: Because [they] are in charge of the village. Like the chairman, the Alcalde… they are the one[s] that are going to do this. They 
are the one[s] to gather people and to have meeting[s] with them.  
Respondent 2: They can find other ways. They can do it. The chairman, the village leaders, taking charge, we can try to find solution on how 
we can prevent the climate change.  
 
Excerpt 70: Disproportionate knowledge and broader resource deficits heightens support for experts irrespective of origin among older women 
Older Women Focus Group - San Miguel, Ya’axché Subset  
Interviewer: Would you like to learn more about climate change? Why do [you] want to know more? 
Respondent 1: Yes, for us to know. I want to know because I don’t know. 
Respondent 2: We hear about it. I want to know more about the climate change.  
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Respondent 3: Same thing. 
Respondent 4: Yes! I want to know more. 
Interviewer: So, you want to know more about this climate change thing. Who in the village [do] you think should […] get you to learn some 
more? From the village or outside the village? 
Respondent 1: I don’t know. Who knows about it for them to explain to us. Whoever from the village or from the outside. 
Respondent 2: Same thing. 
Respondent 3: But how they will [sic] find out [about] the climate change? Through computer or through internet? 
Respondent 4: I don’t know.   
Respondent 5: I think anybody [who knows].  
 
Excerpt 71: Young women self-identify as potential climate leaders due to perceived educational, informational and technological advantages. 
Young Women Focus Group - Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset  
Interviewer: So, most of you think climate change is affecting the village. And, you’ve said that you want to learn more. And you said that 
there is no climate change project happening in the village. If we were to do something about climate change in the village, who do you 
think should lead on that from Flowers Bank? Who should lead? 
Respondent 1: I would say the youths [sic]. 
Interviewer: The youths [sic]. Why the youths [sic]?  
Respondent 1: […] If we could get them at that age to cut it then as we go further, they can pass it down their own kids.  
Interviewer: Why do you think young people.can the youth contribute to climate change?  
Respondent 1: I would because they don’t know. 
Interviewer: Because they don’t know. OK. And who [do] you think should lead? 
Respondent 2: The Chairman [of the village].  
Interviewer: The Chairman. Why the Chairman?  
Respondent 2: Because he is more than likely the leader of the community. 
Interviewer: He is the leader. OK. Who do you think…?  
Respondent 3: I share the same sentiments with her [referring to respondent 1] because for the youths [sic], for me, I believe that they are 
more aware because they are more in tuned with technology and the older folks they need to come around in terms of inviting them on the 
effects of climate change. 
Interviewer: And who do you think should lead?  
Respondent 4: OK. I say the youths [sic], too, because the youth they really… Because you learn, they think[s] in school and the youths [sic] 
[are] more knowledgeable. Like Ms. [name of respondent 3 redacted] said, the technologies, the internet and all [of] that.  
Interviewer: Is there a youth group in the village?  
Respondents 1 & 3: No. 
Angst 
 
Table 56: The relative prevalence of the range of ranked and unranked complex concerns across study populations in Belize 
Subset Village Afforestation CC Impact 
CC Impact        
- 1 
Chemical Use/              
Industrial 
Activity Electricity 
Electricity 
 -1 
Density 
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate  
Ya’axché 
Indian 
Creek  1 3% 0 0% 6 15% 0 0% 6 15% 4 10% 39 
San 
Miguel 0 0% 0 0% 2 22% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 9 
Trio 2 4% 1 2% 9 17% 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 52 
CCCCC Flowers Bank 0 0% 5 13% 7 18% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 40 
Totals 3 2% 6 4% 24 17% 2 1% 6 4% 4 3% 140 
               
Subset Village Flooding Flooding -1 
Food 
Security 
Health 
Centre 
Health 
Centre - 1 Density   
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate   
Ya’axché Indian Creek  0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 39   
  San Miguel 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 9   
  Trio 0 0% 0 0% 3 6% 3 6% 3 6% 52   
CCCCC Flowers Bank 2 5% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 40   
Totals 2 1% 1 1% 4 3% 3 2% 3 2% 140   
 410 
 
               
Subset Village Income Income - 1 Land Rights 
Land Rights 
- 1 
Leadership 
and 
Harmony Density   
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate   
Ya’axché 
Indian 
Creek  0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 6 15% 39   
San 
Miguel 0 0% 0 0% 1 11% 2 22% 0 0% 9   
Trio 4 8% 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 8 15% 52   
CCCCC Flowers Bank 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 6 15% 40   
Totals 5 4% 2 1% 1 1% 2 1% 20 14% 140   
               
Subset Village 
Leadership 
and Harmony 
- 1 Lifestyle Poverty Road Sanitation Density   
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate   
Ya’axché 
Indian 
Creek  0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 8 21% 39   
San 
Miguel 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 9   
Trio 7 13% 1 2% 0 0% 2 4% 5 10% 52   
CCCCC Flowers Bank 2 5% 0 0% 0 0% 4 10% 1 3% 40   
Totals 9 6% 1 1% 1 1% 6 4% 14 10% 140   
               
Subset Village Sanitation -1 Transport Transport -1 
Wild 
Animals 
Wild 
Animals -1 Density   
Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate Prev Rate   
Ya’axché 
Indian 
Creek  6 15% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 39   
San 
Miguel 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 22% 2 22% 9   
Trio 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 52   
CCCCC Flowers Bank 0 0% 8 20% 3 8% 0 0% 0 0% 40   
Totals 6 4% 8 6% 3 2% 2 1% 2 1% 140   
               
Multiple distinctions in leadership preferences and their association with contextual 
factors such as institutional capacity, cultural structures and dispositions, alongside population 
and cohort-level distinctions in perception of impacts, action and cause, mean the efficacy of 
mechanisms to mobilize agency and enable effective action in these primarily collective contexts 
is dependent on accounting for the complexity and linkages among a broad array of issues and 
the intensity with which they are perceived across populations in both messaging and actions. 
While the most pronounced resource gaps undermining agency and confidence in the traditional 
order to lead climate action are informational, a range of multi-linked and cross-sectoral first-
order concerns constrains the minds of the study population. These inter-linked angsts, which are 
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both manifestly and latently caused and/or exacerbated by climate change and variability, are 
variably understood, but especially intractable among this study population.   
Per Table 56, 26 of the 55 codes denoting angst are active in the overall Belize dataset, a 
level only exceeded by the larger Indian dataset (35; and just 10 for Fiji). Specifically, there are 
11 angsts associated with Flowers Bank and 15 varyingly in the Ya’axché subset – 14 in Trio, 
nine in Indian Creek and five in San Miguel. However, some fundamental concerns which have 
no clear connection with climate change warrant careful attention because attending to them 
strengthens critical contextual leverage points for boosting and mobilizing agency and action. 
For instance, overall, Leadership and Harmony is the most grounded angst discernible from the 
dataset as a singularly mentioned or unranked concern (17 percent).  The high level of 
prevalence associated with concern about Leadership and Harmony is likely consequential for 
the mobilization of agency, particularly the substantial level of constrained agency observed, 
given the high degree of collectivity and interdependence of these physically small, socio-
culturally and existentially interdependent contexts. However, the heightened concern about 
leadership and harmony is consistent with observations of shifting confidence in leadership for 
addressing climate change impacts from traditional structures to non-traditional groups, 
exemplary persons and even the general community level, even where local leadership is 
preferred.     
Moreover, the attrition in confidence reposed in the traditional order, which manifests in 
concerns about leadership and harmony, is also due to broader socio-legal developments and 
economic interests, namely contestations about the pursuit of collective or individual land rights. 
Following nearly a decade of legal challenges, the Belize Supreme Court issued a landmark 
decision affirming the customary land rights of 39 Maya communities in southern Belize, which 
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was upheld by the final court of appeal (The Maya Leaders Alliance v. The Attorney General of 
Belize, 2015). The judicial decision grants the communities full rights over their ancestral lands, 
which have been serially encroached upon by the post-colonial Belizean state for resource 
extraction and land privatization for other commercial interests that have resulted in warnings 
from the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (DeLuca, 
2015).  However, differing positions across Mayan communities means support for enacting 
these constitutional rights sought by the Maya Leaders Alliance and the Toledo Alcaldes 
Association and especially vocal activists have caused fissures in the communal order and 
undermined confidence in traditional structures. The data associated with this measure suggests 
differences in economic outlook and current private ownership of land generally undermine 
support for collective ownership and confidence in leadership (see Excerpt 72). This is further 
underscored by the fact that leadership and harmony account for the greatest level of prevalence 
as a ranked concern in Trio, where the individual pursuit of the commercially lucrative agro-
forestry activities is most comprehensive and long-standing. This suggests a strong correlation 
between ownership and successful mobilization of agricultural land and concern about the state 
of the collective order as customary ownership patterns are championed by traditional structures 
and much of the population.            
 However, it is noteworthy that Flowers Bank, a Creole community that does not benefit 
from the landmark legislation, is equally concerned about leadership and harmony (unranked) as 
the Mayan villages. However, this primarily concerns mobilizing support for community events 
(see Excerpt 73). Nonetheless, this offers strong reinforcement of observations in the previous 
subsection about the importance of attending to the socio-cultural in order to effectively 
understand how climate impacts and responses are likely to manifest subjectively across 
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localities and cohorts and constrain climate adaptation efforts, particularly in contexts of holistic 
belief systems where place and culture are germane.      
 While Leadership and Harmony is the most grounded singularly mentioned angsts, at a 
comparative level, Climate Change Impact ranks first in the overall dataset with a slightly higher 
prevalence of 20 percent. This is significant as it suggests a heightened sensitivity to the 
significant impact of climate change in the localities and the extent to which concerns/angsts are 
viewed as being climate change induced, related or exacerbated. This is supported by the fact 
that the only singularly mentioned angst that accounts for more than a tenth of prevalence, 
Sanitation (12 percent or 14 of 120), is only ranked as a primary angst in one locality and 
accounts for overall prevalence of five percent (six of 120). Furthermore, land rights are the only 
angst other than Climate Change Impact that register higher levels of prevalence when ranked 
against Climate Change Impact (0.8 percent or one of 120 to 1.7 percent or two of 120) and this 
is entirely accounted for by older men in San Miguel (see Excerpt 72). All other angsts that 
registered in the dataset had lower levels of resonance when ranked against climate change 
impact, except Health Centre and Wild Animals that maintained the same level of resonance 
when ranked (three of 120 and two of 120 each).  
Furthermore, both angsts are also entirely accounted for by particular cohorts in 
circumscribed localities (older men in Trio and older women in San Miguel, respectively). A 
more granular look at the prevalence of angsts underscores this observation. Even where 
contextual factors invariably drive the articulation of primary angst (Sanitation in Indian Creek 
(eight of 39), Wild Animals in San Miguel (two of nine), Leadership and Harmony (eight of 
nine) in Trio and Transport in Flowers Bank (eight of 40)), climate change impact is the only 
ranked factor to account for a greater share of prevalence for angst in the particular populations. 
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 In Indian Creek, where climate change impact isn’t mentioned as an independent angst, it 
accounts for 15 percent of total prevalence for angsts in the locality as a ranked concern, a figure 
which is only equalled by sanitation as a ranked factor (sanitation-1). However, sanitation, which 
is the top-ranked angst as a singularly mentioned concern, declined in prevalence by more than 
five percent when compared to climate change (21 percent). This decline in prevalence is also 
observed for electricity and leadership and harmony at an even more significant scale. Both 
factors moved from prevalence of 15 percent to 10 percent and 15 to zero, respectively, when 
ranked against climate change.  
A similar pattern is observed in Flowers Bank, where the highest concentration of 
singularly ranked factors registered prevalence as a comparative factor (flooding, income, 
leadership and harmony and transportation). Flooding lost half its salience when ranked against 
climate change (from five percent to 2.5 percent); leadership and harmony lost two-thirds (from 
15 percent to five percent); transport lost 60 percent (20 percent to of eight percent), while 
sanitation and income lost the entirety of their prevalence (2.5 percent to zero). This is 
significant as climate change is independently mentioned as a factor with less prevalence (13 
percent) than both leadership and harmony and sanitation but rose by five percent (18 percent) 
when ranked against the other angsts. This is consistent with the village’s relatively high level of 
premium climate knowledge (second in the dataset) and the lowest level of knowledge gap, 
measures on which Indian Creek is outranked by all villages except San Miguel. The shift in the 
relative rank of angsts in Flowers Bank, particularly flooding in favour of climate impact, is 
illustrative of its comparative knowledge advantages being operationalized. The heightened level 
of angsts about climate change as both a singularly mentioned and ranked concern in this 
locality, which is greater than all other villages, also comports with the village’s high perception 
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of impact (second only to Trio), but inability to discern any response mechanism. The heightened 
level of angsts is also consistent with Flowers Banks disproportionate and distinctly religious 
fatalism and externalization of cause to domains outside of human reach that implies end times 
or irreversible resource exhaustion, respectively.   
Both Trio and San Miguel show marginal variations to the trend of increased concern 
about climate impact when ranked. In Trio, four singularly mentioned factors are ranked, three of 
which decline in resonance sanitation by 100 percent (from 10 percent to zero); specifically, 
income by 50 percent (from eight percent to four percent), leadership and harmony by two 
percent (from 15 percent to 13 percent). However, health centre maintained the same level of 
prevalence when ranked (eight percent). Overall, climate change’s resonance as an angst shifted 
from prevalence of two percent to 17 percent when compared. This 15 percent shift in resonance 
when ranked makes climate change the single most grounded angst for the village overall—
unlike any other context in the study population. This high level of consciousness about the 
primacy of climate impact, which is second only to Flowers Bank, is consistent with Trio’s top 
rank for premium climate knowledge and lower levels of climate gap (second only to Flowers 
Bank), and the highest level of perceived impacts.      
Conversely, San Miguel, where both climate knowledge and perception of impact 
(alongside Indian Creek for the latter) are the lowest, is the only context where there is no 
decisive shift towards privileging climate change impact as an angst when the issue is invoked 
comparatively. Two singularly mentioned factors account for prevalence when ranked against 
climate change: land rights (11 percent) and wild animals (22 percent). Wild animals maintain 
the same level of angsts and land rights doubles its prevalence. However, climate change shifts 
from prevalence of zero of nine to two of nine. While this trend comports with the village’s 
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relative knowledge deficiencies, it also reflects elements of the traditional order’s (elders due to 
the sample distinction) specific and heightened concern about the most significant socio-legal 
and customary challenge facing Mayan communities across southern Belize today: internal 
contestations about enacting customary land rights (see Excerpt 72).    
 While the shifts observed are indicative of both contextual factors and knowledge 
operationalization challenges, that CC-Impact when invoked as a ranking factor is so resonant it 
ranks as a first-tier concern in all villages alongside their other primary expressions of angsts 
strongly suggests that climate change’s multidimensionality is substantially understood, even 
where premium climate knowledge is low and manifestly credible sources of information are not 
readily available. The implication is that comprehensive response mechanisms are likely to be 
positively received because the interlinked nature of the chief concerns held across populations is 
understood. Specifically, climate impact is greater in Trio (9 of 52, versus 8 and 5 for leadership 
and harmony and sanitation, respectively), equal in San Miguel (2 of 9, alongside wild animals) 
and second in Indian Creek (6 of 39) alongside electricity, leadership and harmony but behind 
Sanitation (8) and Flowers Bank (7 of 40 versus transport at 8 of 40).  
Theoretically, this offers strong support for my observation of the high discernibility of 
signs and impact perception in resource-dependent contexts, which accrues substantial 
experiential knowledge. Although variably credible, it forms a critical knowledge base that can 
be leveraged and structured by information provision mechanisms through projects and other 
manifestly credible sources. In other words, not only is the extant literature’s (Moser, 2009) 
concern about climate change communication being uniquely challenging because of distal and 
imperceptible impacts and low perception of personal risk (Board, Fisher & O’Connor, 1998; 
McDaniels, 1996) inapplicable in resource-dependent contexts, but the holistic purview of life 
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and manifest interlinked nature of highly discernible impacts variably override even intractable 
knowledge gaps and likely precludes the emergence of climate denialism, which is entirely 
absent from the dataset. This is reinforced by the fact that the pattern of prioritizing CC-Impact is 
also evident when invoked as a ranked factor across all age and gender cohorts overall. It is also 
notable that women, who are relatively less knowledgeable about climate change, account for the 
greater prevalence for climate change as a singularly mentioned angst (five of six) and both 
young women (50 percent) and older women (33 percent) outstrip their male peers (young men 
17 percent and older men zero). However, older men, who account for no prevalence for climate 
change as a singularly mentioned factor, is the only group for which its resonance is so great that 
as a ranked factor it outranks all other angsts for the cohort (20 percent). The cohort’s distinction 
is consistent with its climate knowledge advantages, substantially higher awareness of impacts 
and action, primarily due to being directly involved.  
For all other cohorts, climate impact is a first-tier factor: tied first alongside leadership 
and harmony (23 percent) for young men and tied second for older women (12 percent, behind 
leadership and harmony at 17 percent) and young women (17 percent, behind sanitation at 23 
percent). This suggests both cohorts of men were more impacted by the ranking of factors and 
the women showed more sturdy perceptions of their angsts. The lower tendency to rank climate 
impact as a first-tier concern among older women compared to all other cohorts is consistent 
with their lower climate knowledge, heightened perception of impacts and actions but 
disproportionately higher levels of fatalism with limited mutability and general externalization of 
cause beyond the purview of humans, particularly in Flowers Bank. Whereas, the similarity 
among young men and women is consistent with nearly identical levels of premium climate 
knowledge among both cohorts (50 percent and 52 percent, respectively). However, the notably 
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higher prevalence of concern about climate change impact among young men is likely a function 
of the higher levels of fatalism and externalization of cause to domains outside the purview of 
humans (nature), notwithstanding their perception of fewer impacts and greater levels of climate 
action.   
However, these gendered observations vary widely across villages as angsts are 
contextually driven. For instance, sanitation, which ranked first in terms of prevalence singularly 
and overall for young women, is almost entirely accounted for by young women from Indian 
Creek at the cohort level (86 percent), while young men from the same locality account for the 
entirety of their cohort’s contribution to the prevalence for leadership and harmony. The high 
perception of fissures in the communal harmony and leadership structures among young men 
further clarifies the higher preference for external leadership and lower collective disposition 
among young men compared to young women. The gendered observations for first-ranked angsts 
also holds true for the second-ranked angsts for each subset across cohorts. Specifically, road is 
ranked second for young men, but is entirely accounted for by those in Flowers Bank (three of 
three) and the second ranked angsts for young women (transport) is also entirely accounted for 
by those in Flowers Bank. A similar pattern is observed for older folks. For older men, health 
centre, road and sanitation rank second with prevalence of seven percent each, with all men 
declaring health centre and sanitation coming from Trio (three of three each) and those declaring 
roads coming from Trio and Flowers Bank (two-thirds and one-third, respectively). For older 
women, electricity, the second-ranked angst for women overall, is entirely reflective of the 
concerns of residents in Indian Creek. 
 
Excerpt 72: Concerns about socio-legal issues/land rights undermines confidence in the collective and traditional order. 
Older Men Focus Group – San Miguel, Ya’axché Subset  
Interviewer: Apart from climate change, what are the two biggest problems in San Miguel? 
Respondent 1: Like with the land and like how Christina [arguably the leading Mayan activist for communal land rights], with the land. When 
it’s free, we would like to know about it because the government want the land and then we hear that the land is in the hand[s] of Christina; 
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and then the people are planting, farming; and when the government gets hold of the land, they will lose. It is good that… if it is your own 
property then that is not a problem, but if not then it will be hard. 
Interviewer: Is it communal land rights in San Miguel or individual? What about in this village is it [that] your land is communal? 
Respondent 1: In the Toledo District, yes communal. 
Respondent 2: I don’t know about them because mines [sic] is private land.  
Respondent 3: Well my one [sic] is lease. It is not [my] property yet but since you mention this Christina Coc, she is fighting for communal 
land. I don’t know, but she say[s] it is communal land for the Mayas [that she is] fighting to [sic] the government. It’s no agreement to [sic] it 
yet but I have a lease. 
Interviewer: [Do] you prefer private property or communal [rights]? 
Respondent 1: Yes.  
Respondent 2: Yes, because actually the land will be for you, but it is hard if it is communal.  
Respondent 3: Yes 
Interviewer: Do you think the land problem is a bigger problem than climate change? And why do you say that? 
Respondent 1: Climate because…  
Respondent 2: My land because [I] work on the land.  
Respondent 3: That’s a hard question to answer. 
 
Excerpt 73:  Collective order and action are undermined by coordination and communication challenges 
Older Women Focus Group - Flowers Bank, CCCCC Subset  
Interviewer: What are the two biggest problem or challenges in the village for you?  
Respondent 2: I would say unity and climate change. 
Interviewer: Unity and climate change. And which one would be ranked as number 1? 
Respondent 2: Climate change. 
Interviewer: Why?  
Respondent 2: Sometimes [I] go to Belize [City] and [I am] no[t] prepared for the cold and when you get up weather change up [referencing 
the weather in the mornings]. You never took [sic] your sweater.   
Interviewer: Yeah. It affects your movement. What are the two biggest affecting the village in your opinion?  
Respondent 3: I would say cooperation. Well, for me, I have my own transportation. Why I would say cooperation. Today is Sunday, and I 
have to go to church and I come after when I done church, but if it was another day, I would have been here early. But the days that…see 
like how only we are here right now, you see. Everybody else could have come out just like we [did] and listen and understand. 
Interviewer: So, you think cooperation is the bigger problem? 
Respondent 3: That is what I think  
Interviewer:  Number one for the village. OK. Ms. [name of respondent 6 redacted], [the] two biggest problems for the village? 
Respondent 6: Biggest problem is participation and communication. Those are the biggest problems. 
Conclusion 
Consistent with findings in the precceeding chapters, this chapter underscores the high 
discernibility of climate impacts, sociotropic risk disposition and heightened appreciation of the 
complexity of unprecedented geologic change in resource-dependent contexts. The heightened 
appreciation of the multidimensionality of climate impacts, and absence of climate denialism, 
even amidst substantial knowledge deficiencies, in these environs underlies the import of the 
sustainable development reading of climate change that underpins this study—specifically, the 
need to treat mitigation and actions addressing impacts as components of broader adaptive 
mechanisms necessitated by subsistence and existential imperatives rather than merely geologic 
change. So, whereas Glantz (1990) contends that mitigation should be foregrounded because it is 
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more politically expedient for global mitigative action, at the level of the quotidian where an 
integrative/holistic purview is the dominant, comprehensive adaptation is most urgent and likely 
most resonant and effective. The study also lays bare the importance of engagement mechanisms 
in maximizing the efficacy of the comprehensive adaptation response frame.  
 It clarifies the need for explicit provision of climate change information even in 
interventions that are manifestly linked to climate change. Specifically, the enactment of a 
comprehensive response mechanism (e.g. Flowers Bank) that is devoid of accompanying 
information constrains even an otherwise knowledgeable and directly engaged population from 
discerning climate action, amidst high perceptibility of impacts. Moreover, while improved 
subsistence is a motive for climate action, a primarily economistic and subsistence frame is 
likely to undermine empowerment possibilities associated with even conceptually expansive and 
transformative endeavours with endogenous origins. The study also highlights the efficacy of 
targeted interventions that prioritize practical engagement, training and experimentation over 
sustained periods in domains of common interest. Such interventions, as evidenced in Trio, are 
likely to accrue indirect population-level knowledge benefits, even among cohorts that are not 
engaged due to the relevance of actions and the discernibility of responses that comports with 
impact perception (e.g. older women in Trio).        
 Notwithstanding the relatively small sample size, the theoretical and practical 
implications of engagement under both scaled versions of these endogenous interventions are 
substantial and consistent with observations in the two previous cross-cultural case studies. At 
one level, they both indicate that the fluidity of the micro-politics of participation and 
empowerment (where control is reposed, the nature and structure of engagement elements, 
especially who are engaged and how) more decisively determine the efficacy and empowerment 
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potential of an intervention than its endogeneity. In the second instance, the study suggests that 
targeted or sub-maximal level interventions focused on domains of shared import (e.g. 
agriculture) over sustained periods accrue substantial population benefits that warrant a more 
textured view of the efficacy of ecological viewpoints on social change that accords heightened 
import to duration and domain of focus rather than just scope. Theoretically, it also indicates that 
formal knowledge introduced through practical training and experimentation afforded by 
external entities does not necessarily undermine or replace traditional knowledge, but rather 
updates and reformats incapacitated experiential knowledge. Experiential knowledge’s critical 
role as the foundational substance of indigenous knowledge systems and its continued salience 
for adaptive capacity in mobilized resource-dependent contexts (both Indian Creek and Trio) 
means integrative knowledge systems that also expands the tapestry of knowledge are of 
paramount importance for boosting climate knowledge, knowledge operationalization, as well as 
optimizing agency and action. This is especially important given its compatibility with the 
traditional order (i.e. the basis of the traditional knowledge systems), which is critical for the 
maintenance of cohesion in collective contexts where interdependence is high and manifests in 
primarily shared risk depositions and motives (socio-tropic and biospheric). 
Relatedly, the study underscores the limitation of primarily techno-economistic adaptive 
frameworks and their significantly counterproductive role where holistic worldviews are 
dominant. It highlights how socio-political (e.g. land rights), cultural, spiritual, environmental, 
contextual and institutional capacities function as interrelated facets through which climate 
perceptions and capacities are structured varyingly at population, cohort and individual levels. 
This suggests that even where a primarily socio-tropic motive underpins perception of risk and 
motive, other key perceptual frames and capacities (food security, biospheric, religious, 
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proximity to environmental/physical vulnerabilities e.g. rivers and anti-environmental activities, 
such as agro-industrial pollution) and the fixity with which they are held can structure perception 
of impacts, risks and responsiveness to action and messages.  
The strong evidence underlying the efficacy of exposure to new formal and informal 
experimental knowledge systems, new internal institutional mechanisms interfacing with 
external actors and systems, which correlates with shifting confidence in the traditional order to 
tackle unprecedented challenges and broader evidence of fissures in the collective order due to 
the effective advocacy of extra-traditional actors for communal land rights, underscores a need 
for bridging structures. The study illuminates how bridging structures that enhance rather than 
usurp traditional authority are likely to buttress internal harmony by empowering the most 
legitimate and durable institutional mechanism in traditional and indigenous contexts, which is 
vital for the mobilization of collective agency. The efficacious integrative knowledge process 
observed in Trio, where new specialist institutional mechanisms (the cocoa farmers group) have 
been effective, underscores a fundamental way in which bridging structures should function. 
Most importantly, contrary to assertions by metropolitan scholars (Hackett, Forde, 
Gunster, Foxwell-Norton, 2017) that the availability of information is a secondary challenge, this 
study highlights a need for a wider tapestry of manifestly credible information. It found that 
amidst absent and weak information mechanisms, there is a uniformly dominant knowledge-
seeking disposition spurred by an existential motive that is strongly associated with the high 
perceptibility of subsistence-level climate change impacts. Additionally, the variability with 
which even manifestly credible sources are available across populations is consequential—
specifically, the form, accessibility, duration, scope and relevance of information provided by 
news (chiefly radio and television), school and project intervention, which are varyingly 
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available across and within populations, differentially structures climate knowledge and 
operationalization. These observations are significant for efforts to mobilize climate agency and 
enable effective action, as they clarify the socio-cultural and contextually determined nature of 
project information provision mechanisms and the broader availability of relevant and accessible 
climate information. The significance of access, form, duration, scope and relevance of even 
manifestly credible sources, alongside the maximalist knowledge seeking disposition, suggests 
key factors, long considered individual level barriers to climate action (Lorenzoni et. al., 2007), 
are more contextual in resource-dependent collective spaces. This highlights a critical locus of 
action for the effective design and pursuit of adaptation pathways envisioned in these contexts. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion: Raising Public Consciousness and Enabling Action 
This comprehensive cross-cultural, multi-country study of climate change perception and 
response focused on disproportionately vulnerable resource-dependent contexts offers 
compelling insights for the optimization of climate change communication. Considering the 
scope of insights generated by this intersectional empirical scrutiny of climate change 
communications in 17 villages in Belize, Fiji and India, this chapter highlights core 
commonalities and differences about communicating climate change. The chapter contemplates 
the significance of these insights in the form of a synthesis of cross-project observations rather 
than the country cases, which do not tell single stories or offer uniform insights.  
Crucially, the chapter articulates critical elements associated with distinct communicative 
approaches necessary for the pursuit of three climate action pathways that encompass a wide 
range of futures that can be endogenously envisioned. Consistent with the explicit reparatory 
political consciousness that underpins this study, I probe the nature of communication required 
for merely coping with, adapting to and pursuing transformation amidst unprecedented 
anthropogenic climate change. These three communicative pathways, which are intended as 
functional corollaries to Pelling’s (2011) tripartite adaptation framework, are systematically 
delineated based on the intersectional case studies. Accordingly, I will articulate the climate 
action pathways and futures possible under the seven distinct adaptation projects studied based 
on their conceptualization. Owing to the variable nature of project implementation and 
engagement across contexts, I will map each of the 17 villages across these climate action 
pathways with keen attention to the communicative modalities employed. While the project 
sample is small and only representative of the contexts studied, the high degree of cross-cultural 
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and cross-national commonalities observed, strongly underscores the transferability of these 
actionable insights. 
Squandering Positive Perception and Ownership       
The elicitation and analytical technique employed by this study demarcates fascinating 
thematic commonalities and distinctions across the case studies. Across all 17 study sites, the 
climate change interventions achieved near maximal levels of positive perception, with primarily 
immediate acceptance or positive belief progression. This is consistent with and chiefly 
attributable to the seven initiatives’ consultative design, alongside explicit endogenous 
generation in Belize. However, the efficacy of endogenous or consultative design is a function of 
the nature and quality of the manifestly credible and current climate change information 
environment available in each context, alongside engagement and use patterns. Chiefly, the 
nature, scope and quality of the information provision mechanisms varyingly afforded by the 
projects across villages and even cohorts and groups within a given village.  
Emblematically, climate knowledge and operationalization are substantially undermined 
in contexts where endogenously derived (Flowers Bank Village in Belize) or varyingly 
consultatively formulated interventions (all villages in India and the tripartite Fijian settlement of 
Seaqaqa) are implemented with a primarily economistic frame and devoid of associative climate 
change information. So consequential is the implementation of consultative and/or scaled 
endogenous initiatives without associative climate change information that it can even constrain 
the perception of climate action where there is population level involvement and substantial 
levels of self-management. While these interventions boost both coping and adaptive capacity, 
their manifestly reductive economistic framing is likely to cauterize the transformative potential 
of even compelling and comprehensively designed responses. This is typified by the inability of 
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even the self-managed in Flowers Bank, Belize to perceive the climate responsive nature of the 
CCCCC-led Cohune Palm Nut Project, which uniquely tackles both the root cause of climate 
change (dependence on fossil fuel) and explores expansive associative livelihood opportunities.  
 However, as observed on Yaqaga Island in Fiji, even consultatively derived interventions 
with associative information can cauterize transformation where limited resources compel the 
pursuit of circumscribed and piecemeal actions that are themselves consultatively derived 
through progressive prioritization approaches that privilege ranking over voting. While an 
inclusive engagement mechanism, resource constraints and the pursuit of an isolated action 
drawn from a set of intersecting first-order challenges truncates people's fundamental needs and 
can undermine climate change agency, project perception and overall adaptive capacity. It 
reinforces the need to and efficacy of addressing climate adaptation as a complex challenge 
rather than a discrete phenomenon. This invariably means establishing partnerships and/or 
working with communities to articulate how, where and with whom to collaborate to establish 
linked actions, where resources (project cycle, funding, staffing, among others) preclude 
comprehensive responses by a singular entity or project. 
Conceptually, the diminished outcomes from endogenous and collectively derived 
climate actions observed suggests the transformative potential of local ownership underscored by 
critical perspectives on development is subject to the politics of participation and other 
intervening factors. Thus, in terms of individual or population level enactment of agency, the 
high positive perception of the primarily economistic communicative frames associated with the 
interventions studied is indicative of Webster and Engberg-Pederson’s (2002, cited in Holland, 
Brockles and Abugre, 2004) distinction between strategies by the disadvantaged to access 
resources and those that influence policy design and implementation with redistributive and 
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equity motives. However, there is also evidence of programmatic foreclosure of the populations’ 
ability to fully grasp and effectively structure the transformations made possible by the 
intervention because of the absence of information and communication necessary for 
transforming social structures (Dutta, 2011) across the Indian villages, Seaqaqa in Fiji and 
Flowers Bank in Belize. So, while the project interventions in these contexts are marked by 
endogenous origins rather than exogenous pre-determination, they manifest as instrumentalist 
participation modalities, which Masaki (2004) contends often undermine transformative 
grassroots impulses. The latter is expounded upon in the sub-section below exploring the 
adaptive pathways enabled by each project. 
Intractable Knowledge Gaps 
Profoundly intractable levels of collective knowledge gaps observed across all study sites 
are illustrative of how the weak information provision mechanisms associated with the projects, 
particularly those devoid of associated information, substantially undermine the transformative 
potential of collectively derived and endogenous aspirations. Knowledge gaps range from a low 
of a fifth in the Fijian dataset, to approximately a third in India and nearly a half in Belize. 
Similarly, premium climate knowledge that enables people to draw connections between cause 
and effect, recognize ensuing or potential to enact action, as well as cultivating and mobilizing 
agency, only exceeds a half in Fiji and is primarily associated with the Gau subset, one of three. 
These distinctions manifest at cohort levels that demarcate older men as distinctly more 
knowledgeable across all field contexts and projects. This is chiefly due to the commonality of 
engagement through the domain of farming, which is customarily a male sphere in these resource 
dependent contexts where the gendered division of labour is firmly established. However, this 
knowledge distinction is uniformly observed among older men who are directly engaged. Other 
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groups of men generally exhibit similar levels of climate knowledge as young men and young 
women.  
However, older women are universally the most knowledge deficient and informationally 
underserved cohort, except in discrete locations such as Flowers Bank, Trio (Belize) and 
Malawai and Lamiti Villages (Fiji), where they are directly engaged by the project or 
engagement has been underway for sustained periods of at least a half-decade (Malawai and 
Lamiti Villages in Fiji and Trio and Flowers Bank in Belize) in domains of shared interest that 
accrues population-level interest, experiential and grapevine knowledge transference.  
Older Women & Disproportionate Knowledge Deficits 
Across the diverse study sites, older women exhibit near uniform knowledge deficit that 
is reinforced by the distinct way a confluence of their age, gender and the micro-politics of space 
and participation disproportionately exacerbates their ideational (knowledge and knowledge 
operationalization) and agency mobilization deficits, which are caused by a weak tapestry of 
manifestly credible sources of climate change information in resource dependent contexts. 
Unlike all other cohorts, older women have no organic primary source of manifestly credible 
climate change information. Young men and women, by virtue of age, benefit from increasing 
access to basic education and the incorporation of environmental elements into the curricula and 
universally cite school as an initial, recent and primary manifestly credible source of 
information.  
Similarly, older men tend to cite the project intervention—which they disproportionately 
benefit from because the domain of engagement is their socio-culturally defined sphere of 
work—and news, which they consume during leisure time and routinely via radio while working. 
While news is ostensibly available to all, the Indian case manifestly highlights how socio-
 429 
 
cultural obligations across traditional contexts impose time constraints that limits women’s social 
time such that they have less than men to allot for watching and listening news and attend 
population-level meetings where projects provide information. Relatedly, population level 
engagement through village meetings, which are generally aimed at older residents, does not 
automatically attract or benefit women. Cultural and socio-spatial barriers curtail the extent to 
which women participate, and even when they attend, they function differentially, which 
reinforces intractable levels of knowledge gaps and agency among older women.    
 While the overall knowledge deficit among older women offers very narrow support for 
the consensus in the extant literature that women often exhibit lower technical knowledge about 
environmental concerns (11 of 16 studies reviewed by Davidson and Freundenburg (1996)), the 
consequential factors are more situational (access, engagement and availability) rather than 
individual, such as a lack of motive or a knowledge seeking disposition as implied by the extant 
literature. As observed in each case, while these situational factors manifest in knowledge 
distinctions that support Tichenor, Donohue and Olien’s (1970) knowledge gap hypothesis, in 
terms of information or knowledge advantages rather than socio-economic status, the consonance 
of the nature and scope of information provision modalities even when manifestly credible 
substantially delimits even more recent incarnations of this hypothesis (Boykoff, 2011; Yang & 
Ho, 2017).  
Climate Information Deprivation: Availability, Access & Quality  
The implication is that contrary to cosmopolitan contentions that the availability of 
information is not the problem in communicating climate change (Hackett, Forde, Gunster & 
Foxwell-Norton, 2017) and a degree of information saturation has been reached (Gunster, 2017), 
the availability and access are foundational climate change informational challenges in all the 
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resource dependent contexts studied. Across all study sites, access to and availability of a 
diversified array of manifestly credible climate change acquisition sources correlate with higher 
climate change agency, knowledge and other critical dimensions for mobilizing knowledge and 
agency. However, so operative is the informational deficit across all contexts that the grapevine 
and variably credible experiential knowledge are accorded heightened significance while 
manifestly credible sources of information are variably available, accessible, and substantial. In 
all three country-level cases, there is compelling evidence that circumscribed issue-specific 
information provision, even alongside manifestly credible sources, as well as economistic 
framing devoid of associative information undermines climate knowledge. Considered alongside 
evidence of situational barriers reinforced by socio-cultural factors, the operative foundational 
climate informational and knowledge challenge is simultaneously a question of availability, 
access and sufficiency. Specifically, the efficacy of climate change information is chiefly subject 
to its nature (currency, frequency, practicality and scope) and quality (level of accuracy).  
Emblematically, the country-level cases highlight the consequential role of the type of 
manifestly credible source of climate information and their likely impact when deployed 
independently or collectively. Where climate change interventions offer limited, primarily 
economistic and issue-specific information or none, news is demarcated as a more substantial 
source of climate change information for positively structuring climate change dispositions.  
Whereas the project intervention presents climate change with issue, context and domain 
specificity that narrows the scope of knowledge provided such that cause and proximity are 
faultily hyper-internalized, news coverage of climate change serves a translating function 
focused on describing a wider range of issues, domains and contexts, which correlates with a 
lower tendency to internalize cause at the village level. However, targeted interventions that 
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provide practical engagement, training and experimentation over sustained periods focused on a 
range of issues such as the Vanuaso Tikina Project in Fiji or primarily in a single domain of 
shared interest such as the Ya’axché project in Belize, are more effective. Unlike news and 
projects with information provision mechanisms, school, the only other manifestly credible 
source of climate information available in the contexts studied, is temporally delimited or time-
bound. The temporal foreclosure of access to this expansive and credible source of climate 
change information precludes updating and at-will consultation that uniquely disadvantages the 
demographic (youth) most dependent upon it. This accord heightened importance to the nature 
and quality of climate change information provision mechanisms (formal and informal) provided 
by projects in resource dependent contexts.  
Contradicting Cosmopolitan Consensus:  
High Knowledge Seeking Disposition, Dominant Food Security Perceptual Valence, High 
Discernibility of Complex Signs; Dominant Collective Motive and Risk Disposition 
Privileging climate change information provision modalities in project engagements 
across resource dependent contexts will therefore attenuate the way in which a paucity of current 
and manifestly credible sources of climate change knowledge acquisition sources constrains 
climate change agency and knowledge operationalization. This is crucial, given the uniformly 
maximal climate knowledge seeking disposition observed across these contexts. This compelling 
knowledge-seeking disposition and curiosity despite informational and broader resource gaps 
that constrain agency, exists alongside a primarily collective/communal motive and risk 
disposition to act on climate change. The knowledge and resource gaps also persist amidst the 
absence of climate denialism, which are conventionally associated.  
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The commonly dominant socio-tropic motive discerned is contrary to the consensus in 
risk communication of the primacy of personal threat, including progeny, in motivating 
behaviour (Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz, 2008). Compellingly, even risk specification 
functions secondarily and with a degree of collectivity. Risk specification is expressed 
secondarily in nearly all instances across country cases and generally only after direct probing. In 
all cases, it is chiefly driven by explicit contextual vulnerabilities, namely proximity to domains 
of risk such as rivers, coasts and hillsides. These contextual commonalities and uniform 
sturdiness of a primarily collective or socio-tropic risk disposition is a salient elicitation marker 
that clarifies points of leverage for optimizing climate change communication as risk disposition 
is a corollary to motive. Human progeny, which is so widely embedded in the public 
consciousness as a commonsense motive for climate action, is so marginal in these communal 
contexts that explicit concern about children was only mentioned four times—twice in Belize 
across two villages (Flowers Bank and Trio) and once each in Fiji and India. Further, human 
progeny is accorded equal or lower significance than other minor motives, such as in Belize 
where human progeny only accounts for two of seven instances in which self/offspring emerged 
as a primary motive. 
 The conscious articulation of an operable risk disposition across all contexts amidst 
knowledge deficiencies suggests risk perception and motive are largely independent of climate 
knowledge, in accordance with findings by Leiserowitz (2003). However, the maximal 
knowledge seeking disposition undermines the applicability of Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and 
Whitmarsh’s (2007) assertion of a trifecta of individual level barriers to communicating climate 
change. Lorenzoni et. al (2007) note a lack of knowledge, lack of desire to find out information 
and a lack of locally and personally relevant and accessible information are primary barriers to 
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communicating climate change. Whereas the maximal knowledge-seeking disposition counters 
the second criterion, the first and third manifest as socio-cultural and contextual determinants 
rather than individual factors in the contexts studied.  
The uniformly positive and dominant knowledge seeking disposition observed across all 
study sites is a product of the high discernibility of signs and indicators of climate change. 
Remarkably, while signs and indicators (as well as responses) are highly contextually structured, 
climate change is chiefly perceived through a food security valence across all contexts. The 
consistency of the food security perceptual valence with the populations’ co-existence with the 
environment and subsistence on natural resources means an existential motive spurs a search for 
knowledge. This high perceptibility of climate change signs and indicators even amidst 
intractable levels of knowledge deficits and fissures in the climate information provision 
mechanisms available on the margins confounds the widely held contention in the extant 
literature that the communicability of climate change is uniquely challenging because of limited 
perceptibility, including “invisibility of causes, distant impacts and a lack of immediacy and 
direct experience of impacts” (Moser, 2010).  
Similarly, the co-existence of multiple discernible local manifestations of climate 
impacts, including health, that are readily associated with climate change and variability by 
populations with knowledge deficits counters the claim that complexity and multidimensionality 
undermines the communicability of climate messages (Nisbet, 2009, Moser, 2010). Rather, 
across all contexts, the discernibility of complex impacts at a subsistence level structures opinion 
intensity so decisively that amidst resource gaps, there is no discernible element of climate 
denialism, and it is compelling socio-culturally changes that manifests in uniform attrition in 
confidence that the collective and traditional order has the capacity to tackle climate change. 
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Theoretically, this means complexity and profound discernible impacts rather than accurate 
knowledge of causes of climate change are the most powerful predictors of intention to take 
voluntary actions in low capacity resource dependent contexts. As observed in discrete chapters, 
but applicable across all cases, this is in accordance with Leiserowitz (2003), who found no 
noteworthy link between accurate knowledge of climate change cause and solutions, nor reported 
or intended actions. 
While most pronounced in the comprehensive ecosystems-based adaptation project 
underway on Gau Island in Fiji, this study also suggests the consonance of proximal 
perceptibility transcends temporal and spatial considerations. Even in contexts of high 
knowledge, proximal climate actions that are routine, domestic and income generating, are 
recognized as ongoing but are not identified as climate change actions. Similarly, distal and 
specialist actions, such as the re-emergence of bird species and use of submerged fish 
aggregation devices, are not recognized. This confounds the widely accepted notion that 
proximal limitations on climate perception, action, agency and knowledge are singularly 
associated with temporally and spatially distal concerns, such as multi-generational projection of 
impacts and geographical distance from endangered islands and/or species such as polar bears 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Moser, 2010; O’Neil & Hulme, 2009; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; 
Weber, 2006).  
Conversely, it also undermines the view that spatial proximity automatically accords 
higher levels of climate awareness and knowledge (Galloway, 2010). The socio-cultural 
elicitation and clarification of the nature of the proximity thesis is consistent with shifts in the 
consensus around the proximity thesis associated generated from discrete experimental 
observations. These experimental studies include Herring et al.’s (2016) study of data 
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visualization of climate science that indicates greater salience of temporal rather than spatial 
proximity. 
  While the core commonalities across projects reviewed thus far comports with my 
expectations as a climate change communication strategist who has direct experience working 
across and lived connections with resource dependent contexts, there are also several significant 
unanticipated and primarily common findings of theoretical and practical import.  
Knowledge Systems 
No Antipathy to Formal Knowledge  
Chiefly, there is no discernible antipathy to reformatting and/or updating traditional 
knowledge. Across all contexts studied, formal and scientific knowledge is highly sought, as 
evidenced by the maximalist knowledge seeking disposition. The introduction of formal and 
scientific knowledge is highly valued and socially determinative where introduced. Specifically, 
it generates shifts in confidence away from the traditional and internal institutions for leadership 
on climate change towards discrete groups with scientific and formal knowledge advantages. 
Internally, these include young people who benefit from climate knowledge introduced in the 
education system and older men, primarily those directly engaged individually or through 
membership in specialist activity groups. This commonality is theoretically significant as it 
challenges the widely accepted view that “book knowledge and schooling undermine[s] the 
appreciation of practical indigenous knowledge” (Korma, 1995, cited in Kohler-Rollefson, 1996, 
p. 11). Rather than a lack of appreciation of practical indigenous knowledge, the universal cross-
context value and determinative infusion of formal knowledge discerned is indicative of the 
knowledge systems emergent and integrative nature. As observed in all village clusters where 
new formal and informal experimental knowledge systems (such as climate smart techniques and 
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crop diversification) are introduced (four of seven - Gau Island subset in Fiji, both village subsets 
in India and Ya’axché subset in Belize), adaptive capacity and local confidence is improved. In 
fact, where formal experimental knowledge systems are infused with associated and ongoing 
information (Belize and Fiji), climate knowledge is enhanced, as well as its operationalization 
across critical dimensions relevant for enabling action.  
Scope and Impact of Traditional Knowledge’s Incapacitations  
The lack of antipathy to formal knowledge and its positive structuring effect underscores 
the continued relevance of experimentation to reformat, improve and accord relevance to 
traditional knowledge, which is being incapacitated by unprecedented geologic change. This 
finding is consistent with Showers’s (1996) contention that there is limited utility in separating 
conceptions of indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge for environmental researchers, 
particularly those committed to using ethnoscientific techniques to improve the design and 
communication of interventions to address unprecedented geologic change. Moreover, the 
finding underscores the conscious paradigmatic decision to eschew essentialism in the pursuit of 
this study using a culture-centric participatory purview. The identification of astounding 
incapacitations of traditional knowledge systems is a direct outcome of this conscious decision. 
This is typified by substantial concerns across all cases and acute subsistence precarity in the 
Indian context about the failure of agricultural techniques and practices that have been cultivated 
and effectively deployed for centuries. These vast incapacitations are indicative of climate risks 
exceeding socially acceptable levels of risk that Adger et al.’s (2009) contents can spur changes 
in attitudes towards climate policy and action.  
While incapacitations were anticipated, the extent and threat it poses to the social order 
are novel empirical observations. Of principal consequence is the universally heightened attrition 
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of confidence in internal capacity, including traditional structures, in small, interdependent 
contexts, where motive and risk disposition are primarily communal. This is consequential both 
for social cohesion and the efficacy of climate response mechanisms on two critical levels. First, 
response mechanisms will be profoundly challenged by fissures in the social order that fragments 
leadership confidence across groups and cohorts with sub-maximal legitimacy. Secondly, the 
attenuation of collectivity will erode the dominant multi-level collective motive that also 
accurately structures a primarily shared risk disposition amidst palpable climate knowledge 
deficits and a weak climate information environment. 
Relatedly, the study suggests unprecedented and sustained impacts of climate change so 
destabilize confidence in internal capacity that it limits the use of established and promising 
practices. Specifically, the Indian case indicates how the seven Adivasi hamlets, which have a 
history of managing droughts and other discrete environmental crises for the enactment of 
religious festivals or pandugas and practices such as Vittanalapanduga (seed festival), lack the 
motive to leverage such capacity to meet routine subsistence needs. This is highly significant, 
given the direct relationship between agronomic activities and pandugas. The potential utility 
and consonance of the agricultural, horticultural and forest produce cycle with festivals (see 
Appendix N.1 to N.5) supports Titilola’s (1994) contention that sustainability is best achieved by 
according the socio-cultural equal, if not greater, importance to physical and biological 
constraints to boost engagement in holistic knowledge and experiential contexts (Duhaylungsod, 
1994; Reichel, 1994). However, this tradition functions in conflicting ways that warrants 
management. Specifically, it simultaneously drives conspicuous consumption alongside critical 
production, which demarcates the socio-cultural as both a limiting factor and enabler for 
mobilizing climate agency and boosting adaptive capacity. Nonetheless, the indication of climate 
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change’s incapacitation of traditional knowledge systems, both in terms of its utility and 
confidence in its potential, also highlights that the limited mobilization of the socio-cultural 
functions at multiple levels. 
Bridging Structures and Approaches 
However, findings from both Fiji and Belize strongly suggest bridging approaches and 
structures, respectively, can be effectively deployed to allow the mobilization and reformatting 
of traditional knowledge to address climate impacts and allay attrition in confidence in internal 
capacity. In both cases, positive perception of the main project agent’s expertise, belongingness 
and the consonance of the proposed activities with the worldviews and experiences in the 
resource dependent contexts enhanced the implementation of local actions without undermining 
the most enduring and legitimate authority structures. While this conforms with broad consensus 
in the extant literature about the importance of effective selection of messengers and champions 
(Moser, 2010; Agyeman et al, 2007) for successful communication, the decisive factors are the 
level and nature of their involvement. Specifically, technical involvement and leadership, as well 
as latitude to privilege activities and provide information in accordance with local customs and 
systems. Representatively, all research sites, except Flowers Bank in Belize and the Seaqaqa 
settlement in Fiji, had a main agent (Yaqaga and Gau Islands (two of three in Fiji) or both agent 
and entity led by and exclusively focused on supporting the cultural group sampled (Ya’axché 
subset in Belize (one of two), and both subsets in India).  
However, the consonance of the interventions with traditional systems and approaches 
and the provision of efficacy building information is greatest and most decisive where the 
connected group (Ya’axché Conservation Trust) or individual (marine scientist and ecosystems 
scholar Dr. Veitayaki for Gau Island) has explicit technical capacity and primary leadership for 
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crafting the infusion of relevant formal knowledge and activities. Whereas this functions at a 
population-level approach through Dr. Veitayaki’s guidance of the conceptualization and 
implementation of the initiative on Gau Island, it is most prescient through targeted and 
sustained engagement of individuals and via new specialist, institutional mechanisms initiated by 
self-motivated actors in the Ya’axché supported intervention. Instructively, both of these highly 
experiencial intiatives provided efficacy building information on a primarily ‘need-to-know 
basis,’ which suggests climate action is likely more effective when enacted in relevant and 
practical frames rather than being in inaccessible and technical(western) conservation language. 
While cultural sensitivity is an operable factor in the concerted deployment and efficacy 
of both initiatives, trust in the body politic’s processing capacity may also be a factor. Across all 
country cases where supporting groups and individuals are culturally connected with the 
intervention site, people distinguished by their relative educational and cultural capital staff 
them. However, this has manifested in articulations about the cognitive limits of the uneducated 
to the researcher. This was palpable in India, where cultural and ethnic connection, significant 
technical capacity and primary leadership manifest in circumscribed issue-specific responses, as 
well as economistic and subsistence response frames. 
Socio-Cultural Determinants: Complexity and Limits of Religious (and Nature) Frames 
Cognizance of the import of cultural sensitivity, alongside the socio-cultural elicitation of 
specific culturally bounded climate change dispositions and leverage points for boosting agency, 
points to socio-cultural enablers and limits to the communicability of climate change. While the 
researcher anticipated the import of the socio-cultural and conceptualized this project as a 
response to the overdetermined techno-scientific and primarily cosmopolitan reading of the field, 
its profound, primary and differential manifestation, even within age and gender cohorts, 
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specialist and belief groups, is especially striking. The multiperspectival views and varying 
amenability to adjustment with the provision of knowledge, associated with religion and nature 
are particularly indicative. Both factors structure worldviews such that they explicitly limit 
agency in the form of expressed fatalism, varyingly shapes motive and foreclose understanding 
of cause. For instance, religious fatalism, which features manifestly in all contexts except the 
Indian villages and functions with greater fixity than nature-oriented fatalism, structures differing 
levels of limits and opportunities for knowledge improvement and agency mobilization. This 
means leveraging religious and nature frames is not a singular mission.  
Emblematically, on both Gau Island, Fiji and Flower’s Bank Village, Belize, focus group 
participants within the same age and gender cohorts and membership in similar faith traditions 
demonstrate frontally proffer differing religious stance on climate action. In both contexts, 
stewardship perspectives that privilege the scriptural ethic of care offer sub-maximal but 
significant openness to action and the utility of efficacy building resources, including knowledge. 
Conversely, more rigid and doctrinaire religious perspectives that privilege end-times readings 
foreclose belief in the efficacy of likely and ongoing action but does not necessarily preclude 
engagement as observed in Malawai, Gau Island, Fiji where communal obligation is cited as a 
mitigating factor. Thus, it is more accurate to speak of highly operative and multifunctional 
socio-cultural (religious in this instance) limits and enablers of climate adaptation rather than 
limits per se, as Adager et al. (2009) and to a lesser extent Pelling (2011), do in their 
interrogation of the notion of adaptation that shifts from a purely techno-scientific reading 
towards the social, cultural and political.  
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Adaptation Pathways and Communicative Requirements 
Paradigmatic Distinctions and Planning vs Action   
 
So, consistent with the critical reading of adaptation outlined in the theoretical chapter, 
this study shows that the nature of adaptation is too germane to the quality of human 
development outcomes and cultural survival to be approached as a narrow “defensive task – 
protecting core assets or functions from the risks of climate change” (Pelling, 2011, p. 3). While 
the resource dependent communities studied have lived with environmental change for centuries, 
the heightened and differential levels at which contemporary geologic change incapacitates 
traditional knowledge systems and elements of their vital collective social and cultural order 
means the efficacy and sufficiency of adaptation responses to intensified and permanent climate 
change will enable various outcomes and differentiating fortunes that are structured by 
contextual vulnerabilities, scope and capacity to act. The variable efficacy, systemic impact and 
differing paradigmatic frameworks governing the seven distinct climate adaptation interventions 
studied, even among villages exposed to the same intervention, underscores this observation. 
This finding is consonant with Pelling’s (2011) contention that adaptation is dynamic and is best 
understood and pursued “as a process rather than a status” (p. 14). The optimal goal or outcome 
of this dynamic process (transformation) is realized where social reforms and transformations 
with reparatory and holistic efficacy building goals are pursued socio-culturally, environmentally 
and politically. Thus, this study’s finding that primarily circumscribed, issue-specific, 
economistic and information deficient adaptation mechanisms are ineffective, strongly supports 
Pelling’s (2011) hypothesis that adaptation actions can be limiting. Specifically, adaptation 
actions without an ethico-political consciousness, lacking comprehensive multi-scaled response 
frameworks, resources and nuanced wide-ranging engagement mechanisms are least likely to 
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result in robust coping capacity, enable transition and foster transformational change. At best, 
such marginal adaptive responses enable communities to cope or achieve a degree of resilience. 
The empirical evidence is highly consistent with Pelling’s theory of adaptive pathways or 
options. As outlined in the theoretical chapter, Pelling’s (2011) progressive tripartite framework 
for assessing and pursuing adaptation across multiple levels, ranges from resilience (stability), 
transition (incremental social change and the exercising of existing rights), to transformation 
(new rights claim and changes in political regimes). Table 57 highlights both the intents and 
outcomes of the interventions studied across the tripartite adaptation pathways. The table shows 
the seven projects based on their conceptual frames and programmatic formulation and more 
granularly, the 17 villages based on the implementation and outcomes, against the three adaptive 
pathways/possibilities. To account for distinctions in levels of enablement across pathways 
conceptually and practically, Pelling’s frame has been segmented into three levels indicative of 
the sturdiness or levels of enablement (low - level one, moderate - level two and advanced - level 
three).  
Table 57: Adaptation Pathways and Levels of Enablement Conceived and Realized 
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Conceptually, the projects associated with the study sites are robust. Five of the seven 
interventions are sufficiently crafted to enable at least moderate levels of transition. Specifically, 
both VTI (Gau Island) and Ya’axché (Belize) can theoretically enable moderate transition (level 
two). This assessment is premised on both project’s comprehensive and explicit focus on climate 
change, employment of practical and self-enhancing information provision mechanisms, 
including demonstrative techniques, in accordance with heightened sensitivity to socio-cultural 
dispositions and authority structures. However, both have been conceived with clear limits to 
resources, primarily monetary and technical, which are critical for realizing advanced levels of 
transition. While both initiatives have an ethico-political consciousness that primes them towards 
the differentiated and disproportionate impacts of climate change, they neither privilege nor 
articulate rights claim in accordance with the explicit reparatory consciousness and reforms 
necessary for transformation.  
On the other hand, the Cohune Palm Nut Project (Belize) is conceived relatively more 
expansively. The Cohune Palm Nut Project privileges sourcing heightened financing in a 
tangible and sustainable manner to tackle both the root cause (fossil fuel consumption) and likely 
solution to the issue of climate change (renewable energy), alongside sustainable income 
generating activities. However, it conceives these reforms and transitional livelihood 
mechanisms within existing state and regional policy terms. So, while it enables advanced 
transition (level three) conceptually, it falls short of transformation, given its direct conformance 
with an unreformed and dominant logic that precludes a reparatory consciousness and critical 
distribution of benefits.   
Conversely, both Indian projects are conceptually disposed towards enabling 
transformations because of their frontal and primary emphasis on a transformative, rights-based 
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approach towards livelihoods with varying but substantial environmental and agro-forestry 
focus. Sub-maximal emphasis and distinctions in the degree of explicit focus on climate change 
and the environment, as well as the range of intended responses, however, accounts for the 
distinction in the level of transformation possible across initiatives (PRAGATI-CARE-STEP and 
Forest Forever! Forests Ecosystems, levels one and two, respective). Laya’s Forestry initiative, 
for instance, explicitly tackles the energy factor (both a cause and solution to climate change) at 
the individual level (rather than systemic), which is absent from PRAGATI’s. 
 The two remaining initiatives, the EU-GCCA Project and C-CAP, which were 
implemented in Fiji, offer the most limited or circumscribed pathways:  coping levels one and 
two, respectively. Both aim to address narrowly defined challenges in accordance with critical 
and externally pre-defined resource limitations (primarily monetary), which are elemental for the 
realization of all adaptive plans. The EU-GCCA project tackles a discrete challenge (water 
scarcity) through the provision of temporary resilience building actions (centralized tanks and 
connecting infrastructure to moderately improved natural catchments), whereas, the C-CAP 
initiative prioritized one aspect (providing an evacuation centre) of an expansive issue of 
adaptive import (disaster risk reduction) with clearly articulated possibilities and tangential 
benefits. The marginal possibilities afforded by the only two donor-funded or explicitly macro-
development approaches to climate change adaptation is consistent with established concerns 
within critical perspectives on development about the limits of external funding agendas and 
circumscribed piecemeal approaches that privileges the documentation of efficacious 
implementation of narrowly defined and marginally funded projects. 
Mapping the projects onto Pelling’s tripartite framework also affords the delineation of 
specific communicative and broader engagement strategies, tactics, techniques and the socio-
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political disposition associated with the pursuit of each pathway within the adaptation 
framework. Three categories of adaptation variables (communicative, engagement and socio-
political) across projects have been distilled based on the implementation of the projects. The 
communicative elements, engagement modalities and socio-political elements at the core of the 
enacted initiatives underpins the positioning of the villages at differentiated levels within each 
pathway in the lower section of Table 57.   
Distilling and Distinguishing Efficacious Communicative and Engagement Variables 
In line with Dutta’s (2011) expansive view of communicative acts, distilling these three 
elements, primarily the first two given the absence of the latter from all but two initiatives, is 
germane for identifying how and with what efficacy communicative processes manifests during 
implementation. The communicative elements constitute a critical contribution, because though 
conceptually and technically consistent with the ethico-political consciousness necessitated by 
this critical research endeavour, Pelling’s rare socio-culturally attentive framework lacks the 
necessary and corollary communicative guidance for enactment. Further, much of what 
underpins collective understanding of how to communicate climate change is stock knowledge 
drawn from communicative approaches to disparate issues across time and contexts (Moser, 
2010; Corner, Markowitz & Pidgeon, 2014). Thus, Table 58 highlights distinguishing 
communicative elements associated with the varyingly promising projects that directly informs 
the action gap noted by Foxwell-Norton & Lester (2017) and illustrated by distinctions in the 
pathways conceptually offered by projects and how they materialize (see Table 57 above). 
 
  
 
 
 446 
 
Table 58: Adaptation Variables and Elements Across Projects 
 
Projects 
Adaptation Variables 
Communicative 
Elements Engagement Modality Socio-Political Elements 
EU-GCCA - Subsistence frame                                               
- Limited and issue-
specific (irrigation)                   
- Time-bound                                
- Issue-specific (water scarcity)                                   
- Population-wide                                                    
- Direct engagement of older  
men                                     
- None 
C-CAP - Limited and issue-
specific (DRR)                         
- Time-bound                
- Multiperspectival but 
circumscribed implementation                                                                                     
- Population-wide                                                    
- No cohort specificity                                                                 
- Employs traditional structures                      
- None 
VTI  - Comprehensive and 
multi-dimentional                                                                
- Provision of 
information on a need-
to-know basis                                                                                
- Demonstrative 
- Sustained over a decade                                                                                                            
- Multi-sectoral and integrative                                                                                                              
- Population-wide                        
- Youth involvement but no 
decision-making influence                                                                                                                                                                                          
- Individual and collective 
engagement of older men                                                  
- Collective engagement of 
older women                                                                                                                                   
- Practical opportunities & 
training                                            
- Employs local frameworks 
and traditional structures (fully) 
- Engagement with local
government within existing 
structures 
PRAGATI-
CARE-
STEP 
- Limited, contingent and 
issue-specific (on-going 
events e.g. weather), but 
primarily devoid of 
supporting information                                                                     
- Subsistence frame                        
- Population-wide (variable)                                                                                
- Collective engagement with 
women but with disparate and 
limited focus                                   
- Implicit incorporation of
climate change                                                       
- Variably engage women and 
youth.                                                                                                                             
- Varyingly offers practical 
training on a selective basis                                               
- Domain specific (farming and 
agro-forestry)     
- Rights-based perspective                                                     
- Engagement with 
government at federal, state 
& sub-state levels and use 
of the legislative systems to 
seek restitution and reform 
Forest 
Forever! 
Forests 
Ecosystem 
- Subsistence frame                                                              
- Limited and devoid of 
supporting information  
(except for variable 
selective individuals)                                                    
- Population-wide (variable)                          
- Explicit incorporation of 
climate change                                   
- Variably engaged women and 
youth engagement          
- Focused engagement on ad 
hoc basis                                                             
- Domain specific (farming and 
agro-forestry)                         
- Rights-based perspective                                                                                             
- Engagement with 
government at federal, state 
& sub-state levels and use 
of the legislative systems to 
seek restitution and reform 
Ya’axché 
Project  
- Provision of 
information on  a need-
to-know basis                                                 
- Demonstrative                                                       
- Targeted and expansive 
but domain, activity and 
experience centred                 
- Targeted                                                                                                                                   
- Variable Cohorts (Chiefly 
older men)                                                                     
- Domain specific (farming and 
agro-forestry)                                                        
- Practical opportunities & 
training, including selective 
international exchange                                                                                               
- Employs local frameworks 
and traditional structures (fully)                         
- Engagement with national
government within existing 
structures 
Cohune 
Palm Nut 
Project 
- Economistic-frame                                                               
- No associative climate 
change information 
- Sustained for more than five
years (ongoing)                                                                                                          
- Population-wide (primarily 
female management)                                 
- Employs local structures  
(instrumental) 
- Tackles root cause (fossil 
fuel consumption) in 
accordance with declared 
state and regional policy 
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While none of the projects manifest at the village level more promisingly than 
conceptualized, the majority (four of seven) manifested profoundly worse. Whereas all the Fijian 
projects manifested along the same pathways as conceptualized, all others resulted in weak or 
moderate levels of enablement for coping. In other words, the projects with the greatest promise 
manifests in the most limited fashion. Both Belizean projects (Ya’axché’s and The Cohune Palm 
Nut Project) conceptually offer moderate and advance transition, respectively, but materializes as 
weak coping mechanisms at the village level, except for Ya’axché’s efforts in Trio (moderate). 
The Indian projects, which are conceptually most promising, materializes with the greatest 
attrition. Laya’s Forest Forever! Forest Ecosystem Project, which is conceptually most promising 
(moderate transformation) manifests as a weak coping mechanism. Similarly, PRAGATI-CARE-
STEP, which conceptually enables (weak transformation), manifests as a mere coping 
mechanism in all four villages—half weak and half moderate.  
 While resources, primarily monetary and technical and adaptive starting-points are 
critical factors in the variation in project conceptualization and materialization across villages, 
the variables distilled in Table 58 are highly consequential given substantial variations in 
manifestation of projects—specifically, distinctions in implementation outcomes within the same 
village cluster (PRAGATI) and across similarly resourced projects operating in contexts with 
identical adaptive capacities (both Indian projects). This is typified by PRAGATI outperforming 
Laya’s relatively more promising intents. Similarly, both promising Belizean projects are 
marginally realized with distinctions within the Ya’axché subset (Trio village) that render the 
intervention relatively more effective as a coping mechanism than the conceptually more 
expansive and better funded Cohune Palm Nut Project.   
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The consistency with which the three Fijian projects materialize relative to their 
conceptualization reinforces the primacy of the communicative and engagement modalities for 
realizing variously envisioned adaptation pathways with differential levels of enablement. All 
three projects vary in scope, nature, cultural attentiveness and duration. These engagement 
frames have corollary and associative communitive elements that materialize in differing levels 
of ideational enablement, which is necessary for mobilization of knowledge and agency. 
Specifically, VTI, the most promising Fijian initiative conceptually and programmatically 
(overall), features comprehensive multi-sectoral and integrative, population-wide and cohort 
specific engagements, including youth and women, over a sustained period approximating a 
decade. It also deploys practical opportunities and training and functions in full accordance with 
local frameworks and traditional structures. These expansive engagement modalities are 
supported by corresponding communicative actions, which are framed in comprehensive and 
multi-dimensional formats, chiefly demonstrative and primarily provided on a need-to-know-
basis. On the other hand, the EU-GCCA and CCAP Project, which conceptually and 
programmatically offers weak and moderate coping, respectively, are limited in scope, (issue-
specific and circumscribed, respectively), levels of engagement and use of traditional structures 
and frameworks (C-CAP only). Whereas C-CAP only employs rudimentary population-wide 
engagement, the EU-GCCA initiative’s marginally more expansive approach only adds a single 
cohort specific element: older men due to their culturally defined belongingness to the domain of 
action (farming and irrigation).  
All other projects manifested in weak coping, except PRAGATI-CARE-STEP’s actions 
in Itikalikota and Palem (India) and Ya’axché’s actions in Trio (Belize). The distinctions in the 
nature and scope of engagement, and their associated communicative elements, accounts for the 
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outlying villages. The engagement modalities and communicative elements deployed by the 
projects in the three outlying villages compares more favourably with the expansive elements 
observed within VTI. Similarly, the other eight villages, where the respective projects enable 
weak coping, features elements more comparable with the limited elements deployed in Seaqaqa.  
 The consequential correlations between the nature and scope of engagement modalities 
and corollary associative communicative elements illuminates several critical pointers about how 
to attenuate the profound gap in understanding of how to raise public consciousnesses and 
mobilize publics to act on climate change (Foxwell-Norton & Lester, 2017). Specifically, 
limited, issue-specific and economistic frames are ineffective, particularly where associated 
information is marginal or absent. Conversely, the most effective communicative and general 
engagement modalities include sustained multi-year, comprehensive and multi-dimensional 
information provision in a demonstrative fashion, and on a need-to-know-basis. The expansive 
communicative and engagement frame also includes efficacy building mechanisms, such as 
training, specific guidance towards and access to alternatives including new crop varieties, 
maximal incorporation of local frameworks and traditional structures, as well as broad, cross 
population engagement. The three outlying villages identified reinforce this finding and indicate 
the determinative role of the nature, form and quality of communicative and engagement 
elements. Both Itikalakota and Palem, where PRAGATI-CARE-STEP is differentially enacted, 
benefitted from cross-cohort engagement, including limited and highly selective efficacy 
building mechanisms. These potentially enabling elements are absent in other villages engaged 
by PRAGATI and correlates with distinctions in knowledge levels and mobilization. While they 
enable moderate coping in both villages rather than the weak form discerned in the remainder of 
the entire Indian sub-set, these critical communicative elements were sub-maximal and 
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infrequent, namely the engagement of women and youth, rate and scope of training provided and 
the absence of focused engagement. These contexts have also been exposed to a reactionary 
rather than programmatic form of information provision on a need-to-know basis, which 
demarcates limits to the efficacy of the information provision mechanism induced by contingent 
deployment. 
 The period of engagement is also a decisive factor, where the expansive frame is 
deployed with sub-maximal population reach and scope. This is typified by Trio, the third 
outlying village noted, where engagement is targeted and enacted with domain specificity. 
However, as previously observed, the comprehensive, sustained and direct engagement of a self-
motivated sub-set of the population, including a specialist group, within a domain of shared 
interest (farming in Trio) accrued population-wide knowledge advantages that distinguishes the 
village in terms of climate knowledge, even among the single most inform deprived demographic 
(older women) in the study. The maximal incorporation of local frameworks and traditional 
structures in the most enabling intervention (VTI) and this cultural disposition’s presence in half 
of the villages that enables moderate coping, also magnifies the import of trust and the socio-
cultural as crucial contextual communicative factors for optimizing the communicability of 
climate change. It poignantly highlights the centrality of communication for the perpetuation of 
knowledge and a need to accord greater attentiveness to traditional communicative frameworks 
and systems. Greater attentiveness to traditional frameworks/worldviews and communicative 
systems which function multifactorially (e.g. religion, holistic purviews, nature, group 
membership and status) is paramount as they generally contrast with exogenous communicative 
and belief systems (Mundy & Compton, 1993). 
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What’s Next?  
While the illuminations offered by this study are significant, optimal consciousness 
raising and mobilization of action amidst unpresented climate change necessitates scrutiny of 
some critical aspects uncovered but insufficiently probed by this study. Chiefly, greater scrutiny 
of the significance of group membership, including but not limited to standard macro-
sociological segmentations, in climate knowledge formation and improvement given its salience 
and positive distinctions, particularly in Trio and Flower’s Bank, Belize. Relatedly, there is great 
need to clarify mechanisms for leveraging cohort-specific engagement across age and genders, 
while managing the multi-factorial and individually differentiated manner in which socio-
cultural limits and blockages (namely religion and nature) to climate messaging and actions 
materialize. Crucially, concerted critical attention should be accorded to augmenting fissures in 
the availability, relevance and accessibility of manifestly credible communicative mechanisms, 
particularly for underserved cohorts, such as older women and disadvantaged groups such as 
youth whose natural source is distal (school). Critical attention should also be accorded to 
identifying and clarifying potential sources of manifestly credible information that can constitute 
a socio-culturally suitable source for older women, which is the only demographic without an 
organic or sociocultural primed form. Evidence of a dominant socio-tropic risk disposition and 
the marginal cognizance of human progeny as a motive for action, even where risk specification 
is observed, also strongly suggests a need to probe the efficacy and resonance of 
widespreadprogeny frames in climate change campaigning and policy pronouncements 
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Appendix A: Official Codebook  
Code Group Total Codes Discrete Codes Definition of Codes 
Project Framework:                                  
Theoretical or programmatic 
approach used by the project. 
1 Framework 
Descriptions of the project by project 
proponents/leaders and project documents that are 
illustrative  or indicative of the intervention's approach, 
techniques used, guiding principles/steps, and the nature 
of how projected outcomes (goals and objectives) will 
come about in the intervention area. 
Climate Knowledge 
Acquisition:                       
When and where 
interviewees learnt about 
climate change. 
11 
Before project 
Awareness of climate change acquired before the 
project intervention associated with a respondent's 
village. 
Catholic Church 
Awareness specifically attributed to the institution. 
Exclude general references to the bible. 
Extreme Event 
Awareness attributed to a specific or series of specified 
natural disasters. 
Friends/Peers/Relatives 
Awareness specifically attributed to local interpersonal 
networks. Include observations attributed to others but 
are unlinked to personal observations. Exclude personal 
observations. 
Holy Book Awareness attributed to a specified religious text. 
News 
Awareness attributed to mainstream or official sources 
of information across media platforms: TV, Radio, 
Print, or online platforms associated with accredited or 
acknowledged news sources. 
Never Heard of Climate 
Change 
Never Heard of Climate Change. Exclude failure to 
recall initial source of climate knowledge acquisition. 
Observation 
Awareness attributed to personal observation. Include 
linked personal and collective observations; Exclude: 
Unlinked recitation of observations made by others. 
Project Intervention 
Awareness attributed to the implementation of the 
project associated with the village. 
School 
Awareness attributed to lessons at school; exclude 
references to non-pedagogical exposure at school e.g. 
peers, observations unrelated to lessons during lessons. 
Village Meeting 
Awareness attributed to discussions during village 
meeting. Exclude: Gossip, interpersonal exchange on 
the sidelines of village meetings, second hand accounts 
of village meetings. 
Climate Risk:                                                          
Perception of vulnerability 
and relative vulnerability in 
relation to self, community 
and livelihoods. 
9 
Children-2 
Mention of anyone under 18 as most, distinctly or 
disproportionately affected by climate change and/or 
manifestly linked impacts (experienced and/or 
anticipated). 
Coastal Dwellers - Self 
Persons who live near rivers, streams or coasts who 
specify themselves as being most, distinctly or 
disproportionately affected by climate change and/or 
manifestly linked impacts (experienced and/or 
anticipated). Do not include collective references to 
coastal dwellers and their vulnerability. 
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers 
Collective references to people who live near rivers, 
streams or coasts as being most, distinctly or 
disproportionately affected by climate change and/or 
manifestly linked impacts (experienced and/or 
anticipated). Include references to specific individuals 
and/or families if made by a respondent who does not 
live near rivers, streams or coasts. 
Elderly 
Reference to the elderly as being most, distinctly or 
disproportionately at risk to climate change and/or 
manifestly linked impacts (experienced and/or 
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anticipated). Include elderly who self identifies and 
specify their age as consequential. 
Equal Risk 
References to undifferentiated risks to climate change 
and/or manifestly linked impacts in the village. Include 
statements indicating "sameness" and "similarity." 
Farmer - 2 
Collective references to farmers as being most, 
distinctly or disproportionately at risk to climate change 
and/or manifestly linked impacts. Include farmers who 
self identifies to illustrate, and those who self identifies 
but make inclusive (non-personal) explanatory 
statements. Include references to specific farmers made 
by non-farmers. 
Hillside Dwellers 
Collective references to people living on hillsides 
(Hillside Dwellers) as being most, distinctly or 
disproportionately at risk to climate change and/or 
manifestly linked impacts. Include hillside dwellers 
who self identifies to illustrate, and those who self 
identify but make inclusive (non-personal) explanatory 
statements. Include references to specific hillside 
dwellers made by non-hillside dwellers. 
Me 
Those who self-identify as being most, distinctly or 
disproportionately at risk for personal reasons (health, 
poverty) or any shared status, activity, role or attribute, 
except age. 
Women - 2 
Collective references to women as being most, 
distinctly or disproportionately at risk to climate change 
and/or manifestly linked impacts. Include women who 
self identifies to illustrate, and those who self identify 
but make inclusive (non-personal) explanatory 
statements. 
Personal 
Inclusion/Influence:                                 
The project's level of 
inclusion per interviewee's 
perception and experience of 
engagement with project 
leadership, key functionaries, 
as well as views on how well 
the project reflects 
community priorities. 
5 
Mixed - 2 
Interviewee's perception of their engagement with 
project leadership, key functionaries, as well as, views 
on how the project reflects community priorities 
includes both positive and negative expressions with 
cons/pros ratios not exceeding 3:1 in either direction. 
Exclude ambivalence and non-committal responses. 
Negative - 2 
Explicitly negative perception of their engagement with 
project leadership, key functionaries, as well as, views 
on how the project reflects community priorities. Do 
not include itemization of pros and cons unless 
disproportionate (3:1 and above for cons). Exclude 
expressions juxtaposing pros and cons, and 
ambivalence. 
Neutral - 2 
Interviewee is ambivalent about their engagement with 
project leadership, key functionaries, as well as, views 
on how the project reflects community priorities but 
offers non-committal responses. Exclude presentation 
of pros and cons. 
Positive - 2 
Explicitly positive perception of their engagement with 
project leadership, key functionaries, as well as, views 
on how the project reflects community priorities. 
Include itemization of pros and cons above 3:1 for pros. 
Youth Consultation 
Statements by youth about how they are incorporated in 
or excluded from village level climate change planning, 
activities and discussions. 
Belief Progression:                                                   
How long it took interviewees 
to accept/repose confidence 
in the project intervention. 
2 
Immediate 
Confidence reposed in project intervention and 
intervention agents upon initiation/introduction. 
Progressive 
Confidence reposed in project intervention and 
intervention agents significantly after implementation. 
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Project Activities:                                                       
Activities the project 
implemented in the study site. 
1 Project Activities 
Activities the project implemented in the study site. 
Coded to identify which has resonance with the study 
population. Applicable to project documents only. 
Gender 2 
Female 
Each respondent in a focus group labelled FG YW or 
FG OW, and individual interviewees labelled with 
village name and gender e.g. "Rokosalase woman." 
Male 
Each respondent in a focus group labelled FG YM or 
FG OM, and individual interviewees labelled with 
village name and gender e.g. "Navai male." 
Schooling:                                                              
Interviewee's level of 
education. 
4 
None None 
Post-Secondary Post-Secondary 
Primary Primary 
Secondary Secondary 
Knowledge:                                                                    
Statements linking climate 
change cause and effect; 
indicators and practices 
5 
A Posteriori 
Statements accurately linking climate change cause and 
effect; indicators and practices that is based on what 
they observe and reflection; Exclude attribution of 
responsibility. 
Experiential 
Statements accurately linking climate change cause and 
effect; indicators and practices that is based on what 
they experience; Exclude attribution of responsibility. 
Falsehood 
Statements linking climate change cause and effect; 
indicators and practices with unrelated phenomena e.g. 
earthquake, expressions nominally accepted as myths, 
exclude misunderstanding or knowledge gaps. 
Knowledge Gap 
Statements incorrectly linking climate change cause and 
effect; indicators and practices irrespective of the basis 
(observation, experience, regurgitation). 
Regurgitation 
Repetition of statements or facts introduced by the 
project without reflection, and/or failure to explain why 
associations are drawn/suggested. Include non-
committal/absence of conviction. Exclude incorrect 
justifications. 
Cause and Proximity:                                   
Interviewees' proximal 
perception of climate change 
and it's degree of connection 
to them (cause/attribution of 
responsibility). 
6 
God/Religion 
Statements suggesting climate change is divine order. 
Exclude references to divine beings and scriptural 
pronouncements on mutability. 
Humans 
Statements suggesting climate change is caused by 
humans. 
International 
Statements suggesting climate change is caused by 
action(s) in a foreign country. 
Local 
Statements suggesting climate change is caused by 
action(s) in local vicinity (village, district, town, city, 
state. 
National 
Statements suggesting climate change is caused by 
action(s) in home country 
Nature 
Statements suggesting climate change is a natural 
phenomenon. An act of nature. 
Signs/Indicators:                                                
Changes or developments in 
the study site that 
interviewee's associate with 
climate change. Include: 
sign/indicators; attribution of 
cause and effect; exclude: 
references to 
responses/remedies (climate 
action). 
13 
Climate 
Changes in rainfall, temperature, sunshine in the long-
term (exceeding 10years). Include trans-generational 
justifications. 
Coastal Erosion 
Erosion at shore, riverbanks and other waterbodies; 
exclude references to sea wall (code as climate action). 
Coral Health Coral health and population. 
Crop Yield/Soil Health Soil fertility/suitability and quality of yields. 
 
Fish Stock 
Availability and accessibility of protein sources (fish, 
crab, lobster, Fijidoma maculata etc.) from waterbodies 
(rivers, sea, lakes, streams). 
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Forest Fires Forest fires 
Health 
Non-lifestyle diseases and health complications 
attributed to climate change. Code lifestyle references 
e.g. diabetes as falsehood. 
Pollution Self-referential. 
Sea Level Rise References to the rise in sea level. 
Socio-Cultural Change 
Changes in cultural practices or patterns, communal 
cohesion directly attributed to climate change. 
Soil Erosion 
Exclude erosion associated with coasts river banks and 
land near tributaries. 
Water 
Availability and accessibility of water. Potability not a 
factor. 
Weather 
Any reference to changes in rainfall, temperature, 
sunshine in the short-term. 
Project Perception:                                            
How interviewees view the 
project. 
4 
Mixed - 1 
Interviewee expresses ambivalence about the project 
overall i.e. offers both positive and negative views 
about the project overall with cons/pros ratios not 
exceeding 3:1 in either direction. 
Negative 1 
Explicitly negative perception of the project overall. Do 
not include itemization of pros and cons unless 
disproportionate (3:1 and above for cons). Exclude 
expressions juxtaposing pros and cons, and 
ambivalence. 
Neutral - 1 
Interviewee is ambivalent about the project overall and 
offers non-committal responses. Exclude presentation 
of pros and cons. 
Positive-1 
Explicitly positive perception of the project overall. 
Include itemization of pros and cons above 3:1 for pros. 
Motive for Action:                                                       
Why people participate in 
climate adaptive activities or 
care about climate change. 
7 
Children 
Children in general. Exclude references to offsprings or 
children in respondent's care. 
Communal Obligation 
Deference to communal harmony, the authority of 
traditional leaders/village structures. 
Community/Village 
For the community. Exclude obligatory sentiments 
attributed to traditional structures or peer pressure. 
God/Religion 
Statements of stewardship/guardianship, divine order, 
scriptural dictate or prescription. 
National In the interest of the nation. 
Self/Offsprings 
For self and/or respondent's own children/children in 
their care. 
World For the world. 
Climate Leadership:                                                  
Articulation of who should 
take charge of or lead 
climate change activities in 
the study site. 
12 
Community/Village 
Preference for collective primary leadership by the 
community/village. 
Elders 
Preference for collective primary leadership by elders 
(generally retired villagers). Age is the consequential 
factor. Exclude references to those on village councils 
or marked by status of customary significance, except 
head of a clan (cluster of families). 
Exemplary Females 
Preference for primary leadership by exemplary females 
within the village. 
Exemplary Group 
Preference for primary leadership by exemplary 
group(s) within the village. 
Exemplary Men 
Preference for primary leadership by exemplary men 
within the village. 
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Exemplary Person 
Preference for primary leadership by exemplary 
person(s) within the village. 
External 
Preference for primary leadership by competent groups 
and/or individuals from outside the village. 
Family 
Preference for primary leadership by families within the 
village. 
Self 
Self specification for primary leadership within the 
village. 
Teachers 
Preference for primary leadership by teachers within the 
village. 
Traditional Structures 
Preference for primary leadership through traditional 
structures within the village. Village council/traditional 
leader/customary authority figure: Alcalde, Turaga ni 
Koro, Village Headman, Chief etc. Exclude family 
heads. 
Youth 
Preference for primary leadership by folks within the 
village who are below 30 years old. 
**Traditional Practices 3 
Farming 
Techniques, patterns, and practices employed for more 
than four generations. 
Roles and Activities 
Gendered, age, and customary status associated roles, 
responsibilities and actions. 
Traditional Knowledge 
General insights on life and coping mechanisms 
attributed to forbearers (above four generations). 
Project Outcomes 2 
Failure/Shortcoming 
Unmet objectives and goals. Include unintended 
negative outcomes. 
Success Objectives and goals met. Include unintended gains. 
Climate Change Agency:                   
Perspectives on what, if 
anything, their community or 
others can do to stop or limit 
the impacts of climate 
change. 
8 
Failed Actions Local efforts have been insufficient or outright failures. 
Fatalism 
Nothing can be done.  Include itemization of pros and 
cons above 3:1 for cons. 
Mixed - Agency 
Expressions of ambivalence about what can be done, 
and how much it can or will change. Includes both 
positive and negative expressions with con/pros ratios 
not exceeding 3:1 in either direction. 
Nature 2 - Agency 
Nature is ordering the course of events. Nature is out of 
our control. 
 
None 
Interviewee does not know or did not respond. Exclude: 
non-committal responses and ambivalence. 
Optimism 
Positive expressions about the possibility of taking 
actions that can stop, manage or cope amidst climate 
change. Include itemization of pros and cons above 3:1 
for pros. 
Religious 
Divine intervention is needed to stop it, indicate what 
should be done to stop it or help people to cope 
Resource Gaps 
Knowledge level, availability of money or equipment is 
cited as a hindrance to knowing what and how to 
respond to climate change. 
 
Angsts:                                                                                    
Issues identified as primary 
community challenges and 
difficulties in general (all 
codes except those with the 
numerical denotation - 1) and 
the ranking of angsts against 
climate change as a primary 
challenge (with the 
denotation - 1). 
55 
Afforestation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ageing 
CC Impact 
 
CC Impact - 1 
Chemical Use/Industrial 
Activity 
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All Angsts are self-
referential. 
Distillery Cost  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALL ANGSTS ARE SELF-REFERENTIAL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Drainage 
Education 
Education -1 
Electricity 
Electricity - 1 
Evacuation Centre 
Fertilizer Cost 
Fevers and Diseases 
Flooding 
Flooding - 1 
Food Security 
Food Security - 1 
Health Centre 
Health Centre - 1 
Housing 
Housing - 1 
Ice Plant 
Income 
Income - 1 
Land 
Land Rights 
Land Rights - 1 
Leadership and Harmony 
Leadership and Harmony 
- 1 
Lifestyle 
Local Institutions 
Market Access 
Money Lenders 
Over Population 
Poisoning Fish 
Poverty 
Rate of Action 
Relocation 
Road 
Sanitation 
Sanitation -1 
Sea Wall Construction 
Sea Wall Construction - 
1 
Storage Facility 
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Streetlights 
Transport -1 
Transport 
Undeclared – 1 
Village Issues – 1 
Water Scarcity 
Water Scarcity -1 
Wild Animals 
Wild Animals -1 
Work 
Project Action and Causes 
Profiled 1 A&C Profiled 
Any climate change activity and causes of climate 
change stated in the project proposal and reports. 
Climate Action:                                                                                                                                   
Activities underway in the 
village/field site that 
interviewees describe/identify 
as climate change responses. 
Include description of how 
they mobilize. 
18 
Agroforestry 
Reference to agricultural activities incorporating the 
cultivation and conservation of trees. Only include 
when done on personal or an individually owned farm. 
Bee-keeping References to participation in bee-keeping. 
Bird 
Conservation/Tracking 
References to participation in bird conservation and 
tracking. 
Crop Diversification Introduction of new crops (and new varieties). 
Filters & Water Supply 
Reference to the introduction of water filters and 
improved water supply. Oriented towards domestic use. 
Hydropower 
References to introduction of hydropower. Generation 
of power from dams/water bodies. 
Inaction 
References to the absence of action on climate change 
in the village. Include: Statements about little or no 
mention of what climate change is and how it affects 
the area during the intervention. 
Irrigation Water supply for agricultural purposes. 
Land Development 
Land preparation techniques/land utilization 
optimization. Exclude references to soil improvement 
e.g. fertilizers. 
Multi-Cropping & Seed 
Dispersal 
Dispersal of seedlings of the same variety range 
available in the area. 
Planting 
Trees/Afforestation 
Exclude Sandalwood (type of tree) or commercial 
forestry, and planting of trees along riverbanks. Exclude 
planting trees on personal farms (agroforestry). 
River Buffer 
Activities to prevent rivers overflowing their banks. 
Include tree planting along riverbanks. 
Sandalwood 
Include general commercial forestry activities. 
Sandalwood is a type of tree planted for commercial 
purposes. 
School/General Clean 
Up References to school and general anti-litter activities. 
Sea Wall 
Construction of marine barriers with stones, cement and 
other solid materials. Exclude mangrove planting. 
Soil Enhancement 
Specific focus on soil improvement. Exclude general 
land preparation activities. 
Taboo/No Take 
All references to no fishing periods and zones or period 
and areas of managed access. 
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Teri Planting The planting of mangroves along marine areas. 
Groupless 6 
Community 
Mobilization 
Descriptions of how communities organize to take 
action on climate change. 
Context 
Descriptions of the socio-economics of the field country 
and/or site. 
COP 
References to awareness about the annual Conference 
of the Parties. 
Country Risk References to the risk profile of a field country. 
FSC References to the Fiji Sugar Cooperation. 
1.5 
References to awareness about the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive 
campaign. 
Total Codes 173   
Codes in Multiple Groups 2 
God/Religion 
Community/Village 
Contextual Codes 8 Coded only for context about the project, ** where contextual information is cultural and obtained from interviewees. 
Non-functional 1 No significant difference in educational attainment or exposure. Only noted where exceptional cases arise. 
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Appendix B: Codebook India 
Code Group Total 
Codes 
Discrete Codes Change Notations 
Project Framework:                                  
Theoretical or programmatic 
approach used by the project. 
1 Framework   
Climate Knowledge 
Acquisition:                       
When and where interviewees 
learnt about climate change. 
6 
Before project   
Holy Book   
News   
Observation   
Project Intervention   
School   
Climate Risk:                                                          
Perception of vulnerability and 
relative vulnerability in 
relation to self, community and 
livelihoods. 
7 
Children-2   
Coastal Dwellers - 
Self 
  
Elderly   
Equal Risk   
Farmer - 2   
Me Altered from self 
in Fiji 
Women - 2   
Personal Inclusion/Influence:                                                          
The project's level of inclusion 
per interviewee's perception 
and experience of engagement 
with project leadership, key 
functionaries, as well as views 
on how well the project 
reflects community priorities. 
5 
Mixed - 2   
Negative 2   
Neutral - 2   
Positive 2   
Youth Consultation   
Belief Progression:                                                     
How long it took interviewees 
to accept/repose confidence in 
the project intervention. 
2 
Immediate   
Progressive   
Project Activities:                                                        
Activities the project 
implemented in the study site. 
1 Project Activities 
Activities the 
project implement 
in the study site. 
Coded to identify 
which has 
resonance with the 
study population. 
Applicable to 
project documents 
only. 
Gender 2 
Female   
Male   
Schooling:                                                              
Interviewee’s level of 
education. 
4 
None   
Post-Secondary   
Primary   
Secondary   
Knowledge:                                                                     
Statements linking climate 
change cause and effect; 
indicators and practices. 
5 
A Posteriori   
Experiential   
Falsehood   
Knowledge Gap   
Regurgitation   
Cause and Proximity:                                   
Interviewees' proximal 
perception of climate change 
and it's degree of connection to 
them (cause/attribution of 
responsibility). 
6 
God/Religion   
Humans   
International   
Local   
National   
Nature   
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Signs/Indicators:                                                
Changes or developments in 
the study site that interviewee's 
associate with climate change. 
Include: sign/indicators;  
attribution of cause and effect; 
exclude: references to 
responses/remedies (climate 
action). 
13 
Climate   
Coastal Erosion   
Coral Health   
Crop Yield/Soil 
Health 
  
 
Fish Stock 
  
Crop Diversification Moved to Climate 
Action while in 
India 
Health   
Pollution   
Sea Level Rise   
Socio-Cultural 
Change 
  
Soil Erosion   
Water   
Weather   
Project Perception:                                                
How interviewee's view the 
project. 
4 
Mixed - 1   
Negative 1   
Neutral - 1   
Positive-1   
Motive for Action:                                                                               
Why people participate in 
climate adaptive activities or 
care about climate change. 
7 
Children   
Communal 
Obligation 
  
Community/Village   
God/Religion   
Nation   
Self/Offsprings   
World   
Climate Leadership:                                                  
Articulation of who should 
take charge of or lead climate 
change activities in the study 
site. 
6 
Community/Village   
Exemplary Person   
External   
Family   
Self   
Traditional 
Structures 
  
Traditional Practices 3 Farming   
Roles and Activities   
Traditional 
Knowledge 
  
Project Outcomes 2 Failure/Shortcoming   
Success   
Climate Change Agency:                                 
Perspectives on what, if 
anything, their community or 
others can do to stop or limit 
the impacts of climate change. 
8 
Failed Actions   
Fatalism   
Mixed - Agency   
Nature 2 - Agency   
None   
Optimism   
Religious   
Resource Gaps   
Angsts:                                                                                                                      
Issues identified as primary 
community challenges and 
difficulties in general (all 
codes except those with the 
38 
Afforestation   
Ageing   
CC Impact   
CC Impact - 1   
Distillery Cost   
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numerical denotation - 1) and 
the ranking of angsts against 
climate change as a primary 
challenge (with the denotation 
- 1). All Angsts are self-
referential.  
Education   
Education -1   
Electricity   
Electricity - 1   
Evacuation Centre   
Fertilizer Cost   
Flooding   
Flooding - 1   
Food Security   
Food Security - 1   
Health Centre   
Health Centre - 1   
Housing   
Housing - 1   
Ice Plant   
Income   
Income - 1   
Lifestyle   
Market Access   
Poisoning Fish   
Rate of Action   
Relocation   
Road   
Sanitation   
Sanitation -1   
Sea Wall 
Construction 
  
Sea Wall 
Construction - 1 
  
Transport -1   
Transport   
Water Scarcity   
Water Scarcity -1    
Wild Animals   
Wild Animals -1   
Project Action and Causes 
Profiled 
1 A&C Profiled   
Climate Action:                                                                                                                                   
Activities underway in the 
village/field site that 
interviewees describe/identify 
as climate change responses. 
Personal involvement is not 
required. Include descriptions 
of how they mobilize. 
7 
Agroforestry   
Inaction   
Planting 
Trees/Afforestation 
  
Sandalwood   
Sea Wall   
Taboo/No Take   
Teri Planting   
Groupless 6 
Community 
Mobilization 
  
Context   
COP   
Country Risk   
FSC   
1.5   
Total Codes 134     
Codes in Multiple Groups 2 
God/Religion   
Community/Village   
Codes that later changed 
groups 
1 Crop Diversification   
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Appendix C: Codebook India-Belize 
Code Group Total Codes Discrete Codes Change Notations 
Project Framework:                                                                     
Theoretical or programmatic 
approach used by the project. 
1 Framework 
  
  
Climate Knowledge 
Acquisition:                                  
When and where interviewees 
learnt about climate change. 
  
11 
Before project   
Catholic Church   
Extreme Event   
Friends/Peers/Relatives 
Friends/Relatives added in India; 
evolved further with Relatives  in 
Belize 
Holy Book   
News   
Never Heard of Climate 
Change 
  
Observation 
  
Project  Intervention   
School   
Village Meeting   
Climate Risk:                                                          
Perception of vulnerability and 
relative vulnerability in relation 
to self, community and 
livelihoods. 
9 
Children-2   
Coastal Dwellers - Self   
Coastal/Riverside Dwellers Evolved.  
Elderly   
Equal Risk   
Farmer - 2   
Hillside Dwellers   
Me Altered from self in Fiji. 
Women - 2   
Personal Inclusion/Influence:                   
The project's level of inclusion 
per interviewee's perception and 
experience of engagement with 
project leadership, key 
functionaries, as well as views 
on how well the project reflects 
community priorities. 
5 
Mixed - 2   
Negative 2   
Neutral - 2   
Positive 2   
Youth Consultation   
Belief Progression:                                        
How long it took interviewees to 
accept/repose confidence in the 
project intervention. 
2 
Immediate 
  
Progressive 
  
Project Activities:                              
Activities the project 
implemented in the study site. 
1 Project Activities 
Activities the project implement in 
the study site. Coded to identify 
which has resonance with the 
study population. Applicable to 
project documents only. 
Gender 
2 
Female   
Male   
Schooling:                                                              4 None   
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Interviewee's level of education. Post-Secondary   
Primary   
Knowledge:                                       
Statements linking climate 
change cause and effect; 
indicators and practices. 
5 
A Posteriori   
Experiential   
Falsehood   
Knowledge Gap   
Regurgitation   
Cause and Proximity:                                   
Interviewees' proximal 
perception of climate change 
and it's degree of connection to 
them (cause/attribution of 
responsibility). 
6 
God/Religion   
Humans   
International   
Local   
National   
Nature   
Signs/Indicators:                                                
Changes or developments in the 
study site that interviewee's 
associate with climate change. 
Include: sign/indicators;  
attribution of cause and effect; 
exclude: references to 
responses/remedies (climate 
action). 
13 
Climate 
Crop diversification moved to 
climate change action while in 
India. 
Coastal Erosion   
Coral Health   
Crop Yield/Soil Health   
 
Fish Stock 
  
Forest Fires   
Health   
Pollution   
Sea Level Rise   
Socio-Cultural Change   
Soil Erosion   
Water   
Weather   
Project Perception:                                            
How interviewee's view the 
project. 
4 
Mixed - 1   
Negative 1   
Neutral - 1   
Positive-1   
Motive for Action:                                            
Why people participate in 
climate adaptive activities or 
care about climate change. 
7 
Children   
Communal Obligation   
Community/Village   
God/Religion   
Nation   
Self/Offsprings   
World   
Climate Leadership:                                                  
Articulation of who should take 
charge of or lead climate 
change activities in the study 
site. 
12 
Community/Village   
Elders   
Exemplary Females   
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Exemplary Group   
Exemplary Men   
Exemplary Person   
External   
Family   
Self   
Teachers   
Traditional Structures   
Youth   
Traditional Practices 3 
Farming   
Roles and Activities   
Traditional Knowledge   
Project Outcomes 2 
Failure/Shortcoming   
Success   
Climate Change Agency:                   
Perspectives on what their 
community or others can do to 
stop or limit the impacts of 
climate change. 
8 
Failed Actions   
Fatalism   
Mixed - Agency   
Nature 2 - Agency   
 
None 
  
Optimism   
Religious   
Resource Gaps   
Angsts: 
Issues identified as primary 
community challenges and 
difficulties in general (all codes 
except those with the numerical 
denotation - 1) and the ranking 
of angsts against climate change 
as a primary challenge (with the 
denotation - 1). 
All Angsts are self-referential. 
55 
Afforestation   
Ageing   
CC Impact   
CC Impact - 1   
Chemical Use/Industrial 
Activity 
  
Distillery Cost   
Drainage   
Education   
Education -1   
Electricity   
Electricity - 1   
Evacuation Centre   
Fertilizer Cost   
Fevers and Diseases   
Flooding   
Flooding - 1   
Food Security   
Food Security - 1   
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Health Centre   
Health Centre - 1   
Housing   
Housing - 1   
Ice Plant   
Income   
Income - 1   
Land   
Land Rights   
Land Rights - 1   
Leadership and Harmony   
Leadership and Harmony - 1   
Lifestyle   
Local Institutions   
Market Access   
Money Lenders   
Over Population   
Poisoning Fish   
Poverty   
Rate of Action   
Relocation   
Road   
Sanitation   
Sanitation -1   
Sea Wall Construction   
Sea Wall Construction - 1   
Storage Facility   
Streetlights   
Transport -1   
Transport   
Undeclared - 1   
Village Issues - 1   
Water Scarcity   
Water Scarcity -1    
Wild Animals   
Wild Animals -1   
Work   
Project Action and Causes 
Profiled 1 A&C Profiled   
Climate Action:                                                                                                                                   
Activities underway in the 
village/field site that 
18 
Agroforestry   
Bee-keeping   
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interviewees describe/identify as 
climate change responses. 
Personal involvement is not 
required. Include descriptions of 
how they mobilize. 
Bird Conservation/Tracking   
Crop Diversification   
Filters & Water Supply   
Hydropower   
Inaction   
Irrigation   
Land Development   
Multi-Cropping & Seed 
Dispersal   
Planting Trees/Afforestation   
River Buffer   
Sandalwood   
School/General Clean Up   
Sea Wall   
Soil Enhancement   
Taboo/No Take   
Teri Planting   
Groupless 6 
Community Mobilization   
Context   
COP   
Country Risk   
FSC   
1.5   
Total Codes 173     
        
Codes in Multiple Groups 2 
God/Religion   
Community/Village   
Codes Added in India 23     
Codes Added in Belize 11     
Evolved from Fiji to India 1     
Evolved from India to Belize 1     
Evolved from Fiji to Belize 0     
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Appendix D: Field Countries and Associated Project and Village Subsets 
Country Project Name Implementer Funder Village Village Subset
The Vanouso Tikina Project ICA Prof. Joeli Veitayaki w/Village Assorted & Local Malawai Gau Island
The Vanouso Tikina Project ICA Prof. Joeli Veitayaki w/Village Assorted & Local Lamiti Gau Island
Coastal Community Adaptation Project (C-CAP) PaCE-SD
United States Agency for 
International Development 
(USAID)
Yaqaga Yaqaga Island
European Union Global Climate Change 
Aalliance (EU-GCCA)
PaCE-SD European Union Navai Seaqaqa
European Union Global Climate Change 
Aalliance (EU-GCCA)
PaCE-SD European Union Navundi Seaqaqa
European Union Global Climate Change 
Aalliance (EU-GCCA)
PaCE-SD European Union Rokosalase Seaqaqa
Forest Forever! Forests Ecosystem Laya Assorted, mainly local Munagalapudi Laya 
Forest Forever! Forests Ecosystem Laya Assorted, mainly local Polusumamaidi Laya 
Forest Forever! Forests Ecosystem Laya Assorted, mainly local Nelloikota Laya 
PRAGATI-CARE Sustainable Tribal 
Empowerment Project (PRAGATI-CARE-STEP) *PRAGATI CARE-India Agraham PRAGATI 
PRAGATI-CARE Sustainable Tribal 
Empowerment Project (PRAGATI-CARE-STEP)
*PRAGATI CARE-India Sunaladana PRAGATI 
PRAGATI-CARE Sustainable Tribal 
Empowerment Project (PRAGATI-CARE-STEP)
*PRAGATI CARE-India Palem PRAGATI 
PRAGATI-CARE Sustainable Tribal 
Empowerment Project (PRAGATI-CARE-STEP) *PRAGATI CARE-India Itikalakota PRAGATI 
Building Climate Change Resilience in Rural 
Communities in the Maya Golden Landscape 
("The Ya'axche Project")
Ya'axche UK-DFID Trio Ya'axche
Building Climate Change Resilience in Rural 
Communities in the Maya Golden Landscape 
("The Ya'axche Project")
Ya'axche UK-DFID Indian Creek Ya'axche
Building Climate Change Resilience in Rural 
Communities in the Maya Golden Landscape 
("The Ya'axche Project")
Ya'axche UK-DFID San Miguel Ya'axche
Cohune Palm Nut Renewable Energy Project 
(Cohune Palm Nut Project) CCCCC European Union, and assorted Flowers Bank CCCCC
Notations
*Implemented with the Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) and various Community Based Organizations
Fiji
India
Belize
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Appendix E: Fiji Sample Profile – Village Level Data 
 
Village/ 
Project 
Subset 
Cohort Interview Format 
Malawai 
Village 
Lamiti 
Village  Total 
Gender 
Totals  
Gender 
Rates 
  G
au Island 
OW FG 8 7 15 
28 52%   YW FG 6 7 13   
YM FG 4 4 8 
26 48%   
OM INDV. 7 11 18   
Total Sample  25 29 54 54 100%   
          
Village Population 141 228 369     
Village Adult Population 79 124 203     
Sample: Adult Pop Rate** 32% 23% 27%     
Total Households 42 53 95     
Households Sampled 23 26 49     
Household Sample Rate 55% 49% 52%     
**The targeted study population did not include children  
Village/ 
Project 
Subset 
Cohort Interview Format Navai Navundi Rokosalase  Total 
Gender 
Totals  
Gender 
Rates 
 
Seaqaqa 
OW FG 5 1 1 7 
13 43% 
 
OW FG 0 4 1 5  
OW INDV. 0 0 1 1  
YW - 0 0 0 0  
YM INDV. 1     1 
17 57% 
 
YM FG 0 0 3 3  
OM FG 1 3 0 4  
OM FG 0 0 3 3  
OM - 
Prob FG 2 1 1 4  
OM INDV. 2 2 2 6  
Total Sample***  9 10 11 30 30 100%  
          
Village Population  - -  -  -    
Village Adult Population 25 26 36 87    
Sample: Adult Pop Rate** 36% 38% 31% 34%    
Total Households 28 29 6 63    
Households Sampled 26 27 5 58    
Household Sample Rate 93% 93% 83% 92%    
**The targeted study population did not include children      
*** Sample reflects ethnic distribution: Navai (except 1) and Navundi: Indo-Fijian   
OM - Prob: Not included in sample total and associated calculations. Includes a subset of individual interviewees for probity 
(Prob). 
          
Village/ 
Project 
Subset 
Cohort Interview Format Total 
Gender 
Totals 
Gender 
Rates 
    
Y
aqaga Island 
OW FG 5 
8 38% 
    
YW FG 2     
YW INDV. 1     
YM FG 5 
13 62% 
    
OM FG 8     
OM INDV 1     
Total Sample   21 21 100% 
              
Village Population 157       
Village Adult Population 42       
Sample: Adult Pop Rate** 50%       
Total Households 38       
Households Sampled 19       
Household Sample Rate 50%       
**The targeted study population did not include children.     
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Appendix F: India Sample Profile – Village Level Data 
 
Village/ 
Project 
Subset 
Cohort Interview Format Munagalapudu Polusumamaidi Nellikota  Total 
Gender 
Totals  
Gender 
Rates 
 
Laya 
OW FG 3 4 6 13 
19 40%  
YW FG 3 3 0 6  
YM FG 3 3 6 12 29 60%  
OM FG 6 5 6 17  
Total Sample***   15 15 18 48 48 100%  
                
Village Population  - -   - -      
Village Adult Population 69 139 69 277      
Sample: Adult Pop Rate** 22% 11% 26% 17%      
Total Households 19 39 9 67      
Households Sampled 9 15 6 30      
Household Sample Rate 47% 38% 67% 45%    
**The targeted study population did not include children.      
Population and Household Data Source: Laya Foundation.        
Village/ 
Project 
Subset 
Cohort Interview Format Agraharam Sunaladana Palem Itikalakota  Total 
Gender 
Totals  
Gender 
Rates 
PR
A
G
A
TI 
OW FG 5 4 6 5 15 
36 49% 
YW FG 4 3 4 5 11 
YM FG 5 3 6 5 14 
37 51% 
OM FG 4 4 6 4 14 
Total Sample***   18 14 22 19 73 73 100%           
Village Population  - -   - -  -   
Village Adult Population 92 92 92 92 368   
Sample: Adult Pop Rate** 20% 15% 24% 21% 20%   
Total Households 22 22 22 22 66   
Households Sampled 8 6 10 8 32   
Household Sample Rate 36% 27% 45% 36% 48%   
**The targeted study population did not include children      
Population and Household Data Source: No available population data. Population calculated based on the average for Laya Villages (92). 
Households calculated using average in Laya Villages (22). Both set of villages are drawn from a similarly composed communal, 
geographic and ethnic environment.  
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Appendix G: Belize Sample Profile – Village Level Data 
 
Village/ 
Project 
Subset 
Cohort Interview Format Trio 
Indian 
Creek 
San 
Miguel  Total 
Gender 
Totals  
Gender 
Rates 
  
Y
a'axché  
OW FG 3 4 4 11 
26 47%   
YW FG 5 6 4 15   
YM FG 4 4 4 12 
29 53% 
  
OM FG 5 5 3 13   
OM-
Prob FG 4 0 0 4   
Total Sample 21 19 15 55 55 100%   
                 
Village Population 899 721 537 2157       
Village Adult Population 376 268 192 836        
Sample: Adult Pop Rate** 6% 7% 8% 7%        
Total Households 188 134 96 418        
Households Sampled 21 19 15 55        
Household Sample Rate 11% 14% 16% 13%        
**The targeted study population did not include children.          
Population and Household Data Source: Belize National Census, 2010, p. 69-70).                                                                     
*** No age-based disaggregated data available for village level populations. Figures calculated using the district average of 
two per household. 
 
 
 
Village/  
Project 
Subset 
Cohort Interview Format Total 
Gender 
Totals 
Gender 
Rates 
     
Flow
ers Bank 
OW FG 7 
11 58%      
YW FG 4 
     
YM FG 4 
8 42% 
     
OM FG 4 
     
Total Sample 19 19 100%      
           
Village Population 121        
Village Adult Population 62        
Sample: Adult Pop Rate** 31%        
Total Households 31        
Households Sampled 15        
Household Sample Rate 48%        
**The targeted study population did not include children      
Population and Household Data Source: Belize National Census, 2010, p. 69-70).                                                                     
*** No age-based disaggregated data available for village level populations. Figures calculated using the district average of 
two per household. 
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Appendix H.1: Belief Progression Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji  
 
Gau Subset Immediate Progressive 
OM Malawai (I) 2 2 
OW Malawai  0 0 
YW Malawai  0 0 
YM Malawai 0 1 
YW Lamiti  0 0 
YM Lamiti 1 0 
YW Lamiti 4 1 
OM Lamiti 7 6 
Subset Totals 14 10 
Gau Island 
Cohorts Immediate Progressive 
OM 9 8 
OW 0 0 
YM 1 1 
YW 4 1 
Men 10 9 
Women 4 1 
Youth 5 2 
Elders 9 8 
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Appendix H.2: Project Perception Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji   
Gau Subset Mixed - 1 Negative - 1 Neutral - 1 Positive - 1 
OM Malawai (I)       10 
OW Malawai  0 0 0 2 
YW Malawai  0 0 0 3 
YM Malawai 0 0 0 5 
YW Lamiti  0 0 0 3 
YM Lamiti 0 0 0 2 
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 3 
OM Lamiti 1     22 
Subset Totals 1 0 0 50 
Gau Island 
Cohorts Mixed - 1 Negative 1 Neutral - 1 Positive 1 
OM 1 0 0 32 
OW 0 0 0 5 
YM 0 0 0 7 
YW 0 0 0 6 
Men 1 0 0 39 
Women 0 0 0 11 
Youth 0 0 0 13 
Elders 1 0 0 37 
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Appendix H.3: Personal Inclusion and Influence Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji  
 
Gau Subset 
Mixed - 2 Negative - 2 Neutral - 2 Positive - 2 Youth Consultation 
OM Malawai (I)       10   
OW Malawai  0 0 0 0 0 
YW Malawai  0 0 0 2 0 
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 2 
YW Lamiti  0 0 0 3 0 
YM Lamiti 0 0 5 0 0 
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 1 0 
OM Lamiti       9   
Subset Totals 0 0 5 25 2 
Gau Island 
Cohorts 
Mixed - 2 Negative 2 Neutral - 2 Positive 2 Youth Consultation 
OM 0 0 0 19 0 
OW 0 0 0 3 0 
YM 0 0 5 0 2 
YW 0 0 0 3 0 
Men 0 0 5 19 2 
Women 0 0 0 6 0 
Youth 0 0 5 3 2 
Elders 0 0 0 22 0 
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Appendix H.4: Climate Knowledge Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji   
Gau Subset A Posteriori Experiential Falsehood Knowledge Gap Regurgitation 
OM Malawai (I) 13 1   3 2 
OW Malawai  5 0 0 0 1 
YW Malawai  3 0 0 0 0 
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti  2 0 0 0 0 
YM Lamiti 0 0 0 1 0 
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 1 0 
OM Lamiti 14 6   5 2 
Gau Island Cohorts A Posteriori Experiential Falsehood Knowledge Gap Regurgitation 
OM 27 7 0 8 4 
OW 7 0 0 0 1 
YM 0 0 0 1 0 
YW 3 0 0 1 0 
Men 27 7 0 9 4 
Women 10 0 0 1 1 
Youth 3 0 0 2 0 
Elders 34 7 0 8 5 
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Appendix H.5: Climate Knowledge Acquisition Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji 
Gau Subset Before 
project
Catholic 
Church
Extreme 
Event
Friends/Peers/ 
Relatives
Holy Book Never Heard of 
Climate Change
News Observation Project 
Intervention
School Village 
Meeting
OM Malawai (I) 0 0 1 1 5
OW Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0
YW Malawai 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
YW Lamiti 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
YM Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
OM Lamiti 1 0 0 1 6 1
Subset Totals 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 6 15 6 0
Gau Island 
Cohorts
Before 
project
Catholic 
Church
Extreme 
Event
Friends/Peers/Relati
ves Holy Book
Never Heard of 
Climate Change News Observation
Project 
Intervention School
Village 
Meeting
OM 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 1 0
OW 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0
YM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0
YW 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0
Men 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 13 3 0
Women 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 3 0
Youth 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 4 0
Elders 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 12 2 0
 g  q    , j
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Appendix H.6: Signs and Indicators Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji 
 
Gau 
Subset Climate 
Coastal 
Erosion 
Coral 
Health 
Crop 
Yield/ 
Soil 
Health 
Fish 
Stock 
Forest 
Fires Health Pollution 
Sea 
Level 
Rise 
Socio-
Cultural 
Change 
Soil 
Erosion Water Weather 
OM 
Malawai (I) 3 5   15 12       5 8 6   6 
OW 
Malawai  1 0 3 1 5 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 2 
YW 
Malawai  0 1 1 3 5 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 2 
YM 
Malawai 1 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 
YW Lamiti  2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 
YM Lamiti 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
OM Lamiti   5 1 19 5   1   2   11   15 
Subset 
Total 7 11 6 44 34 0 3 0 16 9 24 0 32 
Gau Island 
Cohorts                           
OM 3 10 1 34 17 0 1 0 7 8 17 0 21 
OW 3 0 3 2 7 0 2 0 3 1 3 0 5 
YM 1 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 
YW 0 1 2 3 6 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 5 
Men 4 10 1 39 21 0 1 0 9 8 19 0 22 
Women 3 1 5 5 13 0 2 0 7 1 5 0 10 
Youth 1 1 2 8 10 0 0 0 6 0 4 0 6 
Elders 6 10 4 36 24 0 3 0 10 9 20 0 26 
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Appendix H.7: Climate Action Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji 
Gau Subset Agroforestry Crop Diversification Inaction Irrigation Land Development
Multi-Cropping & 
Seed Dispersal
Planting Trees   
/Afforestation
River 
Buffer Sandalwood Sea Wall Soil Enhancement
Taboo/  No 
Take Teri Planting
OM Malawai (I) 2 5 1 2 2 11
OW Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
YW Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 1
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
YM Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
OM Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 7 0 8 15
Subset Totals 0 2 0 0 0 0 14 0 1 15 0 13 33
Gau Island 
Cohorts Agroforestry Crop Diversification Inaction Irrigation Land Development
Multi-Cropping & 
Seed Dispersal
Planting Trees 
/Afforestation
River 
Buffer Sandalwood Sea Wall Soil Enhancement
Taboo/ No 
Take Teri Planting
OM 0 2 0 0 0 0 13 0 1 9 0 10 26
OW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
YM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 3 1
YW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Men 0 2 0 0 0 0 14 0 1 13 0 13 27
Women 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 6
Youth 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 3 3
Elders 0 2 0 0 0 0 13 0 1 10 0 10 30
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Appendix H.8: Cause and Proximity Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji 
 
Gau Subset God/Religion Humans International Local National Nature 
OM Malawai (I) 7           
OW Malawai  0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Malawai  0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti  0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Lamiti 1           
Subset Totals 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Gau Island 
Cohorts 
God/Religion Humans International Local National Nature 
OM 8 0 0 0 0 0 
OW 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Men 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Women 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Youth 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Elders 8 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix H.9: Climate Risk Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji 
 
Gau Subset 
Children 
- 2 
Coastal 
Dwellers - 
Self 
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers Elderly 
Equal 
Risk 
Farmer 
- 2 
Hillside 
Dwellers Me 
Women 
- 2 
OM Malawai (I) 1 2     4         
OW Malawai  0 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 
YW Malawai  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
YM Lamiti 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
OM Lamiti       2 5         
Subset Totals 1 3 1 2 16 1 0 0 1 
Gau Island 
Cohorts 
Children 
- 2 
Coastal 
Dwellers - 
Self 
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers Elderly 
Equal 
Risk 
Farmer 
- 2 
Hillside 
Dwellers Me 
Women 
- 2 
OM 1 2 0 2 9 0 0 0 0 
OW 0 1 1 0 5 1 0 0 1 
YM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
YW 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Men 1 2 0 2 10 0 0 0 0 
Women 0 1 1 0 6 1 0 0 1 
Youth 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Elders 1 3 1 2 14 1 0 0 1 
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Appendix H.10: Climate Agency Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji 
 
Gau Subset 
Failed 
Actions Fatalism 
Mixed - 
Agency 
Nature 2 
- Agency None Optimism Religious 
Resource 
Gaps 
OM Malawai (I) 0 1 0 0 0 12 15 0 
OW Malawai  0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 
YW Malawai  0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
YW Lamiti  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
YM Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
OM Lamiti 2 2 0 0 0 24 0 1 
Subset Totals 3 3 0 0 0 52 18 1 
Gau Island 
Cohorts 
Failed 
Actions Fatalism 
Mixed - 
Agency 
Nature 2 
- Agency None Optimism Religious 
Resource 
Gaps 
OM 2 3 0 0 0 36 15 1 
OW 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
YM 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
YW 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 
Men 2 3 0 0 0 38 15 1 
Women 1 0 0 0 0 14 3 0 
Youth 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 0 
Elders 3 3 0 0 0 46 15 1 
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Appendix H.11: Motive for Action Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji 
 
Gau Subset 
Children Communal Obligation 
Community/ 
Village God/Religion National Self/Offsprings World 
OM Malawai 
(I) 6   5 7       
OW Malawai  0 0 1 0 0 2 0 
YW Malawai  0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Lamiti 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
YW Lamiti 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Lamiti 3   5 1       
Subset Total 10 1 14 8 0 2 0 
Gau Island 
Cohorts 
Children Communal Obligation 
Community/ 
Village God/Religion National Self/Offsprings World 
OM 9 0 10 8 0 0 0 
OW 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 
YM 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
YW 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Men 9 0 11 8 0 0 0 
Women 1 1 3 0 0 2 0 
Youth 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 
Elders 9 0 11 8 0 2 0 
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Appendix H.12: Climate Leadership Macro-Group Data – Gau Island, Fiji 
 
Gau Subset Community/ 
Village Elders 
Exemplary 
Females 
Exemplary 
Group 
Exemplary 
Men 
Exemplary 
Person External Family Self 
Traditional 
Knowledge Youth 
OM Malawai 
(I) 5           0 3   8   
OW Malawai  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
YW Malawai  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Malawai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW 
 Lamiti  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM  
Lamiti 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
YW  
Lamiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM  
Lamiti 5           1 1 2 7   
Subset 
Totals 14 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 3 15 0 
Gau Island 
Cohorts 
Community/ 
Village Elders 
Exemplary 
Females 
Exemplary 
Group 
Exemplary 
Men 
Exemplary 
Person External Family Self 
Traditional 
Knowledge Youth 
OM 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 15 0 
OW 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
YM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
YW 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Men 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 3 15 0 
Women 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Youth 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Elders 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 15 0 
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Appendix I.1: Belief Progression Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Belief Progression 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Immediate 1 0 1 0   
Progressive 0         
Totals 1 0 1 0 0 
Macro-Group Belief 
Progression Men Women Youth   
Immediate 1 1 0   
Progressive 0 0 0   
Totals 1 1 0   
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Appendix I.2: Project Perception Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Project 
Perception 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Mixed - 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Negative 1 0         
Neutral - 1 0         
Positive 1 2         
Totals 2 0 0 0   
Macro-Group 
Project 
Perception 
Men Women Youth 
  
Mixed - 1 0 0 0   
Negative 1 0 0 0   
Neutral - 1 0 0 0   
Positive 1 2 0 0   
Totals 2 0 0   
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Appendix I.3: Personal Influence or Inclusion Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Personal Influence 
or Inclusion 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Mixed - 2 0         
Negative 2           
Neutral - 2           
Positive 2     1     
Youth Consultation   1 0     
Totals 0 1 1 0 0 
Macro-Group 
Personal Influence 
or Inclusion Men Women Youth   
Mixed - 2 0 0 0   
Negative 2 0 0 0   
Neutral - 2 0 0 0   
Positive 2 0 1 0   
Youth Consultation 1 0 1   
Totals 1 1 1   
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Appendix I.4: Climate Change Knowledge Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Climate Knowledge 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Prob 
A Posteriori 1     2 0 
Experiential           
Falsehood           
Knowledge Gap   1   1   
Regurgitation           
Totals 1 1 0 3 0 
Macro-Group 
Climate Knowledge Men Women Youth 
  
A Posteriori 1 2 2   
Experiential 0 0 0   
Falsehood 0 0 0   
Knowledge Gap 1 1 2   
Regurgitation 0 0 0   
Totals 2 3 4   
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Appendix I.5: Climate Knowledge Acquisition Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Climate Knowledge 
Acquisition 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Before project 1         
Extreme Event           
Friends/Peers/Relatives           
Holy Book           
Never Heard of Climate 
Change           
News           
Observation 1         
Project Intervention 2         
School       2 1 
Village Meeting           
Totals 4 0 0 2 1 
Macro-Group Climate 
Knowledge 
Acquisition Men Women Youth   
Before project 1 0 0   
Extreme Event 0 0 0   
Friends/Peers/Relatives 0 0 0   
Holy Book 0 0 0   
Never Heard of Climate 
Change 0 0 0   
News 0 0 0   
Observation 1 0 0   
Project Intervention 2 0 0   
School 0 2 2   
Village Meeting 0 0 0   
Totals 4 2 2   
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Appendix I.6: Signs and Indicators Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Signs and Indicators Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
INDV 
Climate 0         
Coastal Erosion 8     1   
Coral Health 2   1     
Crop Yield/Soil Health 2   1   1 
Fish Stock 2   1 3 5 
Forest Fires 0         
Health 0         
Pollution 0         
Sea Level Rise 0 3   1   
Socio-Cultural Change 0         
Soil Erosion 1 1 1 1   
Water 0         
Weather 2   3 3 3 
Total 17 4 7 9 9 
Macro-Group Signs and 
Indicators Men Women Youth   
Climate 0 0 0   
Coastal Erosion 8 1 1   
Coral Health 2 1 0   
Crop Yield/Soil Health 2 1 0   
Fish Stock 2 4 3   
Forest Fires 0 0 0   
Health 0 0 0   
Pollution 0 0 0   
Sea Level Rise 3 1 4   
Socio-Cultural Change 0 0 0   
Soil Erosion 2 2 2   
Water 0 0 0   
Weather 2 6 3   
Total 21 16 13   
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Appendix I.7: Climate Action Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Gendered Climate 
Actions 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Crop Diversification 0         
Hydropower           
Inaction           
Irrigation           
Multi-Cropping & 
Seed Dispersal           
Planting 
Trees/Afforestation           
River Buffer           
Sea Wall     1     
Soil Enhancement           
Taboo/No Take   1 2   4 
Teri Planting           
Totals 0 1 3 0 4 
Macro-Group 
Climate Actions Men Women Youth   
Crop Diversification 0 0 0   
Hydropower 0 0 0   
Inaction 0 0 0   
Irrigation 0 0 0   
Multi-Cropping & 
Seed Dispersal 0 0 0   
Planting 
Trees/Afforestation 0 0 0   
River Buffer 0 0 0   
Sea Wall 0 1 0   
Soil Enhancement 0 0 0   
Taboo/No Take 1 2 1   
Teri Planting 0 0 0   
Totals 1 3 1   
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Appendix I.8: Cause and Proximity Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Cause and 
Proximity 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
God/Religion 0         
Humans 3       1 
International 1       1 
Local 1       1 
National 0         
Nature 0       1 
Totals 5 0 0 0 4 
Macro-Group 
Cause and 
Proximity Men Women Youth   
God/Religion 0 0 0   
Humans 3 0 0   
International 1 0 0   
Local 1 0 0   
National 0 0 0   
Nature 0 0 0   
Totals 5 0 0   
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Appendix I.9: Climate Risk Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Climate Risk 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Children - 2 0         
Coastal Dwellers 
- Self 0         
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers 0         
Elderly 0         
Equal Risk 2 1 1 1 0 
Farmer - 2 0         
Hillside Dwellers 0         
Me 0         
Women - 2 0         
Totals 2 1 1 1   
Macro-Group 
Climate Risk Men Women Youth   
Children - 2 0 0 0   
Coastal Dwellers 
- Self 0 0 0   
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers 0 0 0   
Elderly 0 0 0   
Equal Risk 3 2 2   
Farmer - 2 0 0 0   
Hillside Dwellers 0 0 0   
Me 0 0 0   
Women - 2 0 0 0   
Totals 3 2 2   
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Appendix I.10: Climate Change Agency Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Agency 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Failed Actions 1         
Fatalism 2 1       
Mixed - 
Agency 0         
Nature 2 - 
Agency 0         
None 0         
Optimism 0 0 3 6 4 
Religious 0         
Resource Gaps 0         
Totals 3 1 3 6 4 
Macro-Group 
Agency Men Women Youth   
Failed Actions 1 0 0   
Fatalism 3 0 1   
Mixed - 
Agency 0 0 0   
Nature 2 - 
Agency 0 0 0   
None 0 0 0   
Optimism 0 9 6   
Religious 0 0 0   
Resource Gaps 0 0 0   
Totals 4 9 7   
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Appendix I.11: Motives for Action Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Motives 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Children 0         
Communal 
Obligation           
Community/Village 0 0 0 2 0 
God/Religion           
National           
Self/Offsprings           
World           
Totals 0 0 0 2 0 
Macro-Group 
Motives Men Women Youth   
Children 0 0 0   
Communal 
Obligation 0 0 0   
Community/Village 0 2 2   
God/Religion 0 0 0   
National 0 0 0   
Self/Offsprings 0 0 0   
World 0 0 0   
Totals 0 2 2   
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Appendix I.12: Climate Change Leadership Macro-Group Data – Yaqaqa Island, Fiji 
 
Climate 
Leadership 
Gendered Cohorts 
OM YM OW YW 
OM 
Indv 
Community/Village 0     2   
Elders           
Exemplary Females           
Exemplary Group           
Exemplary Men           
Exemplary Person           
External       1   
Family         1 
Self           
Traditional 
Structures   1 1   1 
Youth           
Totals 0 1 1 3 2 
Macro- Group 
Climate 
Leadership Men Women Youth   
Community/Village 0 2 2   
Elders 0 0 0   
Exemplary Females 0 0 0   
Exemplary Group 0 0 0   
Exemplary Men 0 0 0   
Exemplary Person 0 0 0   
External 0 1 1   
Family 0 0 0   
Self 0 0 0   
Traditional 
Structures 1 1 1   
Youth 0 0 0   
Totals 1 4 4   
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Appendix J.1: Belief Progression Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
   
 Transcripts     
Codes 
D 40: 
Navail OM 
FG and 
Rokosalase 
OM FG 
D 41: 
Seaqaqa 
OM FG 
(Probing 
Group) and 
Rokosalase 
YM 
D 42: Older 
Women FG 
Navai + 
Navundi and 
Amit's 
Interview 
D 43: 
Seaqaqa11 
Interviews Seaqaqa Totals   
Immediate 0 0 0 1 1 2   
Progressive 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Totals 0 0 0 1 1 2    
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM Navai OW Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
Immediate 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Progressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Immediate 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Progressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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Appendix J.2: Project Perception Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
   
 Transcripts    
Codes 
D 40: Navail 
OM FG and 
Rokosalase 
OM FG 
D 41: 
Seaqaqa OM 
FG (Probing 
Group) and 
Rokosalase 
YM 
D 42: Older 
Women FG 
Navai + 
Navundi and 
Amit's 
Interview 
D 43: 
Seaqaqa11 
Interviews 
Seaqaqa Totals 
  
Mixed - 1 0 0 0 1 1 2   
Negative 1 2 0 1 1 4 8   
Neutral - 1 0 0 0 1 1 2   
Positive 1 1 0 4 2 7 14   
Totals 3 0 5 5 13 26   
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM Navai OW Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
Mixed - 1       1         
Negative 1 2     1 1       
Neutral - 1               1 
Positive 1 1 2 1   1 1 1   
Totals 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Mixed - 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Negative 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Neutral - 1   0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Positive 1 1 3 3 0 2 2 1 1 
Totals 3 5 4 1 4 3 2 1 
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Appendix J.3: Perception of Inclusion and Influence Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
 Transcript   
Codes D 40: Navail 
OM FG and 
Rokosalase OM 
FG 
D 41: 
Seaqaqa OM 
FG (Probing 
Group) and 
Rokosalase 
YM 
D 42: Older 
Women FG 
Navai + 
Navundi 
and Amit's 
Interview 
D 43: 
Seaqaqa11 
Interviews 
Seaqaqa Totals 
  
Mixed - 2 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Negative 2 1 0 0 0 1 2   
Neutral - 2 0 0 0 1 1 2   
Positive 2 0 0 1 1 2 4   
Youth 
Consultation 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Totals 1 0 1 2 4 8   
Codes Testing Group OM Navai OW Navai OM Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko YM Roko 
Mixed - 2                 
Negative 2   1             
Neutral - 2               1 
Positive 2   1       1     
Youth 
Consultation                 
Totals 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Codes Testing Group OM OW  YM Indo Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Mixed - 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Negative 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Neutral - 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Positive 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Youth 
Consultation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 0 3 0 1 2 0 2 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 529 
 
Appendix J.4: Climate Knowledge Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
   
  Transcript   
Codes 
D 40: 
Navail OM 
FG and 
Rokosalase 
OM FG 
D 41: 
Seaqaqa 
OM FG 
(Probing 
Group) 
and 
Rokosalase 
YM 
D 42: 
Older 
Women 
FG Navai 
+ Navundi 
and 
Amit's 
Interview 
D 43: 
Seaqaqa11 
Interviews 
Seaqaqa Totals 
  
A Posteriori 0 4 1 3 8 16   
Experiential 0 0 1 0 1 2   
Falsehood 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Knowledge 
Gap 1 1 1 0 3 6   
Regurgitation 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Totals 1 5 3 3 12 24   
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM Navai OW Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
A Posteriori 3     2 1 1   1 
Experiential         1       
Falsehood                 
Knowledge 
Gap         1 1   1 
Regurgitation                 
Totals 3 0 0 2 3 2 0 2 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
A Posteriori 3 3 1 1 2 1 2 0 
Experiential   0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Falsehood   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Knowledge 
Gap   1 1 1 0 1 2 0 
Regurgitation   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 3 4 3 2 2 3 4 0 
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Appendix J.5: Climate Knowledge Acquisition Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
   
 Transcript   
Codes Navail & 
Roko OM 
FG 
OM 
Probing 
+ Roko 
YM 
OW FG 
Navai + 
Navundi 
+ AC 
Seaqaqa 
11 
Seaqaqa Totals 
  
Before project 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Catholic Church 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Extreme Event 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Friends/Peers/Relatives 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Holy Book 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Never Heard of CC 0 0 0 0 0 0   
News 0 0 1 0 1 2   
Observation 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Project Intervention 2 0 2 1 5 10   
School 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Village Meeting 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Totals 2 0 3 1 6 12   
Codes 
Testing 
Group 
OM 
Navai 
OW 
Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
Before project   2             
Catholic Church                 
Extreme Event                 
Friends/Peers/Relatives                 
Holy Book                 
Never Heard of CC                 
News     1           
Observation                 
Project Intervention   1 1 1         
School                 
Village Meeting                 
Totals 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Before project 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Catholic Church 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Extreme Event 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Friends/Peers/Relatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Holy Book 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Never Heard of CC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
News 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Observation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Project Intervention 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Village Meeting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 0 4 2 0 4 2 0 0 
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Appendix J.6: Signs and Indicators Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
 
Transcript 
Codes OM 
FGs 
Navail 
+ Roko 
OM 
Probing 
+ Roko 
YM 
OW FGs 
Navai + 
Navundi + 
AC 
Seaqaqa 
11 
Seaqaqa Totals 
 
Climate 0 1 0 0 1 2  
Crop 
Yield/Soil 
Health 5 6 8 7 26 52  
Forest Fires 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Health 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Pollution 0 1 0 0 1 2  
Sea Level 
Rise 1 0 0 0 1 2  
Socio-Cultural 
Change 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Soil Erosion 2 1 0 2 5 10  
Water 8 7 18 21 54 108  
Weather 5 4 7 7 23 46  
Totals 21 20 33 37 111 222  
Codes OM 
Navai 
OW 
Navai 
OM Navundi OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM Roko 
Climate             1 
Crop 
Yield/Soil 
Health 9 4 1 4 1 1   
Forest Fires               
Health               
Pollution             1 
Sea Level 
Rise         1     
Socio-Cultural 
Change               
Soil Erosion 1       3   1 
Water 14 3 12 8 4 2 1 
Weather 7 2 2 2 2 1 3 
Totals 31 9 15 14 11 4 7 
Codes OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Climate 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Crop 
Yield/Soil 
Health 11 9 0 10 8 1 1 
Forest Fires 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pollution 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Sea Level 
Rise 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Socio-Cultural 
Change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Soil Erosion 4 0 1 1 0 4 0 
Water 30 13 1 26 11 5 2 
Weather 11 5 3 9 4 5 1 
Totals 57 27 7 46 23 18 4 
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Appendix J.7: Climate Action Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
       
Transcripts 
Codes       
Inaction Totals       
D 40: 
Navail OM 
FG and 
Rokosalase 
OM FG 0 0       
D 41: 
Seaqaqa 
OM FG 
(Probing 
Group) and 
Rokosalase 
YM 2 2       
D 42: Older 
Women FG 
Navai + 
Navundi 
and Amit's 
Interview 2 2       
D 43: 
Seaqaqa11 
Interviews 2 2       
Seaqaqa 6 6       
Totals 12 12       
Codes 
Testing 
Group 
OM 
Navai 
OW 
Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
Inaction 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Inaction 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 533 
 
Appendix J.8: Cause and Proximity Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
Transcripts   
Codes 
D 40: 
Navail OM 
FG and 
Rokosalase 
OM FG 
D 41: 
Seaqaqa 
OM FG 
(Probing 
Group) 
and 
Rokosalase 
YM 
D 42: 
Older 
Women 
FG 
Navai + 
Navundi 
and 
Amit's 
Interview 
D 43: 
Seaqaqa11 
Interviews 
Seaqaqa Totals 
  
God/Religion 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Humans 0 4 5 9 18 36   
International 0 1 0 0 1 2   
Local 0 2 1 0 3 6   
National 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Nature 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Totals 0 7 6 9 22 44   
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM Navai 
OW 
Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
God/Religion                 
Humans 3 4 3 4   2   2 
International 1               
Local 2       1       
National                 
Nature                 
Totals 6 4 3 4 1 2 0 2 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
God/Religion   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Humans 3 10 5 2 8 3 4 0 
International 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
National   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nature   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 6 10 6 2 8 4 4 0 
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Appendix J.9: Climate Risk Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
   
Codes 
Transcripts   
 Navail 
OM + 
Roko OM 
FG 
OM 
Probing 
+ Roko 
YM 
Older 
Women 
FG Navai 
+ Navundi 
+ AC 
Seaqaqa 
11  
Seaqaqa Totals 
  
Children - 2 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Coastal Dwellers - 
Self 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Elderly 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Equal Risk 0 1 1 2 4 8   
Farmer - 2 0 0 0 4 4 8   
Hillside Dwellers 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Me 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Women - 2 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Totals 0 1 1 6 8 16   
Codes 
Testing 
Group 
OM 
Navai OW Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
Children - 2                 
Coastal Dwellers - 
Self                 
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers                 
Elderly                 
Equal Risk   4   1   1     
Farmer - 2               1 
Hillside Dwellers                 
Me                 
Women - 2                 
Totals 0 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Codes 
Testing 
Group 
OM OW  YM Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Children - 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coastal Dwellers - 
Self 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Elderly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equal Risk 0 6 0 0 5 0 1 0 
Farmer - 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Hillside Dwellers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Me 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Women - 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 0 6 0 1 5 0 2 0 
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Appendix J.10: Climate Change Agency Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
 
Codes 
Transcripts Totals   
D 40: 
Navail OM 
FG and 
Rokosalase 
OM FG 
D 41: 
Seaqaqa 
OM FG 
(Probing 
Group) 
and 
Rokosalase 
YM 
D 42: 
Older 
Women 
FG 
Navai + 
Navundi 
and 
Amit's 
Interview 
D 43: 
Seaqaqa11 
Interviews 
Seaqaqa 
  
Failed 
Actions 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Fatalism 3 2 1 3 9 18   
Mixed - 
Agency 0 0 0 1 1 2   
Nature 2 
- Agency 0 2 1 2 5 10   
None 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Optimism 7 7 6 11 31 62   
Religious 3 0 1 1 5 10   
Resource 
Gaps 1 0 0 0 1 2   
Totals 14 11 9 18 52 104   
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM Navai 
OW 
Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
Failed 
Actions                 
Fatalism 2 3 2     1 1   
Mixed - 
Agency                 
Nature 2 
- Agency 2   3           
None                 
Optimism 3 5 2 4 4 7 1 5 
Religious   2 1     1 1   
Resource 
Gaps           1     
Totals 7 10 8 4 4 10 3 5 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Failed 
Actions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fatalism 2 4 3 0 3 2 1 1 
Mixed - 
Agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nature 2 
- Agency 2 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 
None 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Optimism 3 16 7 5 9 6 12 1 
Religious 0 3 2 0 2 1 1 1 
Resource 
Gaps 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Totals 7 24 15 5 14 12 15 3 
 
 
 
 
 536 
 
Appendix J.11: Motive for Action Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
 Transcripts   
Codes 
OM 
FGs 
Navail 
+ Roko 
OM 
Probing 
+ Roko 
YM 
OW 
FGs 
Navai + 
Navundi 
+ AC 
Seaqaqa 
11  
Seaqaqa Totals 
  
Children 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Communal 
Obligation 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Community/ 
Village 0 2 0 1 3 6   
God/Religion 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Nation 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Self/    
Offsprings 0 0 0 0 0 0   
World 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Totals 0 2 0 1 3 6   
Codes 
Testing 
Group 
OM 
Navai 
OW 
Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
Children       0         
Communal 
Obligation       1         
Community/ 
Village 2               
God/Religion                 
Nation                 
Self/         
Offsprings                 
World                 
Totals 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Children   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Communal 
Obligation   1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Community/ 
Village 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
God/Religion   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nation   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Self/             
Offsprings   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
World   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 537 
 
Appendix J.12: Climate Change Leadership Macro-Group Data – Seaqaqa, Fiji 
 Transcripts   
Codes 
OM 
Navail 
& Roko 
FGS 
 OM 
Probing 
+ Roko 
YM 
OW FGs 
Navai + 
Navundi 
+ AC 
Seaqaqa 
11 Seaqaqa Totals 
  
Community/Village 0 2 0 1 3 6   
Elders 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Exemplary Females 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Exemplary Group 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Exemplary Men 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Exemplary Person 2 1 0 0 3 6   
External 1 0 1 4 6 12   
Family 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Self 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Traditional 
Structures 1 3 1 3 8 16   
Youth 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Totals 4 6 2 8 20 40   
Codes 
Testing 
Group 
OM 
Navai 
OW 
Navai 
OM 
Navundi 
OW 
Navundi 
OM 
Roko 
OW 
Roko 
YM 
Roko 
Community/Village 1     1       1 
Elders                 
Exemplary Females                 
Exemplary Group                 
Exemplary Men                 
Exemplary Person   2           1 
External   3   1   2     
Family                 
Self                 
Traditional 
Structures 1 1 2     1   3 
Youth                 
Totals 2 6 2 2 0 3 0 5 
Codes 
Testing 
Group OM OW  YM 
Indo 
Men 
Indo 
Women 
iTaukei 
Men 
iTaukei 
Women 
Community/Village 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Elders   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exemplary Females   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exemplary Group   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exemplary Men   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exemplary Person   2 0 1 2 0 1 0 
External   6 0 0 4 0 2 0 
Family   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Self   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Traditional 
Structures 1 2 2 3 1 2 4 0 
Youth   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 2 11 2 5 8 2 8 0 
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Appendix K.1: Belief Progression Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India  
PRAGATI 
Subset Immediate Progressive 
OM Sunaladana 0 0 
YM Sunaladana 0 0 
YW Sunaladana  0 0 
OW Sunaladana  0 0 
YM Palem 0 0 
YW Palem 0 0 
OM Palem  0 6 
OW Palem 0 0 
OW Agraharam  0 0 
YM Agraharam  0 0 
YW Agraharam  0 0 
OM Agraharam  0 0 
OW Itikalakota  0 0 
YM Itikalakota  0 0 
OM Itikalakota 0 0 
YW Itikalakota 0 0 
Subset Totals 0 6 
Gendered 
Cohorts     
OM 0 6 
OW 0 0 
YM 0 0 
YW 0 0 
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Appendix K.2: Project Perception Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India 
 
PRAGATI Subset Mixed - 1 Negative 1 Neutral - 1 Positive 1 
OM Sunaladana  0 0 0 2 
YM Sunaladana  0 0 0 1 
YW Sunaladana  0 0 0 1 
OW Sunaladana  0 0 0 4 
YM Palem  0 0 0 0 
YW Palem  0 0 0 0 
OM Palem 0 0 0 4 
OW Palem 0 0 0 1 
OW Agraharam  0 0 0 0 
YM Agraharam  0 0 0 0 
YW Agraharam  0 0 0 0 
OM Agraharam  0 0 0 0 
YW Itikalakota  0 0 0 0 
OW Itikalakota  0 0 0 1 
YM Itikalakota  0 0 0 1 
OM Itikalakota  0 0 0 3 
Subset Totals 0 0 0 18 
Gendered Cohorts     
OM    9 
YM    2 
OW    6 
YW    1 
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Appendix K.3: Personal Inclusion & Influence Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India 
 
PRAGATI 
Subset Mixed - 2 Negative 2 Neutral - 2 Positive 2 
Youth 
Consultation 
OM Sunaladana  0 0 0 1 0 
YM Sunaladana  0 0 0 0 0 
YW Sunaladana  0 0 0 1 0 
OW Sunaladana 0 0 0 2 0 
YW Palem  0 0 0 4 0 
YM Palem  0 0 0 3 0 
OM Palem  0 0 0 6 0 
OW Palem 0 0 0 8 0 
OW Agraharam  0 0 0 0 0 
YM Agraharam 0 0 0 1 0 
YW Agraharam  0 0 0 0 0 
OM Agraharam  0 0 0 0 0 
YW Itikalakota  0 0 0 1 0 
OW Itikalakota  0 0 0 1 0 
YM Itikalakota 0 0 0 1 1 
OM Itikalakota 0 0 0 1 0 
Subset Totals 0 0 0 30 1 
Gendered 
Cohorts      
OM    8  
YM    5 1 
YW    6  
OW    11  
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Appendix K.4: Climate Knowledge Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India  
PRAGATI Subset A Posteriori Experiential Knowledge Gap 
OM Sunaladana 1 2 0 
YM Sunaladana  1 0 0 
OW Sunaladana  3 0 3 
YW Sunaladana 2 0 2 
YW Palem  0 1 0 
YM Palem 6 0 0 
OM Palem  1 3 0 
OW Palem 1 2 2 
OW Agraharam  0 0 0 
YM Agraharam 0 0 0 
YW Agraharam 1 0 3 
OM Agraharam  2 0 0 
YW Itikalakota 1 2 0 
OW Itikalakota  2 0 0 
YM Itikalakota 2 0 1 
OM Itikalakota 0 1 0 
Subset Totals 23 11 11 
Gendered Cohorts       
YM 8 1 1 
OM 4 6 0 
YW 5 3 5 
OW 6 2 5 
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Appendix K.5: Climate Change Knowledge Acquisition Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI 
Villages, India 
 
PRAGATI 
Subset 
Before 
project 
Extreme 
Event Friends/Peers News Observation 
Project 
Intervention School 
OM Sunaladana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Sunaladana 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
OW Sunaladana  0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
YW Sunaladana  0 0 0 4 0 0 0 
YW Agraharam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Agraharam 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 
YM Agraharam 0 1 2 0 0 1 3 
OW Agraharam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Palem 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
YW Palem 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
OM Palem 0 0 0 4 6 0 0 
OW Palem 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
YW Itikalakota 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
OW Itikalakota 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 
YM Itikalakota 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 
OM Itikalakota 0 0 1 3 3 0 0 
Subset Totals 1 3 6 22 16 4 4 
Gendered 
Cohorts               
OM 0 1 1 7 9 2 0 
OW 1 0 1 2 4 0 0 
YM 0 1 3 7 3 2 3 
YW 0 1 1 6 0 0 1 
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Appendix K.6: Signs and Indicators Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India  
PRAGATI Subset 
Crop 
Yield/Soil 
Health 
Health Pollution 
Socio-
Cultural 
Change 
Soil 
Erosion Weather 
Signs/ 
Indicators 
OM Sunaladana  5 1 0 0 0 2 6 
YM Sunaladana  3 0 0 0 0 1 4 
YW Sunaladana 3 0 0 0 0 2 5 
OW Sunaladana  0 2 0 0 0 1 3 
YW Agraharam 2 0 0 0 0 4 7 
OM Agraharam  3 0 0 0 0 2 3 
OW Agraharam  4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
YM Agraharam  2 0 0 0 0 1 4 
YM Palem 15 1 0 1 0 9 18 
YW Palem 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
OM Palem  4 0 0 0 0 2 6 
OW Palem  6 0 0 0 0 5 9 
YW Itikalakota  2 0 0 0 0 4 4 
OW Itikalakota 2 0 0 0 0 2 6 
YM Itikalakota  2 0 0 0 0 1 2 
OM Itikalakota  4 1 0 0 0 3 7 
Subset Totals 57 6 0 1 0 40 90 
Gendered Cohorts               
OM 16 2       9 27 
YM 22 1   1   12 36 
YW 7 1       11 19 
OW 12 2       8 22 
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Appendix K.7: Climate Action Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India  
PRAGATI 
Subset 
Crop 
Diversification 
Inaction Irrigation Land 
Development 
Multi-
Cropping & 
Seed Dispersal 
Planting 
Trees/ 
Afforestation 
Soil 
Enhancement 
OM 
Sunaladana  0 2 0 1 1 1 0 
YM 
Sunaladana 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
YW 
Sunaladana  0 6 0 3 0 0 0 
OW 
Sunaladana  0 2 0 1 1 0 0 
YW Palem  0 1 0 1 1 1 2 
OM Palem  0 1 0 3 1 1 3 
YM Palem  0 4 0 2 0 3 2 
OW Palem  0 5 1 0 4 0 4 
OM 
Agraharam  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
YW 
Agraharam  0 3 0 0 4 0 0 
OW 
Agraharam  1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
YM 
Agraharam  0 1 0 0 3 0 0 
YW 
Itikalakota 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 
OW 
Itikalakota  0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
YM 
Itikalakota  0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
OM 
Itikalakota  0 5 0 1 0 0 0 
Subset 
Totals 1 37 1 16 18 6 14 
Gendered 
Cohorts               
YM       4 4 3 2 
OM       5 3 2 3 
OW 1   1 2 6   6 
YW       5 5 1 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 545 
 
Appendix K.8: Cause and Proximity Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India  
PRAGATI Subset Humans International Local National Nature 
OM Sunaladana  1 0 0 0 0 
YM Sunaladana  0 0 0 0 0 
YW Sunaladana  0 0 0 0 0 
OW Sunaladana  0 0 0 0 0 
YM Palem 4 0 3 0 0 
YW Palem 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Palem  0 0 0 0 0 
OW Palem  0 0 0 0 0 
YW Agraharam  0 0 0 0 0 
OM Agraharam  0 0 0 0 0 
OW Agraharam  0 0 0 0 0 
YM Agraharam 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Itikalakota 2 0 0 2 1 
OW Itikalakota 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Itikalakota  1 0 0 0 0 
OM Itikalakota 1 1 1 1 0 
Subset Totals 9 1 4 3 1 
Gendered Cohorts           
OM  2 1 1 1   
YM 5 0 3     
OW 0         
YW 2     2 1 
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Appendix K.9: Climate Risk Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India  
PRAGATI 
Subset Children - 2 
Coastal/Riverside 
Dwellers 
Equal 
Risk 
Farmer - 
2 
Hillside 
Dwellers 
OM Sunaladana 0 0 1 0 0 
YM Sunaladana 0 0 1 0 0 
OW Sunaladana  1 0 1 0 0 
YW Sunaladana  0 0 1 0 0 
YW Agraharam  0 0 1 0 0 
OM Agraharam  0 0 1 0 0 
OW Agraharam  0 0 0 0 1 
YM Agraharam  0 1 0 0 0 
YM Palem 0 0 0 0 0 
OW Palem 0 0 5 0 0 
OM Palem 0 0 1 3 0 
YW Palem  0 0 3 0 0 
YW Itikalakota 0 0 1 0 0 
OW Itikalakota  0 0 1 0 0 
YM Itikalakota 0 0 1 0 0 
OM Itikalakota 0 0 1 0 0 
Subset Totals 1 1 19 3 1 
Gendered 
Cohorts      
OM 0 0 4 3 0 
OW 1 0 7 0 1 
YM 0 1 2 0 0 
YW 0 0 6 0 0 
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Appendix K.10: Climate Change Agency Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India 
 
PRAGATI 
Subset 
Fatalism Mixed - 
Agency 
Nature 2 
- Agency 
Optimism Resource 
Gaps 
OM Sunaladana  1 0 0 4 4 
YM Sunaladana  3 0 3 3 3 
YW Sunaladana 3 0 0 0 3 
OW Sunaladana  2 3 0 0 4 
YW Agraharam 1 0 0 3 2 
OM Agraharam  2 0 0 1 2 
OW Agraharam 1 0 0 0 2 
YM Agraharam 6 1 6 0 7 
YM Palem 1 2 0 3 5 
YW Palem 4 0 0 0 6 
OM Palem 3 0 0 0 1 
OW Palem 0 0 0 0 4 
YW Itikalakota 1 0 0 0 1 
OW Itikalakota 2 0 0 0 1 
YM Itikalakota 3 2 4 0 3 
OM Itikalakota 0 1 0 0 2 
Subset Total 33 9 13 14 50 
Gendered 
Cohorts           
OM 6 1 0 5 9 
OW 5 3 0 0 11 
YM 13 5 13 6 18 
YW 9 0 0 3 12 
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Appendix K.11: Motive for Action Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India  
PRAGATI Subset Children Community/Village Self/Offsprings 
OM Sunaladana  0 1 0 
YM Sunaladana  0 0 0 
YW Sunaladana  0 0 0 
OW Sunaladana 0 1 0 
YW Palem  0 0 0 
YM Palem 0 0 0 
OM Palem  0 0 0 
OW Palem  0 0 0 
OM Agraharam  0 0 0 
YW Agraharam  0 4 0 
OW Agraharam  0 0 0 
YM Agraharam  1 0 0 
YW Itikalakota 0 0 0 
OW Itikalakota  0 0 0 
YM Itikalakota  0 3 0 
OM Itikalakota  0 0 0 
Subset Totals 1 9 0 
Gendered Cohorts        
OM 0 1   
OW 0 1   
YM 1 3   
YW 0 4   
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Appendix K.12: Climate Change Leadership Macro-Group Data – PRAGATI Villages, India  
PRAGATI 
Subset 
Community/ 
Village Elders 
Exemplary 
Females 
Exemplary 
Men 
Exemplary 
Person Youth 
OM Sunaladana  1 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Sunaladana  0 0 0 0 2 0 
OW 
Sunaladana  1 0 1 0 2 0 
YW 
Sunaladana  0 0 0 0 3 0 
YW Agraharam  4 3 0 0 3 0 
OM Agraharam  0 1 0 0 2 0 
OW Agraharam  0 0 0 0 0 1 
YM Agraharam  0 0 0 0 0 1 
YM Palem  0 0 0 0 1 0 
YW Palem  0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Palem  0 0 0 0 5 4 
OW Palem  0 0 1 2 3 0 
YW Itikalakota  0 0 0 0 1 0 
OW Itikalakota  0 0 0 0 1 0 
YM Itikalakota 3 0 0 0 0 2 
OM Itikalakota  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Subset Totals 9 4 2 2 24 8 
Gendered 
Cohorts             
OM 1 1 0 0 8 4 
OW 1 0 2 2 6 1 
YM 3 0 0 0 3 3 
YW 4 3 0 0 7 0 
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Appendix L.1: Belief Progression Macro-Group Data – LayaVillages, India  
Laya Subset Immediate Progressive 
YM Pulusumamidi 0 0 
YW Pulusumamidi 0 0 
OW Pulusumadi 0 0 
OM Pulusumadi 0 1 
YM Nallikota 0 0 
OM Nellikota 0 0 
OW Nallikota 0 0 
OM Munagalapudu 0 0 
OW Munagalapudu 0 0 
YW Munagalapudu  0 0 
YM Munagalapudu 0 0 
Subset Totals 0 1 
Gendered Cohorts     
OM 0 1 
OW 0 0 
YM 0 0 
YW 0 0 
    0 
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Appendix L.2: Project Perception Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India 
 
Laya Subset Mixed - 1 Negative 1 Neutral - 1 Positive 1 
YM Pulusumamidi  0 0 0 2 
YW Pulusumamidi  0 0 0 3 
OW Pulusumadi  0 0 0 4 
OM Pulusumadi  0 0 0 5 
YM Nallikota  0 0 0 1 
OM Nellikota  0 0 0 0 
OW Nallikota  0 0 0 0 
OM Munagalapudu 0 0 0 4 
OW Munagalapudu  0 0 0 1 
YW Munagalapudu 0 0 0 5 
YM Munagalapudu 0 0 0 1 
Subset Totals 0 0 0 26 
Gendered Cohorts         
OM       9 
YM       4 
OW       5 
YW       8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 552 
 
Appendix L.3: Personal Inclusion & Influence Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India  
Laya Subset Mixed - 2 Negative 2 Neutral - 2 Positive 2 Youth Consultation 
YM Pulusumamidi  0 0 0 3 5 
YW Pulusumamidi  0 0 0 3 0 
OW Pulusumadi  3 0 0 0 0 
OM Pulusumadi  1 0 0 6 0 
YM Nallikota  0 0 0 1 1 
OM Nellikota  0 0 0 1 0 
OW Nallikota  0 0 0 1 0 
OM Munagalapudu 0 0 0 2 0 
OW Munagalapudu  0 0 0 2 0 
YW Munagalapudu  0 0 0 2 0 
YM Munagalapudu  0 0 0 0 1 
Subset Totals 4 0 0 21 7 
Gendered Cohorts           
OM 1     9   
YM       4 7 
YW       5   
OW 3     3   
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Appendix L.4: Climate Knowledge Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India  
Laya Subset A Posteriori Experiential Knowledge Gap 
YM Pulusumamidi  1 0 0 
YW Pulusumamidi 0 0 3 
OW Pulusumadi  0 1 1 
OM Pulusumadi  5 1 2 
YM Nallikota  5 1 1 
OM Nellikota  0 1 2 
OW Nallikota  2 0 1 
OM Munagalapudu  2 2 0 
OW Munagalapudu  0 0 2 
YW Munagalapudu  1 0 1 
YM Munagalapudu  0 0 1 
Subset Totals 16 6 14 
Gendered Cohorts    
YM 6 1 2 
OM 7 4 4 
YW 1 0 4 
OW 2 1 4 
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Appendix L.5: Climate Change Knowledge Acquisition Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, 
India  
Laya Subset Friends/Peers News Observation Project Intervention School 
YM Pulusumamidi 0 0 0 0 3 
YW Pulusumamidi 1 0 0 0 0 
OW Pulusumadi  0 0 0 0 0 
OM Pulusumadi  0 0 1 4 0 
OW Nallikota 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Nallikota  0 0 0 0 0 
OM Nellikota  0 0 2 0 0 
OM 
Munagalapudu  0 1 0 0 0 
OW 
Munagalapudu  0 0 0 2 0 
YW 
Munagalapudu  0 0 0 0 0 
YM 
Munagalapudu  1 2 1 0 0 
Subset Totals 2 3 4 6 3 
Gendered 
Cohorts           
OM 0 1 3 4 0 
OW 0 0 0 2 0 
YM 1 2 1 0 3 
YW 1 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix L.6: Signs and Indicators Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India 
 
Laya Subset Crop 
Yield/Soil 
Health 
Health Pollution Socio-Cultural 
Change 
Soil 
Erosion 
Weather Signs/ 
Indicators 
YM Pulusumamidi  0 2 0 0 1 4 7 
YW Pulusumamidi  3 0 0 0 0 3 6 
OW Pulusumadi  4 0 0 0 0 3 6 
OM Pulusumadi  4 0 1 0 0 3 7 
OW Nallikota  4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
YM Nallikota  1 0 1 0 0 4 6 
OM Nellikota  3 4 0 0 0 1 7 
OM Munagalapudu  4 0 0 1 0 1 6 
OW Munagalapudu  2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
YW Munagalapudu 2 0 0 0 0 3 4 
YM Munagalapudu 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Subset Totals 29 6 2 1 1 23 58 
Gendered Cohorts               
OM 11 4 1 1   5 22 
YM 3 2 1   1 9 16 
YW 5 0       6 11 
OW 10 0       3 13 
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Appendix L.7: Climate Action Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India  
Laya Subset Crop 
Diversification 
Filters & Water 
Supply 
Hydropower Inaction Multi-
Cropping & 
Seed Dispersal 
Planting 
Trees/ 
Afforestation 
Soil 
Enhancement 
YM Pulusumamidi  0 0 0 4 1 1 4 
YW Pulusumamidi  0 0 0 10 4 0 1 
OW Pulusumadi  0 0 0 10 4 0 0 
OM Pulusumadi  0 0 0 2 9 2 2 
OW Nallikota  0 1 0 2 1 0 0 
YM Nallikota  0 0 0 0 6 0 0 
OM Nellikota  1 1 0 0 3 0 1 
OM Munagalapudu  0 3 3 8 5 0 3 
OW Munagalapudu  0 0 1 1 3 0 0 
YW Munagalapudu  0 4 1 3 1 0 0 
YM Munagalapudu  0 0 0 1 2 0 0 
Subset Totals 1 9 5 41 39 3 11 
Gendered Cohorts               
OM 1 4 3 10 17 2 6 
OW   1 1 13 8 0 0 
YM    0 0 5 9 1 4 
YW   4 1 13 5 0 1 
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Appendix L.8: Cause and Proximity Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India  
Laya Subset Humans International Local National 
YM Pulusumamidi 0 0 0 0 
YW Pulusumamidi 0 0 0 0 
OW Pulusumadi 0 0 0 0 
OM Pulusumadi  0 0 0 0 
OW Nallikota 0 0 0 0 
YM Nallikota 0 0 0 0 
OM Nellikota 0 0 0 0 
OM Munagalapudu 0 0 0 0 
OW Munagalapudu 0 0 0 0 
YW Munagalapudu 0 0 0 0 
YM Munagalapudu 1 1 1 1 
Subset Totals 1 1 1 1 
Gendered Cohorts         
OM 0 0 0 0 
OW 0 0 0 0 
YM 1 1 1 1 
YW 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix L.9: Climate Risk Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India 
 
Laya Subset 
Equal 
Risk 
Farmer - 
2 
Hillside 
Dwellers Me 
YM Pulusumamidi  2 0 0 0 
YW Pulusumamidi  1 0 0 0 
OW Pulusumadi  1 0 1 1 
OM Pulusumadi  1 3 0 0 
OW Nallikota 0 0 0 0 
YM Nallikota  2 0 0 0 
OM Nellikota  1 0 0 0 
OM Munagalapudu  0 0 0 0 
OW Munagalapudu 0 0 0 0 
YW Munagalapudu  0 0 0 0 
YM Munagalapudu  0 0 0 0 
Subset Totals 8 3 1 1 
Gendered Cohorts         
OM 2 3 0 0 
OW 1 0 1 1 
YM 4 0 0 0 
YW 1 0 0 0 
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Appendix L.10: Climate Change Agency Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India 
 
Laya Subset Fatalism 
Mixed - 
Agency 
Nature 2 - 
Agency 
Optimism Resource Gaps 
YM Pulusumamidi 2 0 0 0 1 
YW Pulusumamidi  4 0  0 
OW Pulusumadi 2 0 0 4 6 
OM Pulusumadi 0 1 1 3 4 
OW Nallikota 0 0 0 0 1 
YM Nallikota 1 0 1 1 1 
OM Nellikota 1 0 0 3 1 
OM Munagalapudu 3 2 1 1 5 
OW Munagalapudu 0 2 0 0 1 
YW Munagalapudu 1 0 1 0 1 
YM Munagalapudu 0 0 0 1 1 
Laya Subset 14 5 4 13 26 
Gendered Cohorts      
OM 4 3 2 7 10 
OW 2 2 0 4 8 
YM 2 0 0 1 2 
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Appendix L.11: Motive for Action Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India  
Laya Subset Children Community/Village Self/Offsprings 
YM Pulusumamidi  0 0 0 
YW Pulusumamidi  0 0 0 
OW Pulusumadi 0 1 0 
OM Pulusumadi 0 1 0 
YM Nallikota  0 0 0 
OM Nellikota 0 0 0 
OW Nallikota 0 2 0 
OM Munagalapudu 0 0 0 
OW Munagalapudu 0 0 0 
YW Munagalapudu  0 0 0 
YM Munagalapudu  0 1 1 
Subset Totals 0 5 1 
Gendered Cohorts    
OM  1  
OW  3  
YM  1 1 
YW  0  
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Appendix L.12: Climate Change Leadership Macro-Group Data – Laya Villages, India 
 
Laya Subset Community/Village 
Exemplary 
Person External Youth 
YM Pulusumamidi 0 0 0 3 
YW Pulusumamidi  0 0 5 0 
OW Pulusumadi  1 0 4 0 
OM Pulusumadi  1 0 7 0 
OW Nallikota  2 0 1 0 
YM Nallikota  0 0 0 1 
OM Nellikota  0 1 0 0 
OM Munagalapudu  0 0 4 0 
OW 
Munagalapudu  0 2 0 0 
YW 
Munagalapudu  0 0 0 2 
YM Munagalapudu  1 0 0 1 
Subset Totals 5 3 21 7 
Gendered 
Cohorts 
    
OM 1 1 11 0 
OW 3 2 5 0 
YM 1 0 0 5 
YW 0 0 5 2 
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Appendix M.1: Project Perception Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages 
   
Ya’axché Subset Mixed - 1 Positive 1 
OW Indian Creek 0 4 
YM Indian Creek  0 5 
YW Indian Creek 3 3 
OM Indian Creek  1 4 
OM San Miguel 0 3 
POW San Miguel  0 0 
OM Trio  0 5 
YW Trio  0 3 
OW Trio  0 2 
OM Trio - Cocoa Group 
(Specialist) 1 5 
YM Trio  0 4 
Subset Total 1 19 
Gendered Cohorts   
OM 2 17 
OW  6 
YM  9 
YW 3 6 
Flowers Bank Subset and 
Gendered Cohorts   
Flowers Bank - OM FG 0 6 
Flowers Bank - OW FG 0 8 
Flowers Bank - YM FG 0 0 
Flowers Bank - YW FG 0 3 
Subset Totals 0 17 
Case Level Totals 5 55 
Gendered Cohorts - Case 
Level   
OM 2 23 
OW  14 
YM  9 
YW 3 9 
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Appendix M.2: Personal Inclusion and Influence Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages  
Ya’axché Subset Mixed - 2 Positive 2 Youth Consultation  
OW Indian Creek  0 0 0  
YM Indian Creek  0 5 0  
YW Indian Creek- 0 6 0  
OM Indian Creek 2 1 0  
San Miguel OM-FG 0 2 0  
San Miguel - OW FG 0 0 0  
Trio - OM FG 0 4 0  
Trio - YW FG 0 3 0  
Trio - OW FG 0 3 0  
Trio - Cocoa Group FG 
(Specialist) 1 5 0  
Trio - YM FG 2 1 0  
Subset Totals 3 16 0  
Gender Cohorts     
OM 3 12 0  
OW  3 0  
YM 2 6 0  
YW  9 0  
Flowers Bank Subset and 
Gendered Cohortts     
Flowers Bank - OM FG 0 1 0  
Flowers Bank - OW FG 0 2 0  
Flowers Bank - YM FG 0 0 0  
Flowers Bank - YW FG 1 1 1  
Subset Totals 1 4 1  
Case Level Totals 6 34 1  
Gender Cohorts - Case Level     
OM 3 13   
OW  5   
YM 2 6   
YW 1 10 1  
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Appendix M.3: Climate Change Knowledge Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages  
Ya’axché Subset A Posteriori Experiential Knowledge Gap 
OW Indian Creek  0 1 6 
YM Indian Creek  2 0 7 
YW Indian Creek 6 0 4 
OM Indian Creek  1 3 2 
OM San Miguel 2 0 6 
OW San Miguel 0 0 9 
OM Trio  7 0 1 
YW Trio  3 0 7 
OW Trio  2 0 0 
OM Trio - Cocoa Group 
(Specialist) 6 3 1 
YM Trio 5 0 0 
Subset Totals 34 7 43 
Flowers Bank Subset and 
Gendered Cohorts    
Flowers Bank - OM FG 1 0 0 
Flowers Bank - OW FG 3 0 1 
Flowers Bank - YM FG 2 0 2 
Flowers Bank - YW FG 4 0 1 
Subset Totals 10 0 4 
Case Totals 44 7 47 
Gendered Cohorts - Case 
Level    
OM 17 6 10 
OW 5 1 16 
YM 9 
 
9 
YW 13 
 
12 
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Appendix M.4: Climate Change Knowledge Acquisition Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages 
 
Ya’axché 
Subset 
Catholic 
Church 
Extreme 
Event 
Friends/ 
Peers/ 
Relatives 
News Observation Project 
Intervention 
School Village 
Meeting 
OW Indian 
Creek 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Indian 
Creek 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 
YW Indian 
Creek 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 
OM Indian 
Creek 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 
OM San Miguel 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 
OW San Miguel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
YW Trio 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
OW Trio 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
OM Trio - 
Cocoa Group 
(Specialist) 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 
YM Trio  0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 
Subset Total 1 0 3 3 6 9 16 1 
Flowers Bank 
Subset and 
Gendered 
Cohorts         
OM Flowers 
Bank  0 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 
OW Flowers 
Bank 0 1 3 4 0 0 0 0 
YM Flowers 
Bank 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 
YW Flowers 
Bank  0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 
Subset Total  1 5 10   4  
Case Totals 1 1 8 13 6 9 20 1 
Gendered 
Cohorts - Case 
Level         
YM   1 2   11  
YW    2   8  
OM 1  4 5 4 9 1 1 
OW  1 3 4 2  0  
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Appendix M.5: Signs and Indicators Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages 
  
Ya'axché Subset Weaher 
Crop 
Yield/Soil 
Health 
Fish 
Stock 
Forest 
Fires Health Pollution 
Soil 
Erosion 
OW Indian Creek  2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Indian Creek  7 0 0 0 0 1 0 
YW Indian Creek 2 1 0 0 0 4 0 
OM Indian Creek  6 3 0 0 0 0 0 
OM San Miguel  4 1 0 0 0 0 0 
OW San Miguel  0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
OM Trio 4 3 3 1 4 6 0 
YW Trio  3 1 0 0 1 0 0 
OW Trio  4 5 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio - Cocoa 
Group (Specialist) 4 2 1 0 3 4 0 
YM Trio  3 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Subset Totals 39 22 4 1 11 15 0 
Gendered Cohorts               
YM 10 4       1   
YW 5 2     1 4   
OM 18 9 4 1 7 10   
OW 6 7     3     
Flowers Bank 
Subset and 
Gendered Cohorts 
              
OM Flowers Bank 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 
OW Flowers Bank  4 1 0 0 1 0 1 
YM Flowers Bank  3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Flowers Bank  2 2 0 0 0 2 2 
Subset Totals 15 6 0   1 2 3 
Case Totals 56 28 4 1 12 17 3 
Gendered Cohorts - 
Case Level               
YM 13 4       1   
YW 7 4     1 6 2 
OM 24 12 4 1 7 10   
OW 10 8     4   1 
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Appendix M.6: Climate Action Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages 
  
Ya’axché 
Subset Agroforestry 
Bee-
keeping 
Bird 
Conservation 
/Tracking 
Inaction 
Multi-
Cropping 
& Seed 
Dispersal 
Planting 
Trees/ 
Afforestation 
River 
Buffer 
School/ 
General 
Clean 
Up 
Taboo/ 
No 
Take 
OW Indian 
Creek 2 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Indian 
Creek  3 0 2 4 0 3 0 2 0 
YW Indian 
Creek 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Indian 
Creek  4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM San 
Miguel 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 
OW San 
Miguel  0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio  5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Trio  1 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
OW Trio  3 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio - 
Cocoa Group 
(Specialist) 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Trio  3 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Subset Total 19 4 0 16 2 0 1 0 1 
Gendered 
Cohorts                   
YM 6 1 2 8   3   2   
YW 3 3   9           
OM 6 3   3 2   1   1 
OW 5 2   10           
Flowers 
Bank Subset 
and 
Gendered 
Cohors 
                  
OM Flowers 
Bank  0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
OW Flowers 
Bank 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Flowers 
Bank  0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
YW Flowers 
Bank  0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
Subset Total 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 
Case Totals 28 8 2 60 2 3 1 2 1 
Gendered 
Cohorts - 
Case Level 
                  
YM 6 1 2 15   3   2   
YW 3 3   15           
OM 6 3   8 2   1   1 
OW 5 2   22           
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Appendix M.7: Cause and Proximity Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages  
Ya’axché Subset God/Religion Humans International Local National Nature 
OW Indian Creek  0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Indian Creek  0 3 2 1 2 2 
YW Indian Creek 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Indian Creek 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM San Miguel  0 0 0 0 0 0 
OW San Miguel 0 0 0 0 0 2 
OM Trio  1 15 0 16 0 0 
YW Trio  1 1 0 1 0 0 
OW Trio  0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio - Cocoa 
Group 
(Specialist) 
0 10 1 9 0 0 
YM Trio  0 3 1 3 1 0 
Subset Total 2 29 2 29 1 0 
Gendered 
Cohorts             
OM 1 25 1 25     
YM   6 3 4 3 2 
YW   1   1     
OW 1 0   0   2 
Flowers Bank 
Subset and 
Gendered 
Cohorts 
            
OM Flowers 
Bank  0 2 0 2 0 1 
OW Flowers 
Bank 4 2 0 2 0 1 
YM Flowers 
Bank 1 0 0 0 0 3 
YW Flowers 
Bank  0 2 0 2 0 0 
Subset Total 5 6 0 6 0 5 
Gendered 
Cohorts - Case 
Level 
            
OM 1 27 1 27   1 
YM 1 6 3 4 3 5 
YW 0 3   3   0 
OW 5 2   2   3 
Case Level 
Totals 7 38 4 36 3 9 
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Appendix M.8: Climate Risk Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages 
 
Ya’axché Subset Coastal/Riverside Dwellers Elderly Equal Risk Farmer - 2 Me 
OW Indian 
Creek 0 0 3 1 0 
YM Indian Creek 0 2 2 0 0 
YW Indian 
Creek 0 0 0 1 0 
OM Indian Creek 0 2 1 2 0 
OM San Miguel  0 0 3 0 0 
OW San Miguel  0 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio 0 0 1 4 0 
YW Trio  0 0 0 0 0 
OW Trio 0 0 2 0 0 
OM Trio - Cocoa 
Group 
(Specialist) 0 0 5 0 0 
YM Trio  0 0 2 1 0 
Subset Total 0 4 19 9 0 
Gendered 
Cohorts           
YM   2 4 1   
YW     0 1   
OM   2 10 6   
OW     5 1   
Flowers Bank 
Subset and 
Gendered 
Cohorts           
Flowers Bank - 
OM FG 0 0 3 1 1 
Flowers Bank - 
OW FG 0 0 6 0 0 
Flowers Bank - 
YM FG 1 0 1 1 0 
Flowers Bank - 
YW FG 1 0 3 0 0 
Subset Total 2 0 13 2 1 
Gendered 
Cohorts - Case 
Level           
YM 1 2 5 2   
YW 1   3 1 1 
OM   2 13 7   
OW     11 1   
Case Totals 2 4 32 11 1 
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Appendix M.9: Climate Change Agency Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages 
 
Ya’axché 
Subset Failed Actions Fatalism 
Mixed 
- 
Agency 
Nature 2 
- Agency None Optimism Religious 
Resource 
Gaps 
OW Indian 
Creek 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 7 
YM Indian 
Creek  0 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 
YW Indian 
Creek 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 6 
OM Indian 
Creek 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 
OM San Miguel 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 1 
OW San Miguel 0 2 5 3 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 
YW Trio  0 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 
OW Trio  0 0 7 0 0 0 0 7 
OM Trio - 
Cocoa Group 
(Specialist) 
0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
YM Trio  0 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 
Subset Total 0 8 22 4 1 31 3 33 
Gendered 
Cohorts                 
YM 0 3 1 1 0 3   4 
YW 0 2 0 0 0 15 2 9 
OM 0 0 8 0 0 10   6 
OW 0 3 13 3 1 3 1 14 
Flowers Bank 
Subset and 
Gendered 
Cohorts 
                
OM Flowers 
Bank  1 2 1 0 0 2 0 6 
OW Flowers 
Bank  0 3 2 1 0 1 4 8 
YM Flowers 
Bank  0 4 0 3 0 0 1 4 
YW Flowers 
Bank  0 1 1 0 0 2 0 6 
Subset Total 1 10 4 4 0 5 5 24 
Case Totals 1 18 26 8 1 36 8 57 
Gendered 
Cohorts - Case 
Level 
                
YM   7 1 4 0 3 1 8 
YW   3 1 0 0 17 2 15 
OM 1 2 9 0 0 12 0 12 
OW   6 15 4 1 4 5 22 
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Appendix M.10: Motive for Action Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages 
 
Ya’axché 
Subset Children 
Community/ 
Village God/Religion Self/Offsprings World 
OW Indian 
Creek  1 0 0 0 0 
YM Indian 
Creek  0 1 0 0 0 
YW Indian 
CreeK 0 1 0 0 0 
OM Indian 
Creek 0 0 0 0 0 
OM San Miguel  0 0 0 0 0 
OW San Miguel  0 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio  0 0 1 0 0 
YW Trio  0 0 1 0 0 
OW Trio 1 0 0 1 0 
OM Trio - Cocoa 
Group 
(Specialist) 
0 8 0 3 0 
YM Trio 0 0 0 0 0 
Subset Totals 1 8 2 4 0 
Gendered 
Cohorts 
          
YM   1 0 0 0 
YW   1 1 0 0 
OW 2 0 0 1 0 
OM   8 1 3 0 
Flowers Bank 
Subset and 
Gendered 
Cohorts 
          
OM Flowers 
Bank 
0 3 0 2 2 
OW Flowers 
Bank  
0 1 4 0 0 
YM Flowers 
Bank 
0 1 1 0 0 
YW Flowers 
Bank  
0 2 0 1 2 
Subset Totals 0 7 5 3 4 
Case Level 
Totals 
2 17 7 7 4 
Gendered 
Cohorts - Case 
Level 
          
YM   2 1 0 2 
YW   3 1 1   
OW 2 1 4 1   
OM   11 1 5 2 
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Appendix M.11: Climate Change Leadership Macro-Group Data – Belizean Villages 
 
Ya’axché 
Subset 
Community/ 
Village Elders 
Exemplary 
Group 
Exemplary 
Person External Teachers 
Traditional 
Structures Youth 
OW Indian 
Creek  0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Indian 
Creek 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 
YW Indian 
Creek 1 4 0 0 0 0 6 0 
OM Indian 
Creek  0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
OM San 
Miguel  0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
OW San 
Miguel  0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
OM Trio  0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
YW Trio  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
OW Trio  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
OM Trio - 
Cocoa 
Group 
(Specialist) 
8 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
YM Trio 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Subset 
Total 10 7 2 4 18 0 13 0 
Gendered 
Cohorts                 
YM 1       3 0 6 0 
YW 1 4     0 0 7 0 
OW 0 3   4 2 0 0 0 
OM 8   2   13 0 0 0 
Flowers 
Bank 
Subset and 
Gendered 
Cohort 
                
OM Flowers 
Bank 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
OW Flowers 
Bank 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
YM Flowers 
Bank 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
YW Flowers 
Bank 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Subset 
Total 7 0 0 0 5 1 4 3 
Case Totals 17 7 2 4 23 1 17 3 
Gendered 
Cohorts - 
Case Level 
                
YM 2       4   8   
YW 3 4     0   8 3 
OW 1 3   4 3 1 1   
OM 11   2   16   0   
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Appendix N.1: Cycle of Agricultural, Horticultural and Forest Produces; Festivals – India (Laya, 
2005, p. 43). 
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Appendix N.2: Cycle of Agricultural, Horticultural and Forest Produces; Festivals – India (Laya, 
2005, p. 44). 
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Appendix N.3: Cycle of Agricultural, Horticultural and Forest Produces; Festivals – India (Laya, 
2005, p. 45).  
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Appendix N.4: Cycle of Agricultural, Horticultural and Forest Produces; Festivals – India (Laya, 
2005, p. 46).  
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Appendix N.5: Cycle of Agricultural, Horticultural and Forest Produces; Festivals – India (Laya, 
2005, p. 47). 
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Appendix O: Core Questions and Recruitment Note 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for participating in this study. If you have questions at any time, please contact me, 
Tyrone Hall, at --- ---- ---- or - - - -@yorku.ca. My supervisor, Professor Anne MacLennan, can 
be contacted at - - - -@yorKu.ca.  As noted in the Informed Consent Form, your participation is 
entirely voluntary. You do not need to answer questions you would prefer not to, or any at all, 
and you may withdraw from the study at any time with absolutely no repercussions. 
Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. Thank you for your time 
and efforts.  
Contextual Information 
1. Name of Community: 
2. Gender: 
3. Occupation or role in the family: 
4. Age: 
5. Level of education: 
 
Macro-case: Questions for negotiators and other members of the regional delegations 
 
1. Describe the arc of the climate change debate in your region since the seminal Brundtland 
Commission? 
2. Describe the region’s current climate change policy? 
3. To what extend are your core policy positions and the associated resources articulated in 
the Paris Agreement? 
4. How does your region’s current climate change policy position allow it to realize the 
individual, social and political changes necessary to manage its climate risks? 
5. Explain how your region’s climate programme support vulnerable communities, namely 
indigenous, agricultural (rural) and coastal communities? 
6. How were your collective Intended Nationally Determined Commitments (INDCs) for 
the Paris Agreement developed? 
7. How did you incorporate the perspectives of vulnerable communities in your INDCS, 
programs and campaigns?  
(a) What would you say were the highlights and challenges of those efforts? 
(b) How can this process be improved? 
8. What indigenous and traditional practices have been or can be incorporated in your 
region’s broader climate change activities and thinking?  
9. Describe the principles, communication modalities, messages and channels that drive or 
are used in climate change activities aimed at indigenous and traditional communities in 
your country or region?  
10. What does your region mean by climate justice, and how does it reflect the 2002 Bali 
Principles of Climate Justice? 
11. Why is this narrative the region’s preferred approach? 
12. Is climate justice achievable without more explicit engagement with traditional and 
indigenous communities? 
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13. What’s your region’s policy position on tangible South-South initiatives such as SIDS-
DOCK that acknowledge climate justice and spearhead innovative adaptation projects? 
14. In what ways can your region both champion the notion of climate justice, and the 
broader Paris commitments and adequately meet the needs of its citizens who are most 
vulnerable to climate change? 
15. How does your region enable climate justice within its borders? 
16. What pattern of change do you anticipate for the realization of the Paris agreement?  
a. What are the likely implications for vulnerable communities? 
b. How can these implications be managed? 
17. Describe your region’s involvement with the 1.5˚C to Stay Alive campaign. 
18. Do you consider the campaign a success?  
19. What factors contributed to the success and/or failure of the campaign? 
20. How did the campaign reflect the priorities and perspectives of indigenous and traditional 
communities in your region or country? 
21. What lessons should be gleaned from the campaign, and how should those lessons be 
leveraged? 
 
Micro-cases: Interview and Focus Group Questions 
 
1. What does climate change mean to you?  
2. How does it affect you and your community? 
3. Who in your community would you say is most affected, and why? 
4. How did you learn about climate change and its impacts?  
5. Describe the changes that you believe are caused by climate change. 
6. Is there anything you can do about these changes and climate change in general? 
7. Please describe some of the ways you have been coping/managing or would like to 
cope/manage climate changes. 
8. Where did these practices originate? 
9. How long have you been using the strategies?  
10. Why do you believe these actions have or will work? 
11. Share with me some of the benefits that you have reaped from implemented these climate 
change responses? 
12. Are these practices understood by public officials and NGOs that are working on climate 
change in your area? 
13. Have you read, watched, listened or participated in any climate change campaigns or 
program(s) in your community?  
14. If yes/no, why? 
15. If yes, please describe the program, how did you participate and when? 
16. Were there consultations before the programs or campaigns were introduced? 
17. If yes or no, what are your thoughts on that? 
 
